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I — The Community economy in 1991-93 
Introduction and summary 
The economic outlook for the Community has deteriorated 
dramatically over recent months. Instead of the hoped-for 
recovery, 1993 will bring a third year of slow growth with a 
return to slightly healthier rates of expansion expected for 
1994 at the earliest. As a result of this poor growth perform-
ance, unemployment is increasing and cannot be expected 
to stabilize until well into 1994 while budget deficits have 
swollen and are now higher than at the beginning of the 
1980s. 
Recovery from the cyclical slowdown which started towards 
the end of 1990, in line with a generalized world economic 
slowdown, is held back by a severe lack of confidence and 
continuing tight monetary policy. The unification of the two 
German States resulted in an extraordinary demand boost 
accompanied by a tightening of monetary conditions to 
control the accompanying inflationary pressures. Thus, in 
1990 and 1991, economic activity throughout the Com-
munity benefited strongly from these positive demand effects 
which allowed the Community to escape in 1991 the full 
brunt of the world slowdown. Subsequently, however, the 
persistence of inflationary pressures in Germany, notwith-
standing a marked weakening in economic activity, led to 
a situation where monetary conditions in many member 
countries became tighter than domestic conditions war-
ranted. 
In the second half of 1992, the continuing weakness of 
economic activity contributed to the difficulties encountered 
in the process of ratification of the Treaty on European 
Union and was one of the factors which ignited the foreign-
exchange crisis. The turmoil within the exchange-rate mech-
anism added a significant element of uncertainty to economic 
prospects and dented the credibility of the EMU timetable. 
In addition, the continued deadlock in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the mixed signals on the prospects for a recov-
ery in the United States, the weakening of the Japanese 
economy, the difficulties of the reform process in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the ethnic conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, all combined to create a very negative business 
environment. In the closing months of 1992, all business and 
consumer confidence survey indicators deteriorated sharply. 
However, the scope for economic policy to sustain growth 
in the short term is limited. Budgetary policy is severely 
constrained in most countries. Some countries did not use 
the period of strong growth to consolidate sufficiently their 
budgets and are now in an even more difficult position. 
Others have used their healthier starting positions to support 
growth by allowing the automatic stabilizers to operate, but 
they have now exploited a large part of the available margins 
for flexibility. A significant loosening of monetary policy is 
possible, but is conditional on a reduction in inflationary 
pressures in Germany and on greater policy credibility in 
the countries linked to it by the ERM. The Edinburgh 
growth initiative represents an attempt to exploit any room 
which is still available without departing from the necessary 
medium-term stability orientation of economic policy. 
But, on the basis of present policies, a return to rates of 
growth between 2 and 3%, possibly within two years, will 
not be enough to improve significantly the unemployment 
situation which is likely to remain very difficult for some 
considerable time. The Community must, therefore, im-
plement medium-term policies which will result in an in-
crease in the sustainable rate of growth so as to be able to 
put unemployment on a significant downward trend. 
The effectiveness of economic policies depends crucially on 
their credibility. Unfortunately, this has been seriously 
compromised by recent developments which have also called 
into question the EMU timetable. Governments must there-
fore take all possible steps to impress on economic agents 
their determination and ability to achieve their goals. At 
the Community level, governments must reaffirm, through 
appropriate actions, their commitment to the EMU process 
and show their determination by coordinating their policies 
more effectively. 
In practice this means : 
(i) in the short term, implementing measures designed to 
support growth to the extent possible, without en-
dangering the necessary medium-term budgetary con-
solidation perspectives (in all countries), or the necessary 
reduction in inflationary pressures (in some countries); 
(ii) in the medium term, following policies aimed at increas-
ing the dynamism and competitiveness of the economies 
through the removal of market impediments to faster 
growth, at fostering a healthier climate against which 
new investment can take place, and at creating the con-
ditions for environmentally sustainable growth. 
I — The Community economy in 1991-93 
The Community economy is going through a phase of slow 
growth which is proving longer and more severe than pre-
viously expected. This is in parallel with developments in 
the world economy which started decelerating towards the 
end of 1990 and virtually stagnated in 1991. But while 
initially the Community economy, thanks largely to the 
growth impulses coming from German unification, perfor-
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med relatively better than the rest of the industrialized world, 
since mid-1992 it has also been facing serious problems 
which suggest that a return to more satisfactory rates of 
growth will only take place in the course of 1994. 
worsening of prospects for recovery through their effect on 
business and consumer confidence (the factors behind the 
present difficulties are examined in greater detail in the next 
section). 
Growth prospects: marked deterioration 
in the course of 1992 ... 
After five years of strong growth, the Community economy 
started decelerating towards the end of 1990. Until mid-1992, 
the slowdown was modest with the Community average rate 
of growth remaining in the 1 to 2% range. The mildness of 
the downturn together with the still relatively satisfactory 
state of fundamentals led prematurely to expectations of a 
rapid end to the period of slow growth. In the course of 
1992, however, prospects deteriorated rapidly. On the one 
hand, it became evident that the underlying strength of the 
economy had been overestimated, whilst on the other, it 
appeared that monetary policy would not be loosened as 
rapidly as had been expected. In addition, the deterioration 
in the economic outlook contributed to the political difficult-
ies which surrounded the ratification process of the Treaty 
on European Union and the foreign-exchange crisis which 
erupted last September. These two events in turn led to a 
After a surprisingly good first quarter, Community GDP 
stagnated in the second and third quarters of 1992, and the 
available evidence suggests that it could have declined 
slightly in the final quarter. These indications, together with 
the dramatic drop in business and consumer confidence in 
the second half of 1992, gave rise to fears that the Com-
munity economy might be entering a serious recession. The 
Edinburgh growth initiative is designed to counter such a 
possibility. 
... and poor growth in 1993 
Forecasts broadly conducted on the conventional no-policy-
change assumptions1 suggest that in the course of 1993 
The forecasts presented in this Annual Economic Report are produced 
on the conventional no-policy-change assumption for most variables, 
particularly in the budgetary sphere. The cut-off date for information 
was 11 January 1993. 
jRAPH 1 : Community: real GDP growth 
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the Community economy could recover slightly. Consumer 
confidence is expected to improve somewhat, leading to a 
gentle pick­up in private consumption followed rapidly by 
stronger investment. Given the growth profile of 1992 — 
strong first quarter followed by sharply weakening activity 
— the expected gentle recovery will nevertheless result in an 
average rate of growth for 1993 of only 0,8%,' lower than 
that for 1992(1,1%). An extrapolation of the expected 1993 
growth trend suggests an average rate of growth for 1994 of 
about 1,8%. While there are good reasons to expect that 
this forecast will materialize, there are large risks on both 
sides. Cyclical turning points are always difficult to predict, 
as the experience of the last 18 months has shown once 
again. 
Germany has given way to a sharply accelerating downturn, 
with the rate of increase in GDP falling from 3,7% in 1991 
(western Germany) to 1,5% in 1992 and to an estimated 
decline of 0,5% in 1993. Conversely, the slow and painful 
emergence of the United Kingdom from its prolonged re­
cession is reflected in an expected turnabout in its perform­
ance from a fall of 2,2% in 1991, followed by a further 
decline of 0,9% in 1992, to an increase of 1,4% in 1993. 
Most other Member States' performances fall between these 
two extremes, with sluggish growth of between 1 to 2% 
expected to continue into 1993. However, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, reflecting their close economic links with Ger­
many, are both experiencing relatively sharp slowdowns, 
with their rates of growth expected to fall to only lA% in 
1993. 
A generalized downturn 
In the course of the last two years growth differentials 
between Member States narrowed. This is due principally to 
two contrasting trends. Firstly, the post­unification boom in 
1 All data for the Community refer to the Community including the five 
new German Lander, unless otherwise specified. 
Weak private consumption 
Reflecting the duration and severity of the downturn, all 
of the components of domestic demand are weak. Private 
consumption in particular has suffered, with the successive 
decelerations in its rate of expansion since 1989 expected to 
continue in 1993, when growth of only 0,8% is forecast. 
This contrasts with a corresponding average figure of 3% 
Table 1 
The EC economy : use and supply of goods and services and main economic indicators 
(Annual real percentage change) 
Average 
1983­85 
Average 
1986­89 
1993' 
Private consumption 
Government consumption 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Domestic demand (including stocks) 
Exports of goods and services2 
Total demand 
Imports of goods and services2 
Gross domestic product 
Inflation (deflator private consumption) 
Employment 
Unemployment (% of active population) 
Public deficits (% of GDP)3 
Current account balance (% of GDP) 
1,8 
1,7 
1,1 
1,7 
4,2 
2,0 
1.4 
2,1 
7.2 
0.0 
0,4 
5,3 
0,3 
3,9 
2.0 
6,4 
4.1 
1,2 
3.8 
7,9 
3.3 
4.0 
1,3 
9.9 
­ 3 , 8 
0,5 
3.2 
2.1 
3,9 
2.8 
5,6 
3,1 
5,4 
2.8 
4,5 
1,6 
8,3 
­ 4 , 1 
­ 0 , 3 
1,9 
2,0 
0 
1,2 
5,54 
1,7 
3,84 
1,4 
5.3 
0,1 
8,8 
­ 4 , 6 
­ 1 , 0 
1.4 
1.6 
0,4 
1,3 
2,9 
1,4 
3,5 
1.1 
4.6 
­ 0 , 7 
10,1 
­ 5 , 3 
­ 0 , 8 
3 /4 
'Á 
5'A 
1 
2'A 
V. 
4'Λ 
­ % 
11 
-5V, 
­ 1 
NB: The figures for the public deficit and the current account balance include the five new German Länder from 1991 onwards. The figures for GDP and its components, inflation and employment/ 
unemployment include the new Länder from 1992 onwards. 
1 Forecasts. 
- Extra­Community trade only. 
1 General government nel borrowing requirement. 
4 These figures arc distorted by the very large increase in trade flows with the former GDR; if these transactions are treated as intra­Community trade (i.e. giving figures for the EC including the 
new German Länder) the figures become: 1,3 for exports and 5,8 for imports. 
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between 1985 and 1990. This continuing fall is attributable 
to the sharp decline in real disposable income owing to 
higher inflation, which has eroded nominal wage increases, 
stagnant employment growth, falling working hours and tax 
increases in several Member States. A recovery in private 
consumption is hampered by fears arising from rising unem-
ployment and further falls in consumer confidence, which 
currently is at its lowest level since the early 1980s. Finally, 
the need in some Member States (notably the UK) to reduce 
high personal indebtedness consequent to the asset price 
boom of the 1980s, has also encouraged a more cautious 
approach to spending on the part of consumers. 
Declining investment 
Following the boom in the latter half of the 1980s, invest-
ment growth in the Community virtually stagnated in both 
1991 and 1992. If the new German Länder are excluded, 
investment actually fell by 0,3% in 1992. Spending on equip-
ment and construction has been almost equally affected, 
with the latter proving to be slightly more resilient to the 
downturn, especially in 1992. As a consequence the rate of 
increase of the capital stock has declined and is currently 
well short of the level required to help counter the high levels 
of unemployment in the Community. This stagnation in 
investment is largely a cyclical response to the fall-off in 
demand, a deterioration of investment profitability (see 
Graph 13), the effect of the high real interest rates which 
prevail in many countries and the consequence of increased 
political and economic uncertainties on business confidence. 
Conversely, however, the deterioration in the profitability 
of the capital stock of 1990 and 1991 has given way to a 
modest improvement in 1992 due to the return, in many 
countries, to more moderate rates of wage increases. Given 
the expectation of continued weak demand, a further decline 
in investment of half a percentage point is expected in 1993. 
I — The Community economy in 1991­93 
Unemployment: loss of the 1986­90 gains 
The effects of the slowdown on employment were felt with 
a certain delay given the lag with which changes in the rate 
of increase in employment follow changes in the rate of 
growth of output. Employment continued to increase 
strongly in 1990 (1,6%), but this trend came to a halt in 1991 
when it virtually stagnated. In 1992, employment actually 
contracted by about three­quarters of a percentage point, 
the first time since 1983 that the number of people in employ­
ment actually decreased, and a similar reduction is expected 
to take place again in 1993. In absolute figures this means 
that in 1993 almost 2 million fewer people than in 1991 will 
be employed in the Community, thus reducing the employ­
ment increase since 1984 from 9 to about 7 million. Given 
that the labour force is projected to continue to increase 
(0,3% in 1993) more or less in line with the trend of recent 
years, this employment trend results in a steep increase in 
unemployment which could reach in 1993 the figure of about 
17 million people (including the former GDR), or, measured 
as a percentage of the civilian labour force, a level similar 
to the peak of 1985 (11%). Thus, in this important respect, 
the gains made during the last five years of the past decade 
will have been lost again in the first three years of the 1990s. 
Small overall gains on inflation 
The ongoing economic downturn and the continued tight 
monetary policy stance have contributed to an easing in 
inflationary pressures in 1992, when the Community private 
consumption deflator fell to 4,6%. This improvement is due 
largely to the relatively better performance in those Member 
States outside the narrow band of the ERM who, with 
the exception of Spain, registered significant progress in 
reducing inflation in 1992, following disappointing progress 
the previous year. But significant progress was also made in 
the countries in the narrow band, which, with the exception 
of Germany and the Netherlands, all had rates of increases 
in consumer prices of less than 3% at the end of 1992. 
However, owing partly to the inflationary impact of recent 
currency devaluations in several Member States, the Com­
GRAPH 3 : Employment and unemployment in the Community 
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munity rate of inflation is expected to remain almost un­
changed in 1993 (4'Λ%). The nominal depreciation for the 
Community as a whole in 1993 implied by the exchange-rate 
assumptions1 will lead to a stronger growth in import prices 
in 1993. This in turn will offset the impact of the expected 
fall in unit labour costs, which are forecast to rise by just 
2,9% in 1993 — the lowest increase for several years. New 
The forecasts produced by the services of the Commission are based on 
a technical assumption as regards exchange rates. In particular, exchange 
rates within the EMS are expected to remain stable in nominal terms 
until the end of the forecasting period at the values obtaining at the 
moment forecasting work started. For other currencies the assumption 
is stability in real terms. In the case of the relationship between the 
dollar and the German mark the assumption used is: USD 1 = DM 
1,66 for the average of 1993. 
increases in indirect taxation are also expected to add to 
inflationary pressures in 1993. 
Little change in the Community's 
current account 
The Community current account remained broadly stable in 
1992 showing a deficit equal to just below 1% of GDP. 
Significantly, all Germany's partners within the narrow band 
of the ERM registered current-account surpluses in 1992. 
Moreover, with the exception of the Netherlands and Lux­
embourg, these surpluses represented an improvement on 
the outturn in 1991, with France registering its first surplus 
since 1986. Conversely, the United Kingdom, Spain and 
Italy registered continued and significant deficits, notwith­
standing the weak economic conditions and the ongoing 
recession in the former. Both Greece and particularly Portu­
gal registered sharp falls in their deficits. 
GRAPH 4 : Inflation in the Community 
(Private consumption deflator: % change p.a.) 
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Economic convergence in the Community 
The phrase 'economic convergence' is often used to cover two 
distinct, but not totally independent, processes. The first, more 
precisely referred to as 'nominal convergence', concerns the 
gradual convergence towards the best possible results of the 
performances of the Member States in those areas which directly 
affect the transition to and the success of a monetary union. 
The Maastricht criteria which cover actual (consumer price 
index) and expected inflation (long-term interest rates), budget 
deficits, public debt to GDP ratios and exchange-rate stability 
relate to this process. The phrase 'real convergence', on the other 
hand, refers to the long-term process of convergence in living 
standards, usually approximated by the levels of GDP per head 
at purchasing power parities (see statistical annex. Table 1), of 
the different regions of the Community. 
Nominal convergence 
The continuing economic difficulties and the foreign-exchange 
turmoil have led to set-backs in the efforts at achieving the 
degree of convergence required for transition to EMU. In the 
budgetary area, this is hardly surprising as weak growth has 
strong negative effects on public deficits and the Member States 
who enjoyed relatively healthier budgetary positions have, 
rightly, allowed the so-called 'automatic stabilizers' to operate. 
As a result, there has been no overall progress towards meeting 
the targets agreed at Maastricht (a budget deficit not exceeding 
3% of GDP and a public debt to GDP ratio of less than 60% 
of GDP). Instead, there was a substantial deterioration in 1991 
and especially 1992 in the budgetary situation both in the Com-
munity as a whole and in several Member States. This deterio-
ration in turn has not permitted any progress towards reducing 
public debt positions which have deteriorated in most countries 
(see Table 2). 
The deceleration in the rate of growth, however, has facilitated 
some progress in reducing the rates of inflation: in 1992, the 
overall rate of inflation decreased by 0,8 points to 4,5% (exclud-
ing the new German Länder). However, the progress made 
may now be threatened by the inflationary impact of recent 
devaluations. 
Budgetary situations have deteriorated further 
Only four Member States (Denmark, France, Ireland and Lux-
embourg) are now expected to have had budget deficit (general 
government net borrowing requirement) outturns of less than 
3% in 1992 — the relevant criterion in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The deterioration has been particularly severe in the UK, where 
the deficit in 1992 is now expected to have increased by over 
3 percentage points to about 6% of GDP. Elsewhere in the 
Community there are two notable trends. Member States with 
relatively sound public finances have allowed the automatic 
stabilizers to operate, leading to a largely cyclical deterioration 
in their budget deficits. This deterioration has, however, been 
restricted to a maximum of about 1 percentage point of GDP 
in France and to half a percentage point of GDP or less in 
Denmark and Ireland. 
Conversely, in those Member States where deficit levels were 
very high, consolidation efforts succeeded in stabilizing or in 
some cases reducing deficits. Thus Belgium and Italy both lim-
ited their deteriorations in 1992 to a quarter of a percentage 
point or less to 6,7% and 10,5% of GDP respectively. Both 
Portugal and especially Greece have made more encouraging 
progress: Greece has reduced its budget deficit to 13,4% of GDP 
from 15,4% in 1991, while Portugal, in the framework of the 
implementation of its convergence programme, has reduced its 
deficit to 5,6% from 6,4% in 1991. In Spain, the introduction 
of corrective fiscal measures in the latter half of 1992 checked 
the deterioration in its public finances and the deficit outturn 
of 4,6% of GDP is slightly down on the level in 1991. Finally, 
the deficit for unified Germany (measured by the general govern-
ment net borrowing requirement, as is the case for all other 
Member States) remained unchanged at 3,2% of GDP. 
In the light of continued weak growth, these overall trends (i.e. 
a continued cyclical deterioration in the Member States with 
relatively sound public finances and further consolidation in the 
high-deficit Member States) are expected to continue in 1993. 
As a result, the overall Community deficit level will deteriorate 
further to 5,7% of GDP. 
Price convergence has improved in 1992 
There has been an improvement in 1992 in both the overall 
inflation picture and the degree of dispersion between Member 
States. However, the fall in the rate of inflation (private con-
sumption deflator) of 0,7 percentage points to 4,6%, is less than 
might have been expected given the weak cyclical position of 
the Community economy. It also compares unfavourably with 
the US and Japan where the price performance in 1992 was 
much better. 
The improvement in the degree of dispersion is largely due to 
the relatively better performance of the Member States with 
higher inflation levels outside the narrow band of the ERM. All 
five of these Member States (Spain, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
the UK) registered significant falls in inflation in 1992, except 
for Spain where only a slight reduction was achieved. Within 
the narrow band of the ERM there is little overall change, 
with slight reductions of up to half a percentage point in all 
participants, except Luxembourg where there was a small in-
crease and western Germany where virtually no change took 
place. Western German inflation (4,0%) remained the highest 
in the present narrow band for the second successive year. 
However, in 1992 only the narrow-band members registered 
rates of inflation within a range of 1 'A percentage points above 
the average of the three best Member States in terms of price 
performance — the relevant Maastricht criterion. 
The relative improvement outlined above had been expected to 
continue into 1993. However, recent developments may threaten 
this further progress. The devaluations in the nominal exchange 
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rates of several Member States increase the prospect of a re­
newed rise in inflation in the countries concerned through signifi­
cant import prices increases, notwithstanding the weak state of 
economic activity and high unemployment in these Member 
States. The impact of these rises on the aggregate inflation figure 
for the Community will be offset by a reduction in inflationary 
pressures in the appreciating Member States, where import price 
rises will be much more moderate. Overall, inflation in the 
Community in 1993 is expected to remain almost unchanged at 
4,5% (4,4% excluding the former GDR). 
Real convergence 
All four of the less prosperous Member States registered growth 
equal to or above the Community average in 1992 (see Table 1 
in the statistical annex for figures on per capita GDP levels). 
However, the significant progress of the previous few years has 
stalled. None the less, there are substantial variations within this 
group. Hence, Ireland with an estimated growth of 2,9% in 
1992 has substantially exceeded the corresponding Community 
growth figure of only 1,1%, as it did also in the preceding three 
years. Greece, on the other hand, should register growth of only 
1 Vi%, which is none the less the second consecutive year since 
1985 that it has exceeded the Community average. This progress 
reflects its long and painful adjustment process to the economic 
imbalances accumulated in the 1980s which is finally beginning 
to pay dividends. Spain's growth performance of only 1 '/<% in 
1992 is also notable as it represents a very sharp slowdown on 
the boom conditions experienced during the latter half of the 
1980s. Portugal has continued its steady progress in 1992, while 
suffering also from the general growth downturn. 
Notwithstanding their relatively better economic performance, 
the rates of growth these countries experienced in 1992 were not 
sufficient to stabilize unemployment which increased everywhere 
except in Greece. Particularly worrying are the increases re­
corded in Ireland (from 16,2% in 1991 to 17,8% in 1992) and 
Spain (from 16,3% to 18%) where unemployment was already 
the highest in the Community. Unfortunately this trend is ex­
pected to continue in 1993 when the rates of unemployment of 
these two countries are expected to reach levels in the 19 to 20% 
range. 
Table 2 
Main nominal convergence indicators 1990­92 
Β 
DK 
D' 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC1 
EC 
(private 
1990 
3,1 
2,1 
2,7 
— 
20,1 
6,4 
3,2 
1.7 
5,9 
3.6 
2,3 
12,6 
5,3 
4.5 
— 
Inflation 
consumption deflator) 
1991 
2.9 
2,4 
3,9 
— 
18,4 
6,3 
3,2 
3,2 
6,8 
2,9 
3,3 
11,9 
7,2 
5.3 
— 
1992 
2,4 
2,1 
4,0 
4.8 
16,0 
6,0 
2,6 
2,9 
5.3 
3,4 
3,1 
9.1 
5,1 
4.5 
4,6 
Budget deficit 
(general government net borrowing requirement) 
1990 1991 1992 
­5,7 
­1,4 
­2,0 
— 
­18,8 
­4,0 
­1,4 
­2 ,5 
­10,9 
5,0 
­4,9 
­5 ,5 
­1 ,3 
­4,1 
— 
­6 ,6 
­2,0 
­3 ,6 
­3,2 
­15,4 
­4,9 
­1,9 
­2,1 
­10,2 
­0,8 
­2,5 
­6 ,4 
­2,8 
­4,7 
­4,6 
­6 ,7 
­2 ,3 
­3,4 
­3 ,2 
­13,4 
­4,6 
­2,8 
­2,7 
­10,5 
­0,4 
­3 ,5 
­5 ,6 
­6,1 
­5,4 
­5 ,3 
1990 
128,3 
66,7 
43,6 
— 
96,3 
44,5 
46,7 
101,6 
97,8 
6,9 
78,8 
68,4 
39,8 
59,5 
— 
Gross public debt 
(percentage of GDP 
1991 
130,1 
72,2 
45,0 
42,0 
102,0 
45,6 
48,5 
100,9 
101,3 
6,1 
78,3 
68,5 
41,1 
61,4 
60,4 
1992 
132,2 
74,0 
— 
43,3 
106,7 
47,4 
50,1 
99,0 
106,8 
6,8 
79,8 
66,2 
45,9 
— 
62,8 
Excluding the five new German Länder. 
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II — Factors behind the present 
poor performance 
The present poor outlook for the Community economy is 
the result of various factors which have emerged progress-
ively over the period 1990-92 and whose combined influence 
has become increasingly stronger. These factors, however, 
have reduced the growth prospects of the Community econ-
omy which, notwithstanding the progress made in the 1980s, 
does not yet perform as well as could be expected in terms 
of growth and employment creation compared to other 
major economies (the factors behind the low potential rate 
of growth of the Community economy are examined in 
greater detail in Section IV) 
The most important factors behind the present period of 
slow growth are the world economic downturn, the parallel 
cyclical slowdown of the Community economy after the 
strong growth of the second half of the 1980s and the 
continuing tight monetary policy resulting from conditions 
in Germany. These factors have combined to prolong the 
period of slow growth to the point where dissatisfaction with 
the current economic conditions has made the ratification 
of the Treaty on European Union more difficult and has 
precipitated the recent foreign-exchange crisis. In turn the 
political difficulties and the loss of credibility associated with 
the ERM turmoil have themselves become factors depressing 
economic activity. 
Effects of the world slowdown 
The 1988 peak in the rate of economic growth in the Com-
munity was in synchrony with that of the world economy 
since they were largely the product of the same impulses: 
the delayed effect of the drop in oil prices of 1985/86 and 
the considerable loosening of monetary policy which fol-
lowed the stock market crash of October 1987. In 1990, 
world GDP growth decelerated sharply from the strong rates 
of growth of 1988 and 1989 (4,5 and 5,2% respectively) to 
about 2% which was followed by a further slowdown to as 
little as half a point in 1991. In 1992, activity in the rest of 
the world recovered slightly, but, at 1,6%, remained weak. 
The absence of a stronger rebound is in part explained by 
the need for firms and households, in a number of OECD 
countries, to continue to reduce their debt positions follow-
ing the unsustainable increase in the previous few years. This 
contraction in the rate of growth of the world economy was 
mirrored in a reduction in the rate of growth in world trade 
which in 1991 and 1992 expanded by only 3 and 4,2% 
respectively. 
GRAPH 5 : Growth in the Community and in the rest of the world 
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Community export markets were particularly affected. In 
1991 they practically stagnated following growth of about 
7% in 1989 and almost 4% in 1990. In 1992, they are 
estimated to have picked up somewhat and to have expanded 
by about 3!Λ%. In addition, exchange-rate trends were not 
very favourable for Community exporters. The nominal 
effective exchange rate of the Community appreciated by 
over 10 percentage points between 1989 and 1992 (average 
level of the years). As a result, Community producers suf­
fered a substantial loss of competitiveness both in domestic 
and world markets. Community exports to the rest of the 
world, which had increased by more than 7% in real terms 
in 1989, decelerated to a rate of increase of just over 2% in 
1990 and actually contracted by about 2Vi% in 1991 (goods 
only). Preliminary estimates suggest that in 1992 Community 
exports may have increased again at a rate of about 2'Δ %. 
It is worrying that the Community has experienced a con­
tinuous loss of market share over the last three years. Finally, 
given that domestic demand in the Community remained 
stronger than in its trading partners, imports from the rest 
of the world also increased substantially in 1991 and 1992 
(7% and 3'Λ% respectively, goods only). 
Cyclical component 
In the second half of the 1980s the Community economy 
experienced a period of strong growth; the average real rate 
of increase of GDP for the five-year period 1986-90 was 
3,2% while the real rate of increase of domestic demand was 
3,9%. Investment increased particularly strongly with an 
average real rate of increase over the same period of 5,9% 
and almost 7'Λ% for investment in equipment. Measures of 
the potential rate of growth are very uncertain, but it is 
possible that during this period the actual rate exceeded 
what the Community economy was able to deliver without 
the appearance of strains. In any case, the recorded rates of 
growth in 1988 and 1989 (4,1 and 3,4% respectively) were 
clearly in excess of the longer run potential rate however 
measured. Under these conditions, a cyclical slowdown was 
to be expected. Indeed, it is reasonable to think that the 
slowdown would have become already very significant 
towards the end of 1989 had it not been for the additional 
expansionary impulses coming from German unification. In 
the event this acted as a major European 'demand expansion 
programme'. 
GRAPH 6: Cyclical differences in the EC: GDP growth in Germany, UK and EUR 4 (F, I, NL, DK)* 
(real % change on same quarter of previous year; three-terms moving averages) 
Q4 
1985 
Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 
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s are available only fo: 
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The subsequent running out of steam of the Community 
economies was also reinforced by a more restrictive orien-
tation of economic policy in response to the appearance 
of macroeconomic imbalances. On the inflation front, less 
favourable import price trends led to consumer price in-
creases accelerating from rates of around 3,7% in the years 
1986-88 to rates of about 5% in 1989-91. Wage increases 
also accelerated from annual rates of increase of less than 
6% in the period 1987-89 to 7,5% in 1990. In some countries, 
current-account deficits began to give cause for concern. 
These imbalances, although not as serious as those that the 
Community had experienced at the beginning at the 1980s, 
prompted some countries to take restrictive action indepen-
dently of the general tightening of monetary conditions 
imposed by the tensions arising from the German unification 
shock. In addition to these factors, in some countries, es-
pecially the United Kingdom and Denmark, the weakness 
of demand was compounded by the need for households 
and firms to correct excessive debt positions. 
German unification and its policy consequences 
This situation resulted in an unbalanced policy mix with 
short-term interest rates, which had been increased in re-
sponse to the first signs of the appearance of inflationary 
pressures and expectations, remaining high. The strong de-
gree of financial integration in the Community, the weight 
of the German economy and, above all, the ERM constraints 
reinforced by deeply ingrained market expectations that 
the German mark would never be devalued vis-à-vis other 
Community currencies, led to tight monetary conditions in 
the rest of the Community. A situation was therefore created 
where the other Member States after a first phase during 
which the effects of German unification substantially 
boosted growth — positive demand effects outweighed the 
restrictive effect of tighter monetary conditions — were now 
receiving deflationary impulses coming from a continuing 
tight monetary policy stance at home combined with a 
weakening of activity in Germany. This situation created 
policy coordination problems and ultimately resulted in a 
very delicate situation since most Community countries were 
experiencing very weak demand in 1991 and 1992. Particu-
larly difficult was the situation of the United Kingdom which 
was undergoing a severe recession. 
German unification constituted for the Community a text-
book case of a major asymmetric shock. At the macro-
economic level, unification implied the creation of a huge 
gap between aggregate demand and supply within Germany. 
Supply was severely reduced in the East while demand was 
supported by huge transfers from the West. These transfers 
were financed mainly by a higher public-sector deficit which 
witnessed a deterioration of more than 3% of GDP within 
one year after unification. 
Given that no corresponding cuts in West German domestic 
demand took place, the effects were predictable. Notwith-
standing an enormous swing in the current-account position 
of Germany (from surpluses equal to 4 to 5% of GDP 
between 1986 and 1989 to a deficit of almost 1% of GDP in 
1992) which bears testimony to the high degree of integration 
reached by the European economies, GDP growth in West 
Germany reached 5,1% in 1990 with rates of growth of 
almost 6% in the last two quarters of 1990 and the first 
quarter of 1991. Demand in other Member States also re-
ceived a substantial boost. It is estimated that the growth 
rates of the other Member States were raised on average by 
about half a percentage point a year in both 1991 and 
1992. This above-potential growth in West Germany led to 
tensions in the labour market and in the markets for goods 
and services. Wage increases accelerated from a trend of 
about 3% a year in the period 1987-89 to 4,7% in 1990 and 
5,8% in 1991 while inflation reached rates of about 4% in 
1991 and 1992 (public utility prices and indirect tax increases 
were also contributing factors). 
A restrictive policy stance 
As a result of the above developments, macroeconomic 
policy over the past two years has generally been restrictive 
and, of necessity, focused on the correction of the imbalances 
inherited from the previous strong growth period. None the 
less, the overall Community budget deficit has continued its 
upward trend and in 1992 reached an unprecedented record 
level of 5,3% of GDP. This increase of 0,7 percentage points 
on the outturn in 1991 is attributable to the impact of the 
downturn on public finances as the automatic stabilizers 
were allowed to play in many Member States. Moreover, 
this aggregate result was substantially influenced by the 
deterioration of over 3 percentage points in the UK deficit. 
Elsewhere in the Community discretionary policy actions 
have been broadly neutral with the loosening in some Mem-
ber States being largely offset by a corresponding tightening 
in others. In 1993, these trends should continue, and the 
overall Community deficit is projected to increase further to 
5,7% of GDP with expectations of a further sharp deterio-
ration in the deficit of the United Kingdom of over 2 points 
of GDP. 
Monetary conditions in the Community remained tight dur-
ing most of 1992, as evidenced by strongly inverted yield 
curves and the strength of Community currencies against 
third currencies and also, in some countries, a deceleration 
of monetary aggregates and/or falling asset prices. This 
tightness contributed to the longer-than-expected downturn. 
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GRAPH 7 : General government net borrowing requirement in the EC 
As noted above, the stance of monetary policy was domi-
nated by events in Germany, whose interest rates continued 
to set the floor for nominal interest rates in the ERM, with 
very minor (at least in 1992) exceptions in the case of the 
Netherlands and Belgium. To counter strong inflationary 
pressures in Germany, the Bundesbank increased its official 
interest rates in December 1991. Most other ERM partici-
pants followed suit. The rise in rates was not inappropriate 
in the high-inflation countries, but was not obviously in line 
with domestic needs in the other narrow-band countries. In 
July 1992, the Bundesbank, faced with monetary growth 
twice as high as the target range, raised its discount rate. 
Only Italy similarly raised an official rate, but the Bundes-
bank's move eliminated market expectations of an early 
downward movement in interest rates in Europe. Combined 
with a further fall in the dollar, as the Federal Reserve 
continued to cut US short-term interest rates, the July move 
additionally tightened monetary conditions in the Com-
munity. 
German short-term rates reached a peak in the second half 
of August (see Graph 8). Thereafter, despite continued high 
rates of M3 growth, German rates trended downwards, 
particularly in response to the effective appreciation of the 
German mark implied by the ERM crisis and partly as a 
result of the defence of the French franc. 
Political difficulties and ERM turbulence 
The difficulties which the ratification of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union encountered — rejection by Danish voters, 
narrow approval in the French referendum, difficult parlia-
mentary debates in some other countries — have complex 
causes. It must be presumed, however, that the deterioration 
of the economic situation has been a contributory factor as 
people became more worried about their future and more 
fearful of change per se. The appearance of these difficulties 
only served to add to the Community's economic problems. 
The rejection in June 1992 by Danish voters of the Treaty 
led market participants to expect a weakening of the commit-
ment to the agreed path towards EMU, which particularly 
affected the countries with the largest budgetary adjustments 
to make or the weakest cyclical positions. As a result, the 
increase or reappearance of risk premiums on many of these 
countries' currencies vis-à-vis the German mark started a 
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VPH 8 : Short-term interest rates in Germany and in the rest of the Community 
(monthly averages January 1991 to January 1993) 
Jan. Apr. Jul. 
1991 
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Germany 
Apr. Jul 
1992 
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1993 
vicious circle as economic prospects for these countries de-
teriorated further — thus raising additional doubts on the 
ability and willingness of governments to carry out painful 
adjustments in a difficult moment — with the higher interest 
rates increasing the debt-servicing burden and making 
budgetary consolidation still more difficult. Furthermore, 
exchange-rate parities, which had not been adjusted for five 
and a half years, were, in a number of cases, out of line with 
the achievement of internal balance without the need for a 
prolonged period of inflation at rates below those in partner 
countries. At the same time, economic evidence was pointing 
to a substantial worsening of the economic situation in most 
Member States and survey results started casting doubts 
on a positive vote in the French referendum called for 
20 September. 
These developments led markets to seriously doubt the 
ability of many governments to defend the existing parity 
grid within the EMS exchange-rate mechanism and served 
to ignite the recent foreign-exchange crisis (see box for a 
description of developments). If these events represented the 
spark, the fuel for the fire had been accumulated over years 
by the continued existence of large imbalances in many, 
although not all, of the countries affected. 
The parity adjustments which have taken place and the 
temporary suspension of the participation of the Italian lira 
and the pound sterling have to a certain extent changed the 
nature of the policy problems faced by Member States, 
but they have not reduced their difficulty. The temporary 
support to economic activity that can be expected from 
a lower exchange rate and the resulting improved price 
competitiveness must be weighed against the need to restrict 
the general stance of macroeconomic policy to prevent in-
flationary pressures degenerating into a price/wage spiral. 
Budgetary adjustment may be easier to achieve to the extent 
that activity is stronger, but lower interest rates are still 
difficult to achieve and, in those countries whose currencies 
now fluctuate freely, the reductions which have taken place 
were obtained at the cost of substantial depreciations which 
are bound to create significant inflationary risks in the 
medium term and economic uncertainty. 
The foreign-exchange crisis is likely to have an adverse effect 
on growth in the Community as a whole since the increase 
in activity in the countries whose currencies have depreciated 
is unlikely to fully offset the losses in the countries whose 
currencies have appreciated. In addition, the crisis has affec-
ted the credibility of the EMU timetable and added a signifi-
cant element of uncertainty to economic agents' plans. 
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GRAPH 9 : Long-term interest rates in Germany and in the rest of the Community 
(monthly averages January 1991 to January 1993) 
GRAPH 10: Changes in the value of the lira and the pound sterling vis-a-vis the German mark since the beginning of September 1992 
(percentage changes relative to 1 September 1992) 
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To make matters worse, over the closing months of last year 
tensions and uncertainties appeared over the possibility of 
reaching an agreement on the current round of GATT trade 
liberalization. Since the freeing of trade aimed at in the 
Uruguay Round is expected to impart a substantial positive 
stimulus to world trade and growth, conclusion of the long 
round of negotiations had been eagerly awaited and the 
appearance of new difficulties must have been perceived as 
an additional new adverse development. Finally, the con-
tinued uncertainty surrounding the prospects for political 
and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia were additional 
factors depressing business and consumer confidence. Hence 
the political and institutional sphere in the second half of 
1992 failed to provide economic agents with the stable and 
credible framework they need and actually contributed to 
depressing their confidence. 
Chronology of recent events in the exchange-rate mechanism 
2 June 1992: Danish voters narrowly reject the Maastricht Treaty 
by referendum leading to the emergence of exchange-rate ten-
sions within the ERM and rises in short-term interest rates in 
several Member States. 
2 July 1992: The US Federal Reserve announces the seventh 
consecutive reduction in its discount rate to only 3%, accelerat-
ing the recent rapid depreciation of the dollar relative to Com-
munity currencies. 
16 July 1992: The Bundesbank raises its discount rate by three-
quarters of a percentage point, but leaves the Lombard rate 
unchanged at 9,75%. 
25 August 1992: Publication of first polls suggesting a negative 
vote in the French referendum. 
28 August 1992: Fuelled by growing fears over the unsustain-
ability of the Italian budget deficit, the lira falls to its floor in 
the ERM. 
3 September 1992: The UK, under growing pressure to increase 
interest rates in defence of sterling's weakness, chooses instead 
to arrange lending facilities for an amount equal to UKL TA 
billion to bolster its external reserves. 
4 September 1992: The US further reduces the federal funds rate 
by a quarter of a percentage point to 3% and the dollar falls to 
a record low relative to the German mark. Italy raises interest 
levels sharply in an attempt to raise the lira above its ERM 
floor, and announces that it will be making use of the very short 
term financing facility. 
6 September 1992: The informal Economic and Financial 
Council in Bath reaffirms its commitment to existing exchange-
rate parities in the ERM. A succession of opinion polls point 
to the possibility of a rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the 
French referendum. 
8 September 1992: Finland floats the markka and Sweden in-
creases its short-term rates. 
14 September 1992: In an effort to relieve ever-mounting ten-
sions within the ERM and to reduce massive speculative attacks 
on the lira, a 7% devaluation of the lira is agreed. The Bundes-
bank reduces the Lombard rate and the discount rate by a 
quarter and half a percentage point respectively and announces 
a reduction in the rate for securities repurchase agreements of 
half a percentage point. 
16 September 1992: Notwithstanding massive central bank inter-
vention and a cumulative 5-point increase in the minimum 
lending rate, sterling falls substantially and the Chancellor an-
nounces its suspension from the mechanism. The lira also suffers 
further massive speculative attacks and also falls to its new 
ERM floor. The Swedish Central Bank increases its marginal 
lending rate to 500%. 
17 September 1992: Italy abandons attempts to maintain the 
lira within the ERM and temporarily suspends its participation 
in the mechanism. The Spanish peseta is devalued by 5%. The 
Danish krone, French franc and Irish punt are all subject to 
speculative attacks requiring central bank intervention and rises 
in interest rates. 
20 September 1992: The narrow approval of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the French referendum fails to dissipate doubts on the 
prospects for its eventual ratification by all Member States and 
tensions intensify within the ERM over the following days. 
23 September 1992: Joint statement by the French and German 
authorities that 'no change in the central rates is justified'. 
19 November 1992: Following several weeks of relative calm 
and a gradual return to pre-September interest-rate levels within 
the ERM, tensions are revived following Sweden's decision to 
abandon its peg to the ecu. 
22 November 1992: The Spanish peseta and the Portuguese 
escudo are both devalued by 6%, while pressure continues to 
mount against the French franc, the Danish krone and in par-
ticular the Irish punt. Conversely, short-term money market 
rates continue to fall in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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10 December 1992: The Bundesbank increases its M3 monetary 
target for 1993 by 1 percentage point at both extremes to a 
range of 4'Λ to 6'Λ%. Norway suspends its ecu peg, putting 
pressure on the Danish krone and the French franc. 
13 December 1992: The European Council in Edinburgh an­
nounces a growth initiative in order to aid recovery. A formula 
to accommodate the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty 
and a new Cohesion Fund to promote growth in the less de­
veloped Member States are also agreed. 
Early January 1993: Tensions are again revived in the ERM 
after the Christmas lull on financial markets and interest rates 
are raised in France and Ireland. The French and German 
authorities reaffirm their commitment to the existing German 
mark/French franc parity. The Bundesbank reduces its repur­
chase rate by 15 basis points (to 8,60%) with corresponding 
reductions in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
30 January 1993: The Irish punt is devalued by 10%. 
Ill — The need for an adequate response 
The continued weak economic conditions, the absence of 
sustained signs of recovery and the alarming increase in 
unemployment have led to increased fears of a slump de­
veloping in the Community economy. These fears lay behind 
the call for a rapid policy response which was recently 
endorsed by the Edinburgh Council. This initiative will now 
proceed as planned and is expected to contribute positively 
to the prospects for recovery in the Community. However, 
the outlook for 1993 still remains uncertain. A more positive 
outcome than that presented in Section I cannot be excluded, 
but there are also risks that the path to recovery could be 
longer. More worrying, however, is the fact that, notwith­
standing the improvement which took place during the 
1980s, the growth potential in the Community appears to 
be very low. Estimates of potential growth are always diffi­
cult to make, but it seems clear that without a significant 
break from recent trends the Community economy can only 
be expected to return gradually to rates of growth of between 
2 and ?.'A%. These are barely sufficient to stabilize unem­
ployment and do not open up any medium-term prospect 
of significant reductions: even if in 1995-96 growth were to 
return to rates of about 3%, as various medium-term fore­
casts suggest, unemployment could still be as high as 10 to 
11%. 
The possible adverse political consequences of such a scen­
ario require little elaboration. Unemployment on such a 
large scale is a very serious social problem and an economic 
waste. But also in relation to economic policy alone, there 
is a genuine fear that this situation might lead to more 
serious problems in the years ahead. Unemployment and 
uncertainty about the future may well endanger many of 
those projects on which the economic future of the Com­
munity rests: full implementation of the residual single mar­
ket decisions, economic and monetary union, liberalization 
of world trade. But there is also a danger that the present 
difficulties might lead to disillusion with the medium-term 
economic strategy followed during the 1980s which may be 
considered wrongly to have failed to deliver its promises. 
The present economic difficulties and, in particular, the 
turmoil on the foreign-exchange markets, are not a product 
of the medium-term orientation of economic policy followed 
since the beginning of the 1980s, but are much more the 
result of the failure to implement it in full. In particular, it 
is to be regretted that the period of strong growth in the 
second half of the 1980s was not exploited to make more 
significant progress towards nominal convergence. Inflation 
has been reduced, even if unsatisfactory situations still exist 
in some countries, and this constitutes one of the most 
significant results obtained. However, unemployment, even 
if it has come down somewhat, is still unacceptably high. 
In addition, budget deficits have remained far too high. 
Furthermore, the countries which presented the most serious 
budgetary imbalances often made the least progress. Struc­
tural adjustment progress has also fallen well short of what 
might have been achieved. 
The goal of the medium-term policy orientation Member 
States have repeatedly confirmed is the return to a macro-
economic framework of stability similar to that experienced 
in the 1960s and until the first oil price shock. The conditions 
required for a smooth and successful transition to EMU, 
which will in itself improve growth conditions, correspond 
exactly to this goal. Low inflation will create the conditions 
for faster growth and lower budget deficits will contribute 
to higher national saving ratios. During the 1960s, most 
Member States had budget deficits well below the 3% goal 
set in the Treaty on European Union and eight countries 
experienced average rates of inflation within 1 Ά percentage 
points of the 2,7% resulting from the average of the three 
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GRAPH 11 : Survey indicators for the EC 
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best performers (Greece, Luxembourg and either Portugal 
or Germany who had the same average rate of inflation). 
Unfortunately, the present situation has led to doubts on 
the soundness of the medium-term policy orientation fol-
lowed by Community governments. Some doubt the effec-
tiveness of these policies while others have a reduced faith 
in the determination and ability of governments to pursue 
them. In this situation governments must act decisively to 
show that they have the determination and ability to pursue 
the agreed goals and to convince economic agents that this 
policy orientation will bear fruit. Concretely this means that 
governments will have to implement policies which face a 
multiple challenge. 
(i) Firstly, to act decisively to support growth without 
putting at risk medium-term growth prospects, i.e. 
above all preserving the commitment to the promotion 
of growth in conditions of price stability; 
(ii) Secondly, to create the conditions which will permit 
stronger employment creation in the medium term; 
(iii) Thirdly, to pursue policies designed to promote greater 
real convergence in employment and GDP per head; 
(iv) Fourthly, to resume progress towards nominal conver-
gence. This means consolidation of the progress made 
in curbing inflation and renewed efforts where inflation 
is still high. In the budgetary area this implies that the 
countries facing the most worrying imbalances should 
continue their efforts to reduce their budget deficits 
notwithstanding the present difficulties, while the others 
should exploit the expected recovery to return to their 
medium-term budgetary consolidation plans. 
IV — The Edinburgh initiative 
The recent European Council declaration on economic 
growth in Europe finds its origin in the need to act rapidly 
to restore the confidence of economic agents. Indeed the 
present extremely depressed level of business and consumer 
confidence constitutes by itself one of the biggest obstacles 
on the way to economic recovery; such low levels of confi-
dence could even provoke a further deterioration in econ-
omic prospects. But the European Council also stressed that 
these actions should not be perceived as implying a departure 
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from the necessary medium-term budgetary consolidation. 
Indeed, credibility depends on following a medium-term 
strategy which can create the conditions for stronger growth 
and faster employment creation and which can be seen as 
possessing the determination and means to implement it. In 
particular, the European Council stressed the need to pursue 
seriously and vigorously the policies set out in the conver-
gence programmes as a means of regaining this loss of 
credibility. 
In addition, the European Council agreed new financial 
perspectives for the period 1993-99. These envisage a 41% 
increase in volume terms in the Community resources for 
structural policies, including the Cohesion Fund. This will 
contribute significantly to strengthening the growth potential 
of the less prosperous economies, whose allocation under 
the structural Funds will virtually double relative to its 1992 
level. 
1. In the short term 
The European Council, at its December 1992 meeting, called 
on Member States to exploit the macroeconomic margins 
for manoeuvre available to take actions 'which would boost 
confidence and promote economic recovery'. More specifi-
cally, it called on governments to implement a two-pronged 
approach involving actions at national and at Community 
level. 
Member States were invited to take concerted action in three 
main areas: 
(i) exploiting the margins for manoeuvre available in the 
budgetary area to implement measures to encourage 
private investment and to switch public expenditure 
towards infrastructure and other growth-supporting 
priorities; 
(ii) strengthening structural adjustment efforts, for example 
through action to reduce subsidies and measures to 
enhance competition and market flexibility; 
(iii) promoting wage moderation with particular regard to 
the public sector given the important demonstrative role 
it plays and the positive effects on budgetary consoli-
dation. 
Work in this direction has already commenced within the 
Economic and Financial Council. Ministers have started 
considering measures of the type recommended with a view 
to their early implementation. It is hoped that governments 
will be able to announce the different measures that will be 
taken in a confidence-enhancing manner. A simultaneous 
and concerted announcement would magnify the psychologi-
cal effect and could be achieved through the presentation of 
the various national initiatives as a joint package, with 
specific commitments regarding the timetable for implemen-
tation of the individual national components. This is particu-
larly appropriate in the case of a number of national 
measures which are common to more than one Member 
State and which consequently warrant joint action at the 
European level. Among the latter there is a strong case for 
simultaneous action in such areas as housing, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, infrastructure projects, market 
liberalization and institutional matters. 
The Community is to contribute to the joint action through 
initiatives in a variety of areas ranging from additional 
efforts to improve the efficiency of the research it funds, 
rapid and effective implementation of the single market, the 
acceleration of actions in favour of SM Es to remove the 
backlog of pollution-abating investment, to action to finance 
infrastructure projects notably connected with trans-Euro-
pean networks. To this end the European Investment Bank 
has been invited to establish a new, temporary lending fa-
cility of ECU 5 billion for the purpose of promoting trans-
European networks (TEN). In addition, a European Invest-
ment Fund with a capital of ECU 2 billion will be established 
with contributions to its capital from the EIB, the Com-
munity and other private financial institutions. The Fund 
will extend guarantees for TEN projects throughout the 
Community and for small and medium-sized enterprises, 
especially in assisted regions. Member States, the Com-
mission and the European Investment Bank will undertake 
a joint effort aimed at using the resources thus made 
available to foster projects which might be implemented 
rapidly. 
2. In the longer term 
Employment growth in the Community cannot be enhanced 
significantly without generating faster economic growth 
whilst at the same time improving the efficiency of the labour 
market. Since the mid-1970s, the rate of GDP growth at 
which Community employment begins to increase, the so-
called 'employment threshold', has remained stable at 
around 2% per year. Given the expected trends of the 
population of working age and participation rates, the Com-
munity economy would need to grow at a sustained rate of 
2,5% if unemployment is to be stabilized. The implication 
is that a major reduction of unemployment is unlikely to be 
achieved within an acceptable time span unless economic 
growth can be maintained at a rate which is higher than 
this. 
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For instance, a sustainable growth of 3,5% would reduce 
the unemployment rate by between three-quarters and one 
percentage point per year. During the second half of the 
1980s an average rate of growth of 3,2%, coupled with 
emerging beneficial effects of various supply-side measures, 
reduced the rate of unemployment from 10,8% in 1985 to 
8,3% in 1990. However, during this period, the underlying 
potential growth rate probably did not exceed 2Ά to 23A%, 
whereas during the 1960s and until the beginning of the 
1970s it was still well above 4%. As a consequence, after 
an initial taking-up of the existing slack in capacity, the 
Community economy experienced overheating problems 
which, together with other factors, led to the present cyclical 
slowdown, as described in Section II. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the degree of capacity utiliza­
tion has fallen again, which leaves some scope for expansion 
without undue inflationary pressures, there is little doubt 
that maintaining rates of growth in excess of 3% over a 
number of years requires a significant increase in the rate 
of growth of the productive potential of the Community 
economy. The Community must generate greater efficiency 
in the use of its resources and shift more of these resources 
into productive investment so as to improve its industrial 
base and its competitiveness. This must be the economic 
policy priority for the medium term. Achievement of this 
goal would allow the reduction of unemployment to more 
acceptable levels as well as promoting progress towards 
EMU and towards greater economic and social cohesion. 
Thus a greater commitment is required on two fronts, 
namely: 
(i) increasing the dynamism of the Community economy 
by removing structural impediments which constrain 
the rate of increase of the productivity of capital and 
labour; and 
(ii) generating sufficient investment which means increasing 
the investment ratio in the Community by a substantial 
amount. 
If those two objectives are to be realized, it will be necessary 
to ensure that incentives are not impaired which means that 
the impetus of supply-side policies must continue. Thus, a 
greater commitment to structural measures aimed at improv­
ing the supply side of the economy is essential both at the 
Community level and in the individual Member States. Such 
measures are necessary, first and foremost, to complement 
the single market programme which is increasingly exposing 
GRAPH 12: Actual and potential rate of growth in the EC 
(approximated by the rate of increase of the stock of capital) 
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 
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the many structural rigidities which continue to exist and 
which exert a high cost in terms of the misallocation of 
resources, higher unemployment and inflation and inad-
equate adjustment to changing economic circumstances. 
At a time when both fiscal and monetary policy are severely 
constrained by existing imbalances, it is imperative that the 
potential for promoting growth through the removal of such 
rigidities and through increased investment in the Com-
munity's human resources is fully exploited. 
increase substantially. If rates of growth of the order of 
3,5% per year are to become sustainable, the investment 
ratio should increase from the present level of less than 20% 
of GDP to about 23 to 24%. Such a substantial increase can 
only be achieved over many years and will depend on a 
favourable development of many different factors. In par-
ticular, investment profitability must increase, and be ex-
pected to remain high; the growth of demand and its compo-
sition must remain adequate; and a progressive shift of 
resources towards savings must take place simultaneously. 
Member States must take the necessary measures to increase 
factor flexibility in their economies. In the absence of nomi-
nal exchange-rate adjustments in full EMU, such flexibility 
will be essential to ensure that their economies can adapt 
to changed economic circumstances without increases in 
unemployment. Similarly, the Community must continue its 
effort in the areas of competition, improved infrastructure 
including research and development, training, the removal 
of trade barriers and, most of all, the implementation of the 
single market. 
Given the present degree of capital intensity and the prevail-
ing capital to output ratio, the investment ratio should 
The large deterioration in capital profitability that occurred 
during the 1970s (Graph 13) was partly corrected during the 
1980s but there is still some ground to make up. Indeed it 
is likely that the profitability of capital will have to increase 
to even higher levels than in the 1960s given the present high 
levels of real interest rates which are not expected to be 
reduced significantly over the medium term, not least in view 
of the demand for savings from the rest of the world (Eastern 
European countries, LDCs, etc). 
The experience of the 1980s has shown that the most effective 
means of securing the required increase in capital profita-
bility is a return, over an adequate number of years, to a 
GRAPH 13: Profitability of fixed capital and investment share in GDP (EC 1961-92) 
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Table 3 
Saving — Investment balance for selected years 
t EC (excluding lhe former G DR. % of GDP) 
I9K9 1992 
Household saving (1) 
Corporate saving (2) 
Private saving (3=1+ 2) 
Public saving (4) 
National saving (5 = 3 + 4) 
10,0 
11,0 
21,0 
4,0 
25,0 
0,4 
23,2 
1.4 
24,6 
12,0 
9.0 
21,0 
- 1 , 0 
20,0 
- 0 , 6 
20,9 
- 0 , 3 
20,6 
10,3 
11,2 
21,5 
- 0 , 8 
20,7 
1,3 
19,0 
0.4 
19,4 
8,6 
12,0 
20,6 
0,8 
21,4 
- 0 , 1 
20,7 
0.8 
21,5 
9,8 
11,2 
21,0 
- 1 , 7 
19,3 
- 0 , 5 
19,6 
0,2 
19,8 
Current balance (6) 
Gross fixed capital formation (7) 
Changes in inventories (8) 
Gross capital formation (9) 
(7 + 8) = (5-6) = (9) 
moderate growth of real wages per head with respect to 
labour productivity. Indeed, this was the wage pattern 
achieved between 1981 and 1989 in most Member States. In 
the Community, real wage-cost per wage earner increased 
on average by slightly less than half the increase in labour 
productivity. 
A similar favourable development during the 1990s would 
allow for the achievement of the required level of profita-
bility. To this end, it is essential that wage-setting procedures 
become, if necessary through additional structural reforms, 
more conducive to the necessary wage developments. Such 
moderate wage increases would still allow for the expansion 
and composition of demand necessary to sustain profitability 
expectations. As labour productivity increases with higher 
fixed investment and investment in human resources, real 
wage increases may then also be higher, thus triggering what 
could become, hopefully, a virtuous cycle. 
But the necessary increase in the investment ratio needs also 
to be accompanied by an equivalent increase in national 
savings. Indeed, given the present current-account position 
of the Community and the need for it to return to a net 
capital exporter position more appropriate to a highly de-
veloped economy, national savings may have to increase 
even more. Private saving has been very stable over a long 
period while public saving has deteriorated substantially 
under the impact of increased public debt and higher real 
interest rates (see Table 3 and Graph 14). Under these 
conditions an increase in national savings appears to require, 
first and foremost, a major reduction in public dissaving. 
But private savings, and in particular that of enterprises, 
should also be encouraged. 
V — Macroeconomic policies and policies 
for structural adjustment 
Macroeconomic policies must be geared to facing the short 
and medium-term challenges described in the two previous 
sections, and they must be implemented bearing in mind the 
already stated need to increase credibility. This task could 
be greatly facilitated through improved coordination of 
national economic policies. 
The most important contribution macroeconomic policy can 
make to the prospects for recovery is to bring about con-
ditions allowing a reduction in short-term interest rates on 
a sound basis. This essentially requires that any continuing 
inflationary pressures due to excessive wage increases and 
unbalanced budgetary positions be reduced. Negotiations 
and agreements between the social partners, where possible, 
could bring positive results through the encouragement of 
lower nominal wage increases with positive effects on in-
flationary expectations. Decisive and credible action in most 
Member States to put public finances again on a medium-
term consolidation path would ease the task of monetary 
policy via a similar reduction in inflationary expectations. 
Institutional measures such as an adaptation of existing 
budgetary procedures and the granting of full independence 
to central banks ahead of the EMU schedule could also 
produce significant results in this respect. Currently, Spain 
is taking a helpful lead in this direction. 
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GRAPH 14: Community interest rates: real short and long-term rates 
(Quarterly figures: interest rates less current rate of inflation) 
1. Monetary policy 
Given the commitment to the ERM and that — by and large 
— German interest rates continue to set the floor for interest 
rates within the system, a weakening of inflationary pressures 
in Germany could provide a major opportunity for a more 
general reduction in interest rates while progress in the other 
countries will depend also on action to reduce the risk 
premiums. 
In September 1992, the Bundesbank took the opportunity 
afforded by the appreciation of the German mark to effect 
modest reductions in its official discount and Lombard rates 
as well as in the rate for security repurchase agreements. 
This has been followed recently by further cuts in short-term 
rates and by a market-induced sharp fall in long-term interest 
rates (see Graphs 8 and 9). This confirmed that the cuts in 
short-term rates had been soundly based and had not given 
rise to expectations of higher inflation in the long term. 
However, most of its ERM partners have, as yet, been 
unable to fully effect similar reductions owing to the need 
for continued vigilance on the exchange-rate implications. 
The scope for yet further reductions in German interest rates 
(particularly at the short end of the market) is crucially 
dependent on the success of the authorities' anti-inflationary 
strategy. A number of factors are expected to contribute 
to the disinflationary process in Germany in 1993. The 
appreciation of the mark within the ERM and the general 
slowdown in growth, both in Germany and elsewhere, are 
all putting downward pressure on prices. Moderation of 
wages and deceleration of monetary growth are expected to 
create the potential for interest-rate cuts. But further pro-
gress is needed given that the present rates of increase of 
nominal unit labour costs and monetary growth are still not 
considered to be consistent with price stability. Similarly, 
the ongoing high level of the underlying budget deficit is 
continuing to fuel inflation. But on the other hand, there is 
evidence of a more pronounced downturn in Germany with 
an ever-growing number of indicators — falls in industrial 
production, reduced export orders, company closures, the 
succession of poor quarterly growth figures, etc.— pointing 
to its severity. 
The Commission forecast of a stagnation in output in Germ-
any in 1993, if realized, will obviously increase disinflation-
ary forces and hence the potential for interest-rate cuts. 
However, it could also increase the already strong pressures 
on public finances through its impact on automatic stabiliz-
ers. If these latter pressures are not sufficiently controlled 
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they could reduce the scope for a monetary easing. The 
'solidarity pact' currently being discussed would be a most 
welcome development. Such a pact, including a measure of 
wage moderation over many years and a credible medium-
term budgetary consolidation programme, would further 
bear down on inflationary expectations, and hence allow the 
necessary significant reduction in short-term interest rates. 
As expectations are revised, long-term interest rates could 
also fall further. 
Other Member States find themselves in different situations. 
In those countries whose currencies did not depreciate during 
the foreign-exchange crisis, inflation does not give cause for 
concern and, in any case, lower import prices will reduce 
inflationary pressures further. Some of these countries 
(France and Denmark), however, still experience positive 
interest-rate differentials vis-a-vis the German mark. These 
countries should maintain the medium-term course and try 
to improve further the credibility of their policies, thus 
allowing a reduction in interest-rate differentials vis-a-vis the 
German mark. A loosening of monetary conditions in these 
countries, however, will depend largely on developments in 
Germany. 
A second group of countries is made up by the Member 
States whose currencies depreciated within the ERM (Ire-
land, Spain and Portugal). Monetary conditions in Spain 
and Portugal will depend essentially on the ability of govern-
ments to improve substantially their stability performance 
and thus reduce the still very large interest rate differentials 
vis-à-vis the German mark. In Ireland, it will be essential to 
maintain the stability-oriented policies of recent years. A 
final group, formed by those countries whose currencies are 
outside the ERM (Italy, the United Kingdom and Greece), 
has a relatively larger degree of freedom in determining 
short-term interest rates. This freedom, however, is con-
strained by inflationary risks, which, given the size of the 
depreciations that have already taken place, are consider-
able. In these two last groups of countries wage moderation 
policies will play a crucial role since these will have to ensure 
that the recent depreciations do not lead to faster inflation 
and that progress towards nominal convergence resumes as 
soon as possible in those cases where a temporary set-back 
is inevitable. 
2. Budgetary policy 
As noted previously, unsatisfactory budgetary positions are 
complicating the conduct of monetary policy in many Mem-
ber States. The budget deficit in the Community is now 
at a record level, exceeding even that of the early 1980s. 
Furthermore, the burden on policy-making is now much 
more severe given that debt to GDP ratios have increased 
substantially and real interest rates are much higher than in 
the 1960s and 1970s. This current unsatisfactory state of 
most Member States' public finances has also very severely 
restricted the room for fiscal manoeuvre in the current down-
turn. 
The essential priority for the public finances in many Mem-
ber States remains their medium-term consolidation. The 
continued high deficit levels are in themselves a major factor 
in the present economic difficulties and in the recent turmoil 
on the foreign-exchange markets. They serve to keep long-
term interest rates high, crowd out private investment and 
act to fuel inflationary expectations. 
In these conditions, it is even more necessary to orient 
public expenditure towards those sectors where it will most 
influence growth prospects. This objective requires switching 
expenditure towards those sectors where the pay-off in terms 
of growth (investment in infrastructure, environmental pro-
tection, research and development, training, etc.) is vital to 
the medium-term performance of the economies. 
The heterogeneous budgetary situation between Member 
States also warrants a differentiated approach. In several 
Member States, notably Italy and Greece, the more immedi-
ate effect of any fiscal expansion would be more likely to 
result in sharply increased interest rates and correspondingly 
increased debt-servicing charges, renewed tensions on for-
eign-exchange markets and increased inflationary pressures, 
rather than in an increase in output. In these Member States 
there is no alternative, therefore, to the continuation of 
the existing stabilization efforts, which in several cases are 
already showing positive signs of progress. In the few 
countries with less pressing problems the 'automatic stabiliz-
ers' may be allowed to continue to work, particularly on the 
revenue side. 
In all cases, however, there is a need for caution to ensure 
that policy credibility is not undermined. The existing con-
vergence programmes will need to be updated to take into 
account the deterioration in the economic situation and, in 
the countries where the public finance situation is most 
worrying, it is essential that any slippage in the implemen-
tation of the convergence programmes be identified early 
and any necessary corrective measures implemented without 
delay. 
3. Structural policies 
3.1. Continued need for structural reform at national level 
Member States must press ahead with the structural adjust-
ment efforts which they have already initiated. These efforts 
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complement initiatives taken at Community level, particu-
larly in relation to the completion of the single market. 
By their very nature, the benefits of structural adjustment 
measures tend to become apparent only over the medium 
term. This should not be allowed to serve as a reason for 
delaying their implementation. The fact that such measures 
are seen to be put into effect helps to restore credibility 
which produces positive effects also in the short term. 
A vast array of structural measures remain to be im-
plemented at national level. Governments could send a 
strong signal to economic agents of their determination to 
break with past behaviour by announcing and implementing 
a significant programme in this area. The need for such 
action is being increasingly felt as the single market comes 
into effect and the increased exposure to greater competition 
highlights the many underlying structural rigidities. There is 
still a lack of competition in key sectors such as the energy, 
communications and transport markets. This is facilitated 
by the continued existence of impediments to market access. 
The persistence of continued high levels of State subsidies is 
also serving to distort competition and impede possible 
change. Total State aids in the Community between 1988 
and 1990 averaged an estimated ECU 89 billion annually 
(about 2% of Community GDP), with nearly half of it (ECU 
36 billion) going to the manufacturing sector alone. Under 
these circumstances, there is a need for a reduction in these 
subsidy levels. 
There is also an ongoing need to examine the necessity 
for government intervention, the attendant costs and the 
alternatives. Improved efficiency needs to be encouraged in 
the public sector, through increased competition with the 
private sector where appropriate. A high level of social 
protection is a distinctive feature of the Community identity 
which must be maintained. Environmental protection needs, 
in many instances, to be increased. Yet, there is ample scope 
for simplifying procedures and reducing the administrative 
charges implied by some regulations without compromising 
these two aims. This is particularly the case for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which because of their 
limited size and resources are particularly vulnerable to 
unnecessary or over-complicated procedures. If the job-cre-
ating potential of SMEs is to be fully exploited, it is essential 
that their growth is unhindered by such rigidities. The State 
role in the provision of infrastructure and housing also needs 
to be critically examined with a view to removing existing 
structural obstacles to growth. 
However, it is in relation to labour markets that the need 
for tackling structural rigidities is imperative. Some progress 
was made in this respect in the latter half of the 1980s. 
However, the coexistence of continued high levels of unem-
ployment, emerging labour shortages and a resumption of 
wage inflation towards the end of the decade clearly indicates 
that this was insufficient. More needs to be done to ensure 
that a resumption of economic growth results in strongly 
increased employment rather than a repeat of the previous 
patterns of inflationary wage increases followed by restric-
tive macroeconomic policies. 
In addition, specific action is needed in relation to unemploy-
ment. Its causes are complex and deep-rooted. To get unem-
ployment moving downwards will require not just a resump-
tion of growth — crucial as that is — but structural actions, 
including special measures for all those who are particularly 
vulnerable, such as young people, women and the long-
term unemployed, and including actions to improve the 
functioning of the labour markets, especially at the local 
level. 
There are many areas where specific action is urgent. Skill 
shortages and mismatch between skills offered and skills 
demanded are very widespread. Initiatives at both the na-
tional and the Community levels are necessary to improve 
training systems. Also necessary are measures to increase 
the geographical mobility of workers. In addition, in many 
cases it may be necessary to modify wage-setting procedures 
to make them more responsive to macroeconomic conditions 
and the existence of large numbers of unemployed workers. 
3.2. Structural adjustment at Community level 
At Community level there have been contrasting results in 
1992 in relation to the removal of structural rigidities. At 
one extreme, the further progress towards the completion 
of the single market and the agreement on the European 
Economic Area represent breakthroughs that will generate 
positive economic benefits well into the future. At the other 
extreme, the delay and difficulty in bridging the narrow 
gap separating the principal parties on the GATT Uruguay 
Round already represent a costly lost opportunity. 
The single market programme is a central pillar of the 
Community's economic strategy and has provided both the 
impetus and the rationale for the EMU project. It is imposs-
ible to conceive of EMU in the absence of the full freedom 
of capital, labour, goods and services provided for under the 
single market. The Community has therefore set itself the 
goal for the next few years not only of finalizing the single 
market agenda, but, most importantly, of making it work. 
On the basis of the 1985 White Paper, the economic environ-
ment for Community enterprises has fundamentally changed 
in the direction of opening up national markets: allowing free 
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circulation of goods, services, and capital, through mutual 
recognition, opening up public procurements and abolishing 
frontier controls. The application of new indirect taxation 
regimes, in particular, has opened the way to important cost 
reductions for businesses in intra-Community trade through 
the removal of all fiscal formalities linked to the crossing of 
internal borders. These developments have led to a signifi-
cant restructuring of Community companies, an effort that 
should be supported at the Community level by putting at 
the disposal of business and individuals a legal framework 
of cooperation. 
In the first place, the rules adopted must be made a reality. 
Effective and equitable enforcement of Community legis-
lation has to be a top priority. The Commission presented 
to the Council in December 1992 a clear strategy to ensure 
the efficient functioning of the single market based on the 
provision of information, transparency in Community law 
and cooperation between administrations. This is not exclus-
ively a Community responsibility; Member States should 
share in the effort on the basis of a permanent partnership. 
In the second place, the technical compatibility of products 
and processes has to be ensured in order to facilitate the 
exchanges and foster investment. Following the Council 
conclusions on the 1991 Green Paper on European standard-
ization the Community has tried to reinforce the procedures 
and widen the role of standardization in Community legis-
lation. 
Business and individuals have to show that they can maxim-
ize the opportunities offered by the single market. In this 
regard, the growth initiative taken at the European Council 
in Edinburgh cannot be dissociated from the economic con-
text and the environment in which the Community acts. 
Indeed, it is only in a truly internal market that enterprises 
can reap the benefits of a growth initiative and thus contrib-
ute to reversing the negative trends which have been visible 
recently. 
The entry into force of the agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA), notwithstanding its recent rejection 
in the Swiss referendum, will further enhance the very close 
trade ties between the Community and the EFTA signator-
ies. The provision in the agreement for the acceptance of the 
vast majority of the single market measures by the latter will 
further facilitate trade and competition between the two 
areas and thus give rise to considerable economic benefits. 
The agreement will also facilitate the expressed intention of 
these countries to proceed with applications for full member-
ship of the Community. Similarly, the conclusion of Associ-
ation Agreements with several Central and East European 
countries will encourage greater integration and trade be-
tween the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Community. 
There is little questioning of the economic benefits which 
would accrue from a successful conclusion to the Uruguay 
Round. However, while all parties agree on the necessity for 
a successful conclusion to the Round and on the risks of 
failure for continued growth in world trade, a final settlement 
is still proving elusive. This is particularly disappointing 
given that the issues separating the interested parties, follow-
ing recent progress, are now relatively minor relative to the 
overall benefits at stake. It is imperative therefore that the 
goodwill of all parties to the settlement of the outstanding 
differences is obtained as soon as possible. 
The current difficulties are reducing the economic policy 
options and testing the resolve to resist short-term solutions 
which are known to create more serious problems in the 
medium term. One of the most effective contributions the 
Community can make is to help Member States maintain 
the course. The implementation of the Edinburgh growth 
initiative will help to restore a measure of confidence to 
economic agents and thus improve growth prospects. But 
economic policies must now be resolutely oriented towards 
improving the growth potential of the Community econ-
omies along the lines indicated in this report. 
The Commission [the Council] has adopted the Annual 
Economic Report for 1993 in this spirit and hopes that its 
discussion by the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee, the social partners and public opinion at 
large will contribute to the desired goal. 
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Statistical annex 
Main economic indicators 1990-94 
Community, USA and Japan 
(a) GDP at constant prices 
(annual percentage change) 
(b) Domestic demand at constant prices 
(annual percentage change) 
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1 
4 
VA 
VA 
VA 
2% 
2 
(c) Deflator of private consumption 
(annual percentage change) 
(d) Balance on current transactions 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
3,1 
2,1 
2,7 
— 
20,1 
6,4 
3,2 
1,7 
5,9 
3,6 
2,3 
12,6 
5,3 
4,5 
— 
5.0 
2.6 
1991 
2,9 
2,4 
3,9 
— 
18,4 
6,3 
3,2 
3,2 
6,8 
2.9 
3,3 
11,9 
7,2 
5.3 
— 
4.2 
2.6 
1992 
2,4 
2,1 
4,0 
4,8 
16,0 
6.0 
2,6 
2,9 
5,3 
3,4 
3,1 
9.1 
5.1 
4,5 
4,6 
3,1 
2,4 
1993' 
2Ά 
l'A 
VA 
4'Λ 
13'Λ 
5 Ά 
2 Ά 
2 Ά 
5 Ά 
4'Α 
2 Ά 
6'Α 
5 
4'Λ 
4'Λ 
2 Ά 
2 Ά 
1994' 
2Ά 
2 
3 
VA 
9 
5 
2 Ά 
2 Ά 
4 Ά 
VA 
2 Ά 
5 Ά 
3 
VA 
3'Λ 
2'Α 
VA 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
P2 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
0,9 
0,5 
3,5 
— 
- 6 , 2 
- 3 , 7 
- 0 , 8 
1.3 
- 1 , 4 
34,2 
4,0 
- 2 , 5 
- 4 , 2 
- 0 , 3 
— 
- 1 , 4 
1,3 
1991 
1.7 
1,3 
1,2 
- 0 , 7 
- 5 , 1 
- 3 , 5 
- 0 , 5 
6,0 
- 1 , 9 
27,9 
3.9 
- 3 , 5 
- 1 , 8 
- 0 , 5 
- 1 , 0 
0,2 
2,5 
1992 
1.8 
3,0 
0,4 
- 0 , 8 
- 3 , 3 
- 3 , 7 
0,1 
6,7 
- 1 , 9 
19,9 
3,9 
- 0 , 2 
- 2 , 1 
- 0 , 5 
- 0 , 8 
- 1 , 0 
3,2 
1993' 
VA 
3 
0 
-VA 
- 3 
-l'A 
Ά 
6 Ά 
-l'A 
18% 
VA 
-2Ά 
-2V, 
- % 
- 1 
- 1 
VA 
1994' 
2 
2Ά 
0 
- 1 
-2Ά 
- 3 
'A 
7 
-l'A 
M'A 
VA 
-VA 
- 3 
-Ά 
-Ά 
-l'A 
VA 
Note: D + and EC + : these aggregates include values for unified Germany. 
1 Based on the forecasts of January 1993 (final). 
Unusually high uncertainties surround the winter 1992/93 economic forecasts which are based on the standard assumption of 'no change in economic policy', implying that projections for 1994 
are essentially extrapolations of expected 1993 trends. Actual outcomes for 1993 and, particularly, for 1994 might differ substantially from present forecasts if, inter alia, economic policies were 
to be significantly modified. 
2 Break in series in 1991-92; until 1991: national accounts data; from 1992 onwards: balance of payments data. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Statistical annex 
(e) Number of unemployed as a percentage of the 
civilian labour force 
(0 General government lending and 
borrowing (as a percentage of GDP) 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
7,6 
8.1 
4,8 
— 
7,2 
16,1 
9,0 
14,5 
9,9 
1,7 
7,5 
4,6 
7,0 
8,3 
5,5 
2,1 
1991 
7,5 
8.9 
4.2 
— 
7,7 
16,3 
9,5 
16,2 
10,2 
1,6 
7,0 
4,1 
9,1 
8,8 
— 
6,7 
2,1 
1992 
8,2 
9,5 
4.5 
7,5 
7,7 
18,0 
10,1 
17,8 
10,2 
1,9 
6,7 
4,8 
10,8 
9,5 
10,1 
7,3 
2,1 
1993' 
9'A 
9'A 
6 
VA 
VA 
19'A 
10% 
19% 
10'Λ 
2 
VA 
SA 
IVA 
10'Λ 
11 
VA 
VA 
1994' 
9% 
9 Ά 
6'A 
8% 
9 
20 
11% 
20'Λ 
10% 
2 
8 
5% 
12% 
11 
IVA 
7 
2% 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
- 5 , 7 
- 1 , 4 
- 2 , 0 
— 
- 1 8 , 8 
- 4 , 0 
- 1 , 4 
- 2 , 5 
- 1 0 , 9 
5.0 
- 4 , 9 
- 5 , 5 
- 1 , 3 
- 4 , 1 
— 
- 2 , 5 
3.0 
1991 
- 6 , 6 
- 2 , 0 
- 3 , 6 
- 3 , 2 
- 1 5 , 4 
- 4 , 9 
- 1 , 9 
- 2 , 1 
- 1 0 , 2 
- 0 , 8 
- 2 , 5 
- 6 , 4 
- 2 , 8 
- 4 , 7 
- 4 , 6 
- 3 , 4 
2,4 
1992 
- 6 , 7 
- 2 , 3 
- 3 , 4 
- 3 , 2 
- 1 3 , 4 
- 4 , 6 
- 2 , 8 
- 2 , 7 
- 1 0 , 5 
- 0 , 4 
- 3 , 5 
- 5 , 6 
- 6 , 1 
- 5 , 4 
- 5 , 3 
- 4 , 8 
2,2 
1993' 
- 6 
- 2 % 
- 3 % 
-VA 
-9Ά 
-4Ά 
-VA 
- 3 
- 1 0 % 
- 1 
-l'A 
-4Ά 
-VA 
-S'A 
-S'A 
- 4 % 
'A 
1994' 
- 5 % 
- 1 % 
- 3 % 
- 3 % 
- 7 % 
- 3 % 
- 3 % 
- 3 % 
- 9 % 
- % 
- 3 % 
- 3 % 
- 8 
-S'A 
-S'A 
-4Ά 
'A 
(g) Total employment 
(annual percentage change) 
(h) Compensation of employees per head 
(annual percentage change) 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
1,1 
- 0 , 5 
3,0 
— 
0.2 
2,8 
1.0 
3,3 
' 1,1 
4,3 
2,3 
0,9 
0,7 
1.6 
— 
1,2 
2,1 
1991 
- 0 , 3 
- 0 , 9 
2,6 
— 
- 2 , 0 
0,2 
0,4 
- 0 , 1 
0,8 
3,6 
1,3 
0,9 
- 3 , 1 
0,1 
— 
- 1 , 6 
1,9 
1992 
- 0 , 7 
- 0 , 7 
0,8 
- 0 , 5 
- 0 , 5 
- 1 , 6 
- 0 , 2 
0,1 
0,1 
1,5 
0,4 
- 0 , 2 
- 2 , 3 
- 0 , 5 
- 0 , 7 
0,7 
0,5 
1993' 
- % 
0 
- 1 
- 1 
0 
- 1 % 
- % 
0 
0 
VA 
- Ά 
- Ά 
-VA 
- Ά 
- Ά 
ι 
Α 
1994' 
% 
% 
- % 
- % 
% 
0 
0 
% 
'Λ 
1% 
0 
0 
- Α 
0 
0 
1% 
% 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
7,7 
3,4 
4,7 
— 
19,7 
7,9 
5,0 
4,4 
10,5 
6.9 
4,1 
18,7 
9,5 
7,5 
— 
4.9 
5.3 
1991 
6.8 
3,7 
5,8 
— 
15,0 
8,7 
4,2 
4,4 
8,7 
5,4 
4,3 
19,0 
8,9 
7,2 
— 
5.1 
4.4 
1992 
5,4 
3,2 
5,3 
— 
12,3 
9,0 
4,1 
6,3 
5,1 
5.1 
4.8 
14,9 
6,0 
5,8 
— 
2.4 
3,2 
1993' 
4% 
2% 
VA 
— 
11% 
7% 
4 
6 
4 
6 
3 % 
9% 
3% 
4% 
— 
2 
2 
1994' 
4% 
2% 
3 % 
— 
10% 
5% 
4 
3 % 
4% 
4'A 
3 % 
8% 
4'A 
4'A 
— 
VA 
2% 
Note: D + and EC + : these aggregates include values for unified Germany. 
1 Based on the forecasts of January 1993 (final). 
Unusually high uncertainties surround the winter 1992/93 economic forecasts which are based on the standard assumption of 'no change in economic policy', implying that projections for 1994 
are essentially extrapolations of expected 1993 trends. Actual outcomes for 1993 and, particularly, for 1994 might differ substantially from present forecasts if, inter alia, economic policies were 
to be significantly modified. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Annual Economic Report for 1993 
(i) Investment in construction at constant prices 
(annual percentage change) 
(j) Investment in equipment at constant prices 
(annual percentage change) 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
1990 
7,1 
- 4 , 6 
5,3 
— 
2,2 
10,8 
2,7 
11,7 
2,5 
8,0 
0,6 
5,3 
- 0 , 6 
3,8 
— 
1991 
2,0 
- 8 , 1 
4,1 
— 
- 6 , 4 
4,3 
0,6 
- 1 , 4 
1,2 
7,1 
- 2 , 1 
4,5 
- 8 , 4 
0,5 
— 
1992 
3,8 
- 4 , 5 
4,5 
5,6 
- 3 , 0 
- 3 , 4 
2,3 
2,5 
0,4 
6,0 
0,0 
2,5 
- 1 , 4 
1,0 
1,5 
1993' 
- 2 % 
4'A 
'A 
VA 
3 
- 3 % 
% 
3 
- % 
3% 
-Ά 
2 Ά 
-VA 
-Ά 
-Ά 
1994' 
1% 
VA 
2 
3 
5 
% 
1% 
2 
A 
4 
'A 
S'A 
S'A 
2 
2Ά 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
1990 
10,9 
3,7 
13,3 
— 
7,9 
1.4 
4,1 
7,2 
3,5 
10,9 
7.6 
5,8 
- 3 , 6 
4.8 
— 
1991 
- 1 , 9 
2,8 
9,1 
— 
3,3 
- 2 , 5 
- 2 , 5 
- 1 1 , 6 
0,7 
11,4 
2,6 
1.0 
- 1 1 , 9 
- 0 , 2 
— 
1992 
0,7 
- 1 2 , 0 
- 2 , 0 
1.3 
4,5 
0,2 
- 4 , 3 
0,5 
- 0 , 7 
3.5 
- 0 , 8 
4,8 
0,6 
- 1 , 5 
- 0 , 7 
1993' 
- 4 
- % 
- 4 
-VA 
6 
% 
- 1 % 
1% 
-VA 
1% 
- % 
3 % 
0 
-VA 
- 1 
1994' 
1% 
4 Ά 
VA 
VA 
VA 
VA 
VA 
VA 
VA 
3 
l'A 
6 
3 % 
2% 
VA 
(k) Gross fixed capital formation at constant 
prices (annual percentage change) 
(1) GDP per head (EC = 100) at current 
prices and current PPS 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
1990 
8,4 
- 0 , 5 
8.7 
— 
4,8 
6,9 
3,1 
10,2 
3,3 
2,5 
3,6 
5,9 
- 3 , 1 
3,9 
— 
- 2 , 8 
9,5 
1991 
0,3 
- 2 , 8 
6,5 
— 
- 1 , 9 
1,6 
- 1 , 3 
- 7 , 2 
0,9 
9,8 
0,1 
2.8 
- 9 , 9 
0.0 
— 
- 8 , 5 
3,4 
1992 
2,5 
- 8 , 3 
1,3 
3,6 
0,6 
- 2 , 0 
- 1 , 5 
1,6 
- 0 , 2 
4,5 
- 0 , 4 
3,6 
- 0 , 4 
- 0 , 3 
0,4 
5,2 
- 0 , 7 
1993' 
- 3 % 
2 
- 1 % 
% 
4'A 
-2 
- % 
VA 
-VA 
VA 
- % 
3 % 
-Ά 
- 1 
-A 
4'A 
1 
1994' 
1% 
4% 
1% 
3 
6% 
1% 
1% 
l'A 
1 
3 % 
1 
5% 
4% 
2 
2% 
5 
2 
Β 
DK 
D 
D + 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
EC 
EC + 
USA 
JAP 
I960 
97,5 
115,2 
124,3 
— 
34,4 
58,3 
107,7 
57,2 
86,6 
155,4 
116,8 
37,2 
122,6 
100,0 
— 
182,6 
54,1 
1973 
103,5 
110,1 
116,7 
— 
50,6 
76,4 
112,7 
55,5 
93,4 
138,9 
111,4 
54,1 
103,5 
100,0 
— 
155,6 
92,8 
1986 
103,1 
114,2 
119,2 
— 
50,1 
70,6 
112,2 
60,1 
102,6 
124,9 
104,5 
50,7 
101,3 
100,0 
— 
146,4 
105,2 
1993' 
106,7 
107,5 
116,3 
— 
46,8 
77,2 
113,3 
72,3 
103,8 
130,6 
104,0 
58,1 
95,2 
100,0 
— 
136,8 
118,1 
1994' 
107,1 
108,4 
114,7 
— 
46,9 
77,6 
113,5 
72,8 
103,9 
130,8 
103,3 
58,8 
96,3 
100,0 
— 
137,7 
119,3 
Note: D + and EC + : these aggregates include values for unified Germany. 
1 Based on the forecasts of January 1993 (final). 
Unusually high uncertainties surround the winter 1992/93 economic forecasts which are based on the standard assumption of 'no change in economic policy', implying that projections for 1994 
are essentially extrapolations of expected 1993 trends. Actual outcomes for 1993 and, particularly, for 1994 might differ substantially from present forecasts if, inter alia, economic policies were 
to be significantly modified. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
The following sections give a fuller assessment of recent 
developments, short-term prospects and the current central 
policy issues in each of the national economies of the Com-
munity. 
The review of developments in 1992 surveys a year in which 
many hopes for better economic performance were disap-
pointed, with greater short-term divergence of results. Such 
divergences underlay much of the pressure which under-
mined existing ERM parities in the autumn. In the short 
term the consequences of the exchange-rate crises, including 
devaluations and suspensions from the mechanism, are likely 
to reinforce these differences. The non-devaluing countries 
are generally likely to have more subdued growth and greater 
disinflation than countries which have devalued. The picture 
overall is nevertheless sombre, with weak growth dominated 
by recession in western Germany. 
The survey of policy issues demonstrates the lack of room for 
manoeuvre in most countries. As regards monetary policy, 
in the ERM countries, this arises from the exchange-rate 
constraints on monetary policy while for the other countries 
(and for the ERM anchor country, Germany) monetary 
independence is limited by the need to restrain inflation. 
Fiscal policy is also in most Member States constrained by 
the need to reduce existing imbalances, often in the context 
of convergence programmes which have as their central 
ambition the need to meet the convergence criteria for EMU. 
Given these constraints, policy includes for most countries 
the intensification of efforts to improve the supply sides of 
their economies; in the context of the introduction of the 
single market and the further liberalization of international 
trade hoped for in the current GATT round, such structural 
improvements are particularly important. 
Looking further ahead, there are other positive forces in 
prospect: a strengthening external environment as well as an 
increase in nominal competitiveness, an eventual easing of 
monetary policy and resumed progress in disinflation. A 
Community economy more efficient and with greater in-
ternal convergence will be in a position to resume a more 
dynamic growth path and will be better able to meet the 
challenges of the world economy in the mid-1990s. 
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Belgium 
Slow growth worsens economic imbalances 
After the buoyant economic expansion of the late 1980s, 
economic growth in Belgium slowed down in 1992 mainly 
as a result of the deterioration in world-wide economic 
conditions. GDP growth decelerated in 1992 to an estimated 
annual rate of approximately 1% (from around 2% in 1991), 
and well below the impressive growth of over 4% registered 
on average from 1988 to 1990. Recent economic performance 
had adverse consequences for the two major imbalances of 
the Belgian economy, concerning public finances and the 
labour market. 
The slowing down of economic growth in 1992 follows the 
fading out of the effect of German unification on export 
demand. Domestic demand decelerated during the year, al-
though remaining at practically the same level for the year 
as a whole as in 1991. Domestic demand was particularly 
dynamic in the first half of 1992, in response to a set of 
temporary favourable circumstances, which were partly re-
versed later in the year. Private consumption was stimulated 
by a set of one-off events that especially stimulated demand 
for durable consumption goods. However, in the second half 
of the year, the tightening of fiscal policy together with the 
unfavourable outlook for the labour market contributed to 
the tapering off of private consumption. 
The real level of residential construction in 1992 was about 
80% above the level of 1986. In spite of the extraordinary 
buoyant growth in this category of spending since the mid-
1980s, the ratio of households' overall debt to disposable 
income remains relatively low, when compared with other 
countries, due to the high level of saving. 
Firms' investment grew modestly in 1992 due to the slow-
down in economic activity and weak demand prospects. The 
pattern of investment spending in manufacturing industry 
was somewhat uneven among sectors, remaining strong in 
some economic branches, such as the car industry, while it 
was less favourable in other sectors more affected by the 
economic slowdown and exposed to increased international 
competition (textile and steel industries). Investment surveys 
in the manufacturing industry point to a significant contrac-
tion in spending in 1993. 
Table 2 
Belgium: Investment performance 
1985-87 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 15,8 
(% change) 3,6 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 1,8 
Equipment (% change) 4,9 
1988-90 
19,1 
12,4 
9,7 
15,9 
1991 
19,8 
0,3 
2.0 
-1,9 
1992 
19,9 
2,5 
3.8 
0,7 
1993 
19,1 
-3,3 
-2,8 
-4,0 
1994 
18,9 
1.3 
1,3 
1,3 
Table 1 
Belgium: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
1.4 
2.4 
0.6 
11,6 
2.8 
1.2 
1988-90 
4.1 
4.3 
1.4 
8.8 
2,7 
1.4 
1991 
1,9 
1,6 
-0,3 
7.5 
2.9 
1,7 
1992 
1,0 
1,9 
-0,7 
8.2 
2.4 
1.8 
1991 
0.5 
0.6 
-0,7 
9,3 
2.8 
1.8 
1994 
1.7 
1.6 
0,2 
9,8 
2,8 
1.9 
Residential investment grew in 1992 at a vigorous pace, 
reflecting both the effects of increased competition on the 
domestic mortgage market, which exerted a downward 
pressure on mortgage rates, and a relatively mild winter. 
Export growth faltered in 1992, entailing some loss in market 
shares. This may be due to the erosion of price-competi-
tiveness, resulting from developments in domestic costs and 
the effective nominal appreciation of the Belgian franc 
which, however, will only be fully felt in 1993. Nevertheless, 
as wage inflation is expected to slow down in 1993 and 1994, 
reflecting the moderate interoccupational agreement reached 
for that period (see below), Belgium's competitive position 
is likely to remain basically sound. In 1992 the current 
account remained in surplus (about 1,5% of GDP) in part 
because import growth has slowed and the terms of trade 
have improved. 
In spite of increases in indirect taxes, the economic slowdown 
and lower import prices allowed a further reduction in in-
flation. Annual CPI inflation decreased from 3,2% in 1991 
to 2,4% in 1992 (about 1,5 percentage points below the 
Community average). 
Growth prospects are not expected to improve in 1993 even 
if monetary policy eases significantly in the coming months. 
Long-term interest rates, which are more relevant for invest-
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Table 3 
Belgium: Economic policy 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness ' 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
indicators 
1985-87 
9.9 
8,2 
8,8 
104,4 
-8,6 
124,9 
0.8 
1988-90 
8,5 
8.4 
8.9 
102,8 
-6,4 
129,4 
1,7 
1991 
4.9 
9.4 
9.3 
105,0 
-6 ,6 
130,1 
3,8 
1992 
4.8 
9.4 
8,6 
107,7 
-6,7 
132,2 
2.9 
199 J 
4.4 
7,3 
7.9 
111,9 
-6,0 
134,3 
1.8 
1994 
5,3 
5,8 
7,8 
112,6 
-5,3 
134,2 
1,7 
1 BLEU. 
Note: Figures for 1993-94 are forecasts made by Commission services in January 1993. based 
on technical assumptions on interest and exchange rates. 
Definitions: 
Unemployment rate: harmonized Eurostat definition. 
Inflation: private consumption deflator. 
Money growth: broad money (M2/M3). 
Competitiveness: nominal unit wage cost (total economy) relative to 19 industrial countries. 
double weighting of exports. 
Budget balance: net lending/borrowing of general government. 
Gross public debt: general government. 
Nominal wages: compensation of employees per head. 
Real wages: compensation of employees per head deflated by private consumption prices. 
ment decisions, are only likely to decrease slightly, while 
foreign demand continues depressed. Stimulus from dom-
estic demand is also not foreseen. All in all economic growth 
is not expected to exceed 0,5% in 1993. 
aiming at further rationalizing production activities through 
the substitution of capital for labour. 
The need to complete fiscal consolidation 
Despite the considerable progress made until the beginning 
of the 1990s,1 the process of fiscal adjustment is yet far from 
being completed (the general government deficit is still above 
6% of GDP while the gross public debt to GDP ratio is 
above 130% of GDP). Fiscal policy since 1992 has been set 
in the framework of the convergence programme approved 
in June 1992 by the national government and endorsed by 
the Economic and Financial Council in November 1992 (see 
below). The general government deficit in 1992 is estimated 
at 6 % % of GDP, overshooting the convergence programme 
target of 5,7%. The slowdown in the pace of economic 
growth in 1992 is the main cause of the deterioration in the 
public finances situation, while higher interest rates also 
made the task of fiscal consolidation more difficult. In ad-
dition, some of the expenditure-saving measures decided in 
1992, in particular in the social security area, will only start 
producing significant results in 1993 (e.g. limiting access to 
unemployment-related schemes), while other measures are 
to a large extent yet to be implemented (e.g. measures to 
curb excessive spending in health care). The convergence 
programme aims at reducing the general government deficit 
to 5,2% of GDP in 1993; however the outcome for 1992 will 
most likely require taking new saving measures in addition 
to the initial 1993 budget, which involved saving measures 
amounting to approximately BFR 145 billion (about 1,9% 
of GDP). 
In the current unfavourable world-wide economic situation 
it is particularly important to maintain a satisfactory degree 
of competitiveness in order to avoid any further slowing 
down of domestic activity. In this respect, it is important to 
secure moderate total labour-cost increases for the 1993-94 
period. This will depend on the outcome of negotiations 
at sectoral and enterprise levels, as the interoccupational 
agreement for the 1993-94 period involves per se only very 
modest increases in labour costs. 
Economic growth prospects will once again negatively affect 
the labour market. The unemployment rate is expected to 
increase from 8,2% in 1992 to 9,3% in 1993 (Eurostat 
definition). In 1993, firms facing low demand growth are 
expected to continue shedding labour in order to restore 
profitability, both through the reduction in employment and 
in the number of working hours. In the current phase of the 
economic cycle investment spending seems to be especially 
The fiscal consolidation strategy: 
the convergence programme 
The convergence programme presented by the Belgian 
Government in June 1992 focuses on fiscal consolidation: 
reducing the general government deficit to no more than 3% 
of GNP in 1996 (which implies raising the primary surplus 
from about 4% of GNP in 1992 to 7% in 1996) and putting 
the indebtedness ratio on a downward trend. Belgium 
already meets the remaining EMU convergence criteria, 
namely on the exchange rate, interest rates and inflation. 
The general government deficit, including financial operations, was 
reduced from 16,3% of GDP in 1981 to 7% in 1990. The extent of the 
fiscal adjustment effort can be more properly assessed by looking at the 
improvement in the primary balance, which showed a deficit of 8,4% 
of GDP in 1981 but a surplus of about 4% of GDP in 1990. 
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GRAPH 1 : Belgium — Gross public debt 
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The convergence programme is based on the following three 
elements: 
(i) unitary tax/nominal GDP elasticity; 
(ii) the freezing in real terms of national government non-
interest expenditures; and 
(iii) a balanced budget for social security given fixed nominal 
transfers from the national government of 
BFR 231 billion (approximately 16% of social security 
revenues in 1992). 
In addition, communities and regions (C&Rs) have to make 
a significant contribution to the overall stabilization effort, 
as they have to increase their primary surplus by 0,6% of 
GDP between 1992 and 1996, about a third of the overall 
consolidation effort. 
plied basically only to the national government.1 Neverthe­
less, given that C&Rs are being asked to contribute approxi­
mately a third of the overall budgetary effort, it is important 
to avoid any slippages and to guarantee an adequate degree 
of coordination between the various levels of government 
(national government and C&Rs) in the framework of the 
law on the financing of C&Rs (16 January 1989), which also 
set up the safeguard mechanisms for the overall consistency 
of fiscal policy. 
In the current phase of the economic cycle, pursuing the 
process of fiscal consolidation has become a very exacting 
task, which is likely to require a thorough re-evaluation of 
policies and priorities, in particular in areas such as health 
care where in recent years real spending has been growing at 
unsustainable rates (from 1988 to 1992 health-care spending 
The convergence programme involves all levels of govern­
ment in the consolidation process. This is a significant im­
provement on the earlier 'double norm' strategy which ap-
The 'double norm' was applied from 1988 to 1991 and consisted of a 
zero real growth rate for non-interest expenditure, and no increase in 
the nominal deficit. 
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grew from 5,7% of GDP to 6,5%). Therefore, curbing ex­
cessive spending in some areas seems to be a necessary 
condition for the successful completion of the fiscal consoli­
dation process. 
Tackling labour market disequilibrium requires 
structural measures 
Despite remaining lower than the Community average, the 
unemployment rate rose from 7,5% in 1991 to 8,2% in 1992, 
while employment declined in 1992 by approximately 25 000. 
Although the more immediate reason for the worsening of 
the labour market situation is the downturn in the economic 
conjuncture, the underlying causes of persistent market dis­
equilibrium are structural. This prompted the introduction 
by the government of a number of important reforms in 
1992, and which are to be extended in coming years. The 
wide scope of public policies, intervening both on the de­
mand and the supply side of the market, have unduly fettered 
the labour market and, together with the unfavourable 
demographic outlook, risk putting a constraint on future 
economic growth. Labour market disequilibrium reflects to 
a large extent the effect of high labour costs, including a 
large tax wedge, which discourages job creation. The open-
handed nature of the various unemployment programmes, 
which developed in scope well beyond the initial objective 
of providing income insurance to implicitly performing a 
multitude of other policy objectives, is also partly responsible 
for the current predicament. 
In the 1992 and 1993 budgets the government took some 
significant measures to address labour market problems, 
in particular the initiative aiming at promoting training 
and employment for the longer-term unemployed 
('Begeleidingsplan/Plan d'accompagnement'). Nevertheless, 
given the size of current distortions and the way in which 
powers on labour market policies are shared at various levels 
of government, these measures should be strengthened and 
fully coordinated in the future. 
GRAPH 2 : Belgium — Beneficiaries of unemployment insurance 
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Source: Report of lhe National Bank of Belgium. 1991. 
■ Early retirement under collective agreements 
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J Part-time unemployed persons 
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Unemployed persons 
receiving training 
Wholly unemployed persons 
receiving benefit 
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Denmark 
Fundamentals remain strong, but slow growth 
continues 
reducing growth in 1992 by about 0,5%. An international 
recovery is not expected until the end of 1993. Prospects 
are accordingly for only modest growth of 1,8% in 1993, 
accelerating to 2,2% in 1994. 
The Danish economy overall presents a healthy picture, 
despite the currency turbulence in 1992 and the low growth 
performance of recent years. Public finances are under con­
trol. The current account shows a large and increasing sur­
plus, which enables Denmark to reduce its large foreign 
debt. Danish cost competitiveness has deteriorated slightly 
due to the nominal appreciation of the Danish krone in 1992, 
but should nevertheless remain strong if wage moderation is 
continued. Real wages should still be able to increase by 
about 1 % over the next one to two years, because of low 
inflation. Consumer prices increased by only slightly more 
than 2% in 1992 and are expected to increase by less than 2% 
in 1993, the lowest inflation rate in the EC. Unemployment is 
the biggest challenge in the Danish economy, requiring 
higher growth for its reduction. 
The slow growth trend continued in 1992 with GDP growth 
of only about 1%. However, drought caused a bad harvest, 
Table 1 
Denmark: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985­87 
2.7 
3,0 
2.0 
6.1 
3.9 
­4,3 
1988­90 
1.2 
­0 ,5 
­0,6 
7.4 
3,7 
­0,8 
1991 
1,2 
0.1 
­0,9 
8,9 
2.4 
1.3 
1992 
1.0 
­0,4 
­0,7 
9,5 
2.1 
3,0 
1993 
1.8 
2,1 
0.1 
9,5 
1.6 
3.0 
1994 
2.2 
2,2 
0,3 
9,3 
2,0 
2,9 
GRAPH 1 : Denmark — Competitiveness and profitability (total economy) 
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Domestic demand was weak in 1992 and provided a negative 
growth contribution. However, domestic demand is expected 
to become the main driver of growth in 1993. Private con-
sumption saw a weak development in 1992, and prospects 
are only for a gradual recovery in 1993 due to high unem-
ployment and high interest rates. Public consumption in-
creased slightly in 1992. Overall the fiscal policy stance 
became more expansionary in 1992 primarily due to new 
initiatives to combat unemployment. Public consumption is 
expected to increase by 2,2% in 1993 as a result of a decision 
to provide a fiscal policy stimulus to the economy. 
Gross fixed investment declined by about 8% in 1992 and 
made a negative contribution to growth. Prospects are for 
a slight increase in 1993, but this is mainly due to the 
acceleration of planned public investments. Construction 
and particularly residential construction is at the lowest 
level for the last 10 years. Increased tax relief for housing 
maintenance and improved conditions for urban renewal 
will give some support to the residential construction sector, 
but a persisting very high real interest rate constrains con-
struction. Investment in equipment has also declined since 
the peak in the mid-1980s, but to a lesser extent than con-
struction. Profitability is still healthy, and investment in 
equipment should pick up with improved demand expec-
tations. 
Table 2 
Denmark: Investment performance 
1985-87 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 19,7 
(% change) 8,2 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 9,2 
Equipment (% change) 7,3 
1988-90 
17,9 
-2,6 
-5,3 
0,1 
1991 
1 
17,1 
-2,8 
-8,1 
2,8-
1992 
15,6 
-8,3 
-4,5 
-12,0 
1993 
15,7 
1,9 
4,5 
-0,6 
1994 
16,2 
4,2 
3.6 
4.9 
The external balance has been the main source of growth in 
recent years. The current account moved into surplus in 
1990 after more than 25 consecutive years of deficit. The 
main reasons behind the turn-around were higher domestic 
savings due to, amongst other things, the 1987 tax reform 
which increased Danish North Sea oil and gas production 
and high export growth, particularly following German uni-
fication. Germany became the largest Danish export market, 
accounting for 22,4% (1991) of Danish exports. 
In 1992 the external current account surplus again increased. 
The bad harvest caused by drought, a slightly deteriorating 
Danish price competitiveness particularly due to an appreci-
ation of the Danish krone and slow growth on the main 
export markets led to a slowdown of export growth in the 
second half of the year. However, the weak development in 
private consumption and investment have led to a decrease 
in import growth as well. The current account surplus was 
2,9% of GDP in 1992, and is expected to stabilize at a level 
of 3% of GDP in 1993 and 1994. Imports will pick up due 
to stronger domestic demand, but at the same time the 
reduction of the external debt will lead to reduced interest 
payments. The external side is not expected to provide any 
growth stimulus in 1993 and 1994. 
Table 3 
Denmark: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt ' 
(VoofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
9,4 6,3 6,4 2,5 3,5 3,8 
9,7 9,5 9,5 11,5 10,5 7,8 
11,3 10,6 10,1 10,1 9,8 9,0 
106,9 111,6 106,1 107,4 110,0 108,4 
1,3 -0,4 -2,0 -2,3 -2,7 -1,9 
70,5 66,6 72,2 74,0 76,2 77,3 
5,7 4,1 3,7 3,2 2,5 2,8 
1,7 0,4 1,2 1,1 0,9 0,8 
1 Before consolidation of government debt held by 'Den Sociale Pensionsfund"; if consolidated, 
the debt/GDP ratio would be below 60%. 
For définitions, see Table 3 for Belgium. 
The public budget deficit was about 2,3% of GDP in 1992. 
The VAT rate was increased to 25% after the abolition of 
a special Danish labour-market tax based on VAT following 
a ruling of the European Court. The abolition of the labour-
market tax caused a one-off increase in the budget deficit of 
about 0,5% of GDP in 1992. Some indirect excise taxes were 
reduced in the second half of 1992 as a preparation for the 
internal market, but these measures were met by increased 
revenues from other sources. The budget for 1993 has ad-
ditional expansionary fiscal measures including increased 
expenditure on education, increased tax relief for mainten-
ance costs for housing and an acceleration of planned public 
investment. The State budget balance was not affected by 
these measures, but due to large loan-financed investments 
by local authorities the total public sector deficit is expected 
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to deteriorate to 2,7% of GDP in 1993. The limited room 
for a fiscal policy growth stimulus seems to have been 
utilized. Public finances are under control, but there is in 
the current situation a downside risk to the budget deficit. 
The biggest challenge in the Danish economy is the high and 
increasing rate of unemployment of which the major part is 
structural. Productivity increases in combination with slow 
growth caused unemployment to continue to increase in 
1992. A high productivity growth is essential to strengthen 
Denmark's position in the internal market, but it also means 
that faster growth is required in order to reduce unemploy­
ment. Given the external environment, higher growth in the 
short term will have to be driven by domestic demand. 
Unfortunately, policy options for stimulating growth are 
limited. Monetary policy must primarily meet exchange­
rate objectives, and fiscal policy is constrained by budget 
considerations and the necessity for economic convergence. 
Thus supply­side measures aimed at promoting industrial 
development will be an essential part of any growth strategy. 
Possibilities for industrial development exist... 
The integrating European economy provides an opportunity 
for a supply­side induced growth cycle. The Danish position 
seems in this respect to be quite favourable. Danish cost 
competitiveness is still quite good despite the devaluations 
in 1992, and Danish companies have adapted their strategies 
to the new, more international, environment. The number 
of mergers and acquisitions per year thus more than tripled 
in the period 1987­91. Most of the mergers and acquisitions 
took place between small to medium­sized companies, but 
the process led to important adaptations of the industrial 
structure. Danish industry was already highly inter­
nationalized by the mid­1980s, but Danish companies inten­
sified their internationalization process in the run­up to the 
internal market, as witnessed in foreign direct investment 
flows, which increased sharply in the period 1987­91. 
Danish industry mainly consists of small to medium­sized 
firms, and the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions did 
not from an overall point of view change the size structure 
of the industry. It could be argued that the lack of big 
Danish multinational corporations will be a competitive 
disadvantage for Denmark in the internal market. However, 
company size is not in itself a source of competitive advan­
tage. Companies need an optimal size for the strategies they 
pursue, and many small to medium­sized Danish companies 
have succeeded in building up considerable export bases. 
Despite the good position on the threshold of the internal 
market, employment creation prospects in Danish industry 
GRAPH 2 : Denmark — Mergers and acquisitions 
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are mixed. Danish industry is strongest in what are normally 
considered to be mature low­technology industries. At the 
same time most of the bigger Danish industrial corporations 
have achieved dominant positions on the home market, 
thereby making Danish core industries highly concentrated. 
The prospects for employment generation in a mature and 
at the same time highly concentrated industry are, almost 
by necessity, limited. Although the biggest companies pro­
vide the backbone of the Danish industrial structure, they 
are unlikely to be the major source of industrial employment 
creation. Small to medium­sized companies offer better pros­
pects for new industrial employment. Key issues in a Danish 
industrial development strategy would therefore seem to be 
the further internationalization of small to medium­sized 
Danish companies, to promote new business development, 
and to attract foreign investment. The integrating European 
economy is a big opportunity in this respect. 
The services sector is often pointed to as the main source of 
new jobs in the future. Indeed some service activities like 
business services have been among the biggest providers of 
new jobs in the past decade. The high Danish level of 
personal taxation has no doubt led to a relatively low con­
sumption level of household services as well as having con­
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GRAPH 3 : Denmark — Foreign direct investment flows 
FDI in % of private fixed capital formation 
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tributed to the black economy. This indicates an employment 
growth potential in the service industries. However, short-
to medium-term prospects are not for a significantly higher 
employment in the service industries as a whole due to the 
current problems and rationalizations in the banking and 
insurance sectors. 
...but unemployment and structural labour 
market problems may prevent growth 
The Danish unemployment rate is currently about 11,3% 
(national definition), but past evidence (from the 1986-87 
boom) shows it can fall only to about 8% before bottlenecks 
develop leading to salary and wage inflation. Therefore, 
a modest economic recovery is possible without meeting 
excessive tensions. Higher growth rates would rapidly lead 
to higher inflation due to the very high structural component 
in unemployment. 
There are several reasons for the structural problems on 
the labour market. First, the very generous unemployment 
benefit system is undoubtedly a major source: the incentive 
for the unemployed to accept job offers could be higher. 
Secondly, the Danish wage structure is very compressed with 
a relatively high minimum wage, which has led to a relatively 
high concentration of unemployment among unskilled 
workers. Thirdly, the labour market would benefit from a 
more modern organization of the trade unions along the 
lines seen for example in Sweden and in Germany. Finally, 
geographic mobility is being constrained by the increase in 
the proportion of double-income families. On the one hand, 
this means that a move almost automatically leads to the 
need for two new jobs in a family. On the other hand, the 
difficulty and cost of finding new housing reduces geographic 
mobility. The supply conditions for rented housing has made 
it very difficult to find rented apartments, and the cost of 
selling a house or an apartment is also constraining mobility. 
The current depressed housing market has aggravated the 
situation. 
The labour force is expected to start declining in the mid-
1990s due to a decline in the number of new entrants 
to the labour force. However, this will not in itself reduce 
unemployment. The structural problems will persist and may 
even worsen, since the average age of the labour force will 
increase, and the rapid technological and market changes 
will increase the need for flexibility and mobility. Demo-
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graphic trends will thus in themselves lead to a greater need 
for further education of people in work. Education increases 
the mobility and flexibility of labour, and will be a key to a 
permanent reduction of structural unemployment. 
The dilemma is to reduce unemployment while 
maintaining stability 
A higher growth rate is necessary in order to reduce unem-
ployment, but the policy options for stimulating growth are 
limited. Both fiscal and monetary policy are constrained. 
Danish competitiveness is expected to improve over the next 
few years and could provide a growth impetus. However, 
the present high level of unemployment makes a very modest 
growth of labour costs imperative. Very low inflation should 
reconcile this with continued improvement of real wages. 
Structural supply-side improvements promoting industrial 
development would still seem to be the best policy option 
although in the short term their effects are limited. In any 
case any growth strategy will be faced with the problem 
of simultaneously reducing the structural labour market 
problems in order to maintain macroeconomic stability. 
The integrating European economy is an opportunity for 
Denmark to promote industrial development and thereby 
increase growth. However, the current uncertainty is un-
favourable for the investment climate, and important labour 
market problems persist. 
46 
Germany 
Germany 
Recession in western Germany, improvement 
later in 1993? 
In western Germany an extended period of substantial 
growth, driven by unification during 1990/91, came to an 
end last year. Although activity was buoyant early in 1992 
and fiscal policy in general again had an expansionary im-
pact, while deliveries to eastern Germany still rose strongly, 
signs of cooling off have increased since last spring. 
While a slowdown in activity is quite natural after a boom 
period, the German economy has had to cope with additional 
challenges. Fiscal policy is confronted with the continuing 
demand to support the economy of eastern Germany. Con-
taining the deficit is difficult, in particular as growth slack-
ens. Yet the primary task seems now to restore confidence 
by agreeing on a medium-term strategy. Inflation, driven by 
wages, taxes, rents and prices of other services, is slow to 
come down. This has made it hard for the Bundesbank to 
ease monetary policy more strongly since the turn-around 
last September. On the external side, problems of competi-
tiveness, augmented by the EMS exchange-rate adjustments 
since September 1992, coincide with still subdued activity 
abroad. 
Cyclical data have turned negative, some to a worrying 
extent. Since early last year, incoming orders have been 
falling. Order books and capacity utilization have been 
shrinking and business climate indicators have declined 
sharply. Pessimistic assessments of short-term prospects 
have had a negative impact on investment, employment and 
output. While growth still attained 1,5% in 1992, mainly 
due to a strong first quarter, the decline of activity since 
spring last year and the very weak leading indicators point 
to a contraction of output in 1993. Assuming a credible 
fiscal policy strategy, further monetary easing and a recovery 
of the world economy at large providing the right signals, a 
turn-around should materialize in the course of this year. 
While this could still leave GDP falling by around 0,5% in 
1993, it could give way to an investment-led recovery and 
GDP growth of about 1 % in 1994. However, given the down 
risks — continuous uncertainty with regard to fiscal policy, 
poor inflation performance, and the related lack of confi-
dence — a more pronounced and prolonged recession cannot 
be excluded entirely. Growth in Germany as a whole will be 
around zero in 1993 and around 1,5% in 1994. 
Table 1 
West Germany: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
1.8 
2,3 
1,0 
6.6 
0,9 
3.6 
1988-90 
4.1 
3.8 
1.7 
5.6 
2.4 
4.2 
1991 
3,7 
3.1 
2.6 
4.2 
3.9 
1,2 
1992 
1,5 
1.3 
0.8 
4.5 
4,0 
0,4 
1993 
-0,5 
-0 ,5 
-1,0 
6.0 
3.6 
-0,1 
1994 
1.0 
0,5 
-0,2 
6,5 
3,1 
0.1 
Inflation set to fall gradually 
Given the weakness of the economy and the deteriorating 
labour market situation, wage moderation will make pro-
gress this year. However, the deceleration of productivity 
growth will limit the deceleration of unit labour costs. Also, 
the fall in import prices, 3,2% in 1992, will probably not be 
repeated in 1993. Inflation is now mostly driven by price 
increases in the services sector and by administrative prices. 
Tariffs for transport and communications and rents are 
rising. Social security contributions have gone up and in 
January 1993 the standard VAT rate was increased from 14 
to 15%. All in all, an inflation rate of slightly above 3,5% 
cannot be excluded in 1993 after 4% in 1992. 
Dramatic swing in the external balance 
Unification has led to a dramatic swing in the external 
balance. The trade balance surplus of unified Germany, 
which was DM 135 billion in 1989, had been reduced to 
DM 22 billion in 1991. Export demand is now falling and 
expected to remain weak in most of 1993, but imports are 
also decreasing. The trade surplus has edged up again, to 
about DM 30 billion in 1992, partly due to an improvement 
in the terms of trade. The traditionally high deficit in services 
and transfers, however, caused the total current account to 
show a deficit of more than DM 30 billion in 1992, approxi-
mately 1 % of GDP. 
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GRAPH 1 : Germany — GDP growth and confidence indicators 
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Table 2 
West Germany: Investment performance 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Gross capital formation 
( % o f G D P ) 
(% change) 
of which: 
Construction (% change) - 1 , 0 4,4 4,1 4,5 0,5 1,9 
19,4 20,2 21,6 21,5 21,4 21,7 
1,9 6,6 6,5 1,3 - 1 , 7 1,9 
Unification lifted the previous balance-of-payments con­
straints and provided substantial income transfers. There­
fore, absorption in the region has grown despite the sharp 
decline in local output. The exceptional situation is high­
lighted by the fact that the level of total domestic demand 
has been almost twice as high as GDP since 1991. The 
massive switch to imports has also affected the labour mar­
ket. Employment, still supported significantly by labour 
market policy measures, has diminished some 40% since 
1989 and official unemployment, an undefined concept in 
the former system, has risen to more than 14% in 1992. 
Equipment (% change) 6,4 10,0 9,1 - 2 , 0 - 4 , 0 1,8 
Disappointing performance in eastern Germany 
In eastern Germany, GDP witnessed a first increase of some 
6% in 1992, rather less than originally hoped for. This 
follows a collapse of economic activity since 1989 with GDP 
falling to little more than half its previous level. Faced with 
world market competition, eastern German products have 
in general been revealed as uncompetitive at the prevailing 
cost levels. A largely obsolete capital stock is a serious 
obstacle to a rise in productivity. 
Even at the present lower level of activity there continue to 
be retarding elements. Output of all tradables suffers from 
the double drawback of low productivity due to a lack of a 
modern capital stock and of wages catching up to western 
levels. Eastern unit labour costs have risen dramatically over 
the last two years and are now well above the western level. 
In addition, industry has been faced with a virtual wiping-
out of traditional East European markets. For the entire 
economy the infrastructure at large is inadequate. The prop­
erty ownership issue continues to be a source of uncertainty. 
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Conditions for eastern catching-up 
Only substantial capital spending will permit a gradual over-
haul of the capital stock, both private and public. Modern 
plants will boost productivity. An upgraded public infra-
structure will make it easier to attract investors. Renovated 
housing will foster the willingness of high-quality specialists 
to settle and slow down a brain drain of highly skilled local 
residents. Investment has indeed picked up, the investment/ 
GDP ratio being above 40% in 1991. Pledges of investment 
by western companies are so far rising. Substantial fiscal 
incentives exist. The construction industry is expanding. 
Besides this, a services industry is being established. Im-
provements will be very gradual, however. Jobs in industry 
are being cut, where employment is falling. Possibly due to 
this, the pace of the wage catching-up seems to be slowing 
down. This will be facilitated by a deceleration of inflation 
which, influenced by structural adjustments in administered 
prices (mainly housing), was at around 10% in 1992. While 
this process has not yet been completed, its impact on con-
sumer prices will, nevertheless, diminish over time. 
Substantial capital spending will, however, only take place 
if there are satisfactory demand expectations and a high 
level of capacity utilization in Germany as a whole and 
world-wide. Therefore, eastern catching-up crucially de-
pends upon a sustained high level of western economic 
activity. The present cyclical slowdown in western Germany 
has thus different structural implications than in the past. 
Rising unemployment in the west... 
After three years of particularly strong dynamism, with the 
number of jobs increasing by 2 million ( + 7%), employment 
growth in western Germany has come to a halt. As the 
population of working age continues to grow by about 1% 
per year (due to demographical factors and immigration), 
unemployment is rising. The December 1992 unemployment 
rate was 6,4% (total labour force). The services sector is still 
seeing some expansion of employment, but the number of 
jobs in industry is falling (e.g. by 2,5% over the last year 
in manufacturing and mining). Rationalization efforts by 
German companies in order to cope with international com-
petition are adding to cyclical factors. Unemployment will 
exceed the 2 million mark in early 1993 and will continue to 
rise throughout the year. 
Besides the slowdown of economic activity, the increase in 
unemployment is also due to structural factors. Among these 
factors which constitute a barrier to employment growth 
are rigid rules concerning working hours, the lack of wage 
differentials among firms and regions and strict dismissal 
protection. Further, improved training and education is 
needed to reduce the currently existing mismatch between 
skills offered and required. The social partners are, to an 
increasing extent, accepting that flexibility of the labour 
market should be enhanced in order to ensure a continuous 
high level and quality of employment. 
...and declining employment in the east 
The situation on the eastern labour market is bleak. Since 
1989, employment has fallen some 40%, which is still less 
than the overall collapse of output by roughly half. The lag 
in employment adjustment has been due to various policy 
measures and other factors. Some of the purely retarding 
devices have now expired ('Rationalisierungsschutzabkom-
men', 'Warteschleife' in the public sector). Active labour 
market policy has provided for job creation programmes 
(ABM). It is unlikely that they will be scaled back signifi-
cantly soon. But more lay-offs from industry are still to be 
expected. This sector has been hit hardest by the economic 
transformation with output shrinking by about two-thirds. 
A more positive factor is the expansion of service industries. 
But the emerging overall growth is unlikely to translate into 
an increase in the number of jobs before mid-1993. 
The 1992 unemployment rate of slightly above 14% grossly 
understates the size of underemployment. It came close to 
40% when full account is taken of all government-financed 
support schemes, i.e. unemployment proper, short-term 
work, employment and training programmes and early re-
tirement facilities. 
Although active labour market measures are justified on 
social grounds, the overall German labour market increas-
ingly has to be assessed as a whole. More open unemploy-
ment in the east should ease upward pressure on wages, not 
only in the east but also in the west. Open unemployment 
would also mobilize the unemployed to more active job 
search — in the west or the east — or to aim at better 
education. Consequently, migration and commuting would 
continue, a positive element of labour market flexibility, 
leaving aside the social costs of migration. Although gross 
migration from east to west is still large, it is encouraging 
that on a net basis it is shrinking because of an increasing 
number of people going east. 
Fiscal policy: deficit stabilized in 1992 
Unification has caused a dramatic swing in German public 
finances. Due to substantial public transfers to eastern Ger-
many of currently some 5% of GDP per year, a tiny surplus 
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Table 3 
Germany: Economic policy indicators 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Money growth ' 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate ' 
Long-term interest rate ' 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100)2 
Budget balance ' 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt ' 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head2 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 2 
(% change) 
5,8 5,6 6,3 8,3 5,6 6,3 
4,7 6,6 9,2 9,5 7,5 5,8 
6.2 7,3 8,6 8,0 7,4 7,5 
108,4 110,1 108,7 114,2 119,1 119,1 
- 1 , 5 - 1 , 4 - 3 , 2 - 3 , 2 - 3 , 6 - 3 , 7 
42,9 43,7 42,0 43,3 46,1 48,6 
3.3 3,5 5,8 5,3 3,6 3,5 
2.4 1,1 1,8 1,3 0,0 0,4 
1 Unified Germany from 1991. 
2 West Germany only. 
For definitions, see Table 3 Tor Belgium. 
in the general government balance before unification 
(1989:0,1% of GDP) has turned into a sizeable deficit 
(1991: 3,2%). Various tax and social contribution increases 
and expenditure cuts since 1991 notwithstanding, the major 
part of unification-related outlays has been financed via a 
higher deficit. 
The overall situation is expected to have at best stabilized 
in 1992 with the general government deficit stagnating at 
3,1% of GDP. A noticeable swing in social security accounts 
from surplus into deficit is likely to have been partially 
compensated for by a decline in the territorial authorities' 
deficit, mainly due to higher tax inflows. While the 
Treuhandanstalt at present is not part of the public sector, 
its accumulated debt will in due course be added to general 
government debt. By the end of 1994, the amount at stake 
will be at least DM 250 billion, some 8% of GDP. Including 
the deficit of the Treuhandanstalt into last year's borrowing 
requirements which is conceptionally arguable, would add 
one percentage point to such an extended deficit. In addition 
the projected debt of the Kreditabwicklungsfonds has re-
cently been revised upwards to DM 140 billion by the end 
of 1994. 
GRAPH 2 : Germany — Eastern labour market 
Unemployment, support schemes and commuters 
1990 
Sources: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; Commission services. 
1991 
I I Commuters 
I- ':-l Early retirement 
Training 
I I Employment programme 
Short-term work 
Unemployment 
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GRAPH 3 : Germany — Budget deficit 
General government' 
% of GDP 
1 
- 1 
- 4 
1989 1990 1991 1992 19932 
1 1989/90 western Germany only. 
2 1992-93 forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
The fiscal situation at large and the challenges caused by the 
ensuing policy mix have increased the need for medium-
term consolidation. This is the message of the German 
convergence programme of late 1991. The government's 
position was to rely on expenditure restraint rather than tax 
increases (over and above the VAT rise of January 1993). 
Since then, tax increases in 1995, when the existing and 
accruing debt related to unification will be shifted 'on-
budget', are now envisaged. But these tax increases are 
devoted to financing a part of the debt of the Treuhand and 
the Kreditabwicklungsfonds. 
Government plans for fiscal consolidation as outlined in the 
convergence programme were based on two main elements. 
First, solid real growth with an improving inflation perform-
ance in the whole of Germany over the medium term (the 
projected average annual nominal growth rate was just below 
7%). The second element was the containment of govern-
ment spending. The expenditure target was most ambitious 
for the federal government, allowing for a 2 i% annual 
rise in nominal terms. This implied a constant decline in real 
terms over the years covered in the medium-term plan. While 
this appeared already highly ambitious, it had, in addition, 
to cover strongly rising interest charges on a higher debt in 
the aftermath of unification. The spending target was more 
generous for other levels of government, thus almost al-
lowing for constant spending in real terms for the govern-
ment at large. In nominal terms, the convergence programme 
called for expenditure rises to be kept to about one-half of 
annual nominal GDP growth during the period 1993-96. 
Except for defence outlays, the political view was not to 
single out individual items for particular saving efforts. In 
the mean time the envisaged medium-term consolidation 
programme lists several items of expenditure cuts, especially 
in the area of social transfers, subsidies and personal expen-
diture. 
Originally, plans for 1993 called for a consolidation effort 
of some 1% of GDP (affecting the draft federal budget, 
summer guidelines of the financial planning council, balanc-
ing efforts for social security). However, these targets are 
adjusted in line with the change in the economic situation. 
Growth prospects have deteriorated and projected expendi-
ture increases revealed as too tight. Projections for 1993 now 
call for a slight increase in comparison to the 1992 level 
induced by the slowdown of economic activity. The most 
recent estimates for tax revenues were based on nominal 
growth of 3 to 4%. The revised projected expenditure in-
creases of the Länder and local authorities of more than 4% 
could still be exceeded. All in all, the currently forecast 
macro development for 1993 is at odds with the medium-
term assumptions upon which the convergence programme 
is based. Thus it seems hardly avoidable that the pattern of 
gradually declining deficits as envisaged in the convergence 
programme will not materialize this year, but the target of 
deficit reductions especially induced by expenditure restraint 
is a main element of fiscal policy in Germany. 
The unsatisfactory but improving economic situation in east-
ern Germany, triggering continuous calls for more money 
to be transferred eastwards, and the difficult fiscal position 
have spurred the debate on policy choices. Certainly there 
is no room now for a net reduction of the tax burden of the 
corporate sector. Government intentions before unification 
to do so in view of relatively high German tax rates in an 
international perspective have been dropped. New plans call 
for reduced rates and a widened tax base with a net effect 
on the tax burden of close to zero. Tax increases for the 
near future are now envisaged in order to cope with the east 
German challenge in the mid-1990s. The draft medium-term 
consolidation programme contains additional transfers east, 
corresponding expenditure cuts elsewhere, higher taxes to 
service the unification-related debt and lower wage increases 
in the whole of Germany. In any case, fiscal policy will face 
an important challenge. With growth weakening, to let the 
automatic stabilizers work will boost the deficit. This would 
be favourable on cyclical grounds, but the leeway is limited, 
given the levels of deficits and debt — therefore, the medium-
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GRAPH 4: Germany — Public debt' 
billion DM 
1989 1990 
' End of period, excluding social security, finance statistics concept. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt. Commission services. 
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term credibility of consolidation efforts will improve when 
the medium-term consolidation programme is implemented. 
Monetary policy: geared to fighting inflation 
Following unification, demand and cost pressures in 
Germany increased, resulting in a subsequent tightening of 
monetary policy. After having raised policy-controlled rates 
three times in 1991, the Bundesbank increased the discount 
rate further in July 1992. The justification given for this 
policy was the strong growth in monetary aggregates at rates 
around 9% (M3), far above the upper target limit of 5,5%. 
The acceleration of monetary growth had already started in 
August 1991 and continued till the autumn of 1992, when 
growth in M3 was further accentuated by the effects of 
exchange-market intervention during turmoil in the EMS. 
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank continued to adhere to monet-
ary targeting. The 1992 target was set at 3,5 to 5,5%, the 
same range as the original target for the previous year.' The 
1 The 1991 target was revised in July 1991 to a range of 3 to 5%. 
target was based on medium-term macroeconomic bench-
mark figures, i.e. an assumed normative 2% increase in 
the price level. This target was very ambitious in the light 
of existing inflation forecasts (in particular for eastern 
Germany), the strong rates of potential growth then assumed 
for eastern Germany and the far higher current rate of 
monetary growth at the end of 1991. The target rate of 
monetary growth signalled the Bundesbank's determination 
to abide by its tight monetary policy stance. A more generous 
target, compared to previous years, could have been misin-
terpreted by economic agents as a signal that the Bundes-
bank would tolerate or even accommodate behaviour at 
odds with stability. 
By mid-1992, however, the M 3 growth target had become 
more and more of out reach. Nevertheless, in July, the 
Bundesbank reconfirmed the range unchanged. On the same 
occasion, it increased the discount rate from 8% to 8 V*% 
again. But in order to bring monetary growth closed to the 
5,5% upper target limit a further significant hike in interest 
rates would, at the time, have been necessary. In view of 
possible adverse repercussions on international money trans-
actions and the exchange-rate pattern, in particular the Euro-
pean Monetary System, this option was, however, not 
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chosen. In addition, the Bundesbank took the view that the 
money stock was in a minor way distorted by special factors 
influencing the demand for money (i.e. the inverted yield 
structure, the influence of the new flat-rate tax on interest 
income, etc.). This decision implied that its policy could not 
exclusively be guided by the development of the money 
stock, but would have to take into account a variety of other 
financial and real indicators. 
other hand, the inflation rate has jumped in January due to 
the increase in VAT, and the Bundesbank might wish to 
wait for actual wage settlements before giving easing signals 
in order not to endanger the internal and external stability 
of the German mark. 
Conclusions: the main policy challenges 
In conjunction with the EMS crisis in September and the de 
facto appreciation of the German mark, which tightened 
monetary conditions, the Bundesbank reduced policy-con­
trolled rates. Since September, day-to-day money market 
rates have come down by more than one percentage point. 
Time rates in the money market and capital market rates 
have fallen further. The yield on government bonds, at 
present, stands at 7%, which is low in the historical and 
international comparison. The inverted yield curve has be­
come rather flat.' The effective German mark exchange 
rate, which had appreciated before and through the ERM 
realignments, has continued to increase slightly since Oc­
tober. Nevertheless, at the end of the year, actual monetary 
expansion (9 'Λ%) was more than twice as high as the 
centre of the target range. But is was pointed out by the 
Bundesbank that is was intended to change neither the 
strict stability course nor its medium-term oriented targeting 
strategy. Indeed, in December, the council set a new target 
for the 1993 M3 growth at 4,5 to 6,5% (a level one percent­
age point higher than that of the previous year). The more 
generous target was justified with reference to developments 
in eastern Germany, where for example a higher growth rate 
of nominal potential was assumed. 
The future course in interest-rate policy is likely to depend, 
external considerations aside, primarily on developments of 
the money stock and in the field of wage and fiscal policies. 
At present, the picture here is not quite clear. The trend in 
the money stock is still strong, but money growth could 
become lower, given the weak outlook for economic activity. 
In addition, the degree of base drift could imply that M3 
growth early in 1993 could be at the lower end of the target. 
The discussions on the solidarity pact are still continuing. 
Latest signals from the wage front might be seen as encour­
aging steps in the direction of a return to consensus. On the 
See Statistische Beihefte :ιι den Monatsberichten der Deutschen Bundes-
hank, Reihe 2. 
In 1993 economic output in western Germany will be con­
tracting and economic growth in Germany as a whole will 
probably be zero. Catching-up and structural improvement 
of the eastern German economy depend to a great degree 
on a sustained high level of activity in the western part of 
the country. Capital-widening investment needed in eastern 
Germany will only take place when capacity utilization in 
western Germany is high and overall demand expectations 
are good. Therefore, the present slowdown of economic 
activity in the western part of the country has different, and 
possibly more serious, implications compared with previous 
recessions. 
The main economic policy question concerns the challenge 
of combining the objective of economic prosperity and social 
balance in eastern Germany with fiscal consolidation. The 
officially held view is still that the huge transfers required 
for eastern Germany should be financed from the capital 
market or from cutbacks in other areas of government 
spending. However, the cyclical slowdown now aggravates 
the task of credible consolidation. 
The unsolved fiscal situation, primarily the result of the 
unsolved question of the distribution of the costs of unifi­
cation, is the main factor behind the persistent tight monet­
ary conditions. The expansionary fiscal policy fuelled in­
flation and the rise in social security contributions add to 
higher labour costs. Monetary policy successfully tried to 
curb the emergence of a wage-price spiral. Following the 
ERM turmoils, the Bundesbank has begun to ease its policy, 
probably earlier than it would have done for domestic 
reasons only. However, monetary policy continues to be 
tight because inflationary pressures have not yet been con­
fined to a satisfactory extent. 
The question of re-establishing a credible medium-term 
policy perspective with clearly defined realistic objectives is 
becoming even more pressing. The scope and credibility of 
such policies and their proper implementation are essential. 
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Greece 
Developments in 1992 
In 1992 developments in the real economy were quite similar 
to those in the previous year. Both domestic and foreign 
demand slowed down, activity weakened and unemployment 
rose further. The tight economic policies pursued in the 
framework of the medium-term fiscal adjustment pro-
gramme, the weakening in the world economy and the delays 
and time-lags involved in the process of structural reform 
seem to be the main reasons behind this performance. Over-
all, the Greek economy made a certain progress in terms of 
nominal and real convergence with the rest of the Com-
munity but the gap to be bridged remains very large. 
Table 1 
Greece: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
1,3 
0.9 
0.4 
7.5 
18,7 
-5,5 
1988-90 
2.5 
3.8 
1.0 
7.4 
16,4 
-4,4 
1991 
1.8 
2,3 
-2,0 
7.7 
18,4 
-5,1 
1992 
1.5 
1.1 
-0 ,5 
7.7 
16,0 
-3,3 
1991 
1.6 
1.6 
-0,1 
8.5 
13,5 
-3,0 
1994 
2,0 
2.4 
0,3 
9.1 
9.0 
-2,2 
Private consumption is estimated to have grown by some 
1,3%; employment decreased and the growth of wages and 
government transfers to households decelerated; thus, de-
spite tax reliefs introduced early in the year, real disposable 
income declined; however, a further fall in the saving rate 
fuelled the modest increase in consumption, which was also 
boosted by tax incentives to replace old cars. 
Public consumption has stagnated in volume reflecting the 
urgent need for fiscal adjustment. Wage expenditure was 
restrained by a restrictive incomes policy providing for no 
general increases; spending on goods and services has also 
stagnated in volume. 
Gross fixed capital formation has grown very modestly. 
Weak demand prospects, a decline in profitability (as indi-
cated by the reduction in the profit margins between 1991 
and 1992) and a high and rising financing cost (the short-
term lending rates adjusted for inflation rising from an 
average 10% in 1991 to 13% in 1992) were the main factors 
which prevented investment in equipment from expanding 
as fast as the generally improving business environment 
would suggest. With respect to construction, the situation 
remained depressed in the housing sector, but positive im-
pulses came from the infrastructure programme which ben-
efited strongly from the EC structural Funds. 
Table 2 
Greece: Investment performance 
1985-87 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 18,2 
(% change) - 2,2 
of which: 
Construction (% change) —0,9 
Equipment (% change) - 3,7 
1988-90 
18,7 
8,2 
5,1 
11,4 
1991 
18,2 
-1,9 
-6,4 
3,3 
199: 
17,5 
0,6 
-3,0 
4.5 
1991 
17,9 
4,5 
3.0 
6.0 
1994 
18,4 
6,3 
5.0 
7.5 
As a result, GDP is estimated to have grown by 1,5% in 
1992 (after a rise of 1,8% in the previous year). On the 
output side, industry registered negative growth for the third 
consecutive year and construction activity was also de-
pressed. In agriculture output stagnated, while positive 
growth was recorded in the services sector; especially in 
tourism the growth was over 10% in real terms (after a 
decline by 5% in 1991). 
Export activity was less buoyant than in 1991. Market 
growth for exports slowed down and competitiveness (as 
measured by relative prices in tradables) improved much less 
than in 1991, so that export of goods advanced by some 5% 
in volume (after a rise of over 14% in 1991). Import growth 
also decelerated considerably after the big increase registered 
in 1991. However, given the difference in level (imports being 
more than double the value of exports), the contribution of 
the external balance to growth turned positive in 1992. 
Wage growth decelerated further in 1992. In the private 
sector the collective agreement concluded in early 1991 for 
two years provided for increases amounting to 11,5%, while 
in the public sector there have been no general increases at 
all. Overall, the rise in compensation per head decelerated 
to 12,3% in 1992 (giving a real loss of 3,2% after a loss of 
2,9% in 1991). Helped also by the restrictive monetary 
and exchange-rate policy and by the weakening in activity, 
consumer prices decelerated until July to an annual rate of 
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13,6%, but this trend was reversed in August following 
indirect tax increases. Inflation rose to 15,9% in October 
but at year­end the annual rate was down to 14,4%. For the 
year as a whole, the inflation rate is estimated at 16% (19,5% 
in 1991). 
GRAPH 1 : Greece — Wage and price developments, 1981­93 
tion as no general increases were granted, but the debt service 
cost overshot budgetary projections by 1 % of GDP, mainly 
because the anticipated fall in interest rates did not ma­
terialize fully. Overall, the target for the budgetary deficit 
set at the beginning of the year has been met. The political 
commitment to the announced targets, which was reflected 
in the important corrective measures introduced during the 
year, is essential for the success of the fiscal adjustment 
programme and is therefore to be welcomed. 
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Prospects for 1993 
Economic policy is set to continue in 1993 the course of 
fiscal and monetary tightening aimed at stabilization, while 
structural reform and infrastructure investment are expected 
to give growth impulses. Essentially the upturn in investment 
is due to positive growth in construction, while the other 
demand components are expected to register only a small 
improvement. Although relatively moderate wage increases 
have been assumed for 1993, wage adjustment payments 
(following the overshooting of the inflation target at end 
1992 by two percentage points) will allow little deceleration 
in the growth of compensation of employees per head. The 
disinflation process is expected to continue, although wage 
developments and the effects of the indirect tax increases 
could affect the pace of progress. Unemployment will con­
tinue to rise, though at a slower pace, owing to the restructur­
1 1992­93 forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
The current account improved in 1992, the deficit declining 
to some 3,3% of GDP (from 5,1% of GDP in 1991). The 
increase in the invisibles surplus and in EC transfers more 
than compensated for the widening in the trade deficit. 
The evolution of public finances in 1992 was characterized 
by major tax changes (a reform of the income tax, harmoniz­
ation of indirect taxes, introduction of an extraordinary levy 
on buildings) but overall tax revenue increased as planned. 
More specifically, revenue from direct taxes fell short of 
budgetary projections by 0,5% of GDP, reflecting mainly 
the effect of the income tax reform in the personal sector. 
Indirect taxation yielded revenue higher than planned as the 
impact of the corrective action taken in August (increase in 
excise duties on oil, tobacco and alcoholic beverages) more 
than compensated the shortfall with respect to VAT and 
collection of tax arrears. On the expenditure side, the wage 
bill was further restrained with respect to the budget projec­
Table 3 
Greece: Economic policy indicators 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 
Money growth 
(% change) 23,3 20,9 12,3 : : : 
Short­term interest rate 17,2 18,1 22,7 24,5 17,9 15,3 
Long­term interest rate 16,3 : : : : : 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 88,9 90,9 89,3 87,9 85,7 85,5 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) ­12 ,4 ­16 ,7 ­15 ,4 ­13 ,4 ­9,8 ­7,7 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 66,7 87,1 102,0 106,7 107,1 106,6 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 15,7 19,0 15,0 12,3 11,3 10,7 
Real wages per head 
(% change) ­2,5 2,2 ­2,9 ­3,1 ­1,9 1,6 
For definitions, see Tabic 3 for Belgium. 
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ing of the economy resulting from deregulation and privatiz­
ation on the one hand and relatively weak demand on 
the other. With respect to public finances, further progress 
towards reduction of the large deficits is expected, but there 
is still far to go in order for Greece to meet the convergence 
criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty. The gentle upturn in 
activity is not expected to prevent the current account from 
ΑΡΗ 2 : Greece — Central government fiscal adjustment 
% of GDP 
201 
15 -
Net borrowing requirement 
Primary deficit 
Interest pa>ments 
1990 1991 1992 1993' 
Source: Ministry of National Economy, Greece. 
improving further, since most of the recovery in investment 
comes from construction and, in addition, is partly financed 
by higher EC transfers. The privatization process may also 
lead to an increase in capital inflows from abroad. 
Economic policy: past failures and current 
challenges 
In the past few years, there was a wide consensus on the need 
for the priority of correcting the macroeconomic, especially 
fiscal, disequilibria. It was also widely recognized that reform 
of the institutional setting and a restructuring of the econ­
omy were not only a prerequisite for more growth but would 
also contribute to restore more quickly macroeconomic equi­
librium. The economic policy programme initiated by the 
Greek Government, and endorsed by the European Com­
munity by the granting of a balance of payments loan in 
early 1991, reflected this understanding by incorporating 
two main pillars: fiscal adjustment and structural reform. 
However, the implementation of the programme at the out­
set was in many respects incomplete and slower than the 
magnitude and the urgency of the problems required. 1992 
marked an important step in that the need for urgency was 
seriously taken into account in the planning of economic 
policy actions. The implementation of the programme gained 
momentum and major steps were made in a number of areas 
(deregulation, privatization, tax and social security reform). 
Nevertheless, the delays observed at the beginning of the 
programme had as a consequence both to increase the overall 
burden of the adjustment and to reduce the span of time 
available to the authorities actually to achieve the anticipated 
results of their policies. This implies that the challenges 
which face economic policy remain substantial. 
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Spain 
Continued deceleration in economic activity 
After several years of buoyant economic growth, economic 
activity in Spain has been decelerating very markedly in the 
early 1990s. GDP, which had increased by 4,8% per year 
on average from 1987 to 1990, grew by 2,4% in 1991 and 
only an estimated 1,2% in 1992, and the trough may well 
not yet have been reached. Growth in 1992 nevertheless 
remained somewhat faster than in the Community as a 
whole, continuing the pattern evident ever since 1986 when 
Spain joined the Community (see Graph 1). 
Table 1 
Spain: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
3.7 
5.4 
1.5 
21,0 
7.8 
1.0 
1988-90 
4.5 
6.5 
3.2 
17,5 
6.0 
-2,7 
1991 
2.4 
2.9 
0.2 
16,3 
6.3 
-3 ,5 
199 : 
1.2 
1.8 
-1 ,6 
18,0 
6.0 
-3,7 
1991 
1.0 
0.4 
-1,6 
19,5 
5.5 
-3,4 
1994 
1,8 
1.8 
- o , i 
19,9 
4.9 
-3,0 
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This marked slowdown is mainly due to the decline in 
domestic demand growth, and in investment in particular. 
Indeed, in three years investment plunged from growth fig­
ures of more than 10% in the late 1980s to negative growth 
in 1992. Investment in equipment reacted first and a faltering 
recovery is now taking place. The effects on construction 
began to be felt later, in part due to the special events of 
1992, and a recovery is not yet expected in 1993, given the 
signs of stagnation in the housing market. Government 
measures to reduce housing costs through financial facilities 
and supply of buildable land, on the one hand, and the 
maintenance of public investment at around 5% of GDP, 
on the other, have prevented a larger fall in investment in 
construction. 
Table 2 
Spain: Investment performance 
1985-87 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 19,8 
(% change) 9,3 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 6,1 
Equipment (% change) 15,9 
1988-90 
23,8 
11,5 
12,8 
10,1 
1991 
24,1 
1,6 
4.3 
-2 ,5 
1992 
22,6 
-2,0 
-3,4 
0.2 
199.1 
22,0 
-1,9 
-3 ,3 
0.3 
1994 
21,6 
1.2 
0,5 
2,2 
Despite some easing, especially in the second half of the 
year, private and public consumption were still the main 
sources of domestic demand growth in 1992. The increase 
in real disposable income, based on relatively rapid expan­
sion of wages and public transfers, the decrease in income 
tax rates and in VAT taxation on cars and the favourable 
prospects stemming from the EMU process kept private 
consumption relatively strong in the first months of 1992. 
However, consumption began to falter in mid-1992 as a 
consequence of higher unemployment coupled with cuts 
in unemployment benefits, the increases in direct taxation 
introduced in the July budget package and the greater un­
certainty about the general economic situation. These 
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unfavourable factors are likely to be fully in play in 1993 
and private consumption could thus slow down significantly. 
Public consumption moderated only slightly in 1992 as com-
pared to 1991, though the freezing of public employment in 
the central government as from the summer and the cuts in 
wage premiums to civil servants entailed a lower growth in 
the second half of the year. In 1993, public consumption is 
expected to be held back severely, thus adding another 
deflationary element to the weak growth prospects for the 
near future. 
Despite its lower growth, domestic demand remained 
stronger than in Spain's main trading partners, thus leading 
to a further deterioration in the contribution of the net 
external balance to GDP growth and to a current account 
deficit remaining above 3% of GDP (see Graph 2). Import 
demand remained strong, increasing by some 7%, reflecting 
a high import income elasticity. The expansion was especially 
marked in consumer goods, mainly due to the boost in car 
demand fuelled by the VAT reduction from 33 to 28% on 
1 January 1992. Exports grew by 5,5%, three points less 
than in 1991, which reflected slower market growth and in 
particular the end of the German import surge, from which 
Spain greatly benefited. Some improvement in competitive-
ness and growth should stem from the depreciation of the 
peseta if the response of nominal wages to higher import 
prices can be contained. 
As a consequence of the lower economic growth, employ-
ment decreased by 1,6% in 1992, the first fall since 1986, 
and the unemployment rate has again been rising since 
the third quarter of 1991. The losses in employment were 
particularly large in agriculture and construction, while em-
ployment growth in services slowed markedly. In 1993, the 
employment picture is likely to deteriorate even further and 
the unemployment rate could exceed 19% (having risen from 
16,3% in 1990 to 18,2% in 1992). 
Inflation remains stubborn because of rigid 
wages and resilient core inflation in services 
Despite the very high and rising level of unemployment, the 
rise in labour costs has not eased very significantly in 1992. 
Indeed, gross wage increases were similar to those in 1991 
and only a slight slowdown in unit labour costs was achieved 
as a result of a substantial reduction in employment-
GRAPH 2 : Spain — External deficit, relative domestic demand and real effective exchange rate (REER) 
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increasing productivity. This low responsiveness of wages to 
labour market conditions makes less likely a recovery of 
investment and has detrimental effects on employment and 
inflation. 
Consumption prices increased on average by 6% in 1992, 
slightly above the 1991 figure, and the consumer price index 
slowed appreciably during the course of the year to reach a 
12-month inflation rate of 5,1% in December. In principle, 
this was not a bad result given that the basic VAT rate was 
raised from 12 to 13% in January and from 13 to 15% in 
August and some excise duties on petrol and tobacco were 
also increased. However, this figure has to be put in perspec-
tive, as it was favourably influenced by the low increase in 
food prices. Underlying inflation, which excludes energy 
and non-processed food, accelerated in 1992. Though some 
reduction in inflationary pressures is to be expected in 1993 
due to the absence of further increases in indirect taxation 
and lower economic growth, the effects of the devaluation 
on prices could somewhat offset this tendency. 
The differential between price rises in the tradable and non-
tradable sectors remained roughly unchanged in 1992. Com-
pounded with the lower growth in external markets this 
probably aggravated the situation of many exporting firms. 
Industrial prices grew by just above 1% in 1992, well below 
wage costs. Given the unfavourable economic environment 
and the otherwise pro-cyclical trend in productivity, com-
panies had much stronger recourse to labour-shedding. 
Despite this reaction, profits in the sector have been severely 
squeezed. However, the peseta devaluation could allow for 
a modest recovery in this sector. 
Despite weaker demand, service prices still accelerated in 
1992, maintaining the rising trend observed since 1988. The 
resilience of inflation in services, which can be attributed to 
a number of impediments to competition, led the government 
to address the liberalization of this sector in the convergence 
programme. 
The convergence programme aims at achieving 
nominal and real convergence 
The Spanish convergence programme, approved in May 
by the Parliament, aims at achieving nominal convergence 
without arresting progress in real catching up. The pro-
gramme has been articulated along two main lines: a new 
policy mix, aimed at keeping the economy on a sustained 
non-inflationary growth path, and a set of structural 
measures, aimed at improving microeconomic efficiency, 
curbing inflationary pressures, raising potential output and 
boosting employment. 
As regards the new policy mix, the strategy of the programme 
aims at achieving nominal stability through a tight fiscal 
policy, while monetary policy would focus on exchange-rate 
stability. Further, this shift in the policy mix is intended 
to have favourable effects on the composition of growth, 
promoting investment and exports. 
Structural reform mainly aims at removing rigidities from 
labour and services markets. Measures in the labour market 
are addressed in three areas: increasing geographical and 
functional mobility, setting up a system of incentives which 
will contribute to a more active job-search and improving 
workers' professional skills. In order to increase geographi-
cal mobility, a public housing plan and some measures to 
enlarge the supply of buildable land have already been 
implemented. The removal of the corporatist working regu-
lations was proposed to the social partners as a way to 
introduce more functional mobility. The setting-up of a 
link between the entitlement to unemployment pay and 
attendance at professional training or the acceptance of a 
job was introduced in April by a law which also cut the 
duration and amount of unemployment benefits. 
As regards services, the major concern was the lack of 
competition which exerts upward pressure on sectoral and 
global prices and leads to an inefficient allocation of re-
sources unfavourable to the tradable sector and to the com-
petitiveness of the economy. Moreover, given the high level 
of wage-price indexation effectively prevailing in the Spanish 
economy, higher inflation feeds into higher wages which 
once again hinder external competitiveness. In order to 
tackle these issues, the programme points to deregulation 
and liberalization measures to be taken according to the 
conclusions of a report by the Competition Court. In addi-
tion, some measures have begun to be considered concerning 
more flexible rules for professional associations and the 
removal of the setting of minimum prices by these associa-
tions. Measures to gradually eliminate the monopolies in 
transport, telecommunications and oil distribution have 
begun to be implemented as well. The programme also 
refers to the objective of reducing the size of public sector 
administrative bodies and public enterprises and of rational-
izing their procedures. 
Tough budgetary policy shows authorities' 
preference for fiscal consolidation instead of 
short-term stabilization 
The overrun in the State deficit in the early months of the 
year, which by July was more than double the corresponding 
figures of 1991, prompted the government to introduce a 
wide package of budgetary measures aimed at increasing 
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revenue and reducing public expenditure. Thus at the end 
of July income tax rates as well as the amount withheld were 
increased two percentage points on average, fully offsetting 
the rebates introduced at the beginning of the year by the 
new income tax law; the VAT standard rate was raised 
from 13 to 15% as from August, bringing forward the 
harmonization measure due on 1 January 1993; a general 
cut in current expenditure was adopted including a freeze of 
public employment. All these measures were intended to 
redress the State deficit in 1992 towards the convergence 
programme target of 2,6% of GDP. 
Table 3 
Spain: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
1985-87 
14,4 
13,2 
12,5 
102,3 
-5,3 
46,0 
8.5 
0,7 
1988-90 
14,8 
13,9 
13,4 
117,4 
-3,3 
43,9 
7,0 
0.9 
1991 
10,9 
13,2 
12,4 
125,9 
-4,9 
45,6 
8.7 
2,2 
1992 
5.1 
13,3 
12,2 
126,9 
-4 ,6 
47,4 
9.0 
2.8 
1993 
5,9 
12,4 
12,7 
122,1 
-4,2 
49,5 
7.3 
1,7 
1994 
6.9 
10,4 
11,3 
123,7 
-3,8 
50,6 
5.7 
0.8 
For definitions, see Table 3 for Belgium. 
The same tough stance is present in the draft budget for 
1993, despite a sharper downswing in economic activity than 
previously expected. The budgetary proposals show a firm 
commitment from the authorities to the convergence pro-
gramme targets for public finance, extending most of the 
summer package of fiscal measures to the budget law for 
1993. The target for the State deficit in 1993 is set at 2,5% 
of GDP, while the general government deficit is to be reduced 
to less than 4% of GDP. State expenditure should increase 
by less than the target rate of inflation. Further, if the 
strongly rising interest payments are excluded, expenditure 
will barely grow in nominal terms in 1993. However, invest-
ment should be more favoured than current expenditure and 
is to grow at the same pace as GDP. Strict control over the 
general government deficit requires the same degree of rigour 
over the budgets of the other public bodies and in particular 
those of the autonomous communities, which the central 
authorities can influence only indirectly. 
Instability in foreign exchange markets adds to 
the uncertainty regarding economic recovery 
In the last few years monetary policy has been devoted to 
maintaining exchange-rate stability and, within the limits 
provided by the ERM, to keeping inflationary pressures 
under control. Thus, although the information provided by 
monetary and credit aggregates in 1992 pointed to a clear 
moderation of demand, the resilience of underlying inflation 
did not prompt the Bank of Spain to reduce substantially 
its intervention rate. However, longer rates declined in the 
first half of the year as a consequence of the reduction of 
the risk premium associated with positive EMU prospects. 
The negative result in the Danish referendum on Maastricht 
marked the end of the downturn in interest rates and the 
beginning of the instability in exchange markets. The turmoil 
in exchange-rate markets in September led to a devaluation 
of the peseta by 5% within the ERM. As a consequence, 
interest rates increased and temporary capital controls were 
introduced. New pressures against the peseta led the Spanish 
authorities in November to ask for a new realignment of the 
peseta, the central rate being reduced by 6% against all other 
ERM currencies, except the escudo. The capital controls 
introduced in September, and only partially suppressed in 
October, were immediately lifted and money market inter-
vention rates increased. The depreciation of the effective 
exchange rate amounted to about 10% between mid-1992 
and the end of the year. In the next few months, interest 
rates could decline though probably remaining above their 
levels before the currency turmoil. Against the possible bene-
fits for growth from a lower peseta, interest rate develop-
ments and the impact of the turmoil on expectations and 
investment make the prospects for short-term recovery more 
difficult. 
Though this strategy may have some costs in the short 
term, a reinforcement of the commitment to the convergence 
programme targets is crucial for a recovery of confidence in 
the Spanish economy and the peseta, thus promoting the 
prospects for healthier medium-term growth. 
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French growth exceeds Community growth 
in 1992 
— thanks to favourable exports 
The French economy grew by about 2% in 1992, signifi­
cantly more than the EC average (1%). This relatively good 
performance stems from the first signs of the beneficial 
effects of the competitive disinflation strategy subsequently 
challenged by the September turmoil in the EMS. The stab­
ility of the French franc and a slow growth of French unit 
labour costs relative to those of its competitors allowed 
an improving export price performance, enabling gains in 
market shares within the Community (more than 1% in 
1992). Moreover, a very favourable external environment 
(with export markets growing by about 4%) boosted French 
exports. 
All in all, the contribution of the external side to overall 
output growth amounted to about one percentage point in 
1992. The trade balance improved strongly and was in sur­
plus for the first time since the beginning of 1980s. It is 
particularly encouraging that the declining trend in net ex­
ports of manufactured goods was reversed. In addition the 
fall in import prices of energy allowed a considerable im­
provement in the terms of trade (by about 1 %) contributing 
to the trade surplus of 0,3% of GDP (customs basis). Never­
theless, the improving external balance was not only the 
result of an excellent export performance. Stagnating dom­
estic demand for manufactured goods together with deterior­
ating competitiveness of importers in the first three quarters 
of 1992 also led to a slowdown in import growth. 
...but domestic demand remained sluggish 
The increase in domestic demand remained very low (1%). 
Private consumption did not improve as expected, as poor 
labour market prospects pushed households to increase their 
saving rate. In total, the number of wage earners decreased, 
despite some higher employment in the public sector. 
The improvement in disposable income of private house­
holds was partly due to increases in non­labour income and 
social transfers. As increases in contributions and cuts in 
allowances are supposed to take place in order to restore 
the financial situation of social security, an underlying 
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upswing in private consumption should not be expected 
before an improvement is visible on the labour market. The 
high level of interest rates and households' indebtedness 
have also affected the path of private consumption. Con-
sumer credits slightly decreased ( — 0,2% in the first half of 
1992), not only because of a fall in demand, but also because 
the banking sector became more cautious about the financial 
situation of potential borrowers. Moreover, the new rules 
regulating personal insolvency (Loi Neiertz)1 have reinforced 
the reluctance of both consumers and financial institutions. 
Table 1 
France: Macroeconomic performance 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 
against about 4% in 1992), leading to a lower overall growth 
of exports markets, despite recovery in some non-EC 
countries. 
Table 2 
France: Investment performance 
1985-87 
Gross capital formation 
( % o f G D P ) 19,4 
(% change) 4,3 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 2,1 
Equipment (% change) 7,0 
1988-90 
21,1 
6.5 
5.5 
7.1 
1991 
20,8 
- 1 , 3 
0,6 
- 2 , 5 
1992 
20,0 
- 1 , 5 
2.3 
- 4 , 3 
1993 
19,6 
- 0 , 7 
0.2 
- 1 , 4 
1994 
19,5 
1,6 
1.8 
1.5 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
2.1 
3.3 
0,0 
10,3 
4.0 
0,1 
3,4 
3,4 
1.0 
9.4 
3.2 
- 0 , 5 
1.1 
0.8 
0.4 
9.5 
3.2 
- 0 , 5 
1,9 
1.0 
- 0 , 2 
10,1 
2.6 
0.1 
1.0 
1.0 
- 0 , 3 
10,8 
2.7 
0.2 
1.9 
1.7 
-o,i 
11,3 
2.6 
0.3 
High real interest rates have also been playing a major role 
in investment decisions, reducing expected profitability in a 
framework of gloomy demand prospects. Less profitable 
investment projects have been dropped or at least postponed, 
and the productivity of the existing capital stock has been 
improved by significant cuts in industrial employment (about 
2,5%). On the contrary, in the services sector investment 
and employment again increased as demand and prospects 
remained satisfactory. 
Corporate investment in industry again declined, after the 
sharp fall in 1991, and by about the same amount (9%). The 
adjustment of capacities to the expected level of production is 
still taking place, new investment being mainly devoted to 
improving productivity. The level of capacity utilization in 
industry remains low relative to the period 1988-90 when 
capacity constraints on production boosted gross capital 
formation. The severe cuts in investment plans reflect the 
deterioration in demand prospects in industry, following the 
changes in the international economic environment which 
took place even before the recent turmoil on the financial 
markets: notably, the end of the demand surge from German 
unification and a consequent more aggressive behaviour of 
German producers on foreign markets and the slowdown in 
market growth in Spain and Italy as a consequence of their 
fiscal adjustments. Consequently, EC markets for French 
exporters are expected to increase by only 2% in 1993 (as 
Low inflation is becoming a permanent feature 
Consumer prices increased by about 2 Vi% in 1992. Wage 
moderation, together with decreasing energy prices, were the 
main contributors to lower inflation, but the weakness of 
domestic demand also resulted in subdued inflationary 
pressure. 
Wage growth largely reflected the poor labour market per-
formance. The fall in employment in the private sector 
(between 0,5 and 1%) dampened wage claims which ad-
justed, with a lag, to the slowdown in economic activity. 
Moreover, wage settlements seem to have internalized the 
strategy of competitive disinflation as the means to improve 
labour market prospects in the medium term. 
The removal of credit regulation led to a strong increase of households' 
indebtedness over the period 1980-90. The Loi Neiertz, which came into 
force in March 1990, aims at keeping under control the financial situ-
ation of those borrowers who experience financial difficulties. 
In 1992, low inflation was helped by falling import prices, a 
trend which may not, however, continue. Moreover, some 
reduction in indirect taxes prevented profit margins on dom-
estic sales from falling further. 
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Fiscal deficits are rising 
The slower than expected growth of private consumption 
reduced the increase of public revenues as receipts from 
VAT, the most important tax source, rose only marginally. 
Moreover, the fall in enterprise profits in 1991 reduced 
corporate tax revenues in 1992. All in all, the loss in fiscal 
receipts amounted to more than FF 90 billion (1,3% of 
GDP) relative to the estimate of 17,7% of GDP in the 
Finance Law for 1992. Interest payments rose by about 
FF 10 billion. Consequently, despite some cuts in expendi­
ture, the budget deficit increased sharply to about 2,6% of 
GDP, twice as large as the initial target. The deterioration 
in the financial situation of social security, following the 
rise in unemployment and the increase in local authorities' 
expenditure, have pushed up general government net bor­
rowing to about 2,8% of GDP from 1,9% in 1991, very near 
to the Maastricht convergence criterion. 
Growing conjunctural difficulties ahead as 
export growth weakens 
French economic growth, based till now upon the medium­
term framework of a successful 'désinflation compétitive' 
strategy, will temporarily suffer from the effects of the ap­
preciation of the French franc nominal effective exchange 
rate by more than 5% over the period 1992­93. In these 
conditions, despite the accumulated gains in relative unit 
labour costs (by about 6% relative to EC partners over the 
last four years), exporters' profit margins would decline: 
despite accelerating in 1993, export prices of manufactured 
goods should again, as in 1992, increase less than producers' 
domestic prices. Given that important markets will be faced 
by stagnation (in particular Germany), the contribution of 
net exports to French economic growth is expected to be 
negative in 1993. Under these circumstances, a recovery in 
private consumption and corporate investment is unlikely. 
Only an improvement in overall demand prospects should 
be able to reverse this trend, but the expected slowdown in 
the EC economy as a whole seems to rule out such a scenario. 
The rate of capacity utilization in industry is already low 
relative to the period 1988­90, such that a higher level of 
production could be easily achieved with the existing capital 
stock. Therefore, in case positive cyclical factors would ap­
pear again, the French economy would easily be able to 
grow at a relatively high rate. 
Financial markets seem to have anticipated gloomy econ­
omic prospects with share prices already more than 10% 
lower at the end of 1992 relative to their peak in May. 
Moreover, lower share prices render more difficult activating 
own capital resources to finance investment. All in all, finan­
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cing costs remain high, making investment less attractive. 
Particularly small and medium­sized enterprises are affected 
by high interest rates on bank lending. The continuing fall 
in gross capital formation in French industry will not only 
affect GDP growth in the short term but will aggravate 
further the labour market situation, quite apart from the 
long­term implications for productivity and competitiveness. 
Increasing unemployment (numbers unemployed rising more 
than 7% in 1993) will moderate private consumption growth 
further. Moreover, despite their decline, the persistence of 
high short­term interest rates might affect household behav­
iour in favour of liquid savings bearing high market interest 
rates. The amount of these monetary assets continues to 
increase. Falling real asset prices, including house prices, 
will prolong the stagnation of activity in the construction 
sector and might worsen the situation. The fall in house 
prices has already depressed banks' financial performance 
in 1992 through the depreciation of their capital invested in 
housing and the potential loss on loans to the construction 
sector. Consumption and investment might thus also be 
negatively affected by the tightening of credit conditions by 
the banking sector, which will have to respect a certain ratio 
between own capital and loans (BIS ratio) from 
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January 1993. Future credit expansion might further be con-
strained following its strong increase over the period 1980-
90, which saw the removal of credit regulations. 
Low demand pressure and the recent exchange-rate appreci-
ation could prevent any acceleration of inflation despite 
higher import prices for energy. Production prices might 
increase only moderately, particularly in manufacturing in-
dustry, under the pressure of stronger foreign competition. 
Increases in unit labour costs will be reduced by wage moder-
ation and further cuts in employment (in industry, of around 
2,5%). 
The economic policy strategy 
The recent macroeconomic performance characterized by 
low inflation, an improving trade balance, relatively low 
public debt and deficits has increased significantly the credi-
bility of the French economic policy framework oriented 
towards nominal stability, witnessed by a continuous fall in 
the French franc/German mark interest-rate differential up 
to 1992. In addition, there have been promising signs of 
the strategy of competitive disinflation bearing fruit, with 
exports quite strong. 
However, recent developments on the exchange markets are 
temporarily reducing the success of this strategy. Although 
inflation remains below the level of most partner countries, 
competitiveness has been eroded by the nominal exchange-
rate adjustment of some main trading partners. Moreover, 
slower growth prospects will affect the performance of the 
public sector. In this regard it is particularly regrettable that 
— in spite of excellent fundamentals — financial markets 
are attaching a higher interest-rate risk premium to the 
French franc, an indication of temporary destabilizing 
speculation. 
In the present framework, in which monetary conditions 
in France are largely determined by Germany, room for 
monetary easing is very limited. For example, reserve re-
quirements were reduced to cut bank lending costs in 
spring 1992. However, as reserve requirements are low in 
France, there are limits as to the quantitative effects of such 
a policy on credit rates. Moreover, the increase in money 
market rates pushed French banks to raise prime rates at 
the end of 1992. 
As in the current situation monetary tools are more or less 
exhausted, the government is using fiscal policy to support 
an upswing in economic activity. The 1992 budget deficit 
(2,6% of GDP) significantly exceeded the revised target, set 
at 1,9% of GDP. This deterioration stems from the approach 
Table 3 
France: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(% of GDP) 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
1985-87 
8.0 
8.6 
9.6 
101,7 
-2,5 
46,1 
4.9 
0.9 
1988-90 
8.9 
9,2 
9,3 
97,7 
-1,4 
47,0 
4.7 
1.4 
1991 
2.5 
9,6 
9,0 
95,6 
-1,9 
48,5 
4.2 
1.0 
1992 
5.8 
10,4 
8.6 
97,4 
-2,8 
50,1 
4.1 
1,5 
1991 
4.3 
8.8 
8,0 
100,3 
-3,2 
52,4 
3.9 
1,2 
1994 
4,7 
6.5 
7.8 
99,7 
-3,6 
54,7 
3.9 
1.3 
For definitions, see Table 3 for Belgium. 
of the French authorities as regards fiscal receipts: the loss 
in fiscal receipts (of about FF 90 billion in 1992) was not 
compensated for by cuts in planned expenditure, leaving 
the automatic stabilizers to operate. To boost the sluggish 
economy, fiscal measures were taken in favour of the stag-
nating construction sector and small to medium-sized en-
terprises more penalized by the relatively high cost of credit. 
In order to strengthen private consumption, the top VAT 
rate was replaced by the standard rate well in advance of 
the previously planned date of January 1993. Moreover, 
partial privatizations of State-owned companies are taking 
place to finance the cost (about FF 12 billion in 1992) of 
measures in favour of job searchers to reduce the rise in 
unemployment. 
The 1993 Finance Law confirms the approach hitherto fol-
lowed by the French budgetary authorities: the estimated 
budgetary outcome ( — 2,2% of GDP) is more the result of 
the automatic stabilizers than of a deliberately expansionary 
fiscal policy, despite some tax cuts in favour of households. 
Nevertheless, the underlying official macroeconomic scen-
ario now appears to be quite optimistic. 
The final budgetary position might thus be less favourable 
than expected, and despite one of the lowest public debt to 
GDP ratios and budget deficits in the EC, the parallel 
deterioration of the social security accounts and the increase 
in local authorities' expenditure might necessitate further 
social security contribution and tax increases, negatively 
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affecting supply performance. Higher than expected interest 
rates would moreover raise debt charges to FF 178 billion 
(about 2,5% of GDP) in 1993. All in all, if the business 
climate does not improve quickly, a stronger deterioration 
of the budget deficit cannot be excluded in 1993. 
will experience major challenges. According to official 
sources, its structural deficit will be increasing by about 
FF 6 billion per year. The reform of pension scheme finan­
cing is all the more necessary because repeated increases 
of social security contributions have raised the weight of 
contributions in the wage bill. 
Structural improvements will increase supply-
side flexibility and improve growth prospects 
Despite the significant improvements in the macroeconomic 
situation in the second half of the 1980s, the French economy 
still suffers from some structural challenges, particularly in 
the fields of the labour market and the education system. 
Increasing unemployment has highlighted rigidities to be 
removed in order to create a more favourable framework 
for job creation. The institutional minimum wage represents 
a factor of wage rigidity, in particular for low-productivity 
workers. Because its removal has important social and politi­
cal consequences, the government has tried to lower labour 
costs by means of fiscal reliefs in favour of employers hiring 
young unqualified job searchers (the Έχο-jeune' programme 
extended to July 1993) and in favour of part-time jobs. 
One of the major problems of the French labour market 
stems from a mismatch between labour supply and demand. 
Therefore the education system should be further improved 
in order to supply enterprises with skilled workers. A law 
favouring apprenticeship was adopted in July 1992, but the 
reactions of employers have not so far been very favourable. 
As regards the corporate sector, the weight of State-owned 
enterprises in the market sector still remains very high despite 
the privatizations achieved during the period 1986-88. It is 
difficult to estimate the loss of flexibility stemming from 
State control of companies facing international competition. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to surmise that in a context of 
rapid changes in corporate structure due to continuously 
growing integration, State-owned enterprises might be penal­
ized by the rigidity of their equity ownership. 
With regard to social security, the slowdown in economic 
activity is increasing its deficit significantly, accentuating the 
difficulties due to structural problems. Public authorities are 
trying to control the volume of supply of medical care 
('maîtrise des dépenses de santé'). As regards unemployment 
allowances, which were very favourable in France relative to 
other EC countries, the conditions for beneficiaries became 
more restrictive with effect from August 1992. In the long 
term, the financial equilibrium of the State pension scheme 
In the field of competition policy, some government inter-
vention is still widespread, for example restrictions on im-
ports from other member countries which are allowed by 
Article 115 of the EC Treaty. There is also room for further 
progress in the distribution sector, for example, reducing 
restrictions on market entry. At the retail level, the most 
worrying case is the 'Loi Royer' which covers the widest 
range of goods and which should be progressively relaxed 
and eliminated. Also, regulations governing car distribution 
should be improved. In the wholesale sector, there are regu-
lations which impede competitive forces, as best illustrated 
by the distribution of petrol and pharmaceutical goods. 
Stronger integration into world markets 
The greater integration of the French economy into world 
markets (internal market, GATT negotiations) will represent 
a new challenge for French enterprises. Competitiveness has 
improved strongly in recent years. Corporate investment 
increased by 45% over the period 1984-90, and by 76% in 
manufacturing industry, leading to stronger performance of 
exports through market share gains. 
The internal market will raise trade in services among EC 
members, particularly in the banking and insurance sector, 
where French enterprises are still investing despite the strong 
fall in gross capital formation in the whole economy. The 
French economy should thus be able to profit from the 
liberalization of world trade in services. 
The reform of the common agricultural policy will imply 
some marked changes in the structure of agricultural pro-
duction in France and will affect the value of the trade 
flows (cereal exports amounted to about 39% of agricultural 
exports in 1991). Nevertheless, the high level of productivity 
reached by a large number of French farmers should also 
allow a high degree of competitiveness in a liberalized mar-
ket, and the recently paid subsidies could be devoted to more 
productive uses. 
The growing foreign direct investment activities in France 
indicate that France has improved its overall supply con-
ditions. The continuation of this process will enable France 
to take the full benefits of progressing integration of the 
Community economy. 
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Ireland 
GDP growth in 1992 led by the performance of 
the external sector 
Following higher than expected growth in 1991, the perform-
ance of the economy continued to improve throughout 1992 
(GDP +2,8%). This performance was due primarily to the 
external sector and in particular to the strong growth in 
exports. 
Despite difficult international conditions the performance 
of Irish exports in 1992 remained buoyant. The growth of 
exports was driven by a substantial increase in agricultural 
exports out of intervention stocks (the volume of agricultural 
exports increased by approximately 24% over 1991) and a 
recovery in the export performance of the high-technology 
sector. The growth of imports, by contrast, remained some-
what subdued, thus giving rise to a current account surplus 
of approximately 6,6% of GDP. 
Table 1 
Ireland: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
2.5 
0.7 
-0,7 
18,1 
4.1 
-1,9 
1988-90 
6.5 
4,8 
1,4 
15,8 
2.6 
1.2 
1991 
2.5 
-0,7 
-0,1 
16,2 
3,2 
6.0 
1992 
2.9 
-0,9 
0.1 
17,8 
2,9 
6,7 
1993 
2,1 
2,2 
0,1 
19,2 
2,2 
6,6 
1994 
2.5 
2,1 
0.2 
20,4 
2.3 
6,9 
In spite of the good growth performance, unemployment 
rose to record levels in 1992. The average rate of unemploy-
ment for 1992 was 18% compared to 16,2% in 1991. This 
continued deterioration in labour market trends is the result 
of a number of factors. First, the deep recession experienced 
in 1992 in the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent in the 
USA led to the virtual cessation of emigration and the return 
of former emigrants from abroad. Second, demographic 
factors ensured a continuing increase in the labour force. 
Third, employment growth remained weak (0,1 %). The poor 
employment growth, despite the apparently robust perform-
ance of the external sector, serves to highlight the tenuous 
links between the foreign direct investment sector in Ireland 
and the rest of the economy. In view of this, which has been 
recognized for some time now, a general review of industrial 
policy was conducted in 1992. This resulted in a decision to 
put greater emphasis on indigenous industry and investment 
and to amalgamate the main industrial development agencies 
with a sharper focus on 'home-firm' development. In the 
same vein the authorities also recognized the need to reduce 
grant levels to overseas industry, to achieve a greater degree 
of grant repayability and in general to foster greater links 
between overseas and domestic firms. 
Budgetary pressures in 1991, which saw underlying net bor-
rowing by general government (excluding once-off privatiza-
tion receipts) slightly exceed targets, were repeated in 1992 
but were however offset by unexpected buoyancy in tax 
revenue. Despite the overrun in social welfare payments of 
the order of IRL 90 million (about IRL 50 million of which 
was due to the continuing rise in unemployment), there was 
little or no overrun on budgetary targets; the underlying 
outturn for central government borrowing was under 
IRL 600 million compared to the budget target of 
IRL 592 million (2,1% of GDP). However, additional 
spending in December 1992, which was brought forward 
from 1993, resulted in the actual outturn exceeding budget-
ary targets by approximately IRL 120 million (0,4% of 
GDP). Despite the rise in the fiscal deficit, the gross debt to 
GDP ratio declined by an underlying 2 points. A change in 
debt management policy gave rise to a further, once-off, 
reduction of 3 points. Overall, therefore, the ratio fell from 
101% ofGDPto96%. 
Table 2 
Ireland: Investment performance 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
17,8 17,5 17,1 16,8 16,7 16,5 
-4,6 8,8 -7,2 1,6 2,2 1,7 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 
(% change) 
of which: 
Construction (% change) -6,4 9,4 -1,4 2,5 3,0 2,0 
Equipment (% change) -1,8 8,7-11,6 0,5 1,2 1,5 
As a result of exchange-rate movements and rising unit 
labour costs Ireland's competitiveness performance declined 
in 1992 by 2,4j>ercentage points. In particular, the faster 
deceleration of real wages in the United Kingdom, combined 
with the sterling depreciation since September 1992, con-
siderably reduced the competitiveness gains achieved against 
the UK since 1987. The impact of the loss in competitiveness 
fell primarily on the traditional (labour-intensive) manufac-
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turing sector which is the most heavily reliant on the United 
Kingdom for its exports. On the other hand, due to the 
lower price of imports (over 40% of Irish imports come 
from the UK) the average inflation rate for 1992 as measured 
by the private consumption deflator fell to 2,9% from 3,2% 
in 1991. This is considerably lower than the average for the 
EC as a whole. 
The convergence programme submitted by the Irish authori­
ties, the 'Programme for economic and social progress 1991­
93' (PESP), outlined a macroeconomic policy mix emphasiz­
ing the need to maintain exchange­rate stability, fiscal re­
straint and wage moderation. 1992 saw the successful con­
tinuation of this policy (despite the upheavals in the currency 
markets) and the further consolidation of nominal conver­
gence. Interest­rate differentials fell in the early part of 
the year, reflecting confidence in the performance of the 
economy and strong adherence to the exchange­rate disci­
pline, but rose strongly in the later part of the year as 
a result of the tensions in European exchange markets. 
Furthermore, as previously noted, inflation remained low 
and the debt­to­GDP ratio declined. 
The PESP also proposed a series of structural reforms to 
improve supply side performance and employment creation, 
including tax reform, industrial policy reform, greater 
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provision of training and limited direct intervention. The 
gradual implementation of these reforms was continued 
throughout 1992. Following a report to the government 
concerning industrial policy in Ireland a general review of 
policy was initiated. New employee training schemes were 
introduced, and FAS, the State training agency, was restruc-
tured to help cater more efficiently for the long-term unem-
ployed. 
Real convergence continued in 1992 though at a slower rate 
than that experienced between 1987 and 1990. By 1990 per 
capita GDP had risen to 68,3% of the Community average 
from 64,5% in 1987. Recently more moderate levels of GDP 
growth have helped per capita GDP to rise slightly to 68,8% 
in 1992. The increasing level of unemployment remains a 
serious concern. To generate increased levels of employment 
the continued application of the macroeconomic strategy 
implied by the PESP and accelerated implementation of 
structural reform is necessary. 
Challenges for 1993 include rising 
unemployment, deteriorating public finances 
and the implications of recent exchange-rate 
changes 
observance of the Maastricht deficit criterion, budgetary 
policy in 1993 should endeavour to maintain borrowing at 
a level consistent with reducing the debt to GDP ratio over 
the medium term. 
The extremely high rates of unemployment and their likely 
persistence for the forseeable future highlight the underlying 
structural problems present in the economy. The barriers to 
efficient employment creation have been recognized by the 
authorities for some time now and progress has been made 
in addressing some of the problems. However, the growing 
level of unemployment indicates the need for further action. 
Despite fiscal constraints, further reform of the tax system 
could contribute to easing the unemployment problem in 
the medium term; high taxation of labour has driven a large 
wedge between gross cost to the employer and net wage to 
the employee; high effective tax rates at low thresholds have 
interacted with the social welfare system to produce high 
replacement ratios and disincentives to seeking work. While 
reform of the tax regime (e.g. eliminating exemptions and 
distortions and widening the tax base) could help to encour-
age employment creation other structural reforms such as 
labour market policies designed to improve flexibility, a 
greater effectiveness of training schemes and implementation 
of the suggested reforms to industrial policy would also help 
to increase the employment intensity of growth. 
The main problems facing the Irish economy in 1993 are 
the extremely high level of unemployment and the difficult 
outlook for the public finances. 
One of the most important elements of recent economic 
strategy has been the pursuit of exchange-rate stability within 
the ERM as a means of ensuring long-term sustainable 
growth and employment creation. The devaluation of the 
Irish pound by 10% on 30 January is unlikely to change the 
fundamental strategy of the Irish authorities and adherence 
to the discipline of the exchange-rate mechanism will remain 
a central feature of Ireland's macroeconomic policy. 
A continued reduction in the gross public debt to GDP ratio 
towards the 60% target in the Maastricht Treaty is essential 
to reduce the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks 
and to maintain credibility in the authorities' fiscal policy. 
The outlook for the public finances in 1993 is considerably 
more difficult than at any time in the recent past. In addition 
to public-sector pay commitments the government also faces 
increasing unemployment, higher social welfare expenditure 
and interest payments. On the revenue side losses are ex-
pected from the process of tax harmonization, carry-over 
effects from the 1992 budget and some deterioration is 
expected due to cyclical factors. Even if the operation of the 
automatic stabilizers should temporarily threaten Ireland's 
Table 3 
Ireland: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
( % o f G D P ) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
1985-87 
5,1 
11,8 
11,7 
102,3 
- 1 0 , 4 
116,1 
6.5 
2.2 
1988-90 
8,9 
9,7 
9.5 
94,7 
- 3 , 0 
109,2 
5.5 
2,8 
1991 
3,1 
10,4 
9.2 
88,3 
- 2 , 1 
100,9 
4,4 
1,1 
1992 
2.7 
12,4 
9,1 
90,7 
- 2 , 7 
99,0 
6.3 
3.3 
1991 
7.5 
10,5 
9.6 
95,4 
- 3 , 0 
98,7 
5.9 
3,6 
1994 
7,3 
7.8 
9.3 
94,2 
- 3 , 7 
98,7 
3.3 
1.0 
For definitions, sec Tabic 3 for Belgium. 
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The outlook for 1993 is somewhat depressed as unemploy- if they remain high, have adverse effects on both investment 
ment will continue to rise against an international back- and confidence. Despite these difficult conditions which may 
ground of recession in Germany and slow recovery in Britain impact negatively on the public finances, the government 
and the United States. A further difficulty facing the authori- has expressed its determination to hold general government 
ties is the present high levels of interest rates which would, borrowing in 1993 at around 3% of GDP. 
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Italy 
Persistence of structural imbalances hampers 
economic growth 
Economic activity in 1992 has been characterized by sluggish 
output and demand growth, but a spur to domestic pro-
duction is likely to come in the next few months from 
external trade as a result of the impact of the mid-September 
devaluation. Continuing the prolonged deceleration of 
growth from 2,8% in 1989 to 1,4% in 1991, real GDP 
growth was just over 1% in 1992, posting the worst perform-
ance since 1983. Notwithstanding the relatively large contri-
bution of net real exports, economic activity is also expected 
to progress very slowly in 1993 (0,8% GDP growth), re-
flecting the negative effects on domestic demand of the 
squeeze in real disposable income. 
Table 1 
Italy: Macroeconomic performance 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 2,9 3,1 1,4 1,1 0,8 1,4 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 3,5 3,4 2,2 1,3 
Employment (% change) 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,1 
Unemployment rate (%) 10,1 10,4 10,2 10,2 
Innation (% change) 6,8 6,0 6,8 5,3 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) -0,2 -1,1 -1,9 -1,9 -1,8 -1,4 
-0,2 
0.0 
10,6 
5.8 
0.9 
0.3 
10,8 
4.7 
Whereas the slowdown of domestic demand has mainly 
resulted from the fall in fixed investment, private consump-
tion has also gradually lost momentum after the phase of 
relatively buoyant growth that lasted until the beginning of 
1992. Consumers' expenditure has been influenced by the 
weakening of consumer confidence, resulting from the 
worsening of labour market perspectives as well as expec-
tations of increasingly severe fiscal measures. Besides, expen-
diture has been affected by the slowdown of disposable 
income due to the restrictive effects on earnings of the demise 
of the wage indexation clause; since mid-year the rate of 
growth of per capita wages has been outpaced by the in-
flation rate. 
The weakness of economic activity, compounded with the 
decline in profit margins (at least until the end of 1991) and 
the high level of real interest rates, has led to an almost 
stagnant evolution of capital accumulation since the second 
half of 1990. The marked shrinking of capital-widening 
investment in manufacturing has reflected growing excess 
capacity (capacity utilization fell by the third quarter 1992 
to its lowest level since 1985) and worsening demand perspec-
tives. Besides, the financial situation of this sector has been 
endangered by the severe profit squeeze undergone by indus-
trial firms partly to offset the rise in relative costs with 
respect to foreign competititors: in 1991 the share of gross 
operating surplus in value-added, while not particularly low 
by historical standards, was about 5 percentage points below 
the 1988 peak. 
Table 2 
Italy: Investment performance 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 20,0 20,2 19,8 
(% change) 2,6 4,8 0,9 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 0,2 2,9 1,2 
Equipment (% change) 5,4 6,7 0,7 
19,4 19,3 
-0,2 -1,2 
0.4 
-0,7 
-0,7 
-1,6 
19,1 
0,9 
0.4 
1.3 
The evolution of external trade in 1992 has been charac-
terized by a continuing rise in import penetration and a mild 
recovery of exports. Although the real exchange rate had 
been almost stable since the beginning of 1991 (up to the 
September devaluation), the large real appreciation experi-
enced over previous years had left a lasting negative effect 
on the competitive position of domestic producers. The 
relatively buoyant evolution of import volumes points to a 
substantial increase in the share of domestic demand met by 
foreign supply. The rise in import penetration has been 
particularly large in the consumption goods sector where, in 
1991 and 1992, import volumes have grown considerably 
faster than real consumer expenditure. Exports of goods 
posted a very negative performance in 1991 (the rate of 
growth was below 1% in volume terms), but gradually 
recovered in 1992. 
In the first part of 1992 the favourable evolution in the terms 
of trade almost completely compensated for the deterio-
ration in trade vojumes; this trend is likely to be reversed in 
1993 by the price effects of the lira depreciation. In turn, the 
current account deficit (1,9% of GDP in 1992) continued to 
widen as a result of the worsening in the balance of invisible 
items, due both to the shrinking of the surplus on foreign 
travel and the rise in net outflows of investment income. 
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The latter reflects the steady growth of the stock of net 
foreign debt which already exceeded 9% of GDP by the end 
of 1991. 
Progress in disinflation due to wage reform may 
be temporarily halted by effects of devaluation 
The recent evolution in the factors shaping the inflation 
process shows a mixed picture. On the one hand, institutional 
changes in the wage formation mechanism resulted in a 
sharp deceleration of labour cost increases as well as in a 
substantial reduction of the inflationary bias built into the 
previous wage-setting regime. On the other, the devaluation 
of the lira and the temporary withdrawal from the ERM are 
bound to lead to a significant rise in import prices. In 
addition, the breakdown of the long-standing commitment 
to a non-accommodating exchange-rate policy could en-
danger the credibility of the anti-inflationary stance of the 
monetary authorities. 
Wages decelerated sharply in the first part of 1992, as a 
result of both the fading out of the effects of previous 
industry-level contracts and the suspension of the cost-of-
living indexation clause, effective since May 1992. The an-
nual rate of increase of contractual pay in the economy as 
a whole fell from 7% in January to just above 4% in July. 
On 31 July the government, trade unions and industrial 
employers' association reached an agreement on the reshap-
ing of the wage bargaining framework. This agreement estab-
lished the definitive abolition of the indexation mechanism 
and predetermined the pay increases to be awarded in 1993 
so as to maintain the nominal wage evolution consistent 
with the inflation targets. The parties also settled the guide-
lines for the reshaping of the wage-bargaining framework to 
be completed in the following months. In particular, they 
established that the two levels of wage bargaining (the indus-
try level and the firm level) should be not superimposed on 
each other, and that a provision should be devised to safe-
guard the purchasing power of wages if the renewals of 
national industry contracts were to lag behind the normal 
timetable. This reform, although still to be completed, rep-
resents major progress in gearing the wage bargaining pro-
cess to the needs of nominal convergence, as it implies a 
substantial increase in coordination between the different 
components contributing to wage evolution. 
The slowdown of wages has been the main determinant of 
the decline in the rate of growth of unit labour cost, which 
fell by more than four percentage points between 1991 and 
GRAPH 1 : Italy — Wage indexation for employees in the industrial sector 
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1992 in the economy as a whole. As for the manufacturing 
sector, the deceleration of growth of unit labour costs (from 
6,6% in 1991 to just below 3% in 1992) has also been 
favoured by the rebound of productivity, obtained through 
a substantial reduction in employment. 
The gradual easing of domestic cost pressure reduced the 
inflation rate to just below 5% by December 1992; on aver-
age in 1992 the CPI rose by 5,4% compared with 6,4% in 
1991. Although the severe squeeze of domestic demand has 
dampened the immediate impact of the lira depreciation on 
final prices, the effects of the increase in input costs are 
likely to reverse, in the short term, the declining inflation 
trend. Assuming a devaluation of the effective exchange rate 
by about 11 % with respect to the parities prevailing before 
the September realignment, the direct impact of the import 
price shock should result in a rise of the inflation rate on 
average in 1993 of up to two percentage points above the 
underlying trend. Taking into account the framework set in 
the July wage agreement and the slack in domestic demand 
preventing a large increase in profit margins, the effects of 
the price shock should fade out very soon. 
Devaluation highlights the fragility of the 
financial situation and the urgency of budgetary 
adjustment 
The exchange-rate commitment within the ERM had long 
been the cornerstone of Italian monetary policy. Since the 
last general realignment in 1987 the credibility of the ex-
change rate, bolstered by the lira's entry into the narrow 
band and the removal of the last controls on capital mobility 
in the course of 1990, had been reflected in a trend reduction 
in the interest-rate differential with respect to Germany: on 
short-term rates, the differential had narrowed from above 
seven percentage points on average in 1987 to three points 
in 1991, with the corresponding position of the lira within 
the band indicating full credibility of the fluctuation margins 
over the short term. In the early months of 1992 up to May 
the three-month interest-rate differential stood consistently 
below three percentage points while the exchange rate firmed 
at about one-and-a-half percentage points above its lower 
limit. However, the overfinancing of the current account 
deficit that had accompanied the progressive liberalization 
of capital flows had come to an end during 1991 : the continu-
ing net inflow of short-term banking capital was no longer 
sufficient to offset the persisting current account deficit 
and the increasing outflow of non-monetary capital, thus 
entailing a drain on official reserves. 
The perceived fragility of the Italian financial situation, 
linked to the very large stock of outstanding public debt and 
the high degree of liquidity of typical debt instruments, was 
enhanced by the apparent lack of progress in reducing the 
budget deficit. The convergence programme presented by 
the Italian authorities in October 1991 incorporated a sub-
stantial reduction in the budget deficit already in 1992. 
However, by March 1992, the publication of the 1991 out-
turn and other negative developments since the presentation 
of the programme led to a projected large overshooting of 
the deficit target in the absence of supplementary corrective 
measures. The main factors behind the overshooting were a 
large tax revenue shortfall with respect to the planned fig-
ures, only partially attributable to slower than projected 
growth, and a higher debt interest burden. Moreover, the 
announced privatization programme underwent successive 
formulations without being effectively implemented. The 
supplementary fiscal package introduced by the new govern-
ment in July was insufficient to reverse the trend, as debt 
interest projections were successively revised upward with 
the unfolding of the exchange-rate crisis. 
The Danish no-vote on the Maastricht Treaty triggered a 
succession of speculative attacks on the lira that were met 
with a mix of intervention on the foreign-exchange market 
and interest-rate increases on the money market. By early 
GRAPH 2 : Italy — General government deficit 
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September the lira had fallen to the bottom of the fluctuation 
band with the German mark; after 10 days of heavy inter­
vention by the EMS central banks, Italy was forced to realign 
(13 September). The realignment, effectively corresponding 
to a 6,7% devaluation of the central parity, did not stop 
market pressure so that a de facto suspension of ERM 
membership was agreed upon on 17 September. The sub­
sequent depreciation against the German mark at one stage 
pushed the exchange rate as far as 20% below the new 
central parity; more recently, it has been close to 13%. The 
relaxation of the exchange­rate constraints and the final 
parliamentary approval of the budgetary package have been 
accompanied by the reversal of the earlier monetary tighten­
ing: short­term interest rates have declined to below 13% 
(from a peak of 19%) and the official discount rate has been 
cut to its pre­crisis level (12%). 
The exchange­rate crisis has brought to an abrupt end the 
situation in which the credibility progressively earned on the 
exchange­rate commitment within the ERM allowed interest 
differentials to shrink in spite of the lack of progress in fiscal 
Table 3 
Italy: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short­term interest rate 
Long­term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
For definitions, see Table 3 for Bclgit 
1985­87 
9,6 
13,1 
12,4 
104,9 
­11,7 ■ 
86,3 
8,6 
1.7 
■m. 
1988­90 
8,6 
12,1 
12,8 
113,9 
­ 10,5 
95,3 
9.4 
3.2 
1991 
9,0 
12,2 
13,0 
122,4 
­10,2 
101,3 
8.7 
1,7 
1992 
6,8 
14,0 
13,7 
119,9 
­10,5 
106,8 
5,1 
­0,2 
1993 
6.5 
13,3 
13,0 
108,4 
­10,2 
112,2 
4,1 
­1 ,6 
1994 
7,0 
10.8 
10,8 
110,1 
­9,1 
115,7 
4.9 
0,2 
consolidation. Henceforth, insufficient fiscal discipline will 
be more heavily penalized by financial markets. 
A devaluation can temporarily help in slowing down the 
growth in the debt to GDP ratio, as the rise in the price 
level lowers the real cost of debt and the gain in competi­
tiveness raises output. For this to occur, however, it is 
necessary that exchange­rate expectations are stabilized by 
a consistent pursuit of monetary policies, income policies 
and fiscal adjustment policies. 
The 1993 budgetary package introduced by the government 
at the end of September 1992, in the aftermath of the ex­
change­rate crisis, responded to the urgency of fiscal consoli­
dation by aiming for a correction in the balance net of 
interest payments unprecedented in its size, both in actual 
terms (more than 2% of GDP) and with respect to trend 
projections (almost 6% of GDP). The measures to carry out 
such correction appear broadly balanced between revenue 
increases and expenditure cuts; the former imply some re­
course to new forms of taxation, which however does not 
exclude the need for a major overhaul of the fiscal system; 
the latter involve for the first time severe curbs on social 
security and the public sector wage bill which in the past 
contributed heavily to the overshooting of objectives. More­
over, the budgetary package is part of a far­ranging consoli­
dation strategy including structural reform in the four areas 
of pensions, health care, local finance and the civil service 
as well as an ambitious privatization programme. Savings 
in pension expenditure and privatization proceeds are ex­
pected to contribute significantly to the achievement of the 
fiscal adjustment targets set for the 1993­95 period, that 
is, the halving of the State sector borrowing requirement 
relative to GDP and the stabilization and subsequent decline 
of the debt ratio. Nevertheless, keeping within the targets 
may prove difficult even in 1993: it is essential that any 
slippages in the implementation of the programme be ident­
ified early and appropriate corrective action taken without 
delay. By requiring precisely such action, the conditionality 
attached to the balance­of­payments loan that the Com­
munity has granted to Italy can contribute to ensuring that 
the consolidation effort is sustained and rewarded. 
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Luxembourg 
Economic outlook remains favourable 
The pace of economic activity slackened in Luxembourg in 
1992, reflecting the worsening economic situation in neigh-
bouring countries and the continued reduction in world 
demand for steel products. However, the prospects for 1993 
remain relatively favourable. 
Table 1 
Luxembourg: Macroeconomic performance 
With regard to external trade, while imports have continued 
to grow under the impact of domestic demand, exports have 
slowed; the fall in exports in the steel industry has been only 
partly offset by the reasonably favourable results in other 
industries. The decline in world steel prices has accentuated 
the disequilibrium in the trade balance. 
Employment has shown an increase of 1,5%, concentrated 
primarily in the services sector, but the trend has been 
slightly less favourable than in previous years; the unemploy-
ment rate is only 1,5%. The rate of price rises has remained 
moderate at 3,4%, much the same level as in 1991; it has 
been affected only slightly by the VAT increase introduced 
on 1 January 1992 in the context of Community harmoniza-
tion of indirect taxation. 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
3,5 5,2 3,1 2,2 2,0 2,6 
4,1 5,9 8,4 3,3 2,2 2,6 
2.3 3,7 3,6 1,5 1,5 1,9 
2,7 1,8 1,6 1,9 2,0 1,9 
2.4 3,3 2,9 3,4 4,7 3,2 
37,6 33,0 27,9 19,9 18,7 17,5 
In 1992 the deceleration in domestic demand has been limited 
by further steady growth of private consumption of 3 % 
in real terms; this has been due to the rise in per capita 
compensation of employees, the increase in employment and 
the delayed impact on disposable incomes of the 1991 tax 
reforms. Private investment has continued to grow, particu-
larly in the construction sector, albeit at a slower pace than 
in previous years. Public-sector investment in infrastructure 
is still buoyant. 
Table 2 
Luxembourg: Investment performance 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 
(% change) 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 
Equipment (% change) 
1985-87 
21,8 
10,9 
4.0 
20,9 
1988-90 
27,0 
8.4 
7.1 
2.2 
1991 
29,0 
9,8 
7,1 
11,4 
1992 
29,7 
4.5 
6.0 
3,5 
1993 
29,6 
2.3 
3,3 
1.7 
1994 
29,8 
3.4 
3.9 
3.0 
While output in the steel industry has fallen by 8% in real 
terms in 1992, activity has remained fairly buoyant in other 
sectors, particularly construction and services, though a 
slight deceleration has been recorded. Gross domestic prod-
uct should thus rise by 2 % % in real terms. 
In 1993 gross domestic product could increase by 2% in 
real terms; however, this will depend on a less negative 
contribution from external trade than in 1992. Among the 
domestic demand aggregates, investment will continue at a 
moderate level, still being underpinned by construction and 
public investment. The pace of price rises should somewhat 
accelerate and is likely to amount to some 4,5%, basically 
due to the increase in some excise duties from 1 January 
1993 as part of the harmonization of tax rates. 
Continuation of a prudent fiscal policy 
Economic policy is providing only limited support for ac-
tivity. While interest rates in the BLEU are still closely linked 
to German rates in pursuit of a strong-currency policy, fiscal 
policy remains cautious. 
The central government budget for 1993 provides for an 
increase in overall expenditure of 6,4%, this being in line 
with the principle of maintaining spending within the limits 
imposed by medium-term economic growth. The central 
government budget thus shows a slight deficit equivalent to 
some 0,7% of GDP, and the general government accounts 
are likely to register a modest deficit of - 0,9% of GDP. 
Luxembourg continues to comply with all the convergence 
criteria set for full participation in EMU, particularly in the 
area of public finance which enjoys a very healthy situation 
relative to other EC countries. 
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GRAPH 1 : Luxembourg — Price deflator private consumption 
annual % change 
1 1992-93 forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
Table 3 
Luxembourg: Economic policy indicators 
1985-87 1988-90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Long-term interest rate 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
8.7 7,8 8,2 7,9 : : 
4,3 4,5 -0,8 -0,4 -1,0 -0,7 
13,1 8,3 6,1 6,8 7,8 8,6 
4,2 5,6 5,4 5.1 6,0 4,5 
1.8 2,2 2,4 1,6 1,2 1,3 
For dcfiniiions. sec Table 3 for Belgium. 
Financial services: slower growth but healthy 
structure 
Financial services continued to expand in 1991 and 1992 but 
were, to some extent, affected by the world-wide slowdown 
in financial activity. The banking sector, the most important, 
registered a growth of its total balance sheet of 4,6% in the 
first three quarters of 1992, compared with 10,1% in 1990. 
This slowdown of growth reflected partly a world-wide trend 
and partly a slight loss in market share on the Euro-currency 
markets, after two years of remarkable market share gains. 
Lending and depositing in ecus has gained further import-
ance; in this sector, Luxembourg has gained a strong position 
on the international markets. The slowdown of volume 
growth led to a certain squeeze in operating profits in the 
banking sector. However, a relatively low amount of loan-
loss provisions led to an overall profits increase, in inter-
national terms a remarkable result and a sign of the sector's 
general health and stability. The overall solvency of Luxem-
bourg's banks is very high in international terms and in-
creased further in the course of 1991. At the end of June 1992 
the total number of banks was 188, of which 42 had a head 
office or parent institution in Germany and 21 in France. 
Banking growth and profitability is increasingly supported 
by markets other than the traditional Euro-currency busi-
ness. The mutual fund sector has become a major source of 
business for a number of banks specializing in such business. 
In 1991 the number of undertakings in collective investment 
(Ucits) grew by almost 12%, whereas asset volume was 
up by an astonishing 43%, partly due to exchange-rate 
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movements. However, in 1992 this strong growth seems to 
have cooled down to some extent. Swiss, Belgian and 
German financial institutions are the main ones setting up 
Luxembourg-based Ucits. The captive insurance sector is 
another example of new business which is becoming im-
portant in its own right for Luxembourg's financial centre 
in general and which generates additional business for the 
banking community in particular. 
The issue volume of Luxembourg franc bonds has also 
experienced a remarkable expansion and has further in-
creased in 1991 by 31%, after more than doubling the year 
before. After the abolition of certain restrictions for issuers, 
the Luxembourg franc has become a major currency for 
Eurobond activity. But Luxembourg bond market activity 
is, unlike some markets, based not only on own-currency 
issues, but also on foreign-currency issues, which are ef-
ficiently and therefore heavily traded, registered and settled 
in Luxembourg. 
The international market position of Luxembourg's financial 
sector has thus broadened and stabilized further. The major 
barriers to a continuous rapid expansion of Luxembourg's 
financial sector lie, first, in the increasingly tight constraints 
on personnel and real estate. In the past, these restrictions 
were alleviated by a heavy inflow of foreign employees, 
which in March 1992 already accounted for 50% of total 
employees, and by the increasing relocation of operations 
from the city of Luxembourg to suburban areas. 
The other limit to Luxembourg's expansion and preservation 
of market share is its continued lack of securities and deriva-
tives trading activity on organized markets. These markets 
normally constitute the core of a large financial centre. Their 
absence means that business expansion is largely restricted 
to certain niches. Luxembourg has so far successfully dealt 
with this shortfall by often being at the forefront of a new 
market-segment development. 
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The Netherlands the present renewed wage moderation may have mitigating 
effects. 
Slowdown in activity but improved outlook 
for prices 
The slowdown in activity which began in 1991 has continued 
in 1992 and will be more pronounced in 1993, with the 
domestic components of demand virtually marking time. In 
1992, the most noticeable feature has undoubtedly been 
the reduction in real terms in private investment, following 
several years of sustained growth. The narrowing of profit 
margins, the impact of the rise in interest rates on firms' net 
debt-servicing burden and the emergence of excess capacity 
in some sectors have exerted a negative impact on investment 
decisions. Private consumption has also slackened markedly 
despite the effects of faster wage rises on disposable incomes; 
the uncertainty surrounding employment has curbed house­
hold spending. Finally, both public consumption and invest­
ment have barely increased owing to continuing fiscal con­
straint. The decelerating trend in domestic demand will be 
more pronounced in 1993, as investment is expected to 
record a further marked reduction, while private consump­
tion will continue to decelerate. 
Table 1 
Netherlands: Macroeconomic performance 
Table 2 
Netherlands: Investment performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
1,8 
2,1 
1.6 
10,3 
0,5 
2,9 
1988-90 
3,7 
3,3 
1,9 
8,4 
1,3 
3,4 
1991 
2.2 
1,7 
1,3 
7.0 
3,3 
3,9 
1992 
1,3 
0.6 
0.4 
6,7 
3.1 
3,9 
1993 
0.6 
0,3 
-0,4 
7,6 
2.7 
3,8 
1994 
1.3 
1.0 
0,0 
8,1 
2,5 
3,7 
The low level of domestic demand led to a deceleration in 
imports in 1992. Exports on the other hand increased by 
3% in real terms last year, reflecting an improvement in 
market shares. However, price competitiveness has been 
maintained only through a reduction in export profit mar­
gins as relative unit labour costs have been increasing. In 
1993, competitiveness could worsen further due to the impact 
of recent exchange-rate adjustments, although in this context 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 
(% change) 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 
Equipment (% change) 
1985-87 
20,4 
5,3 
2.3 
9.0 
1988-90 
21,3 
4,3 
4.3 
6,0 
1991 
20,8 
0,1 
-2,1 
2.6 
1992 
20,6 
-0,4 
0.0 
-0,8 
1993 
20,4 
-0,7 
-0,6 
-0,8 
1994 
20,4 
1,0 
0.5 
1,6 
All in all, the rise in GDP in real terms is unlikely to exceed 
1,3% in 1992 and 0,6% in 1993. Employment has shown a 
slight increase in 1992 but is expected to fall in 1993, with 
the unemployment rate rising to 7,6%. 
The very favourable price trend of the 1980s had deteriorated 
markedly by the turn of the decade. However, the inflation 
rate, which was over 4% at the beginning of 1992, has since 
fallen and is unlikely to have exceeded 3 'Λ % on average for 
that year, one of the best performances in the Community. 
The rise in agreed wage settlements has accelerated to 4 Vi°/o, 
while certain budgetary measures have also had an upward 
effect on prices; a reduction of the standard VAT rate by 
one percentage point to 17!Λ% effective from 1 October 
has been decided. However, the worsening of the economic 
outlook is already having a dampening effect on wage claims. 
More modest wage increases, barely exceeding the inflation 
rate, weaker growth performance and international price 
developments will have a moderating impact on domestic 
price rises in 1993, which could average 2,7%. 
Such progress on inflation will enable the Netherlands to 
continue to comply with most of the convergence criteria 
laid down for EMU. Moreover, monetary policy continues 
to be based on a stable guilder/German mark exchange rate 
and to be geared to maintaining nominal stability. The hard­
core status of the guilder is well established and has never 
been questioned during the ERM crisis of late 1992. Fiscal 
policy, long directed at consolidating public finances and 
reducing budgetary disequilibria, continues to be aimed at 
a further reduction of the public deficit and a fall in the 
collective burden; these objectives have been mentioned in 
a convergence programme designed to meet all the criteria 
set for EMU by 1994. 
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GRAPH 1 : Netherlands — Evolution of consumer prices 
e n year-on-year percentage change 
— inflation (12-month moving average) 
' 'I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 1 4 7 10 I 4 7 10 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Table 3 
Netherlands: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
(%ofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
1985-87 
6.7 
5,8 
6.7 
105,1 
-5 ,6 
73,4 
1.5 
1.0 
1988-90 
10,8 
7.0 
7,5 
103,0 
-4,8 
78,8 
1,9 
0.6 
1991 
4.7 
9.3 
8.9 
99,2 
-2 ,5 
78,3 
4.3 
0.9 
1992 
4.8 
9.4 
8.1 
102,0 
-3 ,5 
79,8 
4.8 
1,7 
1993 
4.0 
7.5 
7.6 
104,8 
-3,5 
81,7 
3.3 
0.6 
1994 
4.0 
5.8 
7.6 
104,5 
-3 ,3 
83,1 
3.3 
0,8. 
For definitions, sec Table 3 for Belgium. 
Convergence programme: EMU budgetary 
objectives to be achieved by 1994 
The convergence programme presented by the Netherlands 
in March 1992 represents an extension of the policy im­
plemented since October 1989 on the basis of the objectives 
then set by the Coalition Agreement. It seeks to reinforce the 
consolidation effort already made on the basis of satisfactory 
performance in 1990 and 1991 but also in the light of 
budgetary prospects for the period 1992-94, which have 
deteriorated compared with initial forecasts. Since 1991 the 
rise in interest rates, the increase in social security spending 
stemming in particular from the larger numbers in receipt 
of sickness and invalidity benefits, and the shortfall in tax 
revenue due to the economic slowdown have clouded the 
outlook for the 1993 budget deficit and for the ensuing years. 
The convergence programme is based on macroeconomic 
assumptions of an annual increase in GDP in nominal terms 
of 5 VA% between 1992 and 1994 (2 2Λ% in real terms and 
3 Vi % in prices) and a long-term interest rate of 8 VA % (the 
average for 1991). The general government deficit is thus 
expected to decline from 5,0% in 1990 to 3,5% in 1992 and 
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2,4% in 1994, which would be below the EMU reference 
value. After an increase from 46,6% in 1990 to 47,5% in 
1992, the overall tax burden is forecast to decline to 46,5% 
in 1994. The interest burden as a proportion of GDP should 
remain stable at 5 3Λ% over the reference period owing to 
the high level of interest rates. However, the impact of short­
term interest­rate changes on interest payments is likely to 
be limited by the debt structure in the Netherlands (no 
foreign­currency debt, no indexation and a large proportion 
of fixed­interest 10­year debt). The ratio of public debt to 
GDP, which is currently stable at around 80%, is expected 
to fall to 76,5% in 1994, still above the EMU reference value 
of 60%. It should continue to decline thereafter. But a fuller 
assessment of the public debt situation in the Netherlands 
would also have to take account of the fact that the country 
is a large net capital exporter and that a large proportion of 
future pension payments are covered by substantial funds 
(for instance for civil servants, these funds are equivalent to 
32% of GDP). 
The target for the general government deficit (of 3,5% of 
GDP) has been achieved for 1992; in the case of the 1993 
budget, however, there is some variance between the conver­
gence programme (2,9% of GDP) and current Commission 
forecasts (3,5% of GDP). This divergence is due to macro­
economic conditions that have worsened in relation to the 
base forecast but, providing growth recovers in 1994, it 
should not affect the outturn at the end of the convergence 
period; moreover, the government has declared its readiness 
to take additional consolidation measures to deal with any 
undesirable budgetary developments. The 1993 budget 
already provides for major spending cuts, particularly in 
the social security sphere. Despite a one percentage point 
reduction in the maximum VAT rate to 17,5%, the tax 
burden will increase in 1993 compared with 1992; other 
indirect taxes have been increased (in particular, road tax, the 
excise duties on diesel fuel and tobacco, and the environment 
levies). Direct taxes and social security contributions have 
been reduced slightly. The budget also includes an allocation 
of HFL 750 million for improving economic and physical 
infrastructures over the period 1992­94. At the end of 
October 1992, when the macroeconomic forecast for 1993 
was significantly revised downward, the government adopted 
a package of spending reductions for the central government 
amounting to HFL 2 billion; additional measures for 
HFL 750 million have been decided and will be proposed in 
detail in the spring of 1993 depending on the economic 
situation and wage developments. 
GRAPH 2 : Netherlands — Government expenditure 
1955 1960 1965 1970 
Source: Ministerie van Financiën. Milj. nota 1993. 
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Structural problems in the public finance sphere 
It would seem possible for the Dutch convergence pro-
gramme to be completed successfully. Additional consoli-
dation measures will be adopted in the face of adverse 
economic developments if it turns out that certain planned 
savings were overestimated, although it could prove difficult 
to implement such measures against a background of slack-
ening growth and a fiscal policy that already has a pro-
cyclical bias. 
Fiscal policy in the Netherlands will continue to be faced 
with the problem of the structure of public finances even if 
the convergence programme is successfully completed. In 
1994 the level of public debt, though falling, will still be 
high: this will necessitate a tight fiscal policy for a number 
of years beyond the end of the convergence period proper. 
The tax burden (including social security contributions) will 
still be onerous at the end of the period since it is unlikely 
to fall below the already high level reached in 1990 (46% of 
GDP). There is even a risk that the tax burden will be 
higher than the 1990 level. A reduction would be desirable, 
particularly in order to alleviate the burden on firms and to 
improve the overall competitiveness of the economy. With 
that in mind, the Dutch authorities will have to set about 
cutting public spending, which is still expected to be very 
high as a proportion of GDP on an international comparison 
(56 to 57% in 1994). The share of transfers to households 
in particular — in the form of social security benefits and 
various grants (e.g. for rents) —will remain high. On the 
other hand, in the interests of budgetary consolidation, con-
siderable sacrifices will still be needed in the field of public 
finance. The reduction in public expenditure should be ac-
companied by a structural adjustment designed to limit 
transfer payments in favour of spending on essential public 
services. This will be possible only if the labour market 
undergoes a simultaneous structural adjustment that in-
creases the employment participation rate and reduces the 
level of social transfer payments. A steady reduction in those 
payments should make it possible to alleviate the heavy tax 
burden and should help to improve supply-side conditions, 
particularly as regards investment. 
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Slower growth but steady progress on the 
inflation front 
After a long period of strong and uninterrupted growth since 
the mid-1980s, economic activity in Portugal has experienced 
a marked slowdown since the end of 1990. The slowdown 
is in line with developments in the world economy. Real 
GDP growth, which reached 4,1% in 1990, was around 
2% in 1991. In 1992 the deceleration of economic activity 
continued but at a slower pace as internal demand remained 
rather buoyant. Growth was further supported by gains in 
the terms of trade. For 1993, given the difficult external 
environment, GDP growth should record a further slow­
down, from an estimated 1,7% in 1992 to a rate closer to 
1,3%' 
Table 1 
Portugal: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate ' 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand ' 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1 1993/94 forecasts based on 1990 pn 
1985-87 
4,1 
6,5 
-0,7 
8,0 
14,4 
0,8 
ces. 
1988-90 
4,5 
5.7 
0,7 
5,1 
11,5 
-0,8 
1991 
1,9 
4,1 
0.9 
4.1 
11,9 
- ι , ο 
1992 
1,7 
3.6 
-0,2 
4,8 
9,1 
-0,2 
1993 
1,3 
3,2 
-0,5 
5,4 
6,8 
-2,3 
1994 
2.5 
4,0 
0.1 
5,8 
5.7 
-3,3 
The previous engines of growth — exports and private-
sector investment — displayed much less dynamism in 1992. 
Portuguese exports recorded continuous gains in market 
share during the 1980s but further progress in this important 
area is losing momentum, which suggests a deterioration in 
competitiveness in recent years. Investment growth in the last 
two years has been clearly below the impressive expansion of 
the late 1980s, particularly in the industrial sector. High real 
rates of interest, mainly due to insufficient competition on 
domestic financial markets, and a clear deterioration in 
the expectations of economic agents seem to be the main 
explanatory factors. The decelerating trend is expected to 
continue in 1993. 
Table 2 
Portugal: Investment performance 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 
(% change) 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 
Equipment (% change) 
1985-87 
22,7 
7.2 
3.8 
11,4 
1988-90 
26,5 
8,8 
6.3 
12,8 
1991 
25,5 
2,8 
4.5 
1,0 
199: 
25,1 
3,6 
2.5 
4.8 
1993 
25,4 
3,3 
2.8 
3.8 
1994 
26,0 
5,8 
5,7 
6.0 
On the other hand, economic activity has been supported 
in the recent period by private consumption and public 
investment, the latter being promoted by the large inflow of 
EC structural Funds. Growth of private consumption has 
been particularly buoyant, close to 5% in both 1990 and 
1991 and in excess of 4% in 1992. This component of 
expenditure has been fuelled by a strong rise in real wages, 
a consequence above all of the very tight situation on the 
labour market: the unemployment rate has been consistently 
below 5%, the lowest in the Community except for Luxem­
bourg. Furthermore, and typically in a disinflation process, 
nominal wage increases have lagged behind the falling rate 
uf inflation, reinforcing the growth in real wages. However, 
although this feature has been common to both the private 
and the public sector, it has been much more substantial in 
the public sector as a result of the progressive implemen­
tation of reform of the civil service pay system since 1989. 
In 1992, the deceleration in wage growth was more pro­
nounced in the private sector, as the first signs of wage 
moderation began to emerge, particularly in industry. As a 
result of the lower increase in real wages expected in both 
the public sector — associated with the effort of further 
reducing the budget deficit — and the private sector, private 
consumption is expected to decelerate clearly in 1993. 
The slowdown of the economy, coupled with a very tight 
stance in both monetary and exchange-rate policy, has 
helped the current disinflation process. The process should 
continue next year, despite the recent realignment of the 
escudo, the market exchange-rate of which did not sub­
sequently display any major movement. The rate of increase 
of consumer prices declined from 13,6% in 1990 to 8,9%' 
in 1992 despite the impact of the measures associated with 
Community indirect tax harmonization, which took place 
Based on 1990 prices. 
1 Including housing, the CPI declined from 13,7% in 1990 to 9,5% in 
1992. 
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during this year. The deceleration of inflation should con­
tinue in 1993, to a figure below 7% in spite of a less 
favourable evolution in import prices. 
The situation on the labour market remains very tight but 
employment creation decelerated in 1992. This trend is ex­
pected to continue in 1993 and the unemployment rate will 
tend to increase, albeit remaining at a level close to virtual 
full employment. 
After the substantial improvement recorded between 1984 
and 1989 (the budget deficit declined from 12,0% to 3,4% 
of GDP), further progress in the field of public finances has 
been hard to achieve. Despite a very favourable evolution 
of (mainly direct) tax revenues, the general government 
deficit registered a deterioration in 1991 to 6,4% of GDP. 
This resulted from a surge of public expenditure, which 
proved much more difficult to control than expected in two 
main areas: the wage bill — especially because of the already 
mentioned reform of the civil service pay system — and 
socially related expenditure, such as health, education and 
social protection (e.g. State pensions). 
and a non­accommodating exchange­rate policy in effect 
since October 1990 and which was reinforced with the ad­
hesion of the escudo to the ERM last April, play the major 
role in the disinflation process. Structural policies and social 
dialogue support nominal convergence and are expected to 
increase potential growth and consequently to sustain real 
convergence. Monetary policy is set to support the partici­
pation of the escudo in the ERM. 
The programme established an appropriate orientation for 
economic policy in order to allow Portugal to fully partici­
pate in the construction of EMU. Although both the dom­
estic and international macroeconomic situation and out­
look have developed so far in a less favourable environment 
than was projected, the implementation of the convergence 
programme in 1992 proceeded in a relatively smooth way; 
inflation receded and the reduction of the general govern­
ment deficit has been largely achieved despite a lower GDP 
rate growth than anticipated in the budget and the difficulties 
already mentioned in controlling public expenditure. As 
envisaged in the convergence programme, controls on capital 
movements were fully abolished. 
However, a return to a declining path for the general govern­
ment deficit was achieved in 1992 in the framework of the 
implementation of the 1992­95 convergence programme. The 
non­accommodating stance of fiscal policy was reinforced 
by the 1993 budget which represents a fully committed at­
tempt to curb public expenditure. The general government 
deficit is targeted at 4,0% of GDP as a result of an impressive 
effort at current expenditure moderation and the reduction 
of interest payments. The associated effort at nominal wage 
moderation in the public sector is to be particularly wel­
comed, for its important direct and indirect (via private 
sector expectations) support for the disinflation process. 
The convergence programme: implementation 
in a less favourable environment 
The Portuguese authorities approved the convergence pro­
gramme in November 1991, thus defining their strategy for 
the transition period to EMU. Its main objective is to achieve 
both nominal and real convergence. The programme aims 
at the virtual elimination of the inflation differential relative 
to the best­performing Community countries, while main­
taining a positive real growth differential vis-à-vis the EC 
average, and bringing the public finance in line with the 
Maastricht criteria. The continuation of fiscal consolidation 
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In 1993, despite current macroeconomic forecasts distinctly 
more pessimistic than the scenario implicit in the Portuguese 
programme, it seems likely that the main targets will be 
largely achieved, due to the severe budgetary stance and 
some easing in demand and cost pressures on prices. How­
ever, the situation implies further efforts to achieve the stated 
objectives regarding both inflation and public finances in 
the coming years. 
Monetary policy could be called upon to operate in a quite 
different environment from that anticipated in the conver­
gence programme. Instead of being under pressure from 
substantial capital inflows (until late 1992 checked by ex­
change controls), its restrictive stance could be accentuated 
in an undesirable way in the aftermath of the recent turmoil 
in the Community foreign­exchange markets. Such an ad­
verse development would render the process of convergence 
more difficult to achieve. Consequently, and similarly to the 
other Member States, the restoration of normality in the 
exchange markets would prove beneficial for the conver­
gence process in Portugal. 
Continuing the convergence process will benefit 
from deeper social cooperation 
Success in continuing convergence towards EMU in the 
current less favourable economic environment will benefit 
to a greater degree from cooperation between the social 
partners. 
In the present difficult international circumstances the Portu­
guese economy needs to increase its competitiveness, reduce 
inflation and remain attractive to foreign capital. In ad­
dition, the ongoing process of industrial restructuring, par­
ticularly in the export sector, will have to be successfully 
completed. The balancing of nominal and real convergence 
calls for a deep dialogue between employers, trade unions 
and the government in order to secure that domestic costs 
do not increase at a rate far higher than the Community 
average, particularly in the context of a non­accommodating 
exchange­rate policy. Consequently, the policy of social dia­
logue already present in the convergence programme needs 
to be maintained and deepened. 
GRAPH 2 : Portugal — ESC/DM average exchange rate 
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Portugal: Economic policy indicators 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short­term interest rate 
Long­term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
( % o f G D P ) 
Gross public debt 
( % o f G D P ) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
24,9 
16,8 
19,6 
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­ 8 , 1 
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Prolonged economic weakness 
As of late 1992, the economy remained in the recession 
which began two years earlier, making this the longest period 
of economic weakness of the post­war period. Output as 
measured by average GDP in the first three quarters of 1992 
was 1% below a year earlier and about 4 %% below its 
1990 peak, almost as large a fall as experienced in the five­
quarter 1980­81 recession (4 'AVo; see Graph l);1 output 
excluding the largely supply­determined sector of oil and 
gas extraction showed a shallower but more prolonged fall 
compared with 10 years earlier (Graph 1). 
By the autumn of 1992 unemployment exceeded 2,8 million, 
over 11 % of the workforce according to SOEC definitions, 
and had begun to rise more quickly after slowing earlier in 
the year. Employment for the whole year seemed likely to 
fall by 2%, after a 3% fall in 1991. The heavy labour 
shakeout was nevertheless effective in producing a rise in 
productivity (2,4% in the year to the third quarter of 1992) 
contributing to a slowdown in unit labour cost pressures. 
The other major contribution to this slowdown was a 
marked reduction in the level of wage settlements under the 
pressure of weak labour and product markets: by mid­1992, 
settlements averaged around 4%, with wide dispersion. For 
similar reasons, price inflation also fell substantially, with a 
measure of 'underlying' consumer price inflation2 falling to 
3,7% in the year to December and with manufacturing 
output prices up 3,5% in the same period. 
A further deepening of the recession in the first quarter of 
1992 (non­oil GDP declined 0,2% on the preceding quarter) 
can be partly attributed to pre­electoral uncertainty: a gen­
eral election, in which the government was returned, was 
held in April. However, the failure of the economy to pick 
up decisively in the second quarter, despite some promising 
indications from manufacturing output and consumer de­
mand, was followed in the early autumn by survey indi­
cations of continued sluggishness (non­oil output proved to 
1 Comparison of path of average GDP at constant market prices: factor 
cost GDP measure declined by 4% in the 1990­92 recession period and 
by 5% in the 1980­81 recession period. The annual change in the retail price index excluding mortgage interest. 
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have fallen a further 0,25% in the third quarter). There were 
increasing perceptions that the stance of monetary policy, 
constrained by the obligations of ERM participation and 
the government's oft-repeated commitment not to devalue, 
was prejudicing recovery to an unsustainable degree. These 
perceptions contributed to the market pressures forcing the 
suspension of sterling from the ERM in September and 
the pound's subsequent steep depreciation. The nominal 
effective index for sterling ended in 1992 about 13% below 
its average level in the first half of the year, and about 17% 
below its former DM central rate. The regained indepen-
dence of monetary policy was used to cut short-term interest 
rates below those prevailing in the ERM: base rates were 
cut in stages to 7% by November, with a further 1 % point 
cut to 6% in January. 
Indicators at the turn of 1992-93 are that the fall in non-
oil output has largely ended, although unemployment will 
continue to rise. A weak recovery in 1993 seems likely, aided 
by some return of domestic confidence and the substantial 
policy easing since the pound's suspension from the ERM. 
The most positive growth impetus should come from net 
exports as a consequence of increased competitiveness; 
slower destocking should also be a positive factor. Domestic 
final demand nevertheless seems set to remain weak. Rising 
unemployment and the depressed housing market will prob-
ably restrain recovery in private consumption, while business 
investment will perhaps decline further. However, govern-
ment consumption and government fixed investment main-
tained at existing levels should buoy activity. 
Assessment of the short-term outlook must take into account 
the repeatedly disappointed expectations of recovery earlier 
in the recession. This suggests a very cautious view of pros-
pects on at least two main grounds: first, the need to recog-
nize the seriousness of the underlying imbalances apparently 
responsible for the length of the recession; and, secondly, 
because disappointed expectations in the past may well lead 
to wariness when an upturn does eventually occur, thereby 
reducing the dynamism of recovery. The deterioration of the 
economic environment in Western Europe is an additional 
factor making for uncertainty. The easing of policy rep-
resented by the large devaluation of sterling from its former 
central ERM parity and the fall in interest rates are favour-
able for activity, although some offset is likely from a tighter 
fiscal policy. 
Table 1 
United Kingdom: Macroeconomic performance 
GDP growth rate 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Inflation (% change) 
Balance of current 
account (% of GDP) 
1985-87 
4.2 
4.4 
1,2 
11,1 
4.7 
-0,8 
1988-90 
2,3 
3,5 
2.3 
7.5 
5,5 
-4,8 
1991 
-2,2 
-3,2 
-3,1 
9,1 
7.2 
-1,8 
1992 
-0,9 
0.0 
-2,3 
10,8 
5.1 
-2,1 
1993 
1,4 
0.5 
-1,7 
12,3 
5.1 
-2,8 
1994 
2.6 
2.5 
-0,5 
12,8 
2.9 
-2,9 
Table 2 
United Kingdom: Investment performance 
1985-87 
Gross capital formation 
(%ofGDP) 17,1 
(% change) 5,3 
of which: 
Construction (% change) 4,8 
Equipment (% change) 6,0 
1988-90 
19,5 
5,9 
5.9 
6,7-
1991 
16,7 
-9,9 
-8,4 
11,9 
1992 
15,6 
-0,4 
-1,4 
0.6 
l')')? 
15,5 
-0,8 
-1 ,5 
0.0 
1994 
15,8 
4.7 
5.5 
3.8 
Table 3 
United Kingdom: Economic 
Money growth 
(% change) 
Short-term interest rate 
Long-term interest rate 
Competitiveness 
(1985 = 100) 
Budget balance 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross public debt 
(VoofGDP) 
Nominal wages per head 
(% change) 
Real wages per head 
(% change) 
policy 
1985-87 
15,1 
10,9 
10,0 
95,1 
-2,2 
57,6 
7.4 
2.6 
indicators 
1988-90 
16,1 
13,0 
10,0 
105,6 
0.2 
44,2 
8.5 
2.9 
1991 
5.8 
11,5 
9.9 
113,3 
-2,8 
41,1 
8.9 
1,5 
1992 
5.2 
9.6 
9.1 
111,0 
-6,1 
45,9 
6.0 
0.8 
1993 
7,5 
6,5 
8.8 
99,0 
-8,2 
52,6 
3,7 
-1,3 
1994 
7.0 
6.3 
9.1 
98,3 
-8,1 
58,4 
4.7 
1,7 
For definitions, see Table 3 for Belgium. 
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The recession, financial imbalances and 
the ERM 
The timing of the mid-1990 onset of recession in the United 
Kingdom was fairly similar to that in a number of other 
economies, notably the United States and Canada, all of 
which during the 1980s shared an experience of financial 
liberalization and rapid build-up of private-sector debt. Else­
where in the Community, there was only a mild deceleration 
of growth from mid-1990. Subsequently, in 1991, the 
United Kingdom developed uniquely among the major econ­
omies with a deepening of recession (the North American 
economies then began a modest recovery aided by sharply 
reduced interest rates) and its continuation through 1992. 
The United Kingdom thus appears to have experienced a 
recession similar in nature but far worse in degree than other 
major industrialized countries.1 The origin of recession was 
essentially domestic, a reaction to the previous debt-financed 
boom: in terms of contribution to GDP growth, it owed 
little to a fall-off of exports, even though there was some 
deterioration in export performance during the first year of 
1 Of OECD countries, only Sweden and Finland have recently experienced 
recessions of similar or worse severity. 
recession. As regards policy response, a key difference in the 
United States and other similarly weak economies was that 
these, following independent monetary policies, were able to 
cut interest rates substantially. By contrast, the UK's entry 
into the ERM in October 1990 limited the scope for cuts in 
short-term interest rates to the floor set by German mark 
rates, the latter maintained at a high level by the Bundes­
bank. The UK, however, was in a less robust position to 
cope with high real interest rates than other Community 
members which had not undergone the same degree of finan­
cial deregulation and build-up of indebtedness. 
By mid-1992 the UK's economic performance was clearly 
out of line with other major industrial countries and with 
its EC partners, and yet the country had 'tied its hands' in 
terms of monetary and exchange-rate policy independence. 
The progressive weakening in the rest of Europe and the 
relative feebleness of the United States upturn offered little 
hope of recovery through stronger trade performance; in­
deed, the renewed widening of the UK's net import gap 
from mid-1991 despite stagnant final expenditure is some 
evidence that the level of the real exchange rate was excessive 
(Graph 2), partly reflecting the high level of ERM currencies 
against the US dollar and the importance of the US in total 
UK trade. 
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Despite this evidence of an existing competitiveness problem, 
the authorities emphasized that the pound's central German 
mark parity would be retained when sterling moved into 
narrow ERM bands (even if other currencies were to realign). 
By the summer this implied a significant future nominal 
appreciation, because sterling was trading towards the bot­
tom of its wide fluctuation band as economic recovery failed 
to take root. Such a nominal appreciation would have been 
even greater in real terms since UK inflation was higher 
than in other ERM members. Given these doubts on com­
petitiveness, it was unclear that official policy, to 'move 
progressively into line with the best inflation performance 
in other ERM countries',1 could be reconciled with the 
rebalancing of the real economy at a higher output level and 
with its external account not under strain. 
The authorities' policy of disinflation at the existing central 
rate, even if feasible, would probably have been slow to 
yield large positive returns through gains in net trade: UK 
manufacturing export prices in sterling rose only some 2% 
in the two years to mid­1992 and the trend of UK export 
prices of manufactures relative to other ERM countries was 
1992 medium­term financial strategy. 
fairly steady; despite this, the UK's share of major countries' 
manufactured exports in the period since the second quarter 
of 1990 had been slowly falling. 
An ambitious counter­inflationary stance, while desirable as 
a stable orientation of policy, may also have had adverse 
consequences in the light of its implications for real interest 
rates and the accumulation of debt. For the personal sector 
the steep rise in the household saving ratio since its trough 
in 1988 (from 5 'Á% in 1988 to about 11 3Λ% in the first 
three quarters of 1992) has resulted in the generation of 
substantial net financial surpluses (of the order of 3% of 
GDP in 1991 and 6% in the first three quarters of 1992). 
Despite this, the ratio of debt to income has declined only 
slightly during the recession, while the ratios of debt to total 
and financial wealth have remained fairly stable (Graph 3). 
In effect, wealth has been depressed because the substantial 
increase in the net acquisition of financial assets (achieved 
more through lower borrowing than through an increase in 
the gross acquisition of assets) has been largely offset by 
falls (real and even nominal) in the market values of assets, 
especially of residential property. 
Furthermore, if personal sector assets accumulated through 
the medium of life assurance and pension funds are excluded 
from the picture, since these represent longer­term, illiquid 
GRAPH 3 : United Kingdom — Personal sector 
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commitments, the remaining, 'discretionary' sector shows a 
bleaker picture of the financial constraints still present: the 
gross acquisition of financial assets and borrowing have 
declined in nominal terms and wealth, non-financial (chiefly 
housing) and financial, has declined in real terms. Total net 
wealth in real terms remains below its level for much of the 
1980s and indebtedness is probably above its desired level 
in relation to income. It may thus be prudent to expect the 
personal sector to maintain a cautious attitude to spending 
while undesired debt levels are reduced. 
The need to re-establish policy credibility 
Following sterling's ERM adhesion in October 1990 the 
government's reformulation of economic policy was centred 
on the maintenance of the UK's chosen parity. The failure 
of the policy in September 1992 when sterling's ERM partici-
pation was suspended was followed, after a time, by a series 
of initiatives intended to repair credibility. These emphasized 
the government's continued commitment to control of in-
flation within a newly independent monetary policy frame-
work. 
monthly monetary report and written grounds for interest-
rate changes. With time this should enable the government 
to demonstrate that it is pursuing a consistent counter-
inflation policy and thus permit it to rebuild its credibility. 
As regard ERM re-entry, government indications suggest 
that this is an aspiration which is unlikely to be realized 
before 1994 at the earliest, while cyclical and policy con-
ditions between the United Kingdom and Germany remain 
far different. 
The apparatus of fiscal policy and public expenditure control 
has remained untouched by the events of September. How-
ever, the financial surpluses of just over 1% of GDP in both 
1988 and 1989 at the height of the last boom have been 
succeeded by worsening deficits, with a particularly sharp 
deterioration in 1992 (an expected deficit of around 6% of 
GDP). Little relief is in prospect in the short term, with a 
further worsening probable in 1993 (Graph 4). The length 
and depth of the current recession which began in mid-1990 
has obviously been the major contributor to the deterio-
ration, but in the Commission's view does not appear to 
account for all of it; while such calculations are open to 
great uncertainty, a partial explanation appears to be an 
Chief among these, the government has reformulated its 
central objective of reducing inflation by specifying a long-
term aim of 2% p.a. or less, with a range of 1 to 4% for 
the remainder of the current Parliament. However, some 
inflationary consequences of devaluation are inevitable in 
1993. It is difficult to gauge the extent and speed of pass-
through of devaluation-induced effects in current circum-
stances. The precedent of falling inflation after the de-
preciation of the pound in 1981 (with a then more regulated 
economy) is encouraging; similar current circumstances of a 
depressed economy with extensive unused capacity should 
also prevent an extensive pass-through in the short term. 
Rising margins between output and input costs in the first 
half of 1992 despite falling inflation also suggest scope for 
at least partial absorption of devaluation-induced cost 
changes. In consequence, progress in further reducing in-
flation may be only temporarily reversed in 1993. 
Despite the unchanged objective, the new monetary and 
exchange-rate policy remains less transparent than the pre-
vious ERM framework. The government's approach has 
been to stress the attention to be given to a range of indi-
cators: monetary growth, interest rates, the exchange rate 
and asset prices. However, a simple range of specified indi-
cators, without a clearer public understanding of how policy 
will be formulated, is unlikely by itself to re-establish credi-
bility. The government has tried to meet such criticism by 
more public dissemination of information, including a new 
GRAPH 4 : United Kingdom — General government net 
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expansionary expenditure path followed from 1990, aided 
by further tax-easing, particularly of corporate tax.' 
The current fiscal policy objective remains to balance the 
'budget' (understood as the public sector borrowing require-
ment — PSBR) over the cycle, normally accepting full oper-
ation of the automatic stabilizers. The aim of achieving 
PSBR balance over the current cycle now seems unattain-
able, however, in view of the length and severity of the 
recession since 1990. Possible alternatives for the medium 
term are to aim for a 'balanced budget' (zero PSBR) when 
the economy eventually returns to its potential level, or to 
give prominence to the Maastricht Treaty limit on govern-
ment net borrowing2 of 3% of GDP (a limit already implictly 
accepted by the government in its commitment to meeting 
the Treaty's convergence criteria). 
In the shorter term the task is to contain the deficit and 
prevent its taking on an enduring structural character. A 
tightening fiscal policy would also be consistent with a rebal-
ancing of the monetary-fiscal policy mix, to offset partially 
the consequence of sterling's devaluation and additional 
policy easing through lower interest rates. An announcement 
in July 1992 tightened expenditure commitments compared 
with previous plans and reformulated the system of expendi-
ture control by attaching greater precedence to aggregate 
expenditure ceilings. The November autumn statement (ex-
penditure budget)3 nevertheless still proposed real increases 
in general government expenditure averaging 2,6% p.a. for 
the three following financial years, front-loaded into 1993-
94 (3,8%). A major contributor to this increase is a strongly 
rising profile for debt interest, consequent upon the move 
back into substantial net borrowing; excluding this, expendi-
ture is projected to rise on average a real 1,8% p.a. over the 
three years (3,3% in 1993-94). These plans, by themselves, 
suggest only a slow return to fiscal balance if tax policies 
remain unchanged, and one moreover vulnerable to disap-
pointment if low growth persists. Greater revenue than con-
sistent with unchanged policies may therefore be required. 
The UK authorities believe the deterioration in the deficit has been 
almost entirely cyclical. 
Equivalent to the UK concept of the general government financial 
deficit (GGFD). The GGFD, unlike the PSBR, does not credit privatiza-
tion receipts and other financial transactions such as onlending to public 
corporations. 
3 The last in its present form. After the final taxation budget in March 
1993 budgets will be unified (jointly presenting tax and expenditure 
proposals for the subsequent financial year) from December 1993. 
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Is slow growth unavoidable? 
Summary 
After a long period of accelerating growth during the 1980s, the Community has, since 1991, been undergoing a cyclical slowdown 
that has not as yet substantially affected the basic growth fundamentals, which the previous decade had seen restored in large 
part. However, the fall in GDP growth has caused a sharp rise in the unemployment rate which is expected to return in 1993 to 
its earlier maximum levels, i.e. above 10,5% of the labour force — and might remain so for several years. 
Given the most likely projections for labour supply and if the employment threshold of the EC economy remains as stable as it 
has been since the mid-1970s, a reversal of the unemployment trend can only be generated by the restoration of a strong and 
sustainable growth rate of around 3,5% per year on average in the medium term. 
Among the basic determinants of such a growth process both the rate of growth and the share in GDP of fixed investment can 
be shown to play a major role. A strong rise in investment in the medium term should therefore become a priority of economic 
policies. 
Besides a favourable and balanced evolution of final demand, helped by member countries and Community actions in the field 
of infrastructures as proposed in the Edinburgh Summit conclusions, the profitability of fixed capital should also be increased in 
order to realize a higher investment share of GDP in the face of continuing high 'real' long-term interest rates. As during the 
1980s, a moderate evolution of real wage-cost per head with respect to labour productivity, helped by structural reforms, should 
be instrumental in providing the required profitability gains. 
At the same time, the pursuit of budgetary consolidation in agreement with the Maastricht criteria and the promotion of private 
saving would help to generate the appropriate savings balance, capable of supporting a higher share of investment without 
causing external disequilibria. 
The feasibility of achieving a higher growth trend with a strong employment content can be assessed by examining the results of 
quantitative medium-term (1993-2000) scenarios. With all due qualifications these scenarios show that the achievement of a 
strong growth pattern does not require anything more in terms of policies and behaviour than what has already been achieved in 
recent years in the member countries and in the Community as a whole. As such, therefore, the scenario results are not implausible 
even if they are certainly difficult targets to reach and their achievement would require persistent efforts from all economic 
agents, public and private, over a long period. 
1. Is slow growth unavoidable? 
In 1981-89 the Community registered 96 months of uninter-
rupted and ever-accelerating growth during which the major 
determinants of a sound and durable growth process were 
largely, but not completely, restored. 
Indeed, during that period, the new stance of economic 
policies together with changes of behaviour in wage determi-
nation, the enlargement of the Community, the launching 
of major Community projects such as the internal market 
and the improvement of the external environment all com-
bined in pushing growth back towards the 3,0 to 4% range 
in 1987-89. Moreover, the combination of these forces suc-
ceeded in reducing the unemployment rate for the first time 
since 1973, in curbing inflation and, above all, in restoring 
the profitability rate of fixed capital and a much better 
balance between the costs of capital and labour. As a conse-
quence, growth was not only driven by investment rather 
than by consumption but employment increased more than 
ever before.1 
The adjustment was, however, incomplete: profitability, in 
spite of a large improvement, still remained in 1989 signifi-
cantly below its 1960s full-employment level and did not 
therefore compensate the higher level of 'real'2 interest rates 
and capital costs. In the same way, the share of investment 
in GDP and the growth of the fixed capital stock were well 
below the levels needed to support in the medium term the 
GDP growth rates registered in 1987-89, culminating in a 
very high degree of use of capacity and overheating problems 
See Annual Economic Report 1990-91, Analytical studies Nos 1 and 4, 
European Economy No 46, December 1990, and Annual Economic 
Report 1991-92, Analytical studies Nos 1 to 3, European Economy No 
50, December 1991. 
Nominal interest rates deflated with the GDP deflator. 
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in critical sectors. The degree of overheating varied from 
country to country but led overall to a reappearance of 
inflationary pressures, increased in some cases by loose mon-
etary policies and financial innovation and deregulation. 
Although these imbalances were nowhere near those follow-
ing the 1973-75 and 1979-81 oil-price shocks, they still war-
ranted both a more restrictive policy stance and a cyclical 
readjustment of activity levels. At first, however, the built-
in recessionary character of these developments was not fully 
appreciated since the global economic picture was blurred 
by political developments. 
Initially, the Gulf crisis and the apparent danger of a third 
oil-price shock were deemed to be the cause of a confidence 
crisis which put the brake on consumption and investment. 
It was nevertheless felt that this confidence should come 
back quickly following the end of the crisis. Afterwards, the 
general slowdown of the world economy in 1991 was, to a 
large extent, offset for EC members by the strong expan-
sionary effects of German unification, which limited and 
delayed the cyclical downturn in most of its continental 
partners so that a fully fledged recession (i.e. negative rate 
of growth for GDP and domestic demand) only appeared 
in the United Kingdom (and in some non-EC OECD 
countries). In 1992, however, those demand-pull effects dissi-
pated and the imbalance in the German policy mix made 
itself felt in many countries in the form of higher nominal 
and real interest rates than their internal position would 
warrant. 
Presently, as the persistence of the slow-growth period be-
comes more and more evident, there is increasing apprehen-
sion that the Community could, once again, be trapped into 
a durable low growth and high unemployment process, as 
happened at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Indeed, one can easily find some analogies between the main 
macroeconomic indicators of the 1979-84 period and those 
expected to prevail in 1989-94: 
(i) the GDP profiles during the two periods are very similar 
(Graph 1). Growth, however, did not fall as much in 
1991-92 as in 1981-82 but the turning-point of the cycle 
is expected to come later; 
(ii) unemployment (Graph 3) is rising back to its former 
maximum of 1985 (10,8%), well above its 1982 level, a 
deeply worrying characteristic of the EC economy; 
(iii) the aggregated budget deficits1 (Graph 4) are roughly 
at the same levels (as a percentage of GDP); 
(iv) inflation-corrected long-term interest rates, which were 
very low in 1979-81, reached levels comparable to the 
present ones from 1982 onward and are very high by 
historical standards. In terms of exchange-rate vari-
ations, the beginning of the 1980s was also marked by 
exchange-rate volatility.2 
On the other hand: 
(i) inflation is presently much lower overall than in 1979-
83 (Graph 2) and the commitment to reduce it further 
and stabilize it at a low level in all member countries is 
a major building block of the progress towards EMU; 
(ii) despite the end-1992 ERM crisis, intra-EC exchange-
rate stability has been initially much more in evidence 
in 1989-92 than in 1979-82; 
(iii) if real interest rates are slightly higher now than 10 years 
ago, profitability rates both per unit of output and per 
unit of fixed capital stock are much higher (Graph 5), 
which was a major determinant of the strong investment 
expansion and restoration of productive capacity that 
marked the second half of the 1980s; 
(iv) thanks to the considerable expansion of intra-Com-
munity trade which follows the continuous integration 
of the Community's economies, extra-EC exports only 
represent now 8,0% of Community GDP (as against 
10,7% in 1981). The unfavourable external environment 
of the Community thus has smaller consequences now 
than in 1981-82 for EC growth; 
(v) economic policies which still showed significant diver-
gence at the beginning of the 1980s progressively turned 
towards the same medium-term targets of stability, 
budget consolidation and structural improvement in all 
member countries, which are embedded and, in some 
sense, institutionalized in the convergence programmes 
called for by Article 109e of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to say that the basic 
growth fundamentals are still in much better shape now than 
they were 10 years ago and should ensure a faster return to 
a sustained and sound growth pattern at the end of the 
present trough. 
1 These are defined in national accounts' terms as the net lending of 
general government. 
Seven realignments took place during that period: on 13 March 1979, 
24 September 1979, 30 November 1979, 23 March 1981, 5 October 1981, 
22 February 1982 and 14 June 1982. 
98 
Is slow growth unavoidable? 
GRAPH 1 : EC real GDP growth (in percentage per year) 
Comparison between 1979-84 and 1989-94 
1993-94: Economic forecasts. January 1993. 
1979/89 
1 Price deflator of private consumption. 
1993-94: Economic forecasts. January 1993 
GRAPH 2 : EC inflation rate1 (in percentage per year) 
Comparison between 1979-84 and 1989-94 
1980/90 1981/91 
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GRAPH 3 : EC unemployment rate (as percentage of civilian labour force) 
Comparison between 1979-84 and 1989-94 
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GRAPH 4 : General government net lending in the Community (as percentage of GDP) 
Comparison between 1979-84 and 1989-94 
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1993-94: Economic forecasts, January 1993. 
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GRAPH 5 : EC profitability of fixed capital (index 
Comparison between 1979-84 and 1989-94 
1979/89 
1993-94: Economic forecasts, January 1993. 
2. How can the EC achieve a higher rate of 
sustainable growth? 
2.1. Employment and growth 
A growth recovery in 1994-96 would, however, still leave 
the Community with a very high unemployment rate during 
those years, given the prevailing employment threshold and 
the expected growth in labour supply: even with a progressive 
return to a 3% growth rate in 1996, unemployment would 
still represent 10,5 to 11% of the civilian labour force in that 
year. 
The employment threshold, defined as the minimal rate of 
growth of real GDP that must be reached before total 
employment starts growing, has proved to be remarkably 
stable during the last 18 years: if one eliminates the pro-
ductivity cycle that goes together with the overall business 
cycle, the threshold has remained at an average of about 
2,0% since 1974 despite many changes in economic environ-
ment and policies during those years. Of course, the invari-
ance of this parameter in the recent past does not imply that 
it will remain so in the future, since it covers in fact a 
complex reality. On the one hand, productivity increases, 
linked, for instance, to the structural changes induced by 
the internal market and the EMU process, may push the 
employment threshold to a higher level. On the other hand, 
a larger share of services in GDP (given the way productivity 
is defined in these activities), further increases in part-time 
work and decreases in average working time would push it 
downward. In the recent past, those conflicting influences 
were already at work and no structural break in productivity 
can as yet be statistically detected. One may thus surmise 
that these factors were actually self-compensating and may 
well continue to be so. The assumption about the near-
invariance of the employment threshold may thus prove 
more robust than it might seem at first glance and also 
corresponds to the natural outcome of the model-based 
scenarios presented in Section 4. If such an evolution does 
indeed occur, a real GDP trend of 2,0% would be the bare 
minimum needed simply to keep constant the number of 
persons employed, in the face of a continuously growing 
labour supply. 
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Labour supply is determined by three basic factors, over 
which economic policies have little influence. The first is 
demographic growth in working age groups which, despite 
the general ageing of the population, will still increase until 
the year 2000,' whatever GDP growth might be. To that 
must be added the impact of net migration which is extremely 
difficult to forecast but which is also likely to be positive in 
the near future. These two elements constitute the potential 
labour supply. The effective labour supply is determined by 
the participation rates in the population in working age 
groups, rates which are influenced by many factors but show 
a distinctive pro-cyclical behaviour. Thus, the slight fall in 
participation rates observed in the present slowdown is likely 
to be reversed as soon as a growth recovery takes place. 
Putting all these factors together, labour supply may be 
expected to grow at an average of about 0,6% per year from 
1993 to 1996 and at 0,4% in 1997 to 2000. 
In those conditions, a GDP rate of growth of 2,5 to 2,6% 
per year would simply stabilize the unemployment rate at 
an unacceptably high level. In fact, in terms of employment 
creation, an average growth rate of 3,5% would be required 
to reduce the unemployment rate strongly and in a visible 
way (i.e. by about 1,0 percentage point per year) if the labour 
content of growth remains structurally as stable as it is now. 
anced and medium-term oriented policy mixes, and return 
to exchange-rate stability) and of the rest of the world (RoW) 
(GATT negotiations, reform processes in the East, and better 
international coordination of economic policies). 
Economic factors at the macroeconomic level deal both with 
supply and demand elements, which should both be given 
due consideration in order to generate a balanced growth 
process. In this field, fixed investment will have a pivotal 
role in the future growth pattern, since it is both a substantial 
part of final demand and the source of productive potential. 
Thus, the growth and level of total investment are critical 
in ensuring and maintaining an adequate level of fixed capital 
stock with respect to labour in order to sustain a sound and 
balanced growth path. 
The achievement of a higher rate of economic development 
will of course have to remain compatible with environmental 
protection and will also have to be supported by adequate 
public infrastructures. It should, however, be said that both 
environment and infrastructure investment are always made 
easier in a growth context that provides the required re-
sources. Besides, these investments are themselves a source 
of job creation and may therefore be adequately integrated 
into a global growth and employment strategy. 
Therefore, in the absence of fundamental structural changes 
and/or major labour market reforms on work sharing (which 
would raise numerous other problems and issues), the only 
way to solve the acute unemployment problem of the Com-
munity is to restore a strong and sustainable growth process 
in the coming years by strengthening the basic growth deter-
minants. 
In the present period, the missing growth factors are both 
subjective and objective. 
Subjective factors are related to business and consumer 
confidence which, from survey evidence, is very low and still 
decreasing in most OECD countries. The main danger at 
that level is self-fulfilling expectations: an increasing degree 
of pessimism may, by unduly delaying consumption and 
investment plans, generate an Objectively' avoidable re-
cession. 
The main issue is therefore to suppress as fast as possible 
the major sources of uncertainty, both at the level of the 
Community (ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, effective 
implementation of the internal market, return to better bal-
2.2. The link between sustainable growth and 
investment 
For expository purposes, the implications of a given invest-
ment share in GDP on potential growth may first be assessed 
within a stylized 'steady state' model.2 According to growth 
theory, when a full-employment, steady-state growth path 
is reached, all components of GDP grow at the same rate, 
as well as the stock of fixed capital and employment ex-
pressed in efficiency units. Thus, for a given (and constant) 
capital-output ratio and depreciation rate, one may compute 
the amount of investment needed to maintain the steady-
state growth rate of the fixed capital stock and hence the 
corresponding equilibrium share of fixed investment in 
GDP. 
During the last 10 years, both the capital-output ratio (COR) 
and the depreciation rate (Table 1 ) remained nearly constant, 
as they were in 1961-73 (although at a higher level). Thus, 
the structural policies and behavioural changes that occurred 
since 1982 had very little impact on those parameters. Fur-
thermore, the only period where the COR did move signifi-
1 Eurostat. Demographic statistics 1992. 
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Table 1 
Main determinants of profitability for the Community, 1961-92 
Years 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
GDP 
5,5 
4,7 
4.5 
5,8 
4,4 
3,9 
3,4 
5.3 
6,0 
4,7 
3,2 
4.3 
6,2 
1,9 
- 1 , 0 
4,7 
2,9 
3,2 
3,5 
1,3 
0,1 
0.7 
1,6 
2,3 
2,4 
2.8 
2,9 
4.1 
3.4 
2,8 
1.4 
1,1 
Capital 
4,9 
4.9 
4,9 
5.1 
5,0 
5,0 
4,9 
4,9 
5,1 
5,1 
4,9 
4,8 
4,9 
4,3 
3,6 
3,5 
3,3 
3,3 
3,3 
3,2 
2,6 
2,4 
2,2 
2,1 
2,1 
2,2 
2,3 
2,7 
2.9 
3,0 
2.7 
2,6 
Average 
Employment 
0.7 
0.3 
0.1 
0,5 
0,2 
0,0 
- 0 , 8 
- 0 , 1 
0,9 
0,7 
0,1 
0,1 
1,6 
0,4 
- 1 , 1 
0,1 
0,4 
0,3 
1,0 
0,4 
- 1 , 1 
- 0 , 8 
- 0 , 6 
0,2 
0,5 
0,7 
1,2 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
0,1 
- 0 , 5 
annual rate of change {%) 
COR Productivity 
of capital 
3,0 0,6 
3,0 - 0 , 2 
3,0 - 0 , 3 
3,0 0,7 
3,0 - 0 , 6 
3,0 - 1 , 0 
3,1 - 1 , 4 
3,1 0,3 
3,0 0,9 
3,0 - 0 , 4 
3,1 - 1 , 6 
3,1 - 0 , 5 
3,1 1,2 
3,1 - 2 , 3 
3,3 - 4 , 4 
3,3 1,2 
3,3 - 0 , 4 
3,3 - 0 , 1 
3,3 0,2 
3,3 - 1 , 8 
3,4 - 2 , 5 
3,5 - 1 , 6 
3,5 - 0 , 6 
3,5 0,2 
3,5 0,4 
3,4 0,6 
3,4 0,5 
3,4 1,4 
3,4 0,4 
3,4 - 0 , 1 
3,4 - 1 , 3 
3,5 - 1 , 5 
Productivity 
of labour 
4.7 
4,4 
4,4 
5,3 
4,1 
3,9 
4,2 
5,4 
5,1 
4,0 
3,1 
4,1 
4,5 
1,5 
0,2 
4,7 
2,6 
2,9 
2,5 
0,9 
1,2 
1,5 
2,2 
2,1 
1,9 
2,1 
1,7 
2,5 
1,8 
1,2 
1,3 
1,5 
Capital 
intensity 
4,1 
4,6 
4,8 
4,6 
4,8 
5,0 
5.7 
5,0 
4,2 
4,4 
4,8 
4,7 
3,3 
4,0 
4,8 
3,5 
3,0 
3,0 
2,3 
2,8 
3,8 
3,1 
2,9 
1,9 
1,6 
1,5 
1,1 
1,1 
1,3 
1,4 
2.6 
3.1 
Indices (1961-73 = 
Gross 
surplus/GDP 
99,4 
99,4 
98,6 
99,4 
99,9 
99,9 
101,0 
102,2 
104,0 
100,5 
98,7 
98,7 
98,3 
93,4 
86,8 
90,3 
92,6 
94,3 
95,2 
93,4 
92,0 
94,2 
96,4 
99,6 
101,4 
104,1 
104,7 
106,9 
108,7 
107,1 
106,4 
107,3 
Net 
surplus/GDP 
100,4 
100,0 
98,5 
99,6 
100,3 
100,1 
101,4 
103,4 
106,3 
100,4 
97,1 
96,7 
95,9 
86,6 
75,5 
80,7 
83,4 
85,7 
86,7 
82,8 
79,1 
81,7 
84,6 
89,0 
91,6 
96,2 
97,3 
100,7 
103,3 
101,1 
99,7 
101,0 
l(K)) 
Capital 
profitability 
101,7 
100,9 
98,9 
100,5 
101,1 
100,5 
101,2 
104,3 
107,7 
99,7 
95,0 
94,5 
93,9 
80,4 
66,9 
72,1 
74,2 
76,2 
76,6 
71,1 
65,8 
67,2 
69,6 
73,6 
76,2 
81,6 
83,5 
87,9 
91,1 
89,2 
87,2 
88,2 
Sources: Euroslat and Commission services. 
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cantly (from 3,0 to 3,5) was 1970-82 which was marked by 
capital deepening and restructuring as a consequence of the 
oil-price shocks and relative factor cost movements. One 
may thus assume that in the absence of massive supply 
shocks, the COR will remain stable around its present level 
of 3,4 in the medium term and the relationship between the 
investment share in GDP and the steady-state rate of growth 
can be derived. 
Relation between GDP growth and investment share' 
Steady-state 
growth 
{% per year) 
Investment 
share 
(% GDP) 
0,0 
1,0 
2,0 
2,5 
3,0 
3.5 
4,0 
4,5 
5,0 
12,6 
15,8 
19,0 
20,5 
22,1 
23,6 
25,1 
26,7 
28,1 
Assuming a capital-output ratio of 3,4. 
Such computations are, of course, a mere illustration of a 
complex problem and, in particular, the stability of the 
capital-output ratio may also be linked to compensating 
influences. In some sectors, technical progress and structural 
changes may go with capital deepening whereas in others 
(e.g. in services) the evolution is less evident. On the other 
hand, a larger decoupling of the 'working time' of the capital 
stock with respect to the working time of workers would 
increase the apparent capital productivity and thus reduce 
the COR. To that must be added that net investment (which 
appears both in the numerator and the denominator of the 
COR) is, in any case, a smaller fraction of the total capital 
stock than it is of GDP. Thus, for pure arithmetic reasons, 
the changes in the COR will always be very slow and pro-
gressive over time. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the kind of effective net 
variations in either productivity or the COR that one is 
likely to register in the future, in the wake of the completion 
of the internal market, EMU and the present stance of 
structural reforms, combined with continuous changes in 
the structure of output, may change the amplitude but not 
the essence of the conclusions presented so far: if growth is 
not all, no employment effect of significant importance can 
be expected without some positive sustainable growth, which 
implies an adequate productive capacity, hence investments. 
Thus, remaining for illustrative purposes within the stylized 
conditions set so far, the present COR and apparent pro-
ductivities suggest that the prevailing investment share of 
about 20% only goes together with a sustainable growth of 
2,3%. A much higher rate (say 3,5%) would require a much 
higher share (23,6%). In other words, an increase by 1,25 
percentage points in the sustainable trend rate of growth 
would require an increase by 3,5 points in the investment 
share. 
In practical terms, this means that in order to increase 
the potential growth of the Community to a level where 
unemployment can be reduced quickly, fixed investments 
will have to grow at a significantly faster rate than total 
GDP in the five to seven years to come, as was the case in 
the second half of the 1980s. Therefore, the promotion and 
support of investment determinants should be key issues of 
micro and macro policies in the 1990s. 
2.3. The determinants of investment and some 
of their implications 
The determinants of investment were analysed in depth by 
the Commission services.' Three elements were found to 
have a fundamental importance. 
1. Final demand plays a major role in the short term since 
the variability of output growth explains the highly cycli-
cal behaviour of investment. In a longer perspective, the 
composition of demand is as important as its growth 
since the balance between consumption and investment 
will determine not only the growth pattern of final de-
mand but also the adequacy of national savings with 
respect to the required amounts of fixed capital forma-
tion. The saving-investment balance thus also deserves 
attention in the assessment of the medium-term develop-
ments. 
2. Real unit user costs of capital goods (a composite index 
consisting of the relative price of investment goods, real 
interest rates, depreciation rates, tax factors, etc.) has a 
weak impact in the short term but a more significant 
influence in the long term. This factor is strongly influ-
enced by fiscal policy measures (interest deductibility, 
depreciation allowances, etc.) and also by the behaviour 
of 'real' interest rates. 
Catinat et al. 'The determinants of investments', European Economy, 
No 31, March 1987. 
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3. Profitability1 was found to be important in the medium 
term although its short-term impact is somewhat smaller. 
Policy measures aiming at improving profitability will 
therefore pay off only in the medium term, but with 
powerful effects. The experience of the 1980s has also 
demonstrated the large impact of wage behaviour on 
increases and reductions in profitability. 
2.3.1. Final demand and the saving-investment balance 
Since fixed investment has a long lifetime, what really mat-
ters of course is expected output which is unobservable and 
can only be derived ex post. However, given the high 
cyclical variability of investment, it is clear that the latter 
will be promoted when the overall economic framework 
is characterized by stability and predictability. Conversely, 
uncertainty and stop-go policies are detrimental to a regular, 
strong and balanced growth of investment and fixed capital. 
Besides, ex-post investment is, by definition, equal to savings. 
The latter, however, is composed not only of domestic sav-
ings but also of external savings as measured by the current 
external balance. In the so-called 'saving-investment bal-
ance', the current balance therefore represents the surplus 
or deficit of domestic saving with respect to the achieved 
amount of investment in a given period. 
In short, the total domestic capital formation (24,6% of 
GDP) was more than matched by national savings (25% of 
GDP), to which the public sector contributed about one-
sixth (4% of GDP). There was thus some room left for a 
slight current balance surplus, as befitted a high-income zone 
with responsibilities towards the less-developed world. In 
the private sector, the global saving ratio (as a percentage 
of GDP) remained remarkably stable over the whole 1961 -92 
period. However, in high growth periods, corporate savings, 
supported by high profitability rates, were larger than house-
hold savings. This happens to be also the case in 1992, 
with broadly the same distribution (about 10% of GDP for 
households and 11 % for corporate savings) and exactly the 
same global ratio as in 1961-73 (21% of GDP). 
The major divergence between the present period and 1961-
73 in terms of saving balances is thus strictly limited to the 
position of the general government sector, which deterio-
rated by nearly 6% of GDP (from + 4% to - 1,7%). The 
consolidation of public balances, already present in the 
Maastricht Treaty requirements for nominal convergence, is 
thus also necessary for improving the growth potential of 
the Community through a positive contribution to national 
savings.3 
Thus, if investment is pushed too fast by, say, a monetary 
or fiscally induced blip in final demand growth, this will not 
only lead to an overheating of the economy with higher price 
and cost inflation but also to an external current account 
deficit and hence an increase in external indebtedness, which 
will require corrective measures afterwards. Conversely, 
sound and durable growth will be characterized by profit-
ability driven investment growth and an evolution of final 
demand with an adequate balance between investment and 
consumption. 
In that regard, the structure prevailing during the 1961-73 
period (which is the closest empirical approximation of a 
steady-state full employment period one may find in the 
history of the Community)2 is worth considering (Table 2). 
2.3.2. Capital unit user costs 
Abstracting from policy variables (such as fiscal deduct-
ibility, investment subsidies, etc.), the main determinant of 
real capital unit user cost is the 'real' long-term interest rate. 
All other things being equal, higher real interest rates in the 
medium term put a brake on investment growth and influ-
ence the choice between investment projects in requiring 
higher expected returns. However, due to the very high 
potential demand for capital from less-developed countries 
(LDCs) and Eastern and Central Europe, such high real 
interest rates will probably endure for many years to come. 
It therefore means that these persistently high levels must 
be compensated by a higher rate of profitability than in the 
1960s. 
This is defined as the net operating surplus per unit of net fixed capital 
stock. The net operating surplus is defined as GDP minus wages, and 
the compensation of self-employed and depreciation allowances. At the 
firm level, it corresponds to total revenue minus variable costs such as 
wages, financial charges and intermediate inputs. 
The 1961-73 period is taken as a reference period since it is characterized 
by high and fairly stable growth with a correspondingly high share of 
investment in final expenditure, near full employment and a sound 
saving-investment balance with a slight current account surplus. 
On the other hand, artificially low inflation-adjusted interest 
rates, as prevailed in the 1970s (when they even became 
3 See 'Trends and structure of gross national savings in the Community', 
European Economy, Supplement A, No 11/12, November/December 
1992. 
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Table 2 
Selected supply and demand indicators for the Community,' 1961-92 
{annual percentage change, unless otherwise staled) 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption de-
flator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment 
( % o f G D P ) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
1961 
5,5 
0,7 
4,8 
2,2 
2,8 
3,2 
0,5 
3.4 
8,8 
5,4 
0,5 
1961-73 
4,7 
0.3 
4.4 
2,2 
4,6 
5,2 
- 0 , 5 
3,5 
9,8 
4,4 
0,0 
1974 
1,9 
0,4 
1,5 
2,8 
14,9 
13,3 
- 2 , 4 
3,8 
17,9 
4,1 
2,5 
1974-80 
2,3 
0,2 
2,1 
4,8 
12,1 
12,2 
- 3 , 8 
40,9 
3,4 
15,0 
2,5 
0,4 
1981 
0.1 
- 1 , 1 
1.2 
7,7 
12,1 
10,9 
- 5 , 0 
45,4 
3.0 
13,0 
1,9 
0,7 
1981-85 
1,4 
- 0 , 4 
1,8 
9,6 
8.9 
8,5 
- 5 , 1 
52,7 
2,8 
9.6 
1.0 
- 0 , 7 
1986 
2.8 
0,7 
2.0 
10,7 
3.8 
5,6 
- 4 , 5 
59,4 
2,8 
6,3 
0,7 
- 1 , 4 
1986-89 
3,3 
1,3 
2,0 
9,9 
4,0 
4,8 
- 3 , 7 
60,1 
2,7 
5,8 
0,9 
- 1 , 0 
1990 
2,8 
1.6 
1,2 
8.3 
4.8 
5,3 
- 4 , 2 
59,5 
2.9 
7.5 
2.0 
0,9 
1991 
1,4 
0,2 
1.2 
8.8 
5.1 
5,4 
- 4 , 6 
62,0 
2,9 
7,2 
1,7 
0,5 
1992 
1,1 
- 0 , 5 
1,6 
9,5 
4,5 
4.7 
- 5 , 4 
65,0 
2.9 
5.8 
1.0 
- 0 , 5 
13. 
14. 
Profitability index 
(1961-73 = 100) 
'Real' long-term interest 
rate (deflated with GDP 
101,7 100,0 80,4 73,9 65,8 70,5 81,6 86,0 89,2 87,2 12 
deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in 
GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total fixed investment 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings 
( = 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings 
( = 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation 
( = 2 7 - 2 8 ) 
1 Including West Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
2,2 
3,0 
22,4 
4,9 
5.5 
4.7 
9,6 
5,8 
5,6 
24,7 
0,6 
24,1 
1,8 
3,0 
23,2 
4,9 
4,9 
3,7 
5,5 
8,0 
5,3 
10,0 
11,0 
21,0 
4,0 
25,0 
0,4 
24,6 
- 0 , 7 
3,1 
23,7 
4,2 
1,7 
2,8 
- 2 , 6 
6,6 
2,7 
13,9 
7,8 
21,7 
2,8 
24,5 
- 0 , 9 
25,4 
0.2 
3.3 
22,1 
3,4 
2,7 
2,8 
0,4 
4,3 
2,5 
12,8 
8,9 
21,7 
1,1 
22,8 
- 0 , 3 
23,1 
4.1 
3.4 
20,9 
2,6 
0,4 
1.8 
- 5 , 1 
3.8 
0,9 
12,8 
8.0 
20,8 
- 1 , 0 
19,8 
- 0 , 6 
20,4 
4.4 
3,5 
19,7 
2,2 
1.3 
1.7 
- 0 , 7 
3,9 
1,6 
11,3 
9,7 
21,0 
- 1 , 2 
19,8 
0,0 
19,8 
* 
3.4 
3.4 
19,0 
2,2 
4,2 
2,3 
4,2 
1,8 
2,5 
10,3 
11,3 
21,6 
- 0 , 8 
20,8 
1,3 
19,5 
4,5 
3,4 
19,8 
2,5 
3.8 
1,9 
6,2 
4.8 
4.2 
9,5 
11,6 
21,1 
-o,i 
21,0 
0.5 
20,5 
5,0 
3,4 
20,8 
3,0 
3,0 
2,1 
4.2 
7.0 
3.8 
9,6 
11,8 
21,4 
- 0 , 3 
21,1 
- 0 , 2 
21,3 
4.5 
3.4 
20,2 
2,8 
1.8 
2.1 
0.0 
5.3 
2.3 
9.7 
11,1 
20,8 
- 0 , 8 
20,0 
- 0 , 3 
20,3 
5.1 
3.4 
19,6 
2.6 
1.3 
1.5 
- 0 , 2 
3.8 
1.8 
9,8 
11,2 
21,0 
- 1 , 7 
19,3 
- 0 , 5 
19,8 
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negative), besides helping to fuel inflation, increase the 
capital-output ratio and capital intensity and may lead 
to a misallocation of resources. 
2.3.3. Profitability and wage moderation in the 1980s 
Profitability (as defined in terms of net operating surplus 
per unit of fixed capital') is determined by two factors (Table 
1): the unit profit rate (net operating surplus per unit of 
GDP) and the apparent productivity of fixed capital (equal 
to the inverse of the capital/GDP ratio). 
In 1961-73, the profitability rate remained high and broadly 
constant, reflecting the stability of its two components. From 
1974 to 1981, it deteriorated by more than one-third, the 
index (1961-73 = 100) falling to 65,8. Of this fall of 34,2 
points, 20,1 resulted from the lower unit profit rate and 
14,1 from the increased capital-output ratio. Afterwards, the 
profitability index recovered to reach 91,1 by 1989 and 
regressed slightly in 1990-92. 
The recovery of profitability in the 1980s was mostly due to 
the impact of wage moderation on the profit share. The 
other determinant of profitability, i.e. capital productivity, 
played a minor role since it did not increase before 1985 and 
then only marginally. Thus, of the 25,3 point recovery in 
1982-89, 24,2 is due to the decline in real unit labour costs. 
The macroeconomic impact of the moderation of wages was 
assessed using the Quest model of the Commission services 
(see Box).2 With all due qualifications, it appears that the 
modification of wage behaviour in 1982-89, compared to a 
'no-change in income shares' hypothetical baseline period, 
has: 
For full definitions and methodological developments, see Annual Econ-
omic Report 1991-92, Analytical study No 2, European Economy, No 50, 
December 1991, pp. 109-125. 
See Dramais, A. 'Les relations entre rentabilité du capital, investissement 
fixe et modération salariale dans l'Europe des Douze au cours des 
années 1980', in Gazier, B. (éd.) Trajectoires de l'emploi, Presse de la 
Sorbonne, to be published. 
(i) increased the level of fixed investment by 7,5%, 
(ii) increased total employment by 5,0%,3 
(iii) decreased the inflation rate by an average of 1,0 percent-
age point per year, 
(iv) increased the current balance surplus by 0,6 percentage 
point of GDP. 
As a result, the share of investment in GDP gained 1,3 points 
and approached 21 %, making it compatible with a 0,5 points 
higher rate of potential growth. The induced increase in 
employment over the period is nearly equivalent when ex-
pressed in an average annual rate of growth, i.e. 0,6%. Thus, 
from a structural steady-state point of view, the employment 
threshold was in fact not affected and remained a stable 
structural parameter. 
In order to test for the overall impact of profitability in-
creases sensu stricto the Quest simulation was also replicated 
without wage moderation but with the same improvement 
of profitability as observed, as if it came as an independent 
increase in technical progress. 
In that case, the 25,3 points improvement in the profitability 
index would have produced about 17% more investment. 
But it should also be noted that the employment creation 
would have been much lower at about 1 % (coming mostly 
through demand effects) and the saving-investment balance 
less favourable with an increased external deficit. Finally, 
inflation would have been higher than in the 'no change' 
baseline. 
Thus, the same improvement in profitability when obtained 
without changes in factor shares, would have resulted in a 
further increase in capital deepening with respect to the 
1970s and led to a higher potential employment threshold. 
3 By more than 6 million people over a total employment creation in 
those years of 9 million. 
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Box: The Quest multinational model1 
The Quest multinational model is a modular system designed to 
simulate the effects of changes in economic variables, both on 
a world level and on the level of individual industrial countries. 
At present, country models have been constructed for all EC 
Member States and also for the United States and Japan. The 
model is used to assist in macroeconomic short and medium-
term forecasting and to analyse the policies of these countries. 
It is particularly well suited for the analysis of policy coordi-
nation and for the design of coordinated policies. 
All country models are similar in structure, but country-specific 
estimates of the parameters allow for the responses to shocks to 
be different in timing and magnitude. 
The linkage between the models is provided by a model of 
bilateral trade in goods. This linkage system divides the world 
into 26 zones, 20 of which correspond to individual countries 
(including the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union). It takes 
the import demand of each country or zone as given from the 
individual modules and then determines the exports of all zones 
from the bilateral trade equations. Import prices and competi-
tors' prices are derived from export prices, which are also taken 
from the country models. The system is closed by trade-feedback 
equations for those countries or zones which are not represented 
by a structural model. World exports of goods are constrained 
to be equal to total world imports, except for the existing trade 
account discrepancy. In the trade linkage part, energy imports 
are separated from trade in non-energy goods. Energy exports 
are identified for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and 
for some of the feedback zones. OPEC is assumed to act as the 
swing producer. 
The structural country models are of the usual formalized type 
in which particular entries into the national accounting frame-
work are replaced by behavioural equations. The consumption 
per head function includes the familiar real disposable income 
effect and a negative inflation effect as a proxy for the real 
For a detailed description of the model, see European Economy, No 47, March 1991. 
pp. 165-243. 
wealth effect. Capital formation, which is disaggregated into 
equipment, construction, housing and inventories, is fostered by 
an acceleration in demand and by an improvement of the in-
ternal or external financing conditions via profitability and 
interest rate effects. Imports typically have a demand elasticity 
which is greater than 1 and a price elasticity which is smaller 
than 1 in absolute value. 
The main supply-side indicator is the capacity utilization rate, 
i.e. the gap between actual and potential output, which exerts 
an influence on prices, investment and, in some countries, on 
imports. Labour supply is exogenous, except in Ireland where 
net migration is to a large extent determined by the unemploy-
ment rate relative to the United Kingdom. Labour demand is 
not completely elastic to changes in the real wage cost, but the 
wage-price block ensures that in the long term, the labour share 
in income returns to stability. The Quest model displays rather 
little nominal rigidity and, in this respect, stands out from other 
multi-country models. The strength of the unemployment effect 
on wages (the Phillips curve) and the direct effect of the utiliza-
tion rate on prices are responsible for different responses in 
the short term among the countries which are represented by 
structural models. 
The model may be operated under different monetary regimes. 
The standard regime for forecasting is one in which assumptions 
are made for nominal interest rates and exchange rates. Another 
option is to fix real interest rates and to determine expected 
exchange-rate movements from an interest parity condition. 
Earlier versions of the model have employed more elaborate 
monetary reaction functions to determine nominal interest rates, 
but have left aside the determination of exchange rates so that 
the interrelations between interest rates of different countries 
are not very strong. A more recent experimental facility links 
the models to a portfolio balance model, in which investors have 
the possibility of substituting between long-term and short-term 
assets, denominated in dollars, yen or an EMS currency. Assets 
denominated in EMS currencies are aggregated, but interest 
rates and exchange rates across the Community may deviate 
from the common rates in accordance with differences in in-
flation rates and current account positions. This facility appears 
to produce satisfactory results if it is combined with model-
consistent exchange-rate expectations and forward-looking reac-
tions of the monetary authorities. 
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2.3.4. The role of expectations 
Private investment is of course the end result of market 
decisions which are influenced, as already stated, by expected 
demand, costs and profitability conditions. All of these will 
of course be influenced by future developments which will 
certainly not mimic the past and are not all under the control 
of policy-makers or even European private operators. Some 
basic principles are, however, likely to remain valid, particu-
larly as regards the role of policies and general conditions 
in which investments take place. Thus, the caveat developed 
above also has implications for policy and behaviour in 
order to create, maintain or strengthen an economic environ-
ment as favourable to labour-creating investment as might 
possibly be achieved. 
3. What are the implications for 
economic policies? 
The present share of investment in GDP, compatible with a 
sustainable growth rate of less than 2,5%, is clearly unsatis-
factory since, at the expected rate of labour supply (see 
Section 2.1), it would barely keep unemployment constant 
over the next five years! A strong rise of investment in the 
medium term is therefore necessary. 
As far as final demand is concerned, it is worth stating 
once again that although the high short-term response of 
investment to expansionary policies might look attractive in 
a period of cyclical slowdown, the improvement in supply-
side conditions is a long-term project which would in fact 
be hampered by short-termism: an artificially induced invest-
ment expansion would translate quickly into inflationary 
pressures, strain the degree of use of capacity and disimprove 
the overall saving-investment balance, all factors which 
would call for lengthy and painful corrective actions (which 
depress investment initially) in later years, as amply demon-
strated by events in the world economy since 1973. 
This does not mean of course that other kinds of stimulation 
must be excluded, since the present slowdown has meant 
that production capacities are underused and hence may be 
reabsorbed without inflationary risks. In particular, Com-
munity-financed infrastructure projects may bolster the con-
fidence of private investors who would benefit from a better 
logistic environment in transnational networks. The main 
point is that such accompanying measures, Community- or 
country-based, should preserve the credibility of a stable 
and medium-term oriented policy stance and a balanced 
pattern of final demand, with investment growing faster than 
GDP and consumption slightly slower. A positive contri-
bution of extra-EC trade to growth would also be desirable 
in order to convert the present current account deficit into 
a slight surplus. 
Demand, however, is not all since, in the medium term, the 
severe unemployment problem of the Community must also 
be tackled and the required long-term expansion of labour-
creating investment must be soundly based and correspond 
to an adequate saving-investment balance with, notably, a 
return to positive public savings through reinforced budget-
ary consolidation. In this context, the Maastricht budgetary 
criteria, defined for nominal purposes, are a step in the right 
direction. Nevertheless, in the longer term, larger efforts 
may be justified in order to arrive at a satisfactory public 
saving condition in terms of growth potential. Given the 
well-known difficulties in acting directly on private savings, 
policies should rather act on its determinants in aiming at 
fostering corporate profitability. 
Profitability should be enough to warrant a higher invest-
ment share than is presently the case in order to make a 
higher GDP and fixed capital growth rate sustainable. The 
recovery of the profitability index should thus continue and, 
in fact, go beyond the average level achieved in 1961-73, 
i.e. within the 105 to 110 range (1961-73 = 100) in order 
to support the investment share of 23,6% GDP, which at 
the present stable level of the capital-output ratio, is required 
to support a sustainable growth trend of 3,5%. 
This profitability improvement may come from various 
sources: it may, for instance, be generated by efficiency and 
productivity gains at the level of the capital stock itself via 
structural changes in production patterns and environment, 
as may come through internal market and EMU effects. 
However, during the 1980s, such factors proved to have a 
somewhat limited impact and the major part of the improve-
ment in profitability should come from the pursuit of a 
moderate growth of real wages with respect to labour pro-
ductivity, such as the one effectively achieved between 1982 
and 1989 in most EC countries, when real wage per head' 
grew on average by 0,9% per year as against 2,0% for labour 
productivity, thus allowing real unit labour costs to fall by 
1,0% per year and the profitability index to recover by more 
than 20 points. 
Finally, the improvement in the overall saving-investment 
balance and, in particular, the return to positive public 
savings may ease the pressure on real long-term interest 
rates. However, it is generally acknowledged that inflation-
1 Deflated with the GDP deflator. Due to terms of trade effects, the 
growth of wage income per head (deflated with the private consumption 
price index) was in fact higher at 1,2% per year during the same period. 
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adjusted long-term interest rates are likely to remain high in 
the medium term given the considerable potential needs for 
capital at world level (Eastern and Central Europe, LDCs, 
etc.) which may turn into effective demands in the near 
future. Since this factor is beyond Community control, it 
makes the achievement of a high rate of capital profitability 
all the more necessary. 
Inflation remains above or equal to 3,5% and the net bor-
rowing of general government falls slightly from 5,4% of 
GDP in 1992 to 4,9% in 2000. As a result, the public debt/ 
GDP ratio climbs to 83,5% in 2000, an increase of more 
than 20 points with respect to its 1990 level. 
The only positive result is found in the evolution of the 
current balance which, thanks to the moderate growth of 
final demand, turns progressively back towards equilibrium. 
4. What kind of future growth trend can be 
envisaged? 
The assessment of the previous sections can be illustrated 
by quantitative medium-term scenarios, 1993-2000, made 
with the Quest model of the Commission services (see Box). 
These scenarios are in no way forecasts but illustrations of 
possible developments under specific assumptions. They are 
thus, by nature, normative. However, they provide a plaus-
ible and consistent measure of the time and effort required 
to extricate the Community from its presently depressed 
economic position. 
A first scenario (Scenario 0) will extend to the year 2000 
the 1993-94 short-term forecast of the Commission services 
on a 'no policy change', purely extrapolative, basis assuming, 
in some sense, that the worst comes to the worst and that 
all policy and behavioural efforts towards more convergence 
stop from 1994 onwards. More particularly, no budgetary 
consolidation effort other than the standard working of 
economic stabilizers is assumed to take place; wage and 
profit shares remain constant (i.e. real wages grow at the 
same rate as labour productivity) as well as savings rates 
and real interest rates; and the investment share increases 
only marginally during the (very gradual) recovery from the 
present cyclical slowdown. 
Politically speaking, such a scenario is of course extremely 
improbable if only because it takes no account of explicit 
commitments already expressed in the wake of the Maas-
tricht Treaty and confirmed at the Edinburgh Summit (11 
and 12 December 1992) but it illustrates clearly the bleak 
consequences of a prolonged slow-growth period. 
Indeed (Table 3), after slightly exceeding 2,0% in 1995, real 
GDP growth would stay around the latter figure until the 
end of the century. As a consequence, despite a slight fall in 
the average growth of labour productivity from 2,0% (in 
1986-89) to 1,8% per annum, labour demand remains below 
labour supply and the unemployment rate increases con-
tinuously from 9,5% in 1992 to 11,7% in 2000, i.e. to more 
than 18 million people. 
There is thus no room for complacency about future growth 
prospects since a 2% trend would certainly entail very serious 
social and political consequences and put in jeopardy the 
achievement of the major Community projects. 
Scenario 1 (Table 4) also starts from the 1993-94 short-term 
forecast but assumes a resumption of medium-term oriented 
policies and of the progress towards real and nominal con-
vergence within the Community. Budget consolidation ef-
forts would follow the commitments of the convergence 
programmes as expressed in 1991-92 and translated into 
normative decisions on receipt and expenditure items. The 
present results in terms of budget deficits may, however, be 
different from those of the original programmes since they 
are affected by the 1992-94 cyclical trough which would 
somewhat delay the achievement of the Maastricht Treaty 
criteria in the budgetary field. Nevertheless, public savings 
would become positive again from 1998 onwards. 
Inflation would resume its convergence trend and the Maas-
tricht criteria would be achieved by most countries around 
a Community average inflation rate of 2,5% from 1996 
onward. This evolution would be helped by an evolution of 
nominal wages compatible with the inflation targets. Real 
wages would register a moderate evolution with respect to 
labour productivity, comparable to the one expected in 
1992-93, implying a decrease in real unit labour costs of 
about 0,6% per year throughout the period. As a result, the 
profitability index would recover and slightly exceed its 
1961-73 average in 2000. 
The final strategic assumption is the evolution of fixed 
investment, which is assumed to replicate the same growth 
trajectory in the second half of the 1990s as in the second 
half of the 1980s. Such an evolution would come from the 
final demand and profitability effects reinforced by a general 
return of business confidence, positive internal market and 
integration effects and favourable expectations coming from 
the renewed and credible march towards EMU before the 
end of the century. 
As a result, growth would reach 3,0% in 1996 and would 
even go beyond 3,5% in 1997-2000 due to temporary 
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Table 3 
Illustrative growth scenarios for the Community,' 1993-2000 
Scenario 0 : slow-growth extrapolative scenario 
(annual percentage change, unless otherwise staled) 
Average 
1993-96 
1996 1997 Average 
1997-2000 
2000 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption deflator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment (% of GDP) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
13. Profitability index (1961-73 = 100) 
14. 'Real' long-term interest rate (deflated with 
GDP deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total investments 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings ( = 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings ( = 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation (= 27-28) 
0,7 
- 0 , 8 
1.5 
10,6 
4,4 
3.8 
5.8 
69,0 
2.7 
4.4 
0,5 
- 0 , 9 
1.7 
0,0 
1.7 
10,9 
3,8 
3,7 
5,5 
73,0 
2,7 
5,0 
1,3 
- 0 , 4 
2,2 
0,4 
1,8 
11,1 
3,7 
3,6 
5,3 
76,5 
2,7 
5,6 
1,9 
0,1 
2,1 
0,3 
1,8 
11,3 
3,6 
3,6 
5,1 
78,4 
2,7 
5,5 
1,8 
-o,i 
2,1 
0,3 
1,8 
11,5 
3,5 
3,5 
5,0 
81,0 
2,8 
5,5 
1,8 
0,0 
2,1 
0,3 
1,8 
11,7 
3,5 
3,5 
4,9 
83,5 
2,8 
5,4 
1,8 
0,0 
5,5 
89,5 
5,4 
89,4 
5,5 
89,0 
5,5 
87,9 
5,5 
86,8 
5,5 
3,4 
19,4 
2,4 
0.7 
0,8 
- i , o 
3,6 
1,3 
9,3 
11,7 
21,0 
- 2 , 1 
18,9 
- 0 , 7 
3,4 
19,6 
2,4 
1,5 
1,1 
2,1 
4,3 
2,3 
9,2 
12,1 
21,3 
- 1 , 9 
19,4 
- 0 , 5 
3,4 
20,0 
2,5 
2,2 
1,2 
3,3 
4,8 
2,9 
9,1 
12,4 
21,5 
- 1 , 7 
19,8 
- 0 , 4 
3,4 
20,1 
2,5 
2,2 
1,2 
2,9 
4,8 
2,8 
9,1 
12,5 
21,6 
- 1 , 5 
20,1 
- 0 , 3 
3,4 
20,3 
2,5 
2,1 
1,2 
2,6 
4,8 
2,8 
9,1 
12,6 
21,7 
- 1 , 3 
20,4 
- 0 , 2 
3,4 
20,4 
2,5 
2,1 
1,2 
2,5 
4,9 
2,9 
9,1 
12,7 
21,8 
- 1 , 1 
20,7 
0,0 
19,6 19,9 20,2 20,4 20,6 20,7 
1 Including West Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
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GRAPH 6: EC profitability of fixed capital, 1961-2000 (index 1961-73 = 
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Table 4 
Illustrative growth scenarios for the Community,' 1993-2000 
Scenario 1 : medium-term policies as in the 1980s 
(annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
Average 
1993-96 
Average 
1997-2000 
2000 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption deflator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment (% of GDP) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
13. Profitability index (1961-73 = 100) 
14. 'Real' long-term interest rate (deflated with 
GDP deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total investments 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings ( = 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings (= 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation ( = 27-28) 
0.7 
-0 ,8 
1,5 
10,6 
4,4 
3,8 
5,8 
68,9 
2,7 
4,4 
0,5 
-0,9 
1,9 
0,1 
1,8 
10,8 
3,4 
3,3 
5,3 
72,9 
2,8 
4,3 
1,0 
- 0 , 8 
3,0 
0,9 
2,1 
10,6 
2,7 
2,7 
4,8 
76,2 
2,8 
4,0 
1,3 
- 0 , 8 
3,8 
1,7 
2,1 
9,6 
2,5 
2,5 
3,9 
76,4 
2,8 
4,1 
1,5 
- 0 , 6 
3,8 
1,7 
2,1 
8,0 
2,5 
2,5 
2,5 
74,6 
2,8 
4,1 
1,5 
- 0 , 6 
3,7 
1,6 
2,1 
6,3 
2,5 
2,5 
1,2 
72,0 
2,8 
4,1 
1,5 
- 0 , 6 
5,5 
90,: 
5,2 
93,6 
4,7 
96,4 
4,8 
99,6 
4,5 
102,4 
4,4 
3,4 
19,4 
2,4 
0,7 
0,8 
- i , o 
3,6 
1,2 
9,3 
11,7 
21,0 
-2,1 
18,9 
-0,7 
3,4 
19,8 
2,5 
1,6 
1,1 
2.9 
4,6 
2,5 
9,2 
12,1 
21,3 
- 1 , 7 
19,6 
- 0 , 5 
3,4 
20,4 
2,7 
2,7 
1,2 
5,5 
5,5 
3,7 
9.2 
12,4 
21,6 
- 1 , 2 
20,4 
- 0 , 3 
3,4 
21,3 
3,1 
3,0 
1,2 
8,6 
5,7 
4,4 
9.2 
12,6 
21,8 
- 0 , 3 
21,5 
- 0 , 2 
3,4 
22,2 
3,4 
3,3 
1,2 
6,9 
6,0 
4,4 
9.0 
12,5 
21,5 
1,1 
22,6 
- 0 , 1 
3,4 
23,0 
3,7 
3,6 
1.2 
5,6 
6,2 
4,4 
8,9 
12,1 
21,0 
2,4 
23,4 
0,1 
19,6 20,1 20,7 21,7 22,7 23,3 
1 Including Wesi Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
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GRAPH 8: EC investment share in GDP, 1961­2000 (percentage of GDP) 
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catching­up effects as regards the rate of capacity utilization. 
Unemployment, however, would only start to fall signifi­
cantly after 1996 (when it is still at 10,6%) and the 1990 rate 
(8,3%) would only be achieved again in 1998. In fact, one 
would still have to wait for the year 2000 in order to see the 
number of unemployed fall below 10 million (6,1% of an 
active population). 
The investment share would progressively grow towards a 
level warranting a growth rate above 3% but would only 
reach it in 2000, despite the strong 1996­99 investment per­
formance.' 
Thanks to the budgetary consolidation and the automatic 
stabilizer effects of higher growth, public saving would again 
become positive. Overall, the saving­investment balance 
would be more soundly based than in the 1980s and would 
leave room for a slight current balance surplus, which also 
finds its counterpart in a better export performance due to 
the well­known 'growth­propelled exports' effect coming 
from a fast expansion of productive capacity, helped by 
improved productivity and price competitiveness. 
1 This illustrates in fact the great inertia of ratios when both the numerator 
and denominator are growing. 
Despite the positive character of those developments, results 
in terms of unemployment gains may still be deemed unsatis­
factory, with rates remaining above 10% until 1996­97. The 
improvement in the investment share also comes rather late, 
a fact which would plead for more immediate actions, as 
indeed agreed upon in the conclusions of the Edinburgh 
Summit. 
Scenario 2 (Table 5) keeps the same basic hypotheses as in 
Scenario 1 in terms of fiscal assumptions and business atti­
tudes but departs from the 1993­94 forecasts by invoking 
three new elements, the first two of which are directly in­
spired by the conclusions of the Edinburgh Summit (11 and 
12 December 1992) and more specifically in Annex 4 to Part 
A of the conclusions of the Presidency ('Declaration on 
promoting economic recovery in Europe'). 
(i) Scenario 2a: since the unemployment rate is presently 
much worse than in 1982 when wage moderation started 
in the EC, it is not unreasonable to assume that, from 
1993 onwards, the evolution of real wages vis-à-vis 
labour productivity could be as moderate as was indeed 
achieved in 1982­89 and follow the same pattern. Real 
wage growth would thus be close to zero (0,2%) in 
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Table 5 
Illustrative growth scenarios for the Community,' 1993-2000 
Scenario 2 : medium-term policies including Edinburgh initiative 
(annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
Average 
1993-96 
1996 1997 Average 
1997-2000 
2000 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption deflator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment (% of GDP) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
13. Profitability index (1961-73 = 100) 
14. 'Real' long-term interest rate (deflated with 
GDP deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total investments 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings ( = 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings (= 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation ( = 27 — 28) 
0,9 
"0,7 
1,6 
10,5 
4,0 
3,1 
5,5 
69,0 
2,9 
3,3 
0,2 
-1 ,3 
2,2 
0,5 
1,7 
10,2 
3,0 
2,8 
5,2 
73,0 
2,8 
3,3 
0,5 
- 1 , 2 
3,3 
1,3 
2,0 
9,5 
2,4 
2,4 
4,6 
76,1 
2,8 
3,4 
1,0 
- 1 , 0 
4,1 
2,0 
2,1 
8,2 
2,4 
2,4 
3,9 
76,3 
2,8 
3,6 
1,2 
- 0 , 9 
4,0 
1,9 
2,1 
6,3 
2,5 
2,5 
2,4 
74,0 
2,8 
3,7 
1,2 
- 0 , 9 
3,8 
1,8 
2,0 
4,3 
2,5 
2,5 
0,7 
71,2 
2,8 
3,7 
1,2 
- 0 , 8 
89,5 
5,7 
93,3 
5,1 
97,4 
4,8 
100,7 
4,5 
104,1 
4,4 
106,9 
4,4 
3,4 
19,6 
2,5 
0.4 
1,2 
- 0 , 2 
3.8 
1,3 
9,2 
11,9 
21,1 
- 1 , 8 
19,3 
- 0 , 4 
3,4 
20,5 
2,7 
1,4 
1,2 
4,3 
5,0 
2,8 
9,6 
12,5 
22,1 
- 1 , 5 
20,6 
-o,i 
3,4 
21,5 
3,0 
2,6 
1,2 
6,4 
5,9 
3,9 
9,8 
13,1 
22,9 
- i , o 
21,9 
0,2 
3,4 
22,5 
3,4 
3,0 
1,2 
9,1 
6,2 
4,6 
9,9 
13,3 
23,2 
- 0 , 3 
22,9 
0,2 
3,4 
23,4 
3,7 
3,3 
1,2 
7,1 
6,3 
4,6 
9,7 
13,2 
22,9 
1,2 
24,1 
0,4 
3,4 
24,2 
4,0 
3,6 
1,2 
5,6 
6,4 
4,5 
9,5 
12,7 
22,2 
2,8 
25,0 
0,6 
19,7 20,7 21,7 22,7 23,7 24,4 
1 Including West Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
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1993-94' and would climb back to 1,2% later on. In 
that way, the evolution of real wages per head would 
remain 1 percentage point below the growth rate of 
labour productivity as in 1982-89.The resulting (in-
crease in) profitability2 would both accelerate and 
strengthen the recovery of investment, as well as keeping 
labour attractively priced as a factor input. The need 
for such wages and profitability evolution is recognized 
in the Joint Opinion of the social partners, as expressed 
in the framework of the Community social dialogue, in 
July 1992.3 
(ii) Scenario 2b: wage moderation is, however, likely to 
cause an initial slowdown in private consumption and 
GDP growth, since there is an unavoidable lag between 
the moderation of real wage per wage-earner and its 
favourable growth, inflation and employment effects. 
The growth of disposable income is therefore initially 
reduced. Such effects can, however, be offset by the 
elements of the growth initiative quoted in Part A, 
Annex 4, of the Edinburgh conclusions, which proposed 
actions providing Community support to public and 
private investments expected to amount to ECU 30 
billion in future years. For the present exercise, it has 
been assumed that these 30 billion would be linearly 
distributed over three years (1993-95) and would effec-
tively represent additional investments with respect to 
those present in Scenario 2a.4 
(iii) Scenario 2c: in previous scenarios, the external environ-
ment of the Community has been assumed to be rather 
neutral with constant real exchange rates after 1994 and 
very moderate growth in the rest of the OECD countries 
and most of all in the USA and Japan. The third element 
of Scenario 2 is therefore a variant into which, thanks 
to the success of the 'Clinton plan', a successful con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round and, overall, an im-
This slow growth of real wages in 1993-94 is justified by the fact that 
productivity growth is still cyclically influenced and that a substantial 
part of it comes from employment decreases. It should thus not be 
considered as distributable. 
The profitability index would reach 96,1 in 1996 and 107,1 in 2000 as 
against 93,6 and 102,4 respectively for those two years in Scenario 1. 
See European Economy, Supplement A, No 7, July 1992. 
Scenario 2b only takes into account the Community part of the Edin-
burgh conclusions and does not incorporate all national contributions 
going beyond what is already included in the Commission services' 
short-term forecast, 1993-94 (January 1993). 
proved multinational coordination of economic poli-
cies, import demand coming from EC partners would 
be 0,5 percentage points higher in Scenario 2c than in 
the previous ones (i.e. around 7,0% per annum rather 
than 6,5%).5 
Taken individually, the impact of these measures is not large 
(see Tables 7, 8 and 9) but, taken together, they bring 
forward to 1995 a significantly stronger recovery of GDP, 
investment and employment. 
The unemployment rate starts to fall at the end of 1994, is 
below 10% in 1996 (9,5%) and reaches 4,3% in 2000. In 
the latter year, both the investment share and the saving-
investment balance are comparable to those prevailing dur-
ing the 1960s. In particular, public saving as a percentage 
of GDP is then positive and equal to the public investment 
share, and the current balance is in slight surplus, as should 
be the case for a developed zone. At 4,5%, real interest rates 
are still 2,0 points higher than in 1961-73 but are offset by 
a profitability index of 107 in 2000 as against 100 in 1961-73. 
The overall budgetary position would also start to improve 
markedly from 1995 onwards, net borrowing reaching 3,0% 
of GDP in 1998 and being practically eradicated in 2000, at 
0,7% of GDP (public savings representing then +2,8% of 
GDP). 
Conditions would thus be restored for sustaining an intern-
ally and externally balanced growth rate of about 3,5% in 
real terms (6,0% in nominal terms), with full employment 
at long last close at hand. The post-2000 years would then 
mark a new growth regime where labour would once again 
become a scarce factor and the ageing of the European 
population would raise a whole new range of issues. 
As with all model-based scenarios, the present ones should 
of course be taken with due qualifications, but it should be 
noted that there is nothing in these scenarios that has not 
already been achieved in the member countries and in the 
Community as a whole in recent periods, in widely varying 
external circumstances. As such, therefore, the results are not 
implausible even if they would certainly constitute difficult 
targets to reach and would require persistent efforts from 
all economic agents, public and private, over a long period. 
These assumptions are purely illustrative and do not prejudge what 
could be decided in the G7 meetings. 
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Table 6 
Summary table: Growth scenarios for the Community,' 1993-2000 
Yearly profile for growth, investment and unemployment rates 
Real GDP growth 
Scenario 02 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Investment share 
Scenario 0 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Unemployment rate 
Scenario 0 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
0,7 
0,7 
0,9 
19,4 
19,4 
19,6 
10,6 
10,6 
10,5 
1,7 
1,7 
1,8 
19,4 
19,4 
20,0 
11,0 
11,0 
10,7 
2,3 
2,3 
3,0 
19,8 
20,0 
20,8 
11,1 
10,9 
10,1 
2,2 
3,0 
3,3 
20,0 
20,4 
21,5 
11,1 
10,6 
9,5 
2,1 
3,8 
4,1 
20,1 
21,4 
22,5 
11,3 
9,6 
8,2 
2,0 
3,9 
4,0 
20,2 
22,1 
23,2 
11,5 
8,5 
6,9 
2,0 
3,8 
3,9 
20,3 
22,6 
23,8 
11,6 
7,4 
5,7 
2,1 
3,7 
3,8 
20,4 
23,0 
24,2 
11,7 
6,3 
4,3 
1 Including West Germany. 
2 All scenarios are derived from a baseline projection (Scenario 0) and policy multipliers coming from the Quest multinational macro model of the Commission services. For the year 1993-94, the 
model has been calibrated (in Scenarios 0 and 1) on the most recent (January 1993) short-term forecast of the Commission services. 
Source: Commission services. 
5. Conclusions 
The recovery process of the EC economies which gathered 
full momentum during the second half of the 1980s was most 
unfortunately stopped in 1991 -93 when it was still incomplete 
and had not yet reached sustainability. Although the deter-
minants of growth are not yet seriously affected, the situation 
leaves no room for complacency given the worrying deterio-
ration of the labour market and the risks for the major 
Community projects. 
In such a situation, psychological factors become as im-
portant as economic fundamentals and there is a substantial 
risk that the prevailing pessimism will become self-fulfilling. 
There is, however, no example in modern history of recession 
without end and the resumption of growth should not be 
seen as a foregone conclusion. 
Indeed, it can be shown by quantified normative scenarios 
that the maintenance and, in some cases, strengthening of 
the policy consensus and of the behavioural changes which 
emerged during the 1980s, along the lines of the measures 
outlined in the Edinburgh Summit conclusions, could restore 
a non-inflationary, sustainable and labour-creating growth 
process in the Community. 
To these macro elements must also be added the micro 
impact of the pursuit of structural policies launched during 
the 1980s aimed at improving the flexibility and competi-
tiveness of markets. These elements are difficult to quantify 
in the (very) global macro framework used in this study 
but they would undoubtedly go in the right direction and 
facilitate the achievement of the overall results presented in 
the growth scenarios. 
The process is, however, a medium-term one with very 
stringent requirements in terms of public policies and private 
behaviour. Its achievement should, therefore, not be taken 
for granted but, as shown by the illustrative 'slow-growth' 
projection, there is really no other acceptable solution for 
the correction of the major Community imbalance: its unac-
ceptably high unemployment rate. 
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Table 7 
Illustrative growth scenarios for the Community,1 1993-2000 
Scenario 2a : Scenario 1 + stronger wage moderation 
(annua! percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1993 Average 
1993-96 
Average 
1997-2000 
2000 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption deflator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment (% of GDP) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
13. Profitability index (1961-73 = 100) 
14. 'Real' long-term interest rate (deflated with 
GDP deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total investments 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings ( = 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings ( = 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation ( = 27-28) 
0,6 
- 0 , 9 
1,5 
10,7 
4,0 
3,1 
5,5 
69,2 
2,7 
3,3 
0,2 
- 1 , 3 
2,0 
0,3 
1.7 
10,6 
3,0 
2,8 
5,3 
73,6 
2.8 
3.3 
0,5 
- 1 , 2 
3,1 
1,1 
2.0 
10,2 
2,4 
2,4 
4,7 
77,0 
2,8 
3,4 
1,0 
- i , o 
4,0 
1,9 
2,1 
9,0 
2,4 
2,4 
4,0 
77,4 
2,8 
3,6 
1,2 
- 0 , 9 
3,9 
1.8 
2.1 
7.2 
2.5 
2.5 
2,6 
75.5 
2,8 
3.8 
1.2 
- 0 . 8 
3,8 
1.8 
2,0 
5.4 
2,5 
2,6 
1,0 
72,6 
2,8 
3,8 
1,2 
- 0 , 7 
88,9 
5,7 
92,2 
5,1 
96,1 
4,8 
99,7 
4,5 
103,7 
4,4 
107,1 
4,3 
3,4 
19,4 
2,4 
0,4 
1,2 
- 1 , 5 
3,5 
1,1 
9,0 
11,9 
20,9 
- 1 , 8 
19.1 
- 0 , 4 
3,4 
19,9 
2.5 
1,4 
1,2 
3,1 
4,7 
2,5 
9,1 
12,5 
21,6 
- 1 , 6 
20,0 
- 0 , 1 
3,4 
20,7 
2,8 
2,6 
1,2 
6,0 
5,7 
3,8 
9,1 
13,0 
22,1 
- 1 , 1 
21,0 
0,1 
3,4 
21,7 
3,2 
3.0 
1,2 
9,0 
6,0 
4,6 
9,2 
13,2 
22,4 
- 0 , 4 
22,0 
0,1 
3,4 
22,6 
3,5 
3,4 
1,2 
7,1 
6,1 
4,5 
9,1 
13,0 
22,1 
1.0 
23,1 
0,3 
3,4 
23,3 
3,8 
3.6 
1,2 
5,6 
6,2 
4.4 
9,0 
12,3 
21,3 
2,7 
24,0 
0,5 
19,5 20,1 20,9 21,9 22,8 23,5 
1 Including West Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 8 
Illustrative growth scenarios for the Community,1 1993-2000 
Scenario 2b: Scenario 2a + Edinburgh investment package 
(annual percentage change, unless otherwise slated) 
Average 
1993-96 
Average 
1997-2000 
2000 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption deflator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment (% of GDP) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
13. Profitability index (1961-73 = 100) 
14. 'Real' long-term interest rate (deflated with 
GDP deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total investments 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings (= 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings (= 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation (=21 — 28) 
0,9 
-0 ,7 
1,6 
10,5 
4,0 
3,1 
5.5 
69,1 
2,9 
3,3 
0.2 
-1 ,3 
2,2 
0,4 
1,8 
10,2 
3,0 
2,8 
5,2 
73,1 
2,8 
3,3 
0,5 
- 1 , 2 
3,2 
1.2 
2,0 
9,6 
2,4 
2,4 
4,6 
76,2 
2,8 
3,4 
1,0 
- 1 , 0 
4,1 
1,9 
2,2 
8,4 
2,4 
2,4 
3,9 
76,5 
2,8 
3,6 
1,2 
- 0 , 9 
4,0 
1,8 
2,2 
6,6 
2,5 
2,5 
2,4 
74,4 
2,8 
3,8 
1,2 
- 0 , 8 
3,8 
1,8 
2,0 
4,7 
2,5 
2,6 
0,7 
71,3 
2,8 
3,8 
1,2 
- 0 , 8 
89,4 
5,7 
93,1 
5,1 
97,1 
4,8 
100,6 
4,5 
104,1 
4,4 
107,1 
4,3 
3,4 
19,6 
2,5 
0,4 
1,2 
- 0 , 2 
3,6 
1,2 
9,2 
12,0 
21,2 
- 1 , 8 
19,4 
- 0 , 4 
3,4 
20,5 
2,7 
1,4 
1,2 
4,2 
4,9 
2.8 
9,5 
12,5 
22,0 
- 1 , 5 
20,5 
- 0 , 2 
3,4 
21,5 
3,0 
2,6 
1,2 
6,4 
5,8 
3,9 
9,7 
13,1 
22,8 
- 1 , 0 
21,8 
0,1 
3,4 
22,5 
3,4 
3,0 
1,2 
9,1 
6,0 
4,6 
9,8 
13,4 
23,2 
- 0 , 4 
22,8 
0,1 
3,4 
23,4 
3,8 
3,4 
1,2 
7,1 
6,1 
4,5 
9,6 
13,2 
22,8 
1,1 
23,9 
0,3 
3,4 
24,2 
4,0 
3,6 
1.2 
5,6 
6,2 
4,4 
9,5 
12,6 
22,1 
2,8 
24,9 
0,5 
19,8 20,7 21,7 22,7 23,6 24,4 
1 Including West Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table 9 
Illustrative growth scenarios for the Community,1 1993-2000 
Scenario 2c : Scenario 2b + stronger external demand 
(annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
Average 
1993-96 
Average 
1997-2000 
2000 
1. Real GDP growth 
2. Employment 
3. Labour productivity 
4. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
5. Private consumption deflator 
6. GDP deflator 
7. Public deficit (% of GDP) 
8. Public debt (% of GDP) 
9. Public investment (% of GDP) 
10. Nominal wages/head 
11. Real wages/head 
12. Real unit labour costs 
13. Profitability index (1961-73 = 100) 
14. 'Real' long-term interest rate (deflated with 
GDP deflator) 
15. Capital-output ratio 
16. Share of investment in GDP 
17. Fixed capital stock 
18. Private consumption 
19. Public consumption 
20. Total investments 
21. Exports 
22. Final demand 
Saving balances (% of GDP) 
23. Household savings 
24. Corporate savings 
25. Private savings ( = 23 + 24) 
26. Public savings 
27. National savings ( = 25 + 26) 
28. Current balance 
29. Gross capital formation (= 27 - 28) 
0,9 
-0,7 
1,6 
10,5 
4,0 
3,1 
5,5 
69,0 
2,9 
3,3 
0,2 
-1 ,3 
2,2 
0,5 
1,7 
10,2 
3,0 
2,8 
5,2 
73,0 
2,8 
3,3 
0,5 
- 1 , 2 
3,3 
1,3 
2,0 
9,5 
2,4 
2,4 
4,6 
76,1 
2,8 
3,4 
1,0 
- 1 , 0 
4,1 
2,0 
2,1 
8,2 
2,4 
2,4 
3,9 
76,3 
2,8 
3,6 
1,2 
- 0 , 9 
4,0 
1,9 
2,1 
6,3 
2,5 
2,5 
2,4 
74,0 
2,8 
3,7 
1,2 
- 0 , 9 
3,8 
1,8 
2.0 
4.3 
2,5 
2,5 
0,7 
71,2 
2,8 
3,7 
1,2 
- 0 , 8 
89,5 
5,7 
93,3 
5,1 
97,4 
4,8 
100,7 
4,5 
104,1 
4,4 
106,9 
4.4 
3,4 
19,6 
2,5 
0,4 
1,2 
- 0 , 2 
3,8 
1,3 
9,2 
11,9 
21,1 
- 1 , 8 
19,3 
- 0 , 4 
3,4 
20,5 
2,7 
1.4 
1,2 
4,3 
5,0 
2,8 
9.6 
12,5 
22,1 
- 1 , 5 
20,6 
-o,i 
3,4 
21,5 
3,0 
2,6 
1,2 
6,4 
5,9 
3.9 
9,8 
13,1 
22,9 
- 1 , 0 
21,9 
0,2 
3,4 
22,5 
3,4 
3,0 
1,2 
9,1 
6.2 
4,6 
9,9 
13,3 
23,2 
- 0 , 3 
22,9 
0,2 
3,4 
23,4 
3,7 
3,3 
1,2 
7,1 
6,3 
4,6 
9,7 
13,2 
22,9 
1,2 
24,1 
0,4 
3,4 
24,2 
4,0 
3.6 
1.2 
5,6 
6,4 
4,5 
9,5 
12,7 
22,2 
2,8 
25,0 
0,6 
19,7 20,7 21,7 22,7 23,7 24,4 
1 Including West Germany. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Summary 
77ie process of structural transformation has accelerated very significantly over the past two decades, mainly due to rapid 
technological change and closer integration, in particular, within the European Community. The adaptation of the productive 
structures to the new environment has fallen short of what is required. This has contributed to reduced rates of growth, to higher 
inflation and record unemployment levels. Governments have reacted to this challenge by structural policy measures. Their 
common objective is to facilitate the optimal allocation of resources in reaction to changing circumstances. For this purpose, 
impediments to structural change have to be identified and tackled by appropriate means. This study presents different approaches 
to structural improvement which at present dominate the discussion in the Member States. 
Following a short introduction, Section 2 succinctly restates the broad case for structural adjustment. This is then followed by 
sections examining the major structural rigidities in the markets for goods and services, in the public sector and in the labour 
market, as they have been discussed recently in Community forums and at national level. 
Structural impediments in the production and sale of goods and services are described in Section 3. It tackles: 
(i) impediments to market access, for example by licensing, recognition of professional qualifications, prudential rules and 
other regulations which, in a number of cases, seem excessive; 
(ii) State subsidies, which negatively affect the performance of the economies in various ways, and, in particular, the functioning 
of the internal market; 
(Hi) the sectors in which the offer of goods and services is especially restricted and other impediments to increased competition 
in the markets for goods and services. 
The current debate concerning the size, efficiency and interventions of the public sector in relation to the overall macroeconomic 
performance is considered in Section 4. The main criticism of the size of public-sector activities is closely connected with the 
amount of taxation that must finance it. Governments face a sort of increasing fiscal competition due to the liberalization of 
international capital movements, the creation of the internal market and progress towards EMU. These developments are 
reducing the scope for divergent national burdens through taxes and social contributions. In addition, special areas are referred 
to, in which large scope for improvements is seen: in the regulatory framework, the redistribution of wealth, the provision of 
public infrastructure and public services. 
High and rising unemployment draws continuous attention to the labour market; therefore Sections 5 and 6 focus on major 
proposals for structural measures which have been raised in discussions at national level in the Community. Section 5 concentrates 
on structural deficiencies on the demand and the supply side of the labour market, such as rigidities in working conditions, 
especially working time arrangements, costs of hiring and dismissals, mismatch, work disincentives, regional mobility, etc. 
The final section highlights the role of wages in the Community and the issue of facilitating a more appropriate adjustment of 
wages to macroeconomic constraints while respecting free collective bargaining. The achievement of this objective could be 
enhanced by various approaches being presented in this section: 
(i) different methods used by Member State governments which have been devised in order to coordinate their macroeconomic 
policy strategies and wage behaviour; 
(ii) wage indexation; 
(Hi) decentralization of collective bargaining; 
(iv) more wage differentiation; 
(v) strengthening of the social dialogue. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the pace of change in the factors 
which determine the way economies function has accelerated 
dramatically. The replacement of steel by plastics and com-
posite materials, the very large change in the relative price 
of energy during the 1970s and the large-scale introduction 
of new production technologies made possible by cheap 
production of microprocessors are just some of the most 
obvious examples. As a result, the normal process of struc-
tural transformation of the economies has also accelerated 
very significantly. Notwithstanding this acceleration, the 
adaptation of the productive structures to the new environ-
ment has fallen short of what would have been required. 
This has led to reduced rates of growth, to higher inflation 
and record unemployment levels. 
The magnitude and the speed of the changes in the economic 
environment revealed the rigidities present in all developed 
economies as a result of various factors such as government 
regulations, private-sector agreements, vested interests and, 
often, simply deep-seated habits. In general, most of these 
'impediments' to change are the response to legitimate con-
cerns of advanced societies and maintain their raison d'être 
even under close scrutiny, suffice it to mention the bulk of 
safety, social and environmental regulations. However, the 
experience of the last two decades has shown that in many 
cases these 'impediments' were either not necessary any more 
to fulfil the original aims, or that the balance between their 
positive and negative effects had changed substantially. In 
addition, greater awareness of the need for structural adjust-
ment highlighted the existence of obstacles whose existence 
had never been justified. This has made governments 
recognize that active steps had to be taken to facilitate the 
adjustment of economic structures. Efforts in this direction 
— labelled 'structural adjustment policies' — were under-
taken during the 1970s, but significant progress only became 
evident during the past decade. 
Growing economic integration, both within the Community 
and at world level, has added to the importance of structural 
adjustment policies via the impact of greater competition on 
the need to adapt rapidly, changes in the international div-
ision of labour and the reduction in the effectiveness on the 
domestic economy of macroeconomic policies. These factors 
are particularly important in the case of the European Com-
munity in the light of the high degree of economic, financial 
and monetary integration already achieved on the way to 
the internal market and economic and monetary union. For 
this reason, structural adjustment policies figure prominently 
in all Community economic policy documents, the most 
recent examples being the Edinburgh Declaration on the 
promotion of economic growth and the Annual Economic 
Report for 1993. 
The present study draws on the work that is being done in 
Community forums and in the Member States to present 
briefly the major problem areas which have been identified 
and some of the possible corrective actions which are being 
discussed. 
The current debate concerns essentially measures to be taken 
at the national level and makes only passing references to 
the two major Community initiatives in this area: the internal 
market and EMU. This is due to the fact that, although the 
former is not yet fully implemented and the latter is only 
outlined, their prospects are sufficiently firm for these pro-
jects to constitute a given framework for Member States in 
the medium-term perspective in which all structural adjust-
ment policies must be seen. It should not be forgotten that 
although the formal transition to EMU is still some years 
away, many countries operate in conditions not very dissimi-
lar from those of a fully-fledged monetary union. This situ-
ation implies that the removal of the impediments identified 
is almost always the sole responsibility of the Member States 
concerned and that the proposed solution must be adapted 
to the specific situation of each individual country. Close 
cooperation and concerted action in this area, however, 
remain very important to ensure that new measures do not 
run counter to common objectives, to derive useful lessons 
from the experience of other countries and to help overcome 
resistance by highlighting progress made in competing re-
gions and countries. 
The second section below succinctly restates the broad case 
for structural adjustment. This is then followed by sections 
examining the major structural rigidities which are pre-
venting the economies from achieving higher growth and 
lower unemployment. These rigidities can be grouped under 
three major headings: 
(i) insufficient competition in the production and offer of 
goods and services; 
(ii) size, efficiency and interventions of the public sector; 
(iii) functioning of the labour markets. 
2. Removal of structural impediments to growth: 
a greater effort is needed 
The objective of structural policies is to facilitate the optimal 
allocation of "resources in reaction to changing circum-
stances. This requires action in a variety of fields ranging 
from the generation of market signals to the ability of 
markets to respond to these signals and to the abolition of 
biases and constraints in the functioning of markets. Very 
often price signals are distorted, or markets do not react 
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timely to correct prices, or the functioning of the markets is 
generally impaired. In most cases, these distortions are the 
direct or indirect result of interventions by the public sector, 
by groups of producers or are the product of historic events. 
In all these cases actions must be taken to identify the causes 
of the distortion and remove them as rapidly as possible. 
Success in increasing the flexibility of the economies trans-
lates into higher productivity, higher investment profita-
bility, stronger investment and, ultimately, stronger output 
growth. This will obviously have positive consequences on 
job creation and on unemployment levels. But structural 
adjustment measures can help lower unemployment more 
directly when they are specifically aimed at improving the 
functioning of the labour markets. Moreover, flexible econ-
omies are also needed to reduce the costs of adjusting to 
possible exogenous shocks and of correcting macroeconomic 
imbalances where these give cause for concern. 
2.1. Structural adjustment policies 
lead to stronger growth and lower 
unemployment 
(i) Artificially distorted prices represent one of the most 
common and serious factors that impair the functioning 
of the economies. The painful transition of the econom-
ies of Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a vivid 
illustration of this point, but price distortions are very 
common also in the developed economies. Prices must 
reflect production costs and relative scarcity to allow 
resources to be allocated efficiently. If this is not the 
case, resources are misdirected to obsolete or inefficient 
uses, where market returns are insufficient to meet costs. 
This in turn increases the difficulty of attracting ad-
ditional resources to areas of expanding production and 
leads to higher unemployment and a faster rise in the 
overall price level than would otherwise be the case. 
For the signal represented by prices to maintain its 
validity, it is important that the rate of inflation be kept 
low. Allocation of resources is determined by changes 
in relative prices which are more difficult to perceive 
when they are obscured by large movements in the 
overall price level. This consideration highlights one 
of the many complementarities between structural and 
macroeconomic policies. As observed in the previous 
paragraph, structural adjustment policies contribute to 
lower inflation through their effect on the allocation of 
resources, but macroeconomic policies which ensure 
that inflation is kept low facilitate the structural adjust-
ment of the economies since they maintain the effective-
ness of price signals. 
(ii) Generating correct prices does not help if markets are 
not able to respond rapidly to changes in prices. This 
is often the case when the sector is controlled by few 
producers or buyers or when its operation has been the 
object of government interventions. Monopoly pos-
itions may be abused to delay the response to price 
changes. The existing producers sometimes refuse to 
switch to new, more efficient production techniques if 
that could involve reducing their monopoly position 
and fight the arrival of new competitors or resort to 
various other types of restrictive practices. 
Experience has shown that, unfortunately, when 
government intervention is invoked and obtained this 
is often in the direction of preventing the changes in 
prices from provoking the appropriate market response. 
Government intervention may also be necessary in vari-
ous instances to cushion the effects of rapid changes, 
but its aim should be to accompany the transformations 
rather than delay or block them. Indeed, there are 
many cases where government intervention, if correctly 
conceived and implemented, could accelerate structural 
adjustment and contribute to higher growth. 
(iii) Irrespective of the effectiveness of price signals, markets 
are often constrained by various forms of regulation 
that limit the range of products, influence production 
techniques and generally constrain the use of productive 
factors. In the majority of cases these constraints are 
justified on more important grounds such as social and 
environmental protection, consumer safety, national de-
fence, etc. But the factors that justify the introduction 
and the maintenance of these constraints are themselves 
in constant evolution. Again, experience shows that 
unfortunately the constraints tend to outlive the con-
ditions that justified their imposition. The most com-
mon example of this situation is found in regulations 
that have given rise to public monopolies which were 
originally justified by national security considerations 
or technological limitations. The world political situ-
ation has changed, technology has evolved, but the 
dismantling of the monopolies is resisted because of its 
short-term implications on employment. 
The labour market is usually identified as an area where 
constraints are very numerous (see Section 5). Some are 
the result of safety and social protection measures. By 
and large, Europe is an area characterized by a high 
degree of protection in this respect. This situation is not 
seriously challenged as there exists a consensus on the 
need to maintain this high level of protection. Heated 
discussions, however, take place on some provisions 
which appear out of date, on the possibility of reducing 
the administrative costs that the application of some 
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regulations entail and on some more fundamental points 
related essentially to the freedom of firms to recruit and 
dismiss workers. Other, and sometimes more serious, 
constraints are due to skills mismatch, insufficient mo-
bility of workers or, simply, poor functioning of the 
market when demand and supply have difficulty to 
meet. 
The interest for the functioning of the labour market, 
however, is linked also to the fact that it profoundly 
affects macroeconomic conditions through the outcome 
of autonomous wage negotiations (see Section 6). There 
is a consensus that at present, the results of wage nego-
tiations do not sufficiently reflect changes in macro-
economic conditions. Consideration is therefore given 
to measures which, in respect of the autonomy of the 
social partners, could make wage-setting procedures 
more responsive to macroeconomic conditions. 
These considerations are particularly relevant in the case of 
the European Community which constitutes an economic 
area characterized by a very high degree of economic inte-
gration. The internal market programme has significantly 
accelerated the process initiated with the Treaty of Rome 
and which will be completed by formation of a full economic 
and monetary union. Already now, the scope for an indepen-
dent monetary policy is almost nonexistent for most Member 
States while that for budgetary policy is very small. For this 
reason, structural adjustment policies figure prominently in 
economic policy recommendations at Community and at 
national level. The informal Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council meeting in Oporto in May 1992 called for a signifi-
cant strengthening of efforts to improve the adaptability of 
the economies. Discussions on various aspects of structural 
adjustment policies have taken place in various Community 
forums. More recently, the European Council meeting in 
Edinburgh and the Annual Economic Report presented by 
the Commission have restated the importance of continued 
efforts in this direction. 
2.2. Growing economic integration requires 
more emphasis on structural policies 
The general case for action to remove structural impediments 
has become stronger with the growing integration of the 
world economy. Better telecommunications and transport 
mean that the number of relevant price signals increases; 
lower trade barriers lead to stronger competition and free 
capital markets imply that one of the factors of production 
has become extremely mobile. All these changes are very 
beneficial and have contributed to faster increases in wealth, 
but they have also meant that conditions in any specific 
sector, region or unit of production may change faster than 
in the past. Greater consideration must therefore be given 
to the elements which determine the location of productive 
investment. In this respect wages play a key role, but other 
factors are also very important such as the provision of good 
infrastructure, efficient public services and the availability 
of a highly skilled labour force. 
At the same time, economic integration has reduced the 
room for manoeuvre at the domestic level of budgetary and 
monetary policy. Demand management through budgetary 
policy has become less effective because of the strong leakage 
to the external sector while monetary policy autonomy for 
small and medium-sized countries has all but disappeared. 
Under these conditions, structural adjustment policies have 
become the most effective instrument to modify economic 
conditions in a region or country. Their effects are strong 
and are concentrated in the area in which they are introduced 
and capital now reacts much more rapidly to improvements 
in the attractiveness of any given region. 
2.3. Difficult economic conditions make 
the implementation of structural policies 
more problematical and more urgent 
The very limited margin for manoeuvre available to macro-
economic policies at the beginning of 1993 highlights the 
importance of structural adjustment policies. Unfortunately, 
structural adjustment implies change which is difficult to 
bring about in a depressed economic climate. This confronts 
the authorities with the additional challenge of convincing 
public opinion of the need to act not 'notwithstanding slow 
growth and rising unemployment', but because of 'slow 
growth and rising unemployment'. The full effect of struc-
tural adjustment measures can only be felt in the medium 
term. But there exist short-term effects due to the antici-
pation of economic agents that should not be underesti-
mated. These are particularly important when bold measures 
can be perceived as signalling a 'regime' change. Changes in 
the budgetary procedures, in the degree of independence 
accorded to the central bank and large privatizations are 
good examples of measures that could be expected to pro-
duce short-term effects. 
3. Structural impediments in the production 
and sale of goods and services 
The economies of the Member States are very open both to 
the rest of the Community and to third countries. Yet they 
still present significant obstacles to competition that could 
be usefully removed. The implementation of the internal 
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market programme has significantly contributed to more 
openness, but it has also brought to light many constraints 
and restrictions which had gone almost unnoticed until now. 
These obstacles can be found at different levels. The pro-
duction of goods and the offer of services are still hampered 
by insufficient competition and by various forms of obsolete 
government restrictions. Furthermore, in many instances, 
the offer of goods and services on the markets suffers from 
an even more obvious lack of competition. 
3.1. Lack of competition in the production 
of goods and services 
3.1.1. Impediments to market access 
Free access to the production of goods and to the offer 
of services within the Community is prevented by various 
practices which, in a number of cases, seem to be excessive, 
for example licensing, recognition of professional qualifi-
cations, prudential rules, internal arrangements of trade 
associations and a huge array of other formal requirements. 
Some of these regulations are justified by the necessity to 
maintain essential quality standards for the protection of 
health, security and consumers in general. In part, they may 
actually be considered economically efficient to the extent 
that they help consumers reduce the cost of informing them-
selves on the quality of the goods and services they want to 
buy. Information costs would be higher, for example, in the 
absence of prior proof of qualification and experience by 
professionals and service providers. But, in general, there is 
a feeling that regulations do not correspond to the present 
needs: in some cases they may still be insufficient, in others 
they have become costly and superfluous. 
The markets where access limitations appear excessive and 
are considered most damaging are those for certain services 
(retail, catering, hotels) and the liberal professions. Particu-
larly disputable seem cases of self-regulation by an industry 
or a profession. In some countries, market access is also 
restricted by the activities of public enterprises which are 
often in a position to exclude competition from private 
firms. 
Some progress in this area is expected from the completion 
of the internal market, especially from the mutual acknowl-
edgement of national regulations and/or harmonization of 
the standards, but various national measures are being con-
sidered in all Member States. 
3.1.2. State subsidies 
Subsidization of productive activities, as a rule, creates devi-
ations from market results, distorts the allocation of re-
sources and reduces efficiency. Only in cases of important 
externalities and other types of market failures can subsidies 
be justified. Unacceptable social burdens could also justify 
subsidies, but only for a strictly limited period. 
Apart from the obvious budgetary costs and the matching 
burden on tax payers, including enterprises, subsidies nega-
tively affect economic performance in various ways. They 
distort competition among existing enterprises and, very 
important for long-term growth prospects, they prevent mar-
ket entry of potentially innovative competitors. In general, 
subsidies tend to slow down structural changes induced by 
market developments. In special cases, however, subsidies 
could reduce the overall costs of structural change and 
improve competitiveness by supporting, for example, re-
search and development activities, the pay-off of which could 
not be restricted to the enterprise which invested its funds. 
If a market failure is identified, State aids are also justified 
in order to distribute the overall social and economic adjust-
ment costs over a larger area and a longer but limited time-
span. 
Cutting subsidies has always been on the agenda of all 
governments, but success has hitherto been fairly limited. 
The 'Third survey on State aids in the European Community 
in the manufacturing and certain other sectors' has revealed 
that the overall level of aid declined slowly over the five 
years 1986 to 1990, however, with a slight upward swing in 
the last year under review. This resilience of State aid is due 
to the fact that the short-term negative effects of cuts in 
subsidies are more visible, and politically more vocal, than 
the larger medium-term gains. 
The present budgetary difficulties are forcing all govern-
ments to review the structure and the amount of subsidies. 
The current economic difficulties, on the other hand, are 
increasing the pressure to extend subsidies. Monitoring of 
State subsidies at the Community level, always necessary to 
prevent distortions of competition, may help to resist calls 
for unjustified increases in the present level of subsidies. 
3.2. Lack of competition in the offer 
of goods and services 
Free competition in the offer of goods and services in the 
Community is restricted by a number of regulations which 
were introduced to respond to particular temporary market 
conditions, to specific characteristics of some sectors and to 
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technical constraints which led to the creation of natural 
monopolies. Agriculture, coal, textiles, energy, telecommuni-
cations and transport are all examples of this situation. 
There exists a consensus, however, that the considerations 
which justified the introduction of these regulations in many 
cases do not exist any more. This is particularly obvious in 
those cases where the restrictions were due to the existence 
of natural monopolies due to technical considerations. Tech-
nological progress has now removed these constraints and 
competition could be increased. Sectors that are being scruti-
nized with this view are: 
(i) the market for piped and wired types of energy; 
(ii) the transport market; 
(iii) the telecommunications markets. 
Increased competition could be achieved by: 
(i) the abolition of official monopolies and, more generally, 
opening the sectors to greater domestic and inter-
national competition; 
(ii) removing technical barriers; 
(iii) improving the protection of intellectual property rights 
(nationally and internationally); 
(iv) banning horizontal price arrangements and market 
share arrangements; 
(v) strengthening competition policy at Community level 
to monitor Community-wide markets. 
4. The public sector 
The role the State is expected to play in a modern society 
creates a huge scope for possible conflicts between State 
action and economic efficiency. It is therefore not surprising 
that State intervention, in all its forms, is closely scrutinized 
in the search for areas for structural improvements. The 
current debate deals on the one hand with the size of govern-
ment activities in the economy and, on the other, with the 
way in which specific interventions take place. 
4.1. The size of the public sector 
It has already been stressed that most structural adjustment 
measures are the responsibility of Member States, but in few 
issues is this so evident as in the case of the relative size of 
government intervention in the economy. It is possible to 
state, however, that there is a general conviction that in most 
Member States government activities have increased so much 
as to represent a drag on economic efficiency through their 
sheer size. However, in some countries, particularly in the 
less prosperous ones, there may still be a need for increased 
public activity. 
The main criticism of the size of public intervention is closely 
connected with the amount of taxation that must finance it. 
In effect, the tax burden crucially affects the expected net 
returns on economic activity. It also influences, together with 
the supply of public goods and services, the attractiveness of 
a country as a location for investment. The average level of 
taxation in the Community is substantially higher than in 
the United States or Japan, although lower than in the 
EFTA countries.' 
An additional pressure on the level of taxation, and indirectly 
on the size of the public sector, is represented by the fact 
that the liberalization of international capital movements, 
the creation of the internal market and the progress towards 
EMU are reducing the scope for divergent national burdens 
through taxes and social contributions. This implies that 
governments face a sort of fiscal competition to which they 
will have to react by avoiding an excessive burden on those 
production factors which, through their mobility, can escape 
high taxation. 
This situation has induced governments to take steps and to 
consider further measures to broaden the tax base and reduce 
high marginal tax rates. At the same time, concern has been 
expressed about the effects of too strong a competition 
among Member States in the fiscal area. All governments 
are considering modifications and simplification of their 
tax systems which have become overly complex: there are 
Member States where more than 200 different taxes are 
being levied! 
The already high level of taxation is exerting pressure on 
governments to cut public expenditure in preference to in-
creasing taxes when budgetary consolidation efforts have to 
be undertaken. This is essentially taking the form of a 
continuous review of entitlements (transfers to households 
and enterprises) and of a tight rein on the public-sector wage 
bill. Furthermore, expenditure on the main public purposes 
is being squeezed from the worrying increase in the cost of 
servicing high and rising levels of public debt. On average, 
interest payments represent in the Community between 10 
and 11 % of all public outlays and the share is increasing 
1 In 1991, current receipts for general government as a percentage of 
GDP were: in the Community (including the new German Länder) 
44,7%, in the United States 34,2%, in Japan 33,8% and in the EFTA 
countries 48,2%. 
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constantly. In some Member States this share is already 
above 20%. 
As part of the effort to control public expenditure govern-
ments are considering modifications of their budgetary pro-
cesses both at the parliamentary and at the administrative 
levels. The experience of recent years has shown that budget-
ary outturns have often been very different from the initial 
government plans. 
4.2. Specific public-sector interventions 
(i) The regulatory framework. This is one of the most 
important forms of government intervention and it pro-
duces effects in all the areas where the scope for struc-
tural reform is explored. In general terms, the goal is 
to seek a balance between a certain stability needed to 
ensure a reliable framework for economic decision-
making and sufficient flexibility to evolve with the dy-
namics of economic and social developments. 
The effects of regulations on the housing sector are not 
dealt with elsewhere in the paper and should be briefly 
addressed here. Social considerations have obviously 
loomed large in this area, but this has led to a very high 
degree of rigidity. In particular, some of the regulations 
have developed effects contrary to their original aims. 
Excessive protection of tenants has tended to impair 
not only the re-renting of units but also the provision 
of additional residential construction. In some cases, 
the market for rented housing has all but disappeared. 
This has led to a very difficult situation, especially for 
those social groups that the original legislation wanted 
to protect, and has seriously discouraged inter-regional 
labour mobility. 
(ii) The redistribution of wealth. This constitutes the single 
largest item of public expenditure. The provision of 
social security is a major task for social, market-oriented 
democracies. However, the size reached by payments in 
this area is pushing governments to consider again the 
economic consequences of social benefits. 
(iii) The provision of basic public infrastructure. There is a 
consensus that there is still a large scope for improve-
ment in the basic infrastructure of the Community. In 
particular, substantial shortcomings have been ident-
ified in the international links due to the fact that older 
infrastructure networks have been planned and built in 
a domestic perspective. Improving the quality of the 
existing infrastructure and completing the so-called 
'missing links' is important to reap the full benefits of 
the single market. 
National efforts in this area are supported by the Com-
munity structural Funds, by the Community initiative 
to construct trans-European networks and additionally 
by the recent decisions taken at the Edinburgh Summit 
on the creation of a European Investment Fund and a 
temporary lending facility within the European Invest-
ment Bank. Furthermore, the necessary expansion of 
infrastructure could be accelerated by using private-
sector financing and operating models for infrastructure 
facilities. A shift of public expenditure from consump-
tion and/or subsidies to investment is being considered 
as a way of increasing the resources available without 
increasing taxation or the deficits. 
(iv) The provision of public services. Concern in this sphere 
relates essentially to two areas. The first is the extension 
of the provision of services to domains where the private 
sector could be more efficient. This is often the result 
of arrangements which have outlived their historical 
reasons. These services are provided by the State at 
prices not corresponding to their true economic costs. 
The presence of the State in these sectors often prevents 
competition through explicit regulation or through de 
facto behaviour. Consideration is being given to increas-
ing competition in these areas, privatizing government 
activities and/or introducing more market-oriented 
prices in those services that the State continues to pro-
vide. 
The second area of concern is the poor quality of the 
services which the State must in any case continue to 
provide. Reform proposals in this sphere concentrate 
on increasing incentives for public employees and man-
agement to improve their performance. Consideration 
is also given to increasing the degree of accountability 
of bureaucratic decision-making to controlling bodies 
and to the general public which, in many countries, 
seems to be very low. 
5. Structural rigidities in the labour market 
and potential areas of reform 
The situation on the European labour market since the 
beginning of the 1970s has been characterized by unemploy-
ment following a rising trend. This trend was caused by an 
unfavourable combination of developments: on the supply 
side by a stronger increase in the labour force due to demo-
graphic factors and rising participation rates, and on the 
demand side by relatively slow output growth and techno-
logical progress, both of which prevented greater absorption 
of the growing labour force. 
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The recent rise in European unemployment rates is due to 
the cyclical slowdown in economic growth and does not 
reflect an independent deterioration of the adaptability of 
the labour market. It should not be overlooked, however, 
that the slowdown in economic growth and the rise in 
unemployment lead to more resistance against structural 
change. This confirms the assessment that sustained econ-
omic growth is the crucial precondition for a gradual re-
duction of unemployment in the Community. The experience 
of the last decade has shown that the combination of acceler-
ated economic growth and a high employment content of 
growth generate a considerable increase in employment. 
Nevertheless, the reduction in unemployment could be sup-
ported by structural improvements on both sides of the 
labour market. In the following sections, major proposals 
for structural measures are presented which have been raised 
in discussions at national level in the Community. 
5.1. Areas for improvement on the demand side 
of the labour market 
In addition to non-inflationary, sustained and strong growth 
the creation of additional jobs could be facilitated by remov-
ing structural deficiencies on the demand side of the labour 
market in various areas: 
(i) Working-time arrangements became much more flexible 
in the last decade, allowing for larger differences be-
tween weekly working and operating times in manufac-
turing and in the services sector. However, in some 
countries the regulation of working conditions is still 
considered restrictive. 
(ii) Employment contracts could be reformed, permitting a 
wider variety of arrangements. 
(iii) More flexibility with respect to raising the retirement 
age essentially on a voluntary basis has been discussed in 
several member countries. Current demographic trends 
stress the need for more flexible retirement patterns 
aimed at raising the average retirement age. 
(iv) High costs of hiring and dismissals are regarded as an 
obstacle to more employment. The reduction of these 
costs would facilitate the supply of regular job oppor-
tunities. 
5.2. Areas for improvement on the supply side 
of the labour market 
Promising areas for improvement on the supply side of the 
labour markets are identified in the educational and training 
systems and in the social security systems, with respect to 
enhancing regional mobility and supporting the entry and 
re-entry of disadvantaged groups into the labour market and 
vocational training and retraining. 
5.2.1. Mismatch, skill shortages 
Even if skill shortages appear not to be of a sufficiently large 
scale to substantially hinder output and employment growth, 
the training and educational systems do not always provide 
an adequate number of people with the necessary skills. 
Some Member States, however, have observed substantial 
oversupplies (unskilled workers, some academic formations) 
and undersupplies (skilled technical workers). Training and 
retraining at work is widely felt to fall short of needs. 
Proposals have been put forward that existing skill mis-
matches could be identified in cooperation between the social 
partners and public authorities, and training facilities could 
be adjusted accordingly. A commonly proposed solution to 
this problem is a greater involvement of enterprises concern-
ing the content of training programmes and their financing. 
This approach induced several Member States to go further 
and to propose the introduction of a 'dual' occupational 
training system in which schooling and practical training in 
the firm go in parallel. 
Some countries have noticed that a certain number of unem-
ployed are often not only unskilled but sometimes even seem 
to be untrainable in the sense that they lack the basic skills 
needed to participate successfully in educational or training 
programmes. The countries concerned give high priority to 
changing this situation. 
Similarly, experienced, older workers also need training and 
retraining to keep up with technological changes. 
5.2.2. Social security schemes and their impact 
on work incentives 
There is a consensus that a delicate balance has to be maintai-
ned or achieved between incentive-efficient and acceptable 
social security schemes in line with the principles laid down 
in the Community Social Charter. Minimum wages and 
generous social support or insurance payments reduce incen-
tives to search intensively for work or to pursue additional 
qualification measures. Notably, in the case of low-income 
workers and/br families with dependent children, incentives 
to resume work can be minimal or nonexistent (poverty 
trap). 
On the other hand, it is not possible to grant benefits below 
a socially accepted minimum. However, the notion about 
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social acceptability may change with the macroeconomic 
situation and the social safety net consequently will have to 
be adjusted. Disincentives to work are generally aggravated 
by high marginal income-tax rates. The transition from 
social benefits to earned income often implies a 'marginal 
tax rate' of 100% if social benefits are cut by the total 
amount of the additional income. A reduction of the disin-
centives could therefore be achieved through appropriate 
changes in the tax treatment of benefits in particular or the 
marginal income-tax rate in general, and by making the 
length and level of benefit payments more dependent on 
certain criteria such as the intensity of job search, or training 
activities. 
5.2.3. Regional mobility 
Regional mobility in the EC is low by international stan-
dards, Ireland and — to a lesser extent — Greece being the 
exceptions. Generally, a higher degree of regional mobility 
is seen as desirable to smooth out regional imbalances. 
However, it is believed that regional mobility can only be 
one means among others to reduce regional disparities in 
unemployment rates. The preferred solution would be the 
attraction of employment-creating investment by regions 
with severe unemployment problems instead of massive mi-
gration movements from the more peripheral regions to the 
central agglomerations. 
In all member countries, important impediments to mobility 
exist in one form or another, caused by various factors which 
could be changed in favour of more mobility: insufficient 
wage differentiation, the abovementioned rigidities in the 
housing market, the non-transferability of pension schemes 
(or at least losses arising from changing employer), seniority-
oriented pay schemes. Other factors such as social and cul-
tural ties or a high female participation rate with the resulting 
high number of double-income families have to be taken as 
given. 
5.2.4. Employment for disadvantaged groups 
An increase in the number of jobs typically absorbs first of 
all the experienced, short-term unemployed and those who 
re-enter the work-force. School-leavers, other newcomers, 
ethnic minorities and the long-term unemployed have more 
difficulty in finding a job. This pattern is reflected in the 
structure of unemployment. The productive potential of 
these groups does not appear to potential employers to 
correspond to their wage costs. The entry of newcomers and 
the re-entry of long-term unemployed into the work-force 
could be further facilitated by a variety of measures aimed 
at individual wage costs adjusted to their productivity and 
at improving the productivity of these groups. This could 
be enhanced in particular by facilitating their access to 
the labour market, to education, vocational training and 
retraining. 
6. Wage adjustment and wage-setting 
procedures 
The recent slowdown in economic growth has led to a 
significant rise in unemployment. The Community unem-
ployment rate in 1993 will probably go beyond the previous 
peak in 1985, i.e. the gains during the second half of the 
1980s will be lost in the present economic downturn. The 
revival of inflationary pressures which started in 1989/90 and 
the acceleration of wages in 1990/91 led to the consequent 
tightening of monetary policies. This created a nominal 
squeeze between the evolution of nominal variables and 
official monetary policy and inflation targets. Wages are 
playing a most important role for the relaxation of this 
squeeze. They are the decisive factor for the development of 
employment and prices and thus for nominal convergence, 
the compliance with EMU criteria and the stability of ex-
change rates in the Community. A short-term return to 
nominal wage increases more in line with inflation targets 
and with the recent reduction in productivity growth would 
help curb inflationary expectations. This would lower long-
term interest rates further and allow central banks to reduce 
their interest rates. Because of the dominant influence of 
Deutschmark interest rates in the EMS such a development 
in Germany would be of special importance for economic 
recovery in the Community. Price and wage developments 
also need special attention in member countries with above-
average inflation rates and where currencies depreciated 
recently. Due to the slow growth of output in present times, 
the remaining growth of labour productivity is largely due 
to the shedding of labour. Such productivity gains provide 
no room for being distributed in the form of real wage 
increases. 
The Annual Economic Report for 1993 argues in a medium-
term perspective that the goal of full employment requires 
a higher level of business profitability which in turn would 
necessitate more moderate wage increases in line with low 
inflation rates. Real wages should not fully absorb the 
growth of labour productivity in order to strengthen profita-
bility. This would lead to the desired revitalization of em-
ployment-creating investment. As labour productivity in-
creases with higher investment and structural reform, real 
wage increases may then also be higher, thus triggering what 
could become a virtuous circle. 
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In full EMU with free trade and capital movements, the 
disappearance of intra-EC exchange rates and traded goods 
price differentials, the evolution of costs and particularly 
wage costs will have a crucial impact on regional supply-
side conditions. In particular, a low productivity of labour 
which is not matched by correspondingly low wages will 
affect regional profitability and hence regional investment, 
output and employment. Thus, in order to foster a more 
appropriate regional growth pattern in the Community, 
specific wage moderation efforts aimed at alleviating and 
ultimately suppressing detrimental intra-EC unit labour cost 
differentials are required during the transition towards 
EMU. 
6.1. Experiences in the 1980s 
The slowdown in the Community economy since the end of 
1990 ended a period of satisfactory growth of output and 
employment. This growth period was characterized by wage 
developments in most member countries and in the Com-
munity as a whole in line with macroeconomic constraints. A 
strong disinflation process was associated with a significant 
adjustment in the evolution of wages. This occurred in both 
real and nominal terms. Nominal wages decelerated and 
since 1982 nominal unit labour costs grew less than the 
price level. This contributed to the restoration of business 
profitability. The profitability index which had reached a 
low (64,3) in 1981 (compared to the index set as 1961-73 = 
100) recovered subsequently to 91,1 in 1989. This recovery 
contributed decisively to the revitalization of investment 
growth. Simultaneously real wage increases lagged behind 
the growth of labour productivity; from 1982 to 1989 real 
wages (nominal wages deflated by the GDP-deflator) grew 
by 0,9% annually and labour productivity by 2,0%. To-
gether with other favourable macroeconomic developments 
this wage trend contributed to nominal convergence, boosted 
investment, output and employment and generated a gradual 
reduction of unemployment. 
In order to achieve a similar economic performance with 
respect to the creation of employment, output growth and 
convergence in the 1990s, economic policy should try to re-
establish the conditions which had allowed the success of 
the second half of the 1980s. This growth process stopped 
mainly because actual output growth exceeded the growth of 
productive capacity and the stability of the macroeconomic 
framework deteriorated.1 The initiatives which have been 
taken so far are based on the consensus that macroeconomic 
stability has to be maintained or restored. 
A detailed analysis and a medium-term perspective is to be found in 
the analytical study on 'Potential for growth and employment in the 
Community until the year 2000' and in the Annual Economic Report 
for 1993. 
6.2. Approaches to achieve wage adjustment 
The most essential precondition for achieving moderate wage 
increases and satisfactory growth of output and employment 
in the second half of the 1980s was a stability-oriented 
macroeconomic framework. Fiscal policy aimed at sustain-
able budgetary positions, most often connected with a con-
tainment of public expenditures, a reduction of budgetary 
deficits and an easing of the tax burden. Monetary policy 
provided for a narrow nominal framework designed to 
achieve the disinflation process. This process was externally 
supported by the world-wide reduction of inflation rates, 
the fall in the US dollar, the decline of the oil price, and 
corresponding gains in the Community terms of trade by 
which real wages in terms of consumption grew more than 
real wages in terms of costs. An effective constraint on price 
increases in the traded goods sector was provided by the 
exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary Sys-
tem, in particular for narrow-band member countries. Fur-
thermore, the ERM emphasized the credibility of the stab-
ility orientation of macroeconomic policies. 
6.2.1. Contributions of governments 
Wages in the member countries are determined by free 
collective bargaining but, nevertheless, governments are in-
volved in varying degrees aiming at wage developments in 
line with macroeconomic constraints. 
France and other Member States which followed the French 
example have successfully tried to manage an ex-ante coordi-
nation between monetary policies and wage moderation. 
These countries succeeded in the first half of the 1980s in 
converting backward-looking wage compensation for losses 
in purchasing power, induced by inflation, into wage settle-
ments based on forward-looking lower target rates of in-
flation. Governments adopted ambitious inflation targets 
which nevertheless seemed to be realistic and the social 
partners were invited to incorporate the expected reduction 
of the inflation rate into their wage settlements. Moderate 
wage increases in the public sector were used as an example 
for the private sector. This approach proved effective as long 
as the inflation targets were realized. It failed in member 
countries where overshooting of inflation targets resulted in 
unexpected losses of purchasing power and subsequent 
claims for compensation through higher nominal wage in-
creases. 
Governments in other Member States, such as Germany, 
have tried to influence the social partners only very in-
directly. The two sides of industry in Germany are perfectly 
free in their wage agreements. The government produces 
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projections on the macroeconomic outlook and require-
ments (Annual Economic Report). Together with the monet-
ary target set by the Bundesbank, these objectives feed into 
the public discussion on appropriate wage developments. 
In a stable macroeconomic framework based on a broad 
consensus on the benefits of price stability, moderate wage 
increases were achieved. Although collective agreements dif-
fer between industries and regions, the sectoral and regional 
differentiation of wage developments is relatively small. 
At the other extreme, in Ireland, government involvement 
in the wage formation process led to formal social contracts 
between the social partners and government. In October 
1987 these partners agreed the programme for national re-
covery which included pay increases for all sectors of 2,5% 
annually for the three years to end-1990. The subsequent 
programme for economic and social progress has provided 
for basic pay increases averaging 3,6% annually for the 
period to end-1993. In addition there is provision for a 3% 
increase to be negotiated at local level in exceptional cases. 
These contracts do not conflict with the competitive needs 
of the Irish economy and have taken the expectations of low 
future inflation into account. 
The Belgian system of indexation is constructed in a particu-
lar rational manner in order to take macroeconomic con-
straints into account. The development of wages is automati-
cally connected with the increase of the consumption price 
index. Thus collective bargaining is liberated from taking 
expected inflation into consideration. Bargaining has only 
to settle the real wage component. The utilization of this 
indexation scheme contributed decisively to the disinflation 
process and the restoration of business profitability during 
the 1980s. After the devaluation of the Belgian franc in 
February 1982, indexation was suspended for more than a 
year and real wages were frozen from 1983 to 1986. The 
international competitiveness of Belgian enterprises vis-à-vis 
its main trading partners is protected by a special safeguard 
clause. However, certain limits of the Belgian approach 
must not be overlooked: inflation and competitiveness (i.e. 
business profitability) are designed to move in line with 
those of Belgium's trading partners. This implies that the 
indexation scheme does not prevent a deterioration of both 
inflation and profitability in parallel to similar developments 
in Belgium's partner countries. Furthermore, despite the 
introduction of ad hoc adjustments, the flexibility of the 
wage structure is restrained which may cause longer-term 
problems. 
A particular role — as stressed recently by the conclusions 
of the Edinburgh European Summit — could be played by 
public-sector pay, which government directly influences as 
employer. Public-sector wage agreements could be presented 
in specific periods as a kind of reference mark for the private 
sector. In the long term, however, wage developments in the 
public sector cannot lag behind private-sector pay without 
affecting the motivation and qualifications of public em-
ployees and the quality of public services. 
The cutting of tax rates and social contributions constitutes 
an additional channel for government to influence wage 
behaviour. A tax reform or a reform of the social security 
system aimed at a reduction of the collective burden could 
be utilized to support wage moderation. Appropriately de-
signed reforms could narrow the gap between wage costs for 
employers and net wages for employees in order to provide 
more incentives for the creation of regular employment 
opportunities and for tackling the poverty trap. 
6.2.2. Wage indexation 
Wage indexation is still used in a number of wage agree-
ments, but its macroeconomic importance has decreased 
during the last decade. A nation-wide practice of wage 
indexation is only used in Belgium, Luxembourg and, with 
regard to lower wages, in Greece. 
In Greece only lower wages are indexed, and it is believed 
that the impact of this indexation scheme has been anti-
inflationary during the stabilization period 1991-92. Public-
sector pay is not indexed. 
The Italian indexation scheme ('scala mobile') was abolished 
in 1992 because it suffered from a number of deficiencies. 
Wages were only partially indexed — 50% of the wage bill 
on average. The indexation compensated for past increases 
in the consumer price level. Wage settlements at national 
level have had an average duration of three years. This 
approach led to considerable recurrent jumps in the wage 
level and contributed to the wage-price spiral. 
6.2.3. Decentralizing collective bargaining? 
Wage-setting procedures in the Community differ widely 
among member countries with regard to the degree of cen-
tralization. Avoiding friction between wage developments 
and macroeconomic constraints raises the issue of whether 
a specific degree of centralization of wage bargaining is 
more favourable than other wage bargaining procedures in 
generating appropriate wage adjustments. Theoretical 
reasoning and empirical analyses have pointed to slight 
advantages for both clearly centralized and clearly decentral-
ized systems whereas procedures between the two extremes 
tend to have greater difficulty in taking macroeconomic 
conditions into account. In centralized systems, the macro-
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economic repercussions of inappropriate outcomes of collec-
tive bargaining quickly fall back on negotiators and the 
members of their organizations. This generates a forceful 
incentive for a thorough consideration of perceived macro-
economic constraints. In decentralized bargaining at en-
terprise level, the individual conditions for the enterprise 
and in the local or regional labour market will enter into 
the negotiations. The outcome will reflect these conditions. 
Macroeconomic constraints will be imposed by market for-
ces via competition in the product and labour markets. 
However, there is no obvious interrelation in the Community 
between the degree of centralization of wage negotiations 
and overall wage adjustment. Changes in the degree of 
centralization in either direction have generated ambiguous 
results: the increased centralization in Ireland, the increased 
decentralization in France and the reduction of centraliza-
tion in Denmark all seem to have improved the wage per-
formance with respect to macroeconomic objectives. Con-
versely, the data for the United Kingdom until recently do 
not exhibit a similar improvement as a result of the increased 
decentralization achieved since the first half of the 1980s. 
This underlines the importance of the stability orientation 
of macroeconomic policies. 
On the other hand, countries with quite different wage-
setting procedures have achieved approximately the same 
performance for most of the past decade: Belgium and 
Ireland with their systems of highly centralized negotiations, 
Denmark with its decreasing centralization, France with 
decentralized bargaining and Germany and the Netherlands 
with regionalized/sectoralized wage negotiations. These 
countries have in common, inter alia, their participation in 
the narrow band of the ERM from the very beginning and 
the corresponding commitment to stability-oriented macro-
economic policies and stable nominal exchange rates. 
During the transition period towards EMU, wages have to 
adjust more to the individual conditions prevailing on the 
regional labour markets. Otherwise, the internal market and 
the single European currency would sanction a mismatch 
between high regional wage increases and low regional pro-
ductivity gains by regional unemployment. Growing inte-
gration requires that wage agreements are reflecting regional 
economic conditions. 
6.3. Impact of wage differentiation 
and minimum wages on employment 
Apart from the overall adjustment of the wage level, the 
differentiation of wages with respect to qualifications, re-
gions and sectors influences the employment performance 
of the economy. Wage differentiation is perceived in most 
countries as insufficient and should be improved. 
The differentiation of wages according to qualifications is 
necessary, in order to motivate efforts aimed at: 
(i) acquiring and improving vocational skills, 
(ii) taking more responsibility, 
(iii) improving work performance. 
The regional differentiation of wages according to regional 
levels of labour productivity is of growing importance with 
the completion of the internal market and the transition 
towards EMU. On the way to, and in full, EMU, price 
differences for traded goods will tend to disappear so that 
the regional supply-side performance is increasingly deter-
mined by wage developments. As mentioned earlier, wage 
differentials which are not matched by corresponding pro-
ductivity differentials will affect regional profitability and 
thus regional investment, output and employment. Regions 
with a real wage trend below the trend in labour productivity 
will gain a competitive edge over other regions where real 
wages and productivity evolve less favourable. Therefore, 
avoiding regional imbalances requires an appropriate re-
gional differentiation of wages and wage developments. 
The permanent structural change is closely connected with 
the rise and decline of individual sectors. In declining sectors, 
an appropriate reaction of wages could help to alleviate the 
decline. However, the sectoral differentiation of wages could 
not and should not neutralize changes in the sectoral distri-
bution of output and labour according to shifts in demand 
and technical progress. 
The existence of minimum wages has been criticized because 
they restrict the adaptability of wages to the productive 
contribution at the lower end of the wage scale. Workers 
whose estimated contribution to output is less than the 
minimum wage equivalent have no chance of regular em-
ployment. Especially the entry into the labour market by 
newcomers will probably be impeded. An appropriate re-
form could contribute to the solution of these problems. 
6.4. Social dialogue 
The common objective of a smooth macroeconomic develop-
ment requires a close cooperation between the relevant social 
groups and the government. Furthermore, the transition to 
EMU in the course of the next few years necessitates im-
proved nominal and real convergence and thus a more 
thorough understanding of the role being played by the level 
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and structure of wages. A better consensus about desirable 
macroeconomic developments and their implications for 
supportable wage increases could be helpful. An appropriate 
means to foster such a broad consensus constitutes the social 
dialogue at the relevant levels. At Community level the social 
partners acknowledged in their Joint Opinion of 3 July 1992' 
the macroeconomic performance during the second half of 
the 1980s as exemplary for the future.1 The Opinion takes 
the different macroeconomic aspects of wage developments 
explicitly into account. 
As the structure of wage negotiations resembles a bilateral 
monopoly in the goods market — in particular in countries 
1 This Opinion is published in Supplement A of European Economy, July 
1992. 
with less decentralized wage negotiations — collective bar-
gaining does not evolve into a straightforward equilibrium 
solution. The degree of freedom for nominal wages and 
prices to vary is only externally constrained by the macro-
economic limits to the overall price level. This macro-
economic constraint is stressed in the Community by the 
commitment of most Member States to stabilize nominal 
exchange rates and by the convergence requirements of 
growing economic and monetary integration. Only if the 
two sides of industry take these macroeconomic constraints 
into consideration will the wage outcome be compatible with 
a dynamic macroeconomic equilibrium. 
A social dialogue between the government, employers' or-
ganizations and trade unions takes place in most countries 
albeit at varying degrees of formalization and intensity. This 
dialogue could be helpful to bring about the required wage 
adjustment in the run-up to EMU. 
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Summary 
This study describes the developments within the European exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992 and the events leading to 
the suspension of two currencies from the mechanism and a series of realignments. 
After an introduction (Section 1) there is a short overview on developments in the US dollar and the Japanese yen (Section 2). 
Section 3 gives an overall description of developments leading up to the exchange-rate turmoil in September 1992 and subsequent 
tensions and realignments. Sections 4 to 6 discuss in more detail developments in individual countries. 
The 'no ' to the Maastricht Treaty in the Danish referendum on 2 June and uncertainty as to the outcome of the French 
referendum on 20 September were the factors that triggered ERM tensions. The longer-term foundations of a stable parity grid 
were, however, undermined by divergent economic developments in EC countries. Most countries in the Community had weak 
economic growth or even recession from 1991 onwards. In Germany growth continued longer than in several other countries at 
the same time as monetary policy was tightened in response to persistent inflationary pressures, reducing the scope for lower 
interest rates in countries with a weak cyclical position. The combination of an asymmetric shock in the anchor country, weak 
growth elsewhere, and political uncertainty about the prospects of monetary union focused market attention on the inadequate 
nominal convergence in several countries. The sharp depreciation of the dollar, reducing the competitiveness of ERM countries, 
further added to tensions. The first devaluations of currencies with internal economic problems led to questioning of the credibility 
of the ERM parity grid and subsequently to attacks on other currencies with sound economic fundamentals. 
Re-enforcement of surveillance procedures, progress in economic convergence, and the strengthening of policy cooperation and 
growth in Europe are necessary for ensuring the future stability of the European exchange-rate system. 
1. Introduction 
Several factors contributed to the turmoil within the ERM 
in 1992. The most important short-term cause was the desta-
bilization of market expectations in the wake of the 'no' to 
the Maastricht Treaty in the Danish referendum and in the 
run-up to the French referendum in September. The longer-
term foundations of a stable parity grid were, however, also 
undermined by divergent economic developments in EMS 
member countries. Most Community countries have had 
weak economic growth or even recession from 1991 onwards; 
in the United Kingdom the downturn started already in 
1990. In Germany, strong economic growth continued much 
longer at the same time as the persistence of inflationary 
pressures led to a tight monetary policy. High short-term 
interest rates in Germany, together with, by early 1992, a 
low level of interest rate differentials for most other ERM 
countries, reduced the scope for lower interest rates in 
countries in a weak cyclical phase and with low inflation. 
There was also inadequate progress towards nominal conver-
gence in several countries. Major fiscal imbalances persisted, 
while further convergence towards a low rate of inflation 
proved difficult to achieve for some countries, where as a 
result there were significant cumulative losses of inter-
national competitiveness. The sharp depreciation of the dol-
lar from March 1992 and the resulting effective appreciation 
of ERM currencies further weakened the competitive pos-
ition of Community countries. 
In recent years foreign exchange controls had been abolished 
in most Community countries, and reduced in others. This 
change in the institutional framework of the foreign ex-
change market clearly also had an effect on the outcome of 
the ERM crisis in the autumn of 1992. In an environment 
of virtually free capital movements it is very difficult to 
maintain fixed exchange rates once the financial market 
participants start to suspect a parity change. Increases in 
interest rates and interventions can to a certain degree stem 
capital flows and help restore confidence. But if interest rate 
hikes to defend currencies which are likely to be devalued 
lack political credibility — whether because of a weak cycli-
cal position, the political sensitivity of lending rates or the 
vulnerability of the public finances — these can prove insuf-
ficient to stabilize the exchange rate in a crisis situation — 
as was the case for Italy and the United Kingdom before 
these countries decided to suspend their currencies from the 
ERM. 
2. The international environment — the US 
dollar and the Japanese yen 
Since the last Annual Report in December 1991, the dollar 
has fluctuated considerably against the Deutschmark and 
other European currencies. It declined steadily until early 
January 1992, reaching a low of DM 1,51. At the end of 
1991, the Federal Reserve had cut its discount rate by 1 
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percentage point while the Bundesbank had raised its rates 
by half a percentage point, widening the interest differential 
in favour of the Deutschmark. Market participants believed 
that the short-term USD/DM interest rate differential had 
reached its highest level and were expecting a recovery of 
the US economy. As a consequence, the dollar strengthened 
up to DM 1,68 in mid-March. However, hopes of recovery 
in the United States and of improved inflationary perform-
ance in Germany were not fulfilled. Weak economic per-
formance in the United States prompted renewed monetary 
easing by the Federal Reserve which cut the discount rate 
for the last time on 2 July 1992. On the other hand, money 
market rates in Germany rose in response to inflationary 
concerns, and the Bundesbank increased its discount rate on 
16 July. Money market rates in Germany rose further in 
August, anticipating a possible rise in the Lombard rate. 
The appreciation of the ERM currencies against the dollar 
clearly played a role in the tensions developing within the 
ERM during 1992. The sharp depreciation of the US dollar 
vis-à-vis the European currencies in the second and third 
quarter of 1992 aggravated the underlying tensions in the 
ERM caused by divergent economic developments. This was 
even more so since among those countries that were most 
affected by the dollar depreciation in terms of loss of com-
petitiveness were those with the most severe economic down-
turn — like the United Kingdom. However, the appreciation 
of the dollar since September 1992 restored much of the 
competitiveness lost earlier in the year for the non-devaluing 
ERM currencies, and the ERM changes implied improved 
competitiveness against the dollar for the lira, pound sterling 
and the peseta. 
From April to August the dollar declined continuously 
against the Deutschmark, depreciating by almost 20%. It 
reached its lowest level against the Deutschmark (DM 1,39) 
in early September. Thereafter, the dollar appreciated by 
around 19% and was at DM 1,66 in early February 1993. 
The main driving forces behind this appreciation were grow-
ing evidence of stronger economic performance in the United 
States coupled with lower interest rate differentials in favour 
of the Deutschmark. 
The Japanese yen also fluctuated widely against the Euro-
pean currencies, broadly reflecting the movements of the 
dollar. The yen depreciated sharply vis-à-vis the Deutsch-
mark from YEN 77,2 in January 1992 to YEN 88,9 in late 
August. During this period short-term interest rate differen-
tials in favour of the Deutschmark widened as interest rates 
in Japan were reduced in response to declining economic 
activity while interest rates in Germany increased. From 
September onwards, the short-term interest rate differential 
GRAPH 1 : Exchange rates and interest rate differentials, USD/DM and YEN/DM 
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in favour of the Deutschmark declined and the yen had 
gained 18% against the Deutschmark by early February 
1993. 
almost disappeared but pound sterling continued to be weak, 
following the UK decision not to raise interest rates in 
December. The exchange-rate spread between pound sterling 
and the peseta remained around 6%. 
3. The ERM since late 1991 
3.1. A long period of stability in the ERM until 
June 1992 
From early 1987 to June 1992 the EMS and ERM experi-
enced an unprecedented long period of relative stability and 
unchanged parity grids. There were no realignments during 
this period (except for the technical realignment involved in 
the lira's move to narrow bands), and the Spanish peseta, 
the UK pound sterling and the Portuguese escudo joined 
the ERM. Although tensions had been felt from time to 
time, these had been successfully countered. In the period 
before the unification of Germany the stability of the ERM 
was underpinned by the parallel cyclical developments of 
most Community economies. When economic developments 
in Community countries diverged in the aftermath of Ger-
man unification, the ERM continued to be stable. In fact, 
interest rate differentials between the Deutschmark and most 
other ERM currencies narrowed substantially throughout 
1991, mostly as a result of the increased credibility of the 
parity grid, but also as a consequence of the temporary 
weakening of the Deutschmark in 1991. 
By the autumn of 1991 interest rate differentials between the 
Deutschmark and other currencies had come down to a very 
low level: short-term interest rate differentials between the 
Deutschmark and French franc had become slightly 
negative, and were significantly reduced for the lira and 
pound sterling. 
At the end of 1991 there were, however, some tensions within 
the ERM due to expectations of a rise in German interest 
rates and uncertainty in the markets regarding the outcome 
of the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. In November 
several currencies came under downward pressure. The ner-
vousness of the markets was intensified by the devaluation 
of the Finnish markka on 15 November. To counter the 
pressure in the foreign exchange markets both Italy and 
France raised their key interest rates by 50 basis points, and 
pound sterling was allowed to move closer to the bottom of 
the wide ERM band. The Danish krone also came under 
pressure during this period. When the Bundesbank raised 
the discount rate by 50 basis points after the Maastricht 
Summit in December, all ERM countries except the United 
Kingdom followed the move. As a result, tensions within 
the ERM eased. In January exchange market pressures had 
During the first few months of 1992 the situation in the 
ERM remained relatively stable. Pound sterling continued to 
be weak as the prolonged recession in the United Kingdom 
increased pressures to cut interest rates. At same time the 
peseta strengthened, putting downward pressure on interest 
rates and forcing an implicit loosening of monetary policy 
in Spain to keep the peseta within its allowed fluctuation 
margin against pound sterling. Pressure against pound ster-
ling eased after the election in April, and in early May UK 
base rates were cut by 50 basis points. In Italy, political 
uncertainty and concerns regarding the fiscal situation re-
sulted in a depreciating lira from March onwards. Another 
feature of this period was the strengthening of the French 
franc within the narrow ERM band from late January to 
the middle of May when this trend was broken by the 
reduction in the banks' minimum reserve requirement (seen 
as signalling the French authorities' concern to lower retail 
rates). In April the Portuguese escudo joined the ERM at a 
central rate parity slightly weaker than the pre-entry market 
rate. It immediately strengthened and became the strongest 
currency in the ERM in May. 
3.2. The Danish and French referendums 
triggered a period of unprecedented 
turmoil in the ERM 
The period of relative calm did, however, come to an end 
after the Danish 'no' to the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 
and the uncertainty created by the French decision to hold 
a referendum on the Treaty in September. These events 
caused a major break in the markets' expectations of an 
early economic and monetary union (EMU), which was 
seen as essential in inducing fiscal convergence in Italy and 
economic convergence in other ERM countries like Spain. 
The position of the lira had become more vulnerable follow-
ing reports earlier in the spring of the overshooting of 
the Italian budget deficit targets in 1992 and the political 
uncertainty after the elections. In the United Kingdom politi-
cal pressure to lower interest rates increased as an economic 
recovery failed to appear. The markets thus began to ques-
tion the sustainability of the prevailing parity grid in light 
of the divergent economic developments in the Community 
and high German interest rates. The sharp depreciation of 
the dollar from March 1992, causing an effective appreci-
ation of the ERM currencies, further added to the strains 
within the ERM. 
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The Bundesbank's decision on 16 July to raise the discount 
rate by 75 basis points, in response to M3 growth well in 
excess of the target range, increased tensions within the 
system. The markets saw this as significantly reducing the 
possibility of lower interest rates in the near future, even 
though the important Lombard rate was left unchanged. 
From July to mid-August, German three-month money mar-
ket rates had increased by 15 basis points. Political develop-
ments in France also had a negative impact as opinion polls 
started to show waning support for the Maastricht Treaty. 
Market pressures built up against the lira (despite new fiscal 
measures introduced by the Italian Government), pound 
sterling and to a lesser extent the peseta during the summer, 
and these currencies depreciated against the stronger cur-
rencies within the band. On two occasions in July and 
again in September, Italy increased interest rates by an 
accumulated 350 basis points in order to stabilize the ex-
change rate, and there were substantial interventions in 
support of the lira. Spain also raised interest rates by 60 
basis points in July. The rise in German short-term money 
market rates until mid-August and heavy Lombard bor-
rowing by the banks further increased pressures. Pressure 
against pound sterling also mounted, and on 28 August 
the EC finance ministers issued a statement through the 
Monetary Committee ruling out realignment in the ERM in 
an attempt to calm the markets. However, the turbulence in 
the exchange-rate markets did not subside, and in conjunc-
tion with the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meet-
ing in Bath in early September, the EC finance ministers 
renewed their 'no realignment' statement. The continuous 
depreciation of the dollar, which reached a low against the 
Deutschmark in early September, further contributed to 
tensions. 
On 8 September Finland decided to suspend the ecu peg-
ging of the Finnish mark, after heavy pressure in the ex-
change markets and huge capital outflows. The Swedish 
krona also became subject to heavy speculative attacks, and 
the Swedish central bank raised interest rates to 75%. Both 
events added to the sense of crisis in the foreign exchange 
markets. By Friday 11 September speculative attacks against 
the lira had become severe. During the weekend of 12 and 
13 September a realignment was decided, in conjunction 
with a German commitment to lower interest rates. In this 
realignment the lira devalued 3,5% against the other ERM 
currencies and the other ERM currencies were revalued 
3,5% against the lira. The following Monday the Bundes-
bank lowered its Lombard rate by 25 basis points to 9,50% 
while the discount rate was reduced by 50 basis points to 
8,25%. On 16 September the Bundesbank offered a repo-
deal at 9,20%, 50 basis points lower than the previous deal. 
Three-month market rates fell by around 40 basis points. 
These measures did not, however, prove sufficient to stem 
the pressures in the exchange markets and restore order in 
the ERM. The instability of the markets was further intensi-
fied by the uncertainty surrounding the French referendum 
due on 20 September. Renewed pressure built up against the 
lira, pound sterling and the peseta. Heavy interventions from 
the central banks and interest rate hikes were not sufficient 
to counter the speculative attacks against these currencies 
and late on Wednesday 16 September pound sterling was 
temporarily withdrawn from the exchange-rate mechanism. 
The intervention obligations to support the lira within the 
ERM were suspended, and the peseta was devalued by 5% 
against the remaining ERM currencies. 
The following days and the next week the French franc, the 
Irish punt, the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo and 
the Danish krone came under heavy pressure in foreign 
exchange markets. This pressure continued despite the nar-
row 'yes' to the Maastricht Treaty in the French referendum 
on 20 September. It was not until the end of the week of 21 
to 25 September that the turmoil in the foreign exchange 
markets receded. The French franc was supported by a 
combination of interventions, interest rate hikes and a show 
of strong political commitment to the exchange-rate parity 
in the form of a joint statement from the French and German 
central banks' governors and finance ministers on 23 Sep-
tember. The French franc was also underpinned by low 
inflation, relatively strong public finances and a surplus on 
the current account. As a result of the large inflows of 
Deutschmarks into the German money market — a conse-
quence of the large Bundesbank interventions in support of 
other currencies — short-term interest rates in Germany fell, 
contributing to stabilizing the situation. Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Denmark raised interest rates to support their 
currencies. With the exception of Denmark, all these 
countries also tightened or activated foreign exchange con-
trols or made use of other administrative measures to sup-
port the exchange rate. 
3.3. The ERM from October 1992 to early 1993: 
a calm period followed by renewed tensions 
After leaving the ERM both pound sterling and the lira 
depreciated sharply against the Deutschmark. On 6 October 
the lira was down to LIT 927 against the Deutschmark, a 
depreciation of 14% since 16 September and 22% since 11 
September. Pound sterling fell to a low of DM 2,38 per 
pound sterling on 5 October, a depreciation of more than 
14% compared to its level just before it left the ERM. After 
the approval of most of the fiscal policy measures introduced 
by the Italian Government in response to the currency crisis, 
the lira strengthened against the Deutschmark up to early 
December, but weakened again after this, and was at LIT 
928 per Deutschmark early February 1993. Developments 
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for pound sterling were also mixed, but by early December 
1992 pound sterling had recovered since its low and stood 
at DM 2,45 per pound sterling at the end of the year. After 
a base rate cut of 1 point late January 1993, pound sterling 
plunged to an all time low of DM 2,35 per pound sterling 
but recovered somewhat later. 
The French franc and the Danish krone strengthened con-
siderably within the parity grid soon after the crisis in Sep-
tember, whereas the Irish punt, the Portuguese escudo and 
the Spanish peseta remained the weakest currencies in the 
ERM band. 
Interest rate differentials between the Deutschmark and the 
remaining ERM currencies — with the exception of the 
Dutch guilder and the Belgian franc — widened significantly 
in connection with the September turmoil. However, France 
was able to reduce its interest rate level considerably, and 
by mid-November the short-term interest rate differential to 
the Deutschmark was down to 50 basis points, nearly the 
same level as before the crisis. Interest rate differentials 
between the Deutschmark and the Spanish peseta, the Irish 
punt, the Danish krone and the Portuguese escudo did, 
however, persist, reflecting the fact that the markets did not 
fully regain confidence in the prevailing parity grid. In the 
case of the peseta, some statements by the Spanish authori-
ties pointing to a second devaluation, contributed to the lack 
of confidence. 
From end-September to mid-November the ERM enjoyed 
a period of relative calm. This was however broken by the 
Swedish decision to float the krona on 19 November, with 
a subsequent immediate depreciation of the krona by 10% 
against the ecu. Tensions within the ERM were renewed and 
on Friday 20 November the peseta, the escudo, the punt 
and the krone were all under pressure in the markets. The 
following weekend — on 22 November — a new realignment 
within the ERM was decided, involving a 6% devaluation of 
the peseta and the escudo against the other ERM currencies. 
Pressure continued against the Irish punt and the Danish 
krone. Early in the following week short-term interest rates 
in both Denmark and Ireland increased sharply. Less affec-
ted initially, pressure against the French franc also increased 
at the end of November and the beginning of December, 
intensified by the dampening of the markets' hope of an 
early cut in German interest rates. The French franc was 
supported by intervention both from the Banque de France 
and the Bundesbank. Shortly afterwards the pressure against 
the franc and other currencies subsided for a brief period. 
GRAPH 2: Exchange-rate developments of the Deutschmark vis-à-vis currencies that devalued or left the ERM 
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Tensions were, however, renewed in anticipation of the im­
portant Bundesbank meeting on 10 December where the 
Bundesbank would decide on its monetary targets for 1993. 
Strains were further exacerbated by Norway's decision to 
suspend the ecu pegging of the Norwegian krone the same 
day. The following day both the Danish krone and the Irish 
punt were pinned to their ERM floors. The French franc was 
again under pressure and was supported by intra­marginal 
interventions from the Bundesbank and the Banque de 
France and increasing money market interest rates. 
After the Edinburgh Summit on 12 and 13 December, where 
EC countries reached an agreement on, among other things, 
special arrangements for Denmark, the pressure on the Dan­
ish krone and the Irish punt, but not on the French franc, 
did again ease. By the end of the year, doldrums in the 
markets left the ERM in a state of relative, but fragile, cajm. 
Early in 1993, tensions again emerged in the ERM. In early 
January pressure against the French franc mounted, but this 
was successfully countered by a new joint statement by 
French and German authorities, French interest rate in­
creases and a marginal lowering of German rcpo rates. By 
end­January the Irish punt was under heavy speculative 
attack, following the sharp decline of pound sterling. On 30 
January the punt was devalued by 10% against the remaining 
ERM currencies. Shortly after, the Danish krone became 
the new target for speculative attacks. However, tensions 
were relieved after Danish interest hikes, concerted inter­
ventions and when the Bundesbank cut its Lombard and 
discount rates on 4 February. 
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4. Germany: tightening of monetary policy 
The immediate impact of German unification was to create 
an asymmetric demand shock, contributing to cyclical diver-
gence among ERM countries. The economic aftermath of 
Germany's unification in terms of budgetary costs and un-
precedented regional unemployment as a result of the recon-
struction of the economy in the eastern Länder was under-
estimated by many. In addition, the shock had profound 
medium-term policy implications. 
In the first half of 1991 the Deutschmark weakened within 
the ERM, and the interest rate differentials to some ERM 
currencies narrowed, which, at the time, reduced the sensi-
tivity of those countries to the rise in German rates. At the 
same time, inflationary pressures intensified due to excess 
domestic demand and strongly rising unit labour costs, but 
also due to administrative price increases and tax measures. 
The Bundesbank reacted to these developments by gradually 
tightening its policy stance over the year; the Lombard and 
discount rates were increased in three steps, from 8 to 9.75% 
and from 6 to 8% respectively. In December 1991, overnight 
money was some 80 basis points more expensive than a year 
earlier. 
By the middle of 1991, the Bundesbank revised its 4 to 6% 
money growth target down to 3,5 to 5,5% which was clearly 
difficult to achieve at unchanged interest rates, given the 
forecast for nominal demand in Germany as a whole. In 
fact, monetary expansion accelerated over the five-month 
period of August to December 1991 when M3 grew at an 
annual rate of 8%. For 1991 as a whole, M3 growth (Q4/ 
Q4) reached 5,2%. In December 1991, the Bundesbank an-
nounced a 3,5 to 5,5% target range for M3 in 1992. Given 
developments over the preceding months and the available 
forecast for potential growth and inflation in eastern Germ-
any, this target clearly demonstrated its anti-inflationary 
resolve. 
The Bundesbank enforced its strategic policy intentions — 
which were reflected in the tight target — by increasing the 
two official instrument rates, the Lombard and the discount 
rate, by 50 basis points each on 19 December. It came at a 
time when the economy was already weakening. Moreover, 
the increase in reported inflation during the second half of 
1991 reflected earlier tax and wage increases, and hence 
could not be reversed by an ex-post tightening of monetary 
policy. Thus, the Bundesbank's move had to be interpreted 
as a signal. It underlined the Bundesbank's intention not to 
accommodate higher wage inflation and could also be seen 
as a warning against the risks of the unsound public finance 
developments in Germany. It also underlined the Bundes-
bank's independence and anti-inflation vigour. 
Throughout 1992, monetary aggregates continued to rise at 
rates well above the Bundesbank's target, in spite of the 
apparent weakness of the economy and signs that west 
Germany could fall into recession, while the hoped for 
upswing in the east did not materialize. By the time the 
Bundesbank held its traditional mid-year target review in 
July the gap between the target and the actual and predicted 
outcome had widened so much that it was unlikely that the 
target could be met by the end of the year without a substan-
tial further increase in interest rates. Nevertheless, the 
Council confirmed the target without any reservations and 
money market rates were nudged up. On 16 July the discount 
rate was increased by 75 basis points to a level of 8,75% but 
the Lombard rate was left unchanged, probably because of 
the situation in the ERM and in the partner countries. 
Nevertheless, the money market was kept tight and short-
term interest rates reached a peak by mid-August when the 
ERM turmoil gathered momentum. 
After the devaluation of the lira on 13 September, the Bun-
desbank lowered its discount rate by 50 basis points to 
8,25% and its Lombard rate by 25 basis points to 9,5%. In 
the course of the subsequent ERM crisis, and after a series 
of interventions in favour of threatened currencies, short-
term rates declined by some 100 basis points and remained 
around that lower level until the end of 1992. Long-term 
rates tended to follow short rates, and by the year-end, they 
were at 7,3% — the lowest level since October 1989. The 
Bundesbank had in effect acknowledged that it was imposs-
ible to meet its 1992 monetary target by the end of the 
year, which had also suffered from the consequences of 
interventions. 
At its meeting on 10 December 1992 the Bundesbank an-
nounced an M3 growth target of 4,5 to 6.5% for 1993. At 
the same time the Bundesbank announced that it would 
reduce the quasi-policy interest rate (overnight money) by 
20 points by offering fixed repo tenders at 8,75%. On 7 
January the repo rate was reduced by another 15 points. 
The easing of monetary policy suggested by the 1993 M3 
target was confirmed on 4 February when the Bundesbank 
reduced the Lombard rate by 50 basis points to 9% and the 
discount rate by 25 basis points to 8%. This decision was 
taken against a background of a downturn in the domestic 
economy which, at an accelerated speed after the induced 
appreciation of the Deutschmark vis-à-vis certain European 
currencies, had become more and more visible. The timing 
of the decision also seems to have been influenced by the 
renewed ERM turmoil. There were as yet no clear signs of 
a fall in domestic inflation, even though news on 1993 wage 
demands were encouraging. 
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5. Developments in countries affected by the 
ERM turmoil 
5.1. The United Kingdom 
In October 1990 the UK Government decided to take pound 
sterling into the ERM. The central DM/UKL rate was set 
to 2,95, corresponding to the market rate at that time. By 
the time of entry, the annual inflation rate had risen close 
to 11 % (although the underlying rate was lower than this), 
and the fight against inflation had been made the central 
element of the Government's economic strategy. Nominal 
short-term interest rates on the money market had been 
raised to 15% in response to a progressive tightening of 
monetary policy. The main objective of pound sterling's 
entry into the ERM was to reduce the output/employment 
costs of disinflating the UK economy, via the attractiveness 
of the ERM as a counter-inflationary framework. By using 
ERM membership to support domestic anti-inflationary 
credibility it was hoped to impact positively on inflation 
expectations, allowing nominal interest rates to fall more 
rapidly than would have been possible outside the ERM. 
Rates were indeed reduced in stages. Before the final day of 
the United Kingdom's active membership of the ERM — 16 
September — nominal interest rates on the money markets 
stayed at around 10%. However, as the domestic disinflation 
continued and the tight monetary policy stance in Germany 
maintained a high effective floor to nominal interest rates 
for most ERM members, real interest rates were, during 
1992, steadily rising. In conjunction with the high debt level 
in the private sector — private households having a debt/ 
income ratio of around 115% — high real interest rates 
depressed private consumption and investment, further ad-
ding to the economic downturn. The United Kingdom was 
also hurt by the appreciation of the ERM currencies in 1992, 
as the dollar is more important for foreign trade than in 
most other Community countries. From the second quarter 
of 1990 to the first quarter of 1992 real GDP fell by more 
than 4%, while unemployment rose sharply to over 10%. 
The current account balance also worsened considerably in 
the course of 1992, despite the recession. 
As a result of the most prolonged recession in the post-war 
history of the United Kingdom, domestic criticism of the 
Government's economic policy grew and focused on the 
constraints that the ERM obligations imposed on monetary 
policy. With interest rate differentials relative to Germany 
almost eliminated by the spring of 1992 and pound sterling 
near the floor of the ERM grid, there was little room for 
manoeuvre in monetary policy, given the commitment to the 
ERM parity. As a consequence, financial market partici-
pants increasingly perceived pound sterling's obligations 
within the ERM as out of line with economic fundamentals, 
and pressure against pound sterling intensified. 
In December 1991 the United Kingdom, unlike other 
countries, had not followed Germany's interest rate hike. 
When pressure against pound sterling increased in the late 
summer of 1992, UK Government representatives issued 
several statements underlining their commitment to pound 
sterling's parity within the ERM. There were, however, no 
moves to raise interest rates in order to defend the exchange 
rate as the economy was already suffering under high real 
interest rates. In September the tensions within the ERM 
were aggravated, and after the devaluation of the lira, the 
pound sterling became subject to severe speculative attacks. 
On Tuesday 15 September pound sterling was under severe 
pressure, and on 16 September the heavy speculative attack 
against pound sterling became irresistible. Massive inter-
ventions by the Bank of England and the Bundesbank and 
the announcement in two stages of a 500 basis points rise in 
the base rate to 15% failed to sustain pound sterling over 
its floor of DM 2,778. In the evening it was decided to 
suspend pound sterling from the ERM and the hikes in 
interest rates were reversed. 
Shortly after the suspension of pound sterling from the ERM 
the UK Government stated that a re-entry into the ERM 
was desirable, but that certain conditions had to be met. 
Among these were: (i) an end to the turmoil in the foreign 
exchange markets; and (ii) that the cyclical developments in 
the German and UK economies should be more in line. 
Early in January 1993 the UK Prime Minister indicated that 
pound sterling would not enter the ERM during the year, 
and spoke of the need to improve certain aspects of the 
system's operation. 
From the suspension of pound sterling from the ERM up 
to the end of January 1993, UK base rates had been reduced 
by 400 basis points to 6%, making them the lowest in the 
Community. Long-term rates also declined somewhat. They 
remained above comparable rates in Germany and France, 
but real long-term rates as suggested by yields on index-
linked bonds have fallen substantially since the ERM suspen-
sion. By early February 1993 pound sterling had depreciated 
14% to around 2,39 against the Deutschmark since it left 
the ERM. Monetary policy has been reformulated and is 
now to be decided on the basis of a set of domestic indicators 
including M0 (base money) and M4 (broad money), but the 
exchange rate wiH also continue to be an important indicator 
along with the yield curve, asset prices and confidence indi-
cators. The authorities have reaffirmed their commitment to 
reducing inflation but have redefined their inflation objec-
tives from a 2% inflation target in the longer term, to a 
medium-term target range of 1 to 4%. 
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5.2. Italy 
In Italy too, domestic economic developments were im-
portant factors behind the events leading up to the lira's 
eventual suspension from the ERM. One of the main reasons 
behind September's exchange-rate crisis was the continued 
weakness in Italy's public finances and the financial markets' 
perception of a lack of political ability to address this funda-
mental imbalance. Lack of convergence also applied to other 
parts of the Italian economy as inflation was higher than in 
other narrow band countries. 
In October 1991 the Italian authorities presented a conver-
gence programme which envisaged a significant lowering of 
inflation and a substantial reduction in the budget deficit to 
take place already in 1992. The prospect of EMU — which 
was to buttress the Italian authorities to achieve economic 
convergence — was widely regarded as vital for the credi-
bility of the programme. In the view of financial market 
participants the external constraint of EMU was essential in 
imposing the necessary fiscal discipline. From late 1991 
onwards the lira was on a weakening trend, only interrupted 
by a temporary recovery in early 1992. In late 1991 the 
appreciation of ERM currencies against the dollar caused 
the lira to slip within the band, as a weaker dollar implied 
a loss of competitiveness. In December 1991 the Banca 
d'Italia tightened monetary policy and increased its discount 
rate by 50 basis points to 12% after the Bundesbank had 
raised its interest rates on 19 December. In the first months 
of 1992 pressure against the lira abated somewhat, but 
was apparently triggered again by the political uncertainty 
generated by the April 1992 election. The underlying cause 
of the increasingly vulnerable position of the lira was, how-
ever, due to worries about economic fundamentals, as the 
state of public finances began to affect market sentiments 
negatively. Long-term interest rate differentials consistently 
pointed to a substantial lira depreciation before stage three 
of EMU, but short-term differentials did not at this stage 
discount an early devaluation. In the spring it was officially 
confirmed that the 1992 budget target was likely to be 
overshot by a wide margin. The original target for the budget 
deficit was LIT 128 000 billion; the new estimate was LIT 
165 000 billion. In May, EC finance ministers called on Italy 
to take drastic and immediate action 'to put the Italian 
budget back on track' and said that there would be 'signifi-
cant and adverse repercussions throughout the Community' 
if Italy failed to meet the economic convergence criteria laid 
down in the Maastricht Treaty by 1996. 
The 'no' in the Danish referendum did, however, cause a 
serious destabilization of the lira. With the prospect of EM U 
suddenly less certain, doubts as to Italy's ability to solve its 
budgetary problems were reinforced. The lira fell to the 
bottom of the ERM grid and the Banca d'Italia had to 
tighten monetary policy and intervene to support the lira. 
Short-term interest rate differentials indicated that the parity 
no longer had market credibility on a three-month view. In 
early July pressures against the lira intensified, despite a 
series of fiscal measures introduced to limit the budget deficit 
to its original 1992 target. The new Amato Government 
introduced a budget savings package which was adopted by 
the Parliament, and the 'scala mobile' (where wages were 
indexed to cost of living) was abolished definitively. On 
5 July the discount rate was raised to 13% and further to 
13,75% (following the Bundesbank's increase in the discount 
rate of 75 basis points on 16 July). Later in the summer the 
pressure on the lira abated somewhat, and interest rates were 
temporarily lowered. In late August and early September 
doubts about a 'yes' to the Maastricht Treaty in the French 
referendum emerged, provoking new attacks on the lira. The 
discount rate was raised to 15%, but this was insufficient to 
stem capital outflows. High interest rates for a prolonged 
period of time would have a detrimental impact on the 
budget deficit, given Italy's huge public debt of relatively 
short maturity. This factor clearly affected the political credi-
bility, and the possibility, of using interest rates as a means 
to stabilize the lira if pressures resisted for any length of 
time. 
The severe pressure on the lira continued and both the 
Italian and German central banks intervened heavily to 
support the lira. On 13 September, an attempt was made to 
end the crisis by an ERM realignment involving a devalu-
ation of the lira by an effective 6,7% and a lowering of 
German interest rates. This did not, however, prove suf-
ficient to calm markets. In the view of the markets the lira 
was still overvalued, given public finance prospects, and 
speculative attacks continued. By Wednesday 16 September 
the lira had fallen through its floor against the Deutschmark, 
despite continuous interventions from both the Bundesbank 
and the Banca d'Italia. In the evening of 16 September it 
was decided on the request of the Italian authorities — 
following the United Kingdom's decision to suspend pound 
sterling from the ERM — that intervention obligations in 
respect of the lira should be temporarily suspended. 
Immediately after the lira left the ERM, the Italian Govern-
ment introduced an emergency budget packet involving sav-
ings of around LIT 93 trillion. During November approxi-
mately 90% of the measures were approved by the Parlia-
ment, which helped the lira to recover somewhat from its 
initial depreciation against the Deutschmark. By end-De-
cember the full budget package was finally approved by 
Parliament; immediately afterwards the Banca d'Italia low-
ered the discount rate from 13 to 12%. This was the third 
reduction since the September crisis, bringing the rate back 
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to the level of the first half of 1992. Rates were further cut 
by 50 basis points in the beginning of February 1993. 
The Italian authorities aim at reintroducing the lira in the 
ERM as soon as possible. In the period following the suspen-
sion, the lira was very volatile, a development which clearly 
did not favour an early return to the ERM. Later on, 
renewed turmoil in the currency markets and new realign-
ments within the ERM made the climate for a re-entry of 
the lira even less favourable, especially as the lira again 
weakened against the Deutschmark. Originally aiming at a 
re-entry of the lira in the ERM by the end of 1992, the 
Italian authorities postponed this to the new year. In January 
1993, the Governor of the Banca d'Italia emphasized, in 
addition to the need for the restoration of sounder public 
finances, his view that the ERM should not be considered 
as a fixed exchange-rate system and that the whole parity 
grid, once agreed, should be supported by all participants. 
Mid-January 1993 the European Community agreed on a 
balance payment loan to Italy to support the Italian Govern-
ment's medium-term programme of reduction in fiscal im-
balances. 
5.3. Spain 
Spain joined the ERM in June 1989 with fluctuation bands 
of 6%. At the time the peseta joined the ERM, the Spanish 
economy was overheating and monetary policy was tight in 
order to contain inflation. In the early 1990s growth in the 
Spanish economy had decelerated markedly, but despite the 
low phase of the business cycle, inflation remained resilient 
until very recently. 
Early in 1992 the Spanish Government, with the support of 
the Parliament, approved a convergence programme which 
set up a policy framework until 1996. The programme in-
cluded a tighter fiscal policy which was aimed at keeping the 
domestic economy on a non-inflationary path and involved 
substantial structural reforms. Monetary policy was to focus 
on exchange-rate stability. 
Up to the summer of 1992, monetary policy was as tight as 
the ERM commitment would allow, with the peseta at the 
top of the band. During the first half of 1992 favourable 
expectations relating to the Maastricht Treaty on the one 
hand, and a renewed confidence in the peseta due to capital 
liberalization on the other, led to a renewed strength of the 
peseta. The capital inflows associated with these factors, 
together with the weakness of pound sterling, produced 
downward pressure on interest rates. In the beginning of 
1992, the Bank of Spain reduced its key rate by 25 basis 
points to 12,4%, after having raised interest rates in conjunc-
tion with the German interest rate hike in December. 
As was the case for Italy, the outcome of the Danish refer-
endum on 2 June raised doubts in the markets as to the 
credibility of Spain's commitments to economic conver-
gence. Consequently, the peseta weakened in the ERM band. 
Initially the Spanish authorities chose not to raise interest 
rates, even though the weakening of the peseta within the 
ERM band would now have allowed a tighter monetary 
stance with a view to counteract inflationary pressures. This 
choice apparently had a negative impact on market senti-
ment. During the summer, pressure built up in the foreign 
exchange markets, and on 23 July the Bank of Spain raised 
its key intervention rate — leading to a temporary firming 
of the peseta. 
As the French referendum was approaching, increasing un-
certainty as to its outcome intensified pressures on the peseta 
and both short- and long-term rates followed an upward 
trend. On 16 September, together with the suspension of the 
lira and pound sterling, the peseta was devalued by 5% 
within the ERM. This was the result of severe market press-
ure against the peseta that was deemed irresistible by the 
Spanish authorities. The loss of competitiveness Spain had 
suffered since 1987 (given the persistent high rate of wage 
increases) and the slow growth of the economy also played 
an important role in this decision. 
Speculation against the peseta did not subside following the 
devaluation, despite an increase in money market interest 
rates and interventions in support of the peseta. On 23 
September the Spanish authorities issued a regulation aimed 
at limiting short-term capital flows. Two weeks later controls 
were eased somewhat. Even though the introduction of these 
measures clearly had a negative impact on market sentiments 
towards the peseta, as further controls could lock in the 
peseta positions of investors, they probably had some effects 
on short-term capital outflows. 
From mid-September to mid-November the peseta was the 
weakest currency within the ERM band, in part as a result 
of intimations from the Spanish authorities that a second 
devaluation might be considered. Sweden's decision to sus-
pend the pegging of the krona to the ecu on Thursday 19 
November provoked new tensions within the ERM and at 
the end of the week Spain asked for a new realignment. On 
Sunday 22 November, a 6% devaluation of the peseta and 
the escudo against the remaining ERM currencies was ag-
reed. In conjunction with this, Spanish authorities scrapped 
the regulations introduced in connection with the September 
crisis and confirmed their commitment to the convergence 
programme. On the following Monday official interest rates 
were raised, underlining the Government's anti-inflationary 
commitment. After this second realignment, the peseta was 
among the strongest currencies in the ERM, moving in the 
upper half of its fluctuation band. 
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GRAPH 4: Competitiveness indicators: ULC in manufacturing industry in common currency 
(vis-à-vis industrial countries) 
150 
140 
130 
120 
110 
100 
90 
80 
— Portugal 
.'.·· Spain 
— United Kingdom 
- · Italy 
1987 I 1988 I 1989 I 1990 I 1991 1992 
5.4. Portugal 
The escudo joined the ERM only in April 1992, at a rate 
slightly weaker than the prevailing market rate, after having 
shadowed the ERM since October 1990. Inflation being one 
of the main concerns of the Portuguese economy, the prior 
ERM shadowing and subsequent entry of the escudo into 
the ERM was looked upon as a means to bring inflation 
down and enforce stability. Since inflation continued to 
be high, albeit on a declining trend in relation to other 
Community countries, this policy did, however, lead to a 
substantial real appreciation of the escudo in terms of unit 
labour costs. 
Until mid-August the escudo was generally the strongest 
currency within the ERM band. In August Portugal lowered 
official interest rates in conjunction with the announcement 
of a programme aimed at establishing full liberalization of 
capital movements by the end of the year (in effect, controls 
bore mainly on inflows). After this the escudo lost ground 
to the other ERM currencies and dropped to the middle of 
its ERM band. During the currency turmoil in September 
the escudo was also under heavy pressure, but a combination 
of drastic increases in short-term interest rates, marginal 
tightening of foreign exchange controls and the small scale 
of the escudo foreign exchange market kept the escudo well 
within its ERM bands. The result of the September upheaval 
in the ERM was, however, a further deterioration of com-
petitiveness — the pound sterling, the peseta and the lira 
having a combined export weight of around 30%. 
After the September turmoil subsided the escudo remained 
among the weakest currencies in the ERM band. When new 
tensions in the ERM emerged on 19 and 20 November, the 
escudo came under renewed pressure in the foreign exchange 
markets. When Spain asked for a devaluation the following 
weekend, Portugal decided to follow Spain's move — mainly 
to maintain its competitiveness vis-à-vis Spain. As in Spain, 
Portugal raised its official interest rates on the following 
Monday. From the realignment to end-1992, the escudo was 
the strongest currency in the ERM grid with exchange rates 
near its pre-22 November parity against the Deutschmark. 
In the new year it weakened slightly. At the end of 1992, 
Portugal abolished remaining foreign exchange controls. 
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5.5. France, Denmark and Ireland 
Following the exit of the lira and pound sterling from the 
ERM and the devaluation of the peseta on 16 September, 
the French franc, the Irish punt and the Danish krone all 
became subject to speculative attacks, together with the 
peseta and the escudo. 
In contrast with the other currencies subject to speculative 
attacks in the September turmoil, all these currencies were 
underpinned by strong economic fundamentals as measured 
by the Maastricht criteria: inflation rates among the lowest 
in the Community, moderate budget deficits and, in the case 
of France and Denmark, relatively low levels of public debt. 
These countries had also gained competitiveness relative to 
Germany over the past few years and had significant sur-
pluses on their current accounts. In all countries there was 
also a strong commitment to a 'hard currency' policy. The 
events of 16 September did, however, imply an erosion of 
their favourable competitiveness situation. 
After the withdrawal of the lira and pound sterling from the 
ERM and throughout most of the week ending 25 Sep-
tember, the French franc was subject to very heavy pressure 
in the foreign exchange market. Initially, the French franc 
was supported by massive interventions from the Banque de 
France and the Bundesbank, as French authorities tried to 
avoid a rise in interest rates immediately before the refer-
endum on 20 September. The pressure against the franc 
continued despite the narrow French 'yes' to Maastricht. On 
23 September the Banque de France, after having suspended 
for a couple of hours the repurchase facility offered to banks, 
raised a key intervention rate by 2,5% in conjunction with 
an unprecedented common statement from the French and 
German central banks and finance ministers, underlining 
that no change in the central rate between the franc and the 
Deutschmark was justified. In support of this statement the 
Bundesbank engaged in public intra-marginal intervention 
in favour of the franc. Soon after, market pressures subsided 
and the franc strengthened against the Deutschmark. By 
early November interest rate differentials vis-à-vis the 
Deutschmark had been brought down close to pre-crisis 
levels. 
In late November/December there were again periods of 
pressure against the franc, first triggered by the floating of 
the Swedish krona, but aggravated by signals from the 
Bundesbank that interest rates had to remain high to 
counteract persistent inflationary pressures in Germany. 
Later on, tensions re-emerged in the run-up to the Bundes-
bank meeting on 10 December and as a result of the floating 
of the Norwegian krone. During this period, the Bundesbank 
did again show strong support for the franc, but end-De-
cember (with foreign exchange markets becalmed ahead of 
the year-end), the franc remained the weakest currency 
within the ERM band. 
Early in the new year the franc was subject to a new speculat-
ive attack, but pressure soon subsided as French and German 
authorities reconfirmed their 23 September declaration and 
the Banque de France suspended the banks' 10% five-to-ten 
days borrowing facility, and replaced it with a 12% overnight 
facility. The franc was also supported by interventions from 
the French and German central banks and the decrease in 
the German repo rate on 7 January. The franc was further 
helped by the cut in German interest rates in early February. 
The Irish punt overcame the September crisis through a 
combination of tightening of the implementation of foreign 
exchange controls, interest rate hikes and interventions, but 
remained relatively weak within the ERM. Short-term inter-
est rate differentials towards the Deutschmark had to be 
kept at around 600 basis points to stabilize the exchange 
rate — implying very high real interest rates. When ERM 
turmoil was renewed in late November and early December, 
interest rates were again raised to support the punt, the Irish 
central bank increasing the overnight lending rate to 100% 
for a short period. The Irish punt came under renewed 
speculative pressure following the floating of the Norwegian 
krone, but recovered quickly after the Edinburgh Summit. 
After the Irish elections late November, the government 
question remained unresolved until 12 January, which may 
also have had a negative effect on the stability of the punt. 
Early in the new year the punt was again hit by ERM 
tensions, and interest rates were again raised to support the 
punt. In a statement in mid-January, the new government 
confirmed its commitment to the exchange-rate parity and 
introduced schemes to insulate the domestic economy from 
high interest rates by covering the exchange risk of bor-
rowing in foreign currency. On 18 January the Economic 
and Financial Council issued a statement in support of the 
punt. Pressure against the punt abated by the second half 
of January, but domestic interest rates still remained very 
high. In late January, after a cut in UK base rates led to a 
sharp decline in pound sterling, pressures again intensified 
and the overnight rate was hiked to 100%. On 30 January 
it was decided to devalue the punt by 10% vis-à-vis the other 
ERM currencies. 
The pressure against the Danish krone in September was 
less severe, and the krone was supported by swift moves by 
the central bank to push up money market interest rates 
and by interventions. The pressure against the krone soon 
abated, and it strengthened in the ERM band. Interest rate 
differentials to the Deutschmark did, however, remain high 
relative to the pre-crisis level, indicating that markets did 
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not fully regain confidence in the krone, despite the strong 
fundamentals of the Danish economy. 
The Danish krone came under renewed pressure first after 
the floating of the Swedish krona, and later in connection 
with the floating of the Norwegian krone. Following the 
depreciation of pound sterling, the lira, the peseta and the 
Finnish mark, this meant that the Danish krone had appreci-
ated against more than a third of the currencies in its trade-
weighted currency basket, implying a substantial short-term 
loss of competitiveness. To counter the pressures, interest 
rates were pushed up substantially. By early December the 
Danish krone had fallen to the bottom of the parity grid, 
but was later replaced by the French franc. After the clarifi-
cation of Denmark's future within the European Community 
at the Edinburgh Summit, the Danish krone strengthened 
within the grid and pressure subsided, enabling the central 
bank to lower interest rates on several occasions. After the 
devaluation of the Irish punt, the krone was, however, sub-
ject to a new speculative attack in early February. It was 
supported by interest rate hikes and by publicized, concerted 
interventions from several ERM central banks. Pressure 
against the krone subsided rapidly after the Bundesbank's 
interest rate cut on 4 February, but interest rates remained 
high to support the krone. 
6. Unaffected by the ERM crisis — Belgium and 
the Netherlands 
The only two currencies, apart from the Deutschmark, not 
subject to downward market pressures in last autumn's ERM 
crisis, were the Belgian franc and the Dutch guilder. Gener-
ally these currencies were at the top of the ERM band and 
their interest rate differentials to the Deutschmark were close 
to zero or slightly negative. During the closing months of 
1992, the Dutch and Belgian central banks lowered various 
key and official interest rates three times, partly in order to 
ease tensions within the ERM. 
The Netherlands has followed a hard currency, anti-in-
flationary policy in tandem with Germany ever since the 
start of the ERM in 1978 (with one exception in 1983 
when the guilder did not completely follow a Deutschmark 
revaluation), which can partly explain the high degree of 
credibility the exchange rate enjoyed during the recent crisis. 
The case of Belgium is more striking. Like some other 
countries within the ERM, Belgium followed a 'soft cur-
rency' policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s and used 
devaluation as a means to restore loss of competitiveness. 
By the mid-1980s, Belgium, as well as Denmark, Ireland and 
France, had changed its economic policy to a 'hard cur-
rency', low inflation policy, where the ERM framework was 
regarded as essential in bringing inflation down. Further-
more, in 1990 Belgium made a public commitment to follow 
the strong ERM currencies which in practice so far has 
meant a link with the Deutschmark on the Dutch model. 
The great emphasis which is put on the exchange-rate target 
also means that the Belgian central bank closely links its 
monetary policy decisions to those of the Bundesbank. All 
these factors contribute to explaining the high credibility of 
the Belgian franc in the markets. 
7. Conclusions 
From the early to the late 1980s the EMS/ERM provided 
a useful framework for promoting economic convergence 
between the member countries in the fields of inflation and 
interest rates. Several factors contributed to the success of 
the ERM in this period. Firstly, high priority was accorded 
to disinflation. Secondly, governments believed that the costs 
of disinflation would be reduced by 'borrowing' the credi-
bility of the Bundesbank. Thirdly, Germany provided a 
reliable nominal anchor for the system as German inflation 
was itself falling or, at least in underlying terms, stable. The 
process was also supported by a growth environment in the 
Community during the second half of the 1980s which in its 
turn was supported by stability in the ERM and reduction 
of interest differentials with Germany. 
By the end of the 1980s the convergence process had slowed 
down. Among the original narrow band countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands) 
convergence in terms of inflation was more or less achieved 
and interest rate differentials had come down considerably. 
There was less progress toward convergence in the field 
of public finances. In other ERM countries (Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and partly the United Kingdom) price and cost 
growth continued, despite some decrease, to be higher than 
among the original narrow band countries, leading to a 
substantial real appreciation of their currencies and loss of 
competitiveness. Furthermore, economic policies did not 
sufficiently support the 'hard currency' stance implied by 
the ERM commitment. Instances of this are Italy's failure 
to tackle the budget deficit problem and Spain's persistently 
high inflation rate. 
In addition to the insufficient progress in convergence, the 
system changed character as a result of the asymmetric 
economic shock Germany suffered after the unification: 
while remaining the nominal anchor of the system, Germany 
diverged from the original narrow band member countries 
in terms of inflation. In response to inflationary pressures 
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and high growth in monetary aggregates, Germany tightened 
monetary policy. This led to a rise in interest rates through-
out the whole ERM area. With inflation under control in 
many of the ERM countries and economic growth slowing 
down sharply since 1991, this monetary policy stance was 
increasingly seen as being too tight in relation to domestic 
economic developments in these countries. 
Despite these developments, the ERM was characterized 
by relative stability up until June 1992. The stability was 
maintained by an effective management of the system in 
periods of tension and by the positive impact the progress 
of EMU had on exchange-rate expectations. When these 
expectations were destabilized, market operators began to 
focus more on existing imbalances in member countries' 
economies. Realignment expectations became widespread, 
resulting in very large capital movements. Ultimately this 
created a crisis which forced a series of realignments within 
the system, while two currencies — pound sterling and lira 
— were suspended from the ERM. 
Several lessons can be drawn from the turmoil in the ERM 
in the autumn of 1992. 
1. The commitment of all ERM members to the future of 
the ERM is unquestioned. However, the nature of the 
mechanism has undoubtedly changed since the September 
crisis. First, and most fundamentally, the perception, 
including that of the markets, that the ERM had become 
a fixed-rate system has been radically revised. This, in 
combination with the achievement of complete capital 
liberalization in the ERM, has increased the need for 
much more monetary policy and economic policy cooper-
ation to ward off incipient instability, long recognized as 
a theoretical possibility in fixed-but-adjustable exchange-
rate regimes. 
Defending an agreed parity grid, in the face of unrestric-
ted possibilities of capital movements, while at the same 
time maintaining a stability-oriented framework for the 
ERM area as a whole, may turn out to require greater 
symmetry within the system. However, the acceptance of 
greater symmetry (which in itself increases the willingness 
on the part of all countries whose currencies may poten-
tially come under attack to raise interest rates) will un-
doubtedly be conditional first on a decrease of inflation 
in Germany and then on the achievement of greater 
convergence in other countries. 
2. The role of convergence programmes should be re-
inforced. Following a proposal from the Commission, the 
Community agreed on the need for divergent countries 
to present multi-year convergence plans in 1991 to ensure 
progress by the end of stage two of EMU. Convergence 
programmes need to be closely monitored and above all 
to become credible to the markets by showing clear and 
positive results. 
An improvement in growth prospects is also needed. 
Without an environment supportive of growth, conver-
gence will prove more difficult to achieve. At the same 
time, implementation of convergence programmes — 
namely deficit reduction and structural measures — will 
increase confidence in the economy and allow a decrease 
of interest rates and an improvement in growth prospects. 
3. Multilateral and country surveillance procedures should 
be strengthened so that problems of divergent economic 
developments in the EMS may be revealed and addressed 
at an early stage. These surveillance procedures did not 
play the role they should have done last year. 
4. The instruments at the disposal of the Member States 
in the ERM — interventions (including intra-marginal 
interventions) and interest rates — should be used in a 
more active, joint and flexible manner, conditioned by a 
clear, common understanding of the economic situation 
and policies of the different Member States. In particular, 
interest rate increases should not be used only as a last 
resort. 
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Table 1 
Realignments and changes in the ERM since 1979 
IRL LIT HFL ESC UKL 
13.3.1979 The European Monetary System (EMS) starts with BFR/LFR, DKR, DM, FF, IRL, LIT, HFL and UKL. 
BFR/LFR, DKR, DM, FF, IRL, LIT, HFL and UKL are components of the ecu basket. 
BFR/LFR, DKR, DM, FF, IRL, LIT, HFL (but not UKL) participate in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM). 
They are in the narrow band (2,25% fluctuation) of the ERM, except the LIT in the wide band (6% fluctuation). 
24.9.1979 
30.11.1979 
23.3.1981 
5.10.1981 
22.2.1982 
14.6.1982 
22.3.1983 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-8,50 
0 
+ 1,50 
-3,00 
-5,00 
0 
0 
-3,00 
0 
+ 2,50 
+ 2,00 
0 
0 
+ 5,50 
0 
+ 4,25 
+ 5,50 
0 
0 
0 
3,00 
0 
5,75 
2,50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3,50 
0 
0 
-6,00 
-3,00 
0 
-2,75 
-2,50 
0 
0 
0 
+ 5,50 
0 
+ 4,25 
+ 3,50 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
17.9.1984 Revision of the ecu composition (the drachma enters into the ecu basket without participating in the ERM). 
22.7.1985 
7.4.1986 
4.8.1986 
12.1.1987 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
+ 2,00 
+ 1,00 
0 
+ 2,00 
+ 2,00 
+ 1,00 
0 
0 
+ 2,00 
+ 3,00 
0 
+ 3,00 
+ 2,00 
-3,00 
0 
0 
+ 2,00 
0 
-8,00 
0 
-6,00 
0 
0 
0 
+ 2,00 ■ 
+ 3,00 ■ 
0 ' 
+ 3,00 ' 
19.6.1989 Though not in the ecu basket yet, the peseta joins the EMS by entering into the wide band of the ERM. 
21.9.1989 Revision of the ecu composition: the peseta and the escudo enter into the ecu basket. The escudo does not participate in 
the ERM. 
8.1.1990 The Italian lira (formerly in the wide band of the ERM) joins the narrow band of the ERM. 
8.1.1990 Realignment 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 3,6774 0 
8.10.1990 Pound sterling enters into the wide band of the ERM. 
6.4.1992 The escudo enters into the wide band of the ERM. 
14.9.1992 Realignment +3,50 +3,50 +3,50 2 +3,50 +3,50 +3,50 
17.9.1992 Pound sterling and the Italian lira suspend their participation in the ERM. 
•3,50 +3,50 +3,50 +3,50 
17.9.1992 
23.11.1992 
1.2.1993 
Realignment 
Realignment 
Realignment 
2 
2 
2 
-5,00 
-6,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-10,00 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-6,00 
0 
2 
1 
2 
Currency not in the EMS. 
Currency not in the ERM. 
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Summary 
The competitiveness of an economy determines its ability to increase its market shares or to sustain a higher growth without a 
deteriorating current-account balance. The determining factors of trade and current-account performance can be grouped in 
three main categories: relative cyclical positions (income effects), relative cost developments (price effects) and relative change 
in productive potential (supply effects). 
Over the period 1987-92, different cyclical developments seem to explain the direction of changes in external positions and trade 
performance in the US, Japan and the Community. However, relative cost developments seem to have played a significant role 
in the intensity of these changes. 
For the US, the 22,3% improvement in export market share can therefore be explained by the combination of domestic demand 
growth a cumulative 8% below the average of its industrial partners, and an 18,8% improvement in its cost-competitiveness 
against the same partners in the fourth quarter of 1992 compared to the first quarter of 1987. Such a reduction of its relative 
manufacturing unit labour costs in common currency resulted from both an effective nominal depreciation of the dollar ( — 11,5%) 
and a decrease in relative unit labour costs measured in national currencies( — 6,5%). 
For Japan, a 7,5% loss in export market share looks very moderate in relation to an almost 15% faster growth in its domestic 
demand, and an 11% deterioration in cost-competitiveness measured in the fourth quarter of 1992 by relative unit labour costs 
in common currency. Such a competitiveness deterioration was the net result of a nominal appreciation of the yen ( + 18,5%) 
and a reduction of relative unit labour costs measured in national currencies ( — 6,5%). It seems, therefore, that other factors 
played a compensatory role in favour of Japanese external performance, such as the substantial profitability advantage that the 
Japanese manufacturing sector enjoyed at the beginning of the period. 
For the Community as a whole, the deterioration of export and current-account performance could be explained by cyclical 
factors (domestic demand growth 2,8% above the average of its industrial partners) and a cost-competitiveness deterioration. 
Until the third quarter of 1992, the loss of competitiveness (+17,8 %) was more due to a nominal appreciation of Community 
currencies (+10,2 %) than to an increase in relative unit labour costs measured in national currencies ( + 6,9 %>). However, 
during the fourth quarter of 1992, the Community currencies' depreciation ( — 6,8%) permitted a reduction in the cost-
competitiveness losses to 10,4% compared to the first quarter of 1987. 
Within the Community, the five countries whose currencies did not belong to the initial narrow band of the ERM accumulated 
cost-competitiveness losses over most of the period until mid-1992. During the second half of 1992, successive realignments and 
floating permitted a correction of most of the cost divergences accumulated by these five countries, while Germany was registering 
a sharp deterioration in its cost-competitiveness. 
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In order to capture the complex notion of an economy's competitive position, something more than summary indicators — 
which cannot be interpreted too literally — is required. As well as monitoring a broad range of cost and price indicators, a 
degree of interpretation and overall analysis is necessary. The purpose of this study is not to solve the methodological 
problem of measuring competitiveness, but rather to give an overview of the salient facts provided by the observation of 
the most easily accessible information on EC countries, the US and Japan, after a short methodological introduction. 
1. Competitiveness: what does it mean and 
how should it be measured? 
The extent to which a country is competitive is reflected in 
its ability to increase its share of export markets, or to 
sustain a relatively higher rate of growth of domestic demand 
without a deterioration in its current-account balance. 
Change in competitiveness in one direction or another will 
tend to balance supply and demand in the economy. For 
example, some deterioration in competitiveness is necessary 
when domestic demand is growing very rapidly as a result 
of private sector expectations of structural improvement or 
economic 'catching up'. However, if demand disturbances 
are due to inappropriate budgetary policies, the response 
should be to correct those policies rather than induce com-
pensation by changes in relative cost positions. 
One of the most widely used indicators of competitiveness 
is based on unit labour costs in the manufacturing sector 
(ULCM). The latter is used as a proxy for all sectors exposed 
to external competition. It is calculated as the ratio of 
manufacturing unit labour cost indices in the home country 
to manufacturing unit labour cost indices in its trading 
partners, with all data expressed in a common currency. For 
the home country, it corresponds to the combined impact of 
changes in relative unit labour costs measured in respective 
national currencies and changes in the nominal effective 
exchange rate of this country's currency against its partners' 
currencies. This indicator is also called a real exchange rate 
index. The implicit assumption behind this indicator is that, 
since traded goods prices are linked by strong international 
competition, developments in relative unit labour costs are 
indicative of changes in relative profitability in the traded 
goods sector. Movements in such an indicator for any given 
country should point to changes in the incentives to produce 
manufactured goods in this country relative to its trading 
partners. 
Interpreting ULCM as a measure of relative profitability is 
however an arbitrary simplification, which is misleading 
inasmuch as relative profitability is influenced by other fac-
tors. For example, product differentiation across countries, 
structural differences in their material inputs and especially 
differences in domestic input prices may affect profitability 
in a given country with respect to the others. Thus, a rise in 
the output price of traded goods supplied by the home 
country relative to the foreign price need not necessarily 
indicate a deterioration in competitiveness, to the extent that 
it may reflect a shift in external demand preferences, or to 
the extent that the quality of industrial specialization allows 
it to pass domestic cost increases on to its trading partners 
without any profit squeeze. Another typical case is a country 
with unchanged relative unit labour costs but showing a 
decrease in its relative output prices (or an increase in its 
relative input prices) provoking a reduction in its relative 
value-added deflator. Contrary to conventional interpret-
ation, this country has not improved its competitiveness for 
existing production since it registers a squeeze in profit 
margins with respect to its competitors. It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine relative profitability by looking simul-
taneously at ULCM indicators and at adequate price indi-
cators. The best price indicator for this purpose is, of course, 
the deflator of manufacturing value-added (PVA). The PVA 
takes into account not only output-price variations, but 
also, negatively, input price movements. So, a change in the 
specific terms of trade of the manufacturing sector of one 
country, which will affect profit margins, should be correctly 
reflected in a change in the value-added deflator. 
Accordingly, the preferred competitiveness indicator might 
be the ratio of the relative unit labour costs to the relative 
price of the value-added, since this indicator gives the evol-
ution of labour's share in value-added for the home manu-
facturing sector with respect to that of its foreign competi-
tors, which corresponds also to a measure of relative profit 
margins (its complement). Of course, this indicator is also 
imperfect: 
(i) it is an ex-post indicator, i.e. it reflects the relative cash-
flow position of existing output capacities; 
(ii) it does not exhaust the possible factors which may affect 
the rate of return, such as differences in the cost of 
capital, in capital intensity or in the elasticity of factor 
substitution (but whose consideration would result in 
an excessive complication of the analysis); 
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(iii) it suffers from some weaknesses in the comparability of 
data across countries. 
The following analysis starts with a short presentation of 
the trade performances and imbalances, which are the result 
of global developments. Then the most commonly used 
ex-post cost-competitiveness indicator of the traded goods 
sector — that is the relative unit labour costs in the manufac-
turing sector (ULCM) — is examined. As an alternative 
indicator, relative consumer price indices, to which ex-
change-rate operators usually refer to as a benchmark for 
developments in purchasing power parities, is also presented. 
Finally, the study tries to overcome some of the traditional 
difficulties with ULCM, such as differences in other domestic 
costs or in the path of input costs, or shifts in external terms 
of trade, by using the relative labour share developments as 
a synthetic indicator of ex-post profitability. A tentative 
comparison of absolute levels of total wage costs per em-
ployee and value-added per employee closes the analysis. 
2. Current-account balances and 
trade performances 
Factors other than changes in competitiveness may account 
for the evolution of trade balances and performances. 
Changes in relative cyclical positions (income effects), rela-
tive growth in productive potential (supply effects and out-
put gap) and competitiveness (relative-price effects) are the 
three main categories of determining factors. 
In more recent years, relative demand growth (cycle) seems 
to have played a major role in shaping the external positions 
of a majority of industrialized countries. Since 1987, the 
relative dynamism in domestic demand enables three groups 
of countries to be distinguished: one with a higher domestic 
demand growth, another with a lower growth, and those 
whose growth hovered around the average for the group as 
a whole (see Table 1). 
In the first group, domestic demand growth was 14,8% 
higher for Japan than for the average of its 19 industrial 
partners, 13,4% for Portugal, 12,5% for Spain, 4,5% for 
(Western) Germany, 4,2% for Belgium, 2,2% for Greece 
and 2,8% for the Community as a whole. These growth 
differentials should, ceteris paribus, explain a deterioration 
of the current balances and trade market shares in these 
countries, as a function of their respective income elasticities. 
Indeed, the table below shows that it is the case in all these 
countries for current balances, and also for market shares 
except for Portugal and Spain. For these two countries, the 
two other factors of trade performance were thus playing a 
more important role than income effects. 
For the second group (Denmark, the US and the UK) with 
a relatively lower rate of domestic demand growth, the same 
argument implies that income effects should, ceteris paribus, 
improve trade performances and current balances. It is in-
deed the case for two of the three countries of Group 2: only 
the UK registered a deterioration of both current account 
and market share indicators in spite of a significant negative 
differential in its domestic demand with respect to the other 
industrial countries. This implies a priori a loss of competi-
tiveness for the British economy. 
In the third group (France, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Italy), the cumulative income effects should be rather neutral 
for trade and current-account performances during the 1987-
92 period. Only the Netherlands registered an almost con-
stant market share performance; France and Ireland showed 
significant progress, whilst Italy lost market share. This 
indication of an improvement of competitiveness for France 
and Ireland, as well as of a deterioration in Italian competi-
tiveness, is confirmed by the developments in current-ac-
count balances. 
The combination of indicators presented in Table 1 suggests 
that the competitiveness factor should, at the most, explain 
only that part of the trade performance which cannot be 
accounted for by income effects. So, the dramatic recovery 
of market shares by the US exporters cannot be imputed 
solely to competitiveness, since the cyclical gap will also have 
played a major role. The same is true in explaining a part 
of the corresponding deterioration in trade performance for 
Japan, the Community and Germany. Intuitively, however, 
it seems that the deterioration of current balances and mar-
ket shares in Japan are rather modest relative to the import-
ance of the income effects, indicating a possible partial 
compensation by the other factors. 
Among Community countries, possible competitiveness 
losers — other than Germany — would be the UK, Italy 
and Greece. Possible winners would be, at this stage of the 
analysis, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, France and the Nether-
lands. 
Before comparing the components of relative trade perform-
ance unexplained by income effects with the possible effects 
of specific competitiveness indicators, it is worth mentioning 
some additional features of the Community's external trade, 
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drawing on a previous publication1 of the Commission ser­
vices. 
Between 1987 and 1990, extra­Community imports of manu­
factures, in volume terms, have grown more rapidly (32,4%) 
than intra­Community imports (21,4%). In particular, this 
phenomenon is also true for high­tech products: EC imports 
1 Study No 4 — 'Main features of Community trade', European Economy 
No 50, December 1991. 
from the rest of the world have increased more (39,1%) than 
the intra­EC imports of the same products (32%). On the 
export side during the same period, total growth of extra­
EC exports of manufactures, in volume, has been rather 
modest (5,9%), well below the expansion of intra­EC exports 
(23,3%). Also in the field of high­tech products, the total 
progression in volume terms of extra­EC exports (13,2%) is 
less than half of the progression of intra­EC exports (31,2%). 
These elements constitute additional information pointing 
towards a weakening of competitiveness of the Community 
as a whole vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Table 1 
Income effect and trade performance in 1992 against 1987 
1. Countries with domestic demand growth above the average 
Japan Portugal 
(a) Relative domestic demand (1987 
(b) Market share in volume1 (1987 = 
(c) Current balance (% of GDP, 
against 1987) ­0,4 ­1 ,7 
Spain Germany Belgium Greece EUR 12 
= 100) 
100) 
change 
114,8 
92,5 
113,4 
106,7 
112,5 
105,4 
104,5 
94,8 
104,2 
93,8 
102,2 
88,8 
102,8 
94,7 
­3,6 ■3,7 0,0 ­0 ,3 ­1 ,3 
2. Countries with domestic demand growth below the average 
(a) Relative domestic demand (1987 = 100) 
(b) Market share in volume' (1987 = 100) 
(c) Current balance (% of GDP, change against 1987) 
Denmark 
88,7 
102,2 
+ 5,8 
USA 
92,0 
122,3 
+ 2,5 
UK 
95,6 
90,9 
­0 ,5 
3. Countries with domestic demand growth around the average 
Netherlands 
(a) Relative domestic demand (1987 = 100) 99,5 
(b) Market share in volume1 (1987 = 100) 100,1 
(c) Current balance (% of GDP, change against 
1987) +2,7 
France 
99,7 
105,6 
+ 0,3 
Italy 
101,0 
96,0 
­2 ,2 
Ireland 
101,5 
118,2 
+ 5,4 
1 Export volume indices of a country compared to the export volume indices of industrial countries. 
Sources: Commission services; IMF — International Financial Statistics. 
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GRAPH 1 : Export performance' of industrial countries 
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3. Description of relevant trends in relative 
manufacturing unit labour costs 
In this section, the trend in relative manufacturing unit 
labour costs in the three main industrial countries and in 
the Community as a bloc is examined. This examination is 
based on the nominal effective exchange rates of each of 
their respective currencies (or group of currencies) vis-à-vis 
the other industrialized countries, deflated by unit labour 
costs in manufacturing. Intra­Community developments are 
then addressed using the same indicator for each Member 
State, but calculated against the (other) ERM currencies. 
3.1. Relative unit labour costs in the 
manufacturing sector of the USA, Japan, 
Germany and the Community 
According to the relative unit labour cost indices, the com­
petitive position of the US manufacturing sector has substan­
tially improved since the time of the Louvre Accord (first 
quarter of 1987). The last quarter of 1992 registered a relative 
cost improvement of 18,8% (estimated) in comparison to the 
first quarter of 1987. Such real exchange­rate depreciation 
resulted from the combination of an 11,5% nominal de­
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preciation of the effective exchange rate of the dollar — 
despite the upsurge in the nominal exchange rate of the 
dollar at the end of 19921 — and a 6,5% reduction in US 
relative unit labour costs measured in national currencies. 
Since 1987, the competitive position of the Japanese manu-
facturing sector registered mainly two divergent trends: first 
a strong improvement until the second quarter of 1990, and 
since then a steady deterioration, which put Japanese relative 
ULCM 11% higher than at the time of the Louvre agree-
ment. 
During the first period the sharp drop in relative ULCM 
for Japan was the combined result of a fall in the nominal 
exchange rate of the yen ( - 6 , 1 % from the Louvre level) 
and a reduction in relative unit labour costs measured in 
national currencies ( - 9,9 %). During the second period, the 
increase of ULCM in common currency amounted to 33%, 
as a result of both a nominal appreciation of the yen against 
the 19 other currencies (26,2%) and an increase in relative 
unit labour costs measured in national currencies (5,4%). 
Over a longer-term perspective, the yen is showing a trend 
of real appreciation.2 
The German manufacturing sector has lost competitiveness 
since 1987: relative unit labour costs for the fourth quarter 
of 1992 show an increase of 14,6%, the bulk of which is due 
to the nominal appreciation of the Deutschmark. However, 
the strengthening of the real exchange rate of the Deutsch-
mark is entirely due to developments which occurred after 
the collapse of the centrally-planned economies of Eastern 
Europe. Between the trough of the third quarter of 1989 and 
the fourth quarter of 1992, the real appreciation of the 
Deutschmark amounted to 16,5 %, of which 12,2% related 
to a nominal appreciation. A comparison of the position of 
the latest available data with its corresponding values along 
a long-term trend would point to a real overvaluation of the 
Deutschmark. As will be explained in Section 7, such an 
overshooting is the inescapable result of relative macro-
economic developments. 
1 It is only with the level reached during the first half of January 1993 
that the nominal effective exchange rate of the dollar has recovered its 
level of mid-1991. 
The 1980-91 trend of the real exchange rate of the yen, estimated by 
linear regression, shows an average growth rate of 4,3% per year. If the 
structural factors underlying this rising trend were to be still operating, 
the yen would still be below its extrapolated value. 
GRAPH 2: Relative unit labour costs in manufacturing industry: EC, USA, Japan and Germany 
(vis-à-vis industrial countries, 87Q1 = 100) 
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For the Community currencies taken as a group vis-à-vis 
third currencies, the real appreciation in the fourth quarter 
of 1992 compared to the first quarter of 1987 amounts to 
10,4%, after a peak of 17,8% in the third quarter of 1992. 
This 6,3% drop of the Community's relative unit labour 
costs in the fourth quarter is due to the appreciation of the 
dollar combined with the impact of the depreciations of the 
pound, the lira and the peseta. However, in contrast to the 
German position, the Community's competitiveness losses 
of 10,4% with respect to the Louvre period comes more 
from a rise in relative costs in national currencies (7,5 %) 
than from nominal exchange­rate appreciation (2,7 %). No 
significant trend can be detected for the period as a whole 
starting from the early 1980s. 
The weakening in the competitive position of the Com­
munity's manufacturing sector can be examined bilaterally 
with respect to the United States and Japan. Graph 3 shows 
the relative developments (in common currency) of US and 
Japanese unit labour costs with respect to those of the 
Community. The cumulative Community losses in the fourth 
quarter of 1992 relative to the 'Louvre quarter' are around 
20% against the United States and 1,3% against the yen. In 
the third quarter of 1992, these losses reached 27% against 
the dollar and 12% against the yen. 
3.2. Developments in intra­Community 
competitiveness 
Regarding developments in relative unit labour costs for 
each Member State against the other ERM participants1 
for the period under review, two sub­periods may be dis­
tinguished: 1987 to mid­1992, and after mid­1992. The Com­
munity countries may be grouped in two categories: the 
seven countries which have participated in the narrow band 
of the ERM since its inception, and the five other Member 
States. Eac sub­group is presented on the same graph, since 
common developments characterize mainly each sub­group. 
The seven countries of the initial narrow band show stable 
or declining relative unit labour costs until mid­1992; during 
the second sub­period their competitiveness is reduced by 
the upward movement in their relative unit labour costs 
essentially due to the ERM realignments and floatings of 
September and November 1992. The five other countries 
show mostly divergent unit labour cost developments with, 
1 The definition of ERM members is the same throughout the whole 
period and includes 11 countries. 
^mÊmmmÊm ■■■HnnHHHHHDnHMHIHBMHBHMBnBEËS 
GRAPH 3 : Relative unit labour costs in manufacturing industry: USA and Japan 
(vis­ò­v« EUR 12, 87Q1 = 100) 
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in most cases, important losses of competitiveness, followed 
by some adjustments in four of them, first by labour cost 
moderation in national currency and, finally, for three of 
them by significant parity realignments. 
Amongst the seven countries, some divergences are to be 
highlighted. In both sub-periods, German relative unit la-
bour costs rose significantly against the six other countries 
of the first sub-group. At the end of 1992, the cumulative 
loss in competitiveness of the German manufacturing sector, 
measured bilaterally against these partners, reached 7,8% 
against the Danish manufacturing sector, 11 % against Bel-
gium, 13,2% against France, 16,3% against the Netherlands 
and 23,7% against Ireland.' As such this evolution is not 
due to parity realignments, it results essentially from wage 
slippage in Germany throughout the whole period and very 
good performances in the six other countries (wage modera-
tion and increases in productivity). 
Considering the increases in unit labour costs of all the 
ERM members, at mid-1992, the competitiveness gains of 
Germany's partners in the first group reached 6,7% for 
Denmark, 8% for Belgium, 12,2% for France, 15,2% for 
the Netherlands, and 21,1% for Ireland. The successive 
realignments of the second half of 1992 reduced these cumu-
lative gains to only 1,1% for Denmark, 3,5% for Belgium, 
7,6% for France, 10,6% for the Netherlands and 17,4% for 
Ireland. 
The five other Community members that have not been 
within the narrow band from the beginning all witnessed a 
period of weakening of their cost-competitiveness. There 
are however large differences amongst them concerning the 
intensity and duration of such weakening, as well as the 
parameters used to absorb the cost differentials. Only Portu-
gal did not display any real depreciation of its currency in 
the fourth quarter of 1992, as the November devaluation of 
the escudo in the ERM amounted to only 1% in effective 
terms. Its cumulative losses amounted to 42% in comparison 
to the base period (first quarter of 1987). As a result of 
the two devaluations, Spain reduced its real exchange-rate 
appreciation registered since the beginning of 1987 (whose 
level at that time was an all-time low for the peseta's real 
exchange rate), from 33% in mid-1992 to 25% for the fourth 
quarter of 1992 (i.e. a real depreciation of only 5,8 %). Thus, 
Spain and Portugal show clear losses of competitiveness 
according to developments in their relative-price effects. 
However, as was mentioned in Section 2 above, these two 
countries have registered significant market share progress 
(see Table 1) in spite of adverse income effects (differential 
in domestic demand growth). Therefore, the third category 
of factors, the supply effects, have certainly played a major 
role in these cases: the catching-up process implies a fast 
development of new output capacity, which is not properly 
taken into account in conventional competitiveness indica-
tors. 
Italy joined the narrow-band ERM after an 8% loss of 
competitiveness during the year 1989. During its stay in 
this mechanism the real exchange rate was also stable. The 
devaluation of the lira, followed by its withdrawal from 
the ERM, amounted to a nominal depreciation of 10,8% 
(measured as the gap between the average of the second 
quarter of 1992 and the fourth quarter of 1992). The real 
depreciation, which amounted to 11,3 %, corresponds to an 
improvement of 8% for Italian manufacturing competitive-
ness with respect to the base period. 
The UK joined the wide band of the ERM during the fourth 
quarter of 1990, after a period of nominal appreciation and 
wage slippage whose combined effects, compared with the 
base period, amounted to 16% of competitiveness losses. 
During its two years of participation in the ERM, its real 
exchange rate was stable. Since mid-1992, the real deprecia-
tion absorbed entirely the previous losses of competitiveness. 
This real depreciation amounted to 14,4 %, of which 13,6% 
came from the nominal depreciations allowed, first, by the 
use of the wide margin of fluctuation and, next, by the 
withdrawal of the pound from the ERM. 
From 1987 to the third quarter of 1990, Greece, which is 
the only country whose currency has never belonged to the 
ERM, experienced a 27% real appreciation, in spite of 
a 25% nominal depreciation. A continuation of nominal 
depreciation, combined with some wage moderation, permit-
ted Greece to register an 8% real depreciation at the end of 
1992 in comparison to the first quarter of 1990, reducing 
the cumulative losses in competitiveness to 16,9 %. 
4. Description of relevant trends in purchasing 
power of each currency 
Due to the lack of data on value-added for the Irish manufacturing 
sector, Irish data for manufacturing productivity are not fully compar-
able with the other country data, and the proxy used (output index) 
could lead to an exaggerated measure of productivity growth. 
Traditionally, another indicator used by analysts to assess 
currency prospects is the relative inflation index. So, Graphs 
6 to 9 present the relative consumer price indices measured 
in a common currency, i.e. they correspond to the ratio of 
the consumer price index in one country to consumer price 
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GRAPH 4: Relative unit labour costs in manufacturing industry: initial narrow­band ERM countries 
(vis-à-vis ERM, 87Q1 = 100) 
GRAPH 5 : Relative unit labour costs in manufacturing industry: other Community countries 
(vis-à-vis ERM, 87Q1 = 100) 
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GRAPH 6: Relative consumer prices: EC, USA, Japan and Germany 
(vis-à-vis industrial countries, 87Q1 = 100) 
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indices in its trading partners, multiplied by the index of the 
nominal exchange rate of this country against its partner 
currencies. 
appreciation was reduced from 24 to 15,6 %, while, on the 
contrary, the real appreciations in Greece and Portugal 
continued, reaching respectively 16 and 29,5 %. 
According to this indicator, real exchange­rate developments 
since the Louvre have been less marked: in the fourth quarter 
of 1992 the competitive improvement of the US economy 
amounted to some 8 %, while the deterioration for the yen 
is limited to 5,6 %, to 3,6% for the EC currencies and to 
only 1% for the Deutschmark. However, compared to mid­
1989, real appreciations of the EC currencies and the 
Deutschmark reached 10,5 and 10,9% respectively. 
Inside the ERM, the same indicator shows that at the end 
of 1992, the seven initial members of the narrow band of 
the ERM were back very close to their relative positions at 
the beginning of 1987, after a period of several substantial 
real appreciations (ranging from 8,8% for Germany to 4,6% 
for Denmark). For the five other Community members, the 
nominal depreciations that occurred during the second half 
of 1992 enabled some of the real appreciations previously 
recorded to be reduced or eradicated: in the fourth quarter 
of 1992, Italy had relative prices 5,9% lower than at the 
beginning of 1987 and British relative prices were only 2,8% 
higher,, after a peak of 21,7% in 1991. For Spain, the real 
5. Developments in relative manufacturing 
profitability 
As explained in Section 1, cost­competitiveness indicators 
alone cannot capture the complex notion of a nation's com­
petitive position. One of the main reasons is the structural 
differences amongst industrialized economies, particularly 
relating to the specialization features of each, which may 
also affect competitiveness indicators. Differences in the 
composition of trade baskets between countries allow for 
differences in measured relative prices without necessarily 
changing competitive positions. For example, even with indi­
vidual export prices perfectly aligned with those of its compe­
titors, the measured index of the relative export price average 
of one country could rise merely as a result of a different 
sectoral composition in its export basket if the products 
benefiting from the largest international price increases have 
a higher weight in its basket. In this example, such a speciali­
zation effect implies an improvement in the terms of trade 
of this country compared to the others, i.e. an increase in 
GRAPH 10: Relative labour share in value­added (manufacturing) :r EC, USA, Japan and Germany 
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GRAPH 11 : Relative labour share in value-added (manufacturing):' initial narrow-band ERM countries 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1 Relative ULCM/relative deflator of gross value-added; both indices are calculated against industrial countries. 
the disposable income which is statistically registered as an 
increase in the relative value-added deflator of the manufac-
turing sector of this country. This allows for either an in-
crease in relative unit labour costs of this country without 
any squeeze in its profitability compared to the other coun-
tries, or for improvement in the relative profitability without 
any change in the relative ULCM. In more general terms, 
one can say that terms of trade variations across countries, 
due to the differences in international specialization, imply 
differences in the variation of the value-added deflators, 
opening different 'warranted wage rooms' for existing output 
capacities. In other words, divergences in unit labour costs 
do not affect relative profitability insofar as they coincide 
with offsetting movements in relative value-added deflators. 
Consequently, one can better assess the net impact of cost-
competitiveness and structural competitiveness by referring 
to the relative evolution of the labour share in manufacturing 
value-added, i.e. the ratio of relative unit labour costs and 
relative deflators of the corresponding value-added. The 
trend in this indicator of relative wage share, which gives 
implicitly (its inverse) a relative profitability indicator, is 
represented in Graphs 10 to 12. However, some data for 
1991 are still approximate, and all the data for 1992 are only 
estimates, both made by the Commission services. 
Graphs 11 and 12 present the same indicator for the other 
Community members, compared to their industrial partners. 
In contrast to the deterioration for Germany, the Irish and 
French performances are notable. Profit squeezes for the 
UK and Italy confirm some Overvaluation' difficulties, as 
well as for Portugal, Greece and Spain. 
Comparison of absolute levels of total wage 
costs and productivity 
The above presentation gives only relative evolutions in 
order to assess competitiveness. However, competitiveness 
is also a question of level: gaps between levels in the past 
could justify catching-up evolutions in the period considered, 
showing 'deteriorations' which are only the paths of real 
convergence for some countries. The question of absolute 
level comparison is still open to methodological and statisti-
cal problems, and one might suggest looking at the absolute 
level of wage costs for easily available information on cost 
levels, and comparing it simultaneously to the value-added 
per worker. 
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GRAPH 12: Relative labour share in value­added (manufacturing):' other Community countries 
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Graph 13 provides these comparisons. Until 1987, the US 
was the country with the highest level of total wage costs 
per employee. In 1992, German and Belgian workers have 
taken over. The ranking of Community members has not 
been changed since 1987. Among the G­7 countries, France 
maintains its rank of third place, after the US and just before 
Japan. Italy is fifth and has reduced somewhat its gap with 
France. A partial catching up appears for Spain and also 
for the UK. These two countries still have some catching up 
to do before they join the top levels. Of course, these wage 
gaps also reflect some average productivity level gaps, as the 
comparison with the value­added (at current prices and 
exchange rates) per employee shows (Graph 14). However, 
with the increase in the mobility of capital and entrepreneur­
ship in the Community, the existing average productivity 
level gaps are not necessarily a constraint for new invest­
ments and activities, where there are still some opportunities 
to reap the benefits of the wage level gaps. 
its competitors. This point could confirm the interpretation 
that the room for a profit squeeze in the Japanese manufactu­
ring sector — thus for a real appreciation of the yen — 
could still exist. On the contrary, the fact that German wage 
costs are the highest while German productivity in value is 
not, confirms that the level of gross profitability in the 
German manufacturing sector does not seem excessive. In 
particular, a bilateral comparison with France shows that 
wage costs, which were already higher in Germany in 1987, 
have increased more in Germany than in France, while the 
disadvantage for Germany of having a level of value­added 
per worker lower than in France has been getting worse 
from 1987 to 1992. 
7. Conclusions 
An interesting point concerning the comparison of the abso­
lute levels of ex-post productivity expressed in value terms 
is the information that could tentatively be deducted about 
the level of gross profit margins, particularly for Japan and 
Germany. For Japan, its value­added per worker is the 
highest although its wage costs per worker are not the 
highest, indicating a higher gross profitability compared to 
Keeping in mind the complexity of assessing the evolution 
of the relative competitive positions of a given group of 
countries, the examination of unit labour cost and profitabi­
lity indicators would tend to point to important changes in 
competitiveness between the US and the EC economies: the 
EC currencies might presently (end of 1992) be seen as 
overvalued against the dollar. 
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Though overshooting against some so-called equilibrium 
exchange rate does not necessarily mean that exchange rates 
are inappropriate or should be adjusted, one might consider 
that the Community currencies, viewed as a bloc, have 
overshot upwards (overvaluation) while conversely the dol-
lar has overshot downwards. The explanation of these devel-
opments since mid-1989 lies with divergent macroeconomic 
conditions on both sides of the Atlantic. Real exchange rates 
will tend to be above or below their 'equilibrium levels' to 
the extent that domestic demand is above or below short-
term potential output. Thus if there is a boom in domestic 
demand in a particular country then, depending upon the 
stance of monetary policy in that country, either short-term 
interest rates will rise (or are expected to rise), tending to 
produce a nominal appreciation, or inflation will accelerate, 
or both. In either case, the real exchange rate will tend 
to appreciate. In the longer term, however, since domestic 
demand cannot exceed productive potential output indef-
initely, the real exchange rate will tend to depreciate towards 
the equilibrium level. Thus, in effect, any view on the ap-
propriate character of actual or expected movements in 
exchange rates and competitiveness depends not so much on 
whether the exchange rate is 'overvalued' or 'undervalued' 
as on the assessment of the balance between domestic de-
mand and short-term potential output. 
In this perspective, the 'overvaluation' of the real exchange 
rates of the Community countries vis-à-vis other industrial-
ized countries, which emerged in 1990 and 1991, can be 
viewed as the result of different (actual and anticipated) 
cyclical developments between the Community (and, more 
particularly, the economy of the ERM's anchor currency) 
and its industrial partners. This cyclical divergence appears 
to have fostered both the emergence of interest-rate differen-
tials in favour of the European currencies and of a relatively 
high inflation rate in Europe. The monetary policies that 
were at the root of this joint development were, at least as 
far as ERM currencies were concerned, considered ap-
propriate by the central banks. 
In 1992, in spite of the cyclical deterioration in Europe, the 
postponement of the narrowing in interest-rate differentials 
between the Community and the US was, at least partly, 
due to a combination of wage slippage in Germany and a 
frustrated recovery of the American economy. Presently, it 
seems that current and prospective cyclical developments in 
the Community and the US have led to market expectations 
of a narrowing of interest-rate differentials, thus fuelling a 
strengthening of the dollar against Community currencies. 
This nominal depreciation of the European currencies, which 
already started in the second half of 1992, seems to be 
warranted by the recent shift in the balance of risks between 
inflation and recession, and could help the European cyclical 
recovery. 
As regards the yen, despite a faster growth in Japanese 
domestic demand and a substantial real appreciation, trade 
and current account performances remained good, showing 
the robustness of Japanese competitiveness. For the near 
future, as the technological and structural advantages of 
Japan seem to progress further, the yen does not seem to be 
overvalued, and one should expect a continued appreciation, 
at least against Community currencies. The ongoing real 
appreciation of the yen, which has been observed since mid-
1990, corresponds to a correction of the prolonged decline 
registered from the beginning of 1989 to the second quarter 
of 1990. The G-7 seems to have played a role in making the 
markets aware of the undervaluation of the yen at a time 
when interest-rate differentials and difficulties in the Japa-
nese financial system were acting against an appreciation of 
this currency. 
As for the Community currencies, taking into account, on 
the one hand, the results from the trade performances unex-
plained by income effects (Section 2) and the competitiveness 
analysis on the other, the following assessment can be pro-
posed: 
(i) Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK had obviously 
registered a competitiveness deterioration until the third 
quarter of 1992. For Italy and the UK, the depreciation 
of their nominal exchange rates has probably offset 
the previous relative cost slippages. For Germany, the 
realignments and the suspensions of ERM participation 
that took place in the third and fourth quarters of 
1992 have contributed to a significant increase in that 
country's relative prices; combined with its relative wage 
slippage, the real appreciation of the Deutschmark 
reached 12% in the fourth quarter of 1992 compared to 
1991; 
(ii) Spain and Portugal have registered a rather important 
increase in their relative prices, as it is typical in any 
catching-up process. However, two question marks re-
main: whether or not the chosen base period is appropri-
ate for these countries, and whether or not the losses of 
competitiveness of existing output are being incurred 
too fast; 
(iii) Ireland, France and Denmark enjoy a rather healthy 
competitiveness position, while the Netherlands and 
Belgium, arguably, do not face any problems in this 
field. 
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Statistical annex 
Long-term macroeconomic series 
Notes on the statistical annex 
General remarks 
This edition of European Economy gives updated time series of annual data in its 
statistical annex. 
For the period up to 1991, the aggregates are defined for member countries as in the 
ESA (European system of economic accounts), and for the USA and Japan as in the 
SNA (UN-OECD system of national accounts). Unless otherwise specified, the sources 
of the data are Eurostat for the EC member countries and OECD for the USA and 
Japan. 
Figures for 1992 and 1993 are estimates and forecasts made by Commission staff using 
the definitions and latest figures available from national sources. These series are not fully 
comparable with the corresponding figures for earlier years, however the discontinuities of 
the levels of these series have been eliminated. The figures for 1992-93 are based on data 
up to 2 February 1993. 
Up to 1990 the data concerning Germany refer to West Germany, from 1991 onwards 
data for both unified (D) and West Germany (WD) are available. 
See also the explanatory notes on the tables for specific definitions. 
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Table 1 
Population; total 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
• Break in 
Β 
9153 
9184 
9221 
9290 
9378 
9464 
9 528 
9 581 
9619 
9646 
9651 
9 673 
9 709 
9 739 
9 768 
9 795 
9 811 
9822 
9830 
9837 
9847 
9853 
9856 
9 855 
9 855 
9858 
9 862 
9 870 
9921 
9938 
9967 
9977 
9997 
10017 
1991/92. 
DK 
4581 
4 612 
4 647 
4684 
4 720 
4 757 
4797 
4 839 
4867 
4 893 
4 929 
4 963 
4992 
5 022 
5 045 
5 060 
5 073 
5088 
5104 
5117 
5125 
5122 
5119 
5114 
5112 
5114 
5121 
5127 
5130 
5132 
5141 
5154 
5167 
5178 
WD E 
55 433 
56185 
56 837 
57 389 
57971 
58 619 
59148 
59286 
59 500 
60 067 
60651 
61284 
61672 
61976 
62054 
61829 
61531 
61400 
61327 
61359 
61566 
61682 
61638 
61423 
61175 
61024 
61066 
61077 
61449 
62063 
63 253 
64083 80 04t 
65 006 80731 
65 864 8146Í 
GR 
8 327 
8 398 
8448 
8480 
8 510 
8 551 
8 614 
8 716 
8 741 
8 773 
8 793 
8 831 
8 889 
8929 
8 962 
9046 
9167 
9 309 
9430 
9548 
9642 
9730 
9 790 
9847 
9900 
9934 
9964 
9984 
10005 
10033 
10140 
10269 
10350 
10422 
E 
30 559 
30 880 
31133 
31405 
31716 
32 060 
32427 
32 824 
33 214 
33 540 
33 849 
34163 
34471 
34783 
35119 
35 487 
35 909 
36338 
36749 
37 079 
37 356 
37 726 
37950 
38142 
38 311 
38474 
38 604 
38 716 
38 809 
38 888 
38 959 
39025 
39085 
39141 
F 
45 684 
46163 
46998 
47836 
48 330 
48 778 
49184 
49 568 
49915 
50 318 
50772 
51251 
51701 
52118 
52460 
52 699 
52909 
53145 
53 376 
53 606 
53 880 
54182 
54492 
54 772 
55 026 
55 284 
55 547 
55 824 
56118 
56423 
56 735 
57 050 
57 366 
57 685 
IRL 
2 834 
2 819 
2 830 
2850 
2864 
2 876 
2884 
2900 
2913 
2926 
2 950 
2 978 
3 024 
3 073 
3124 
3 177 
3 228 
3 272 
3 314 
3 368 
3 401 
3 443 
3 480 
3 505 
3 529 
3540 
3 541 
3 542 
3 538 
3 515 
3 503 
3 524 
3 555 
3 579 
I 
50198 
50523 
50843 
51198 
51600 
51987 
52332 
52 667 
52987 
53 317 
53 661 
54005 
54381 
54751 
55111 
55 441 
55 718 
55955 
56155 
56 318 
56434 
56508 
56639 
56836 
57005 
57141 
57 246 
57345 
57452 
57 540 
57 661 
57 796 
57913 
58 024 
L 
313,5 
316,9 
320,8 
324,1 
327,8 
331,5 
.333,9 
335,0 
335,9 
337,5 
339,2 
342,4 
346,6 
350,5 
355,1 
359,0 
360,8 
361,4 
362,1 
363,0 
364,4 
365,4 
365,6 
365,7 
366,0 
366,7 
368,4 
370,8 
373,9 
377,7 
382,0 
386,2 
385,3 
390,3 
NL 
11483 
11637 
11801 
11964 
12125 
12 293 
12455 
12 597 
12 726 
12 873 
13032 
13194 
13 330 
13438 
13 543 
13 660 
13 773 
13 856 
13 939 
14 034 
14148 
14247 
14 312 
14 368 
14423 
14488 
14 567 
14 664 
14 760 
14 846 
14947 
15066 
15188 
15 311 
Ρ 
8 426 
8420 
8410 
8466 
8 505 
8511 
8492 
8486 
8496 
8482 
8432 
8 382 
8 364 
8 368 
8482 
8 737 
8942 
9044 
9105 
9189 
9 289 
9358 
9429 
9502 
9 577 
9640 
9686 
9 727 
9 761 
9 793 
9 808 
9815 
9 345» 
9355 
UK 
52 372 
52 807 
53 292 
53625 
53991 
54 350 
54 643 
54959 
55 214 
55461 
55 632 
55 928 
56097 
56223 
56 236 
56 226 
56216 
56190 
56178 
56 240 
56330 
56 352 
56 306 
56 347 
56460 
56618 
56 763 
56930 
57 065 
57 236 
57411 
57 561 
57 741 
57927 
EUR 12- EUR 12+ USA 
279364 
281944 
284781 
287511 
290038 
292 577 
294 838 
296 758 
298 528 
300633 
302692 
304995 
306976 
308 770 
310260 
311516 
312637 
313 781 
314 869 
316058 
317383 
318 569 
319 377 
320077 
320739 
321482 
322 335 
323 177 
324 382 
325 785 
327907 
180671 
183 691 
186 538 
189242 
191 889 
194303 
196 560 
198 712 
200706 
202677 
205052 
207 661 
209896 
211909 
213 854 
215973 
218035 
220239 
222 585 
225 055 
227 757 
230 138 
232 520 
234799 
237 011 
239279 
241 625 
243 942 
246 307 
248 762 
251 523 
329 706 345 669 254 284 
331099 346825 256900 
332894 348498 259 290 
(1000) 
J 
94118 
94965 
95 853 
96772 
97 791 
98 851 
99769 
100839 
101999 
103 261 
104674 
105 713 
107 156 
108 660 
110160 
111520 
112770 
113 880 
114 920 
115 880 
116800 
117 650 
118 450 
119260 
120020 
120 750 
121490 
122090 
122610 
123 120 
123 540 
123960 
124 380 
124800 
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Table 2 
Occupied population 
Total economy 
■ 
1961-70 
1971-80 
1981-90 
(Annual percentage change) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 ­ EUR 12+ USA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
0,8 
1,6 
0,7 
1,3 
0,2 
0,5 
-0,3 
-0,1 
1,7 
-0,4 
1,5 
1,5 
1,2 
2,1 
1,8 
0,5 
-0,6 
0,8 
1,2 
0,7 
1,4 
0,3 
0,2 
0,1 
0,6 
-0,3 
-3.3 
0,1 
1,6 
1,3 
0,4 
-1,0 
-1,3 
-1,2 
-0,7 
-0,9 
-1,2 
-1,1 
-0,3 
-0,1 
0,2 
0,9 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 . 
0,8 
0,8 
0,9 
0,7 
0,1 
0,2 
1,0 
1,1 
0,4 
0,8 
0,3 ' 
-0,3 
1,5 
1,5 
-0,2 
0,7 
0,6 
0,5 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-0,6 
0,3 
0,3 
-1,2 
0,2 
-1,1 
-1,5 
-0,6 
-1,7 
-1,5 
1,1 
0,0 
0,5 
0,0 
1,1 
0,3 
-0,4 
1,7 
0,9 
0,5 
-1,1 
-0,4 
1,4 
2,0 
1,5 
2,0 
1,4 
1,8 
0,9 
0,8 
-0,3 
0,9 
1,7 
1,1 
0,5 
0,5 
-0,2 
-0,1 
0,4 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
5,2 
1,1 
0,7 
0,1 
1,2 
1,0 
0,6 
-1,4 
-0,6 
0,1 
-0,4 
0,7 
0,3 
0,1 
0,5 
0Í 
0,0 
-0,8 
-ο,ι 
0,9 
0,7 
-0,4 
2,1 
0,9 
1,8 
3,3 
4,5 
2,5 
2,4 
2,5 
-0,8 
1,4 
1,3 
0,9 
1,3 
1,6 
2,1 
1,9 
1,7 
0,8 
1,1 
0,6 1,1 0,2 
0,3 0,7 0,2 
0,1 0,5 0,5 
­0,7 0,6 0,6 0,0 ­0,5 0,6 1,2 0,4 0,2 0,2 
0,7 ­0,6 0,4 0,9 1,0 1,2 0,2 ­0 ,3 0,2 0,3 
1,0 0,8 0,1 ­0,3 0,6 1,8 0,5 ­0,4 0,6 0,5 
1,9 1,4 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1,0 
-0,1 
1,3 
1,4 
-1,4 
-0,6 
-0,2 
0,0 
1,2 
0,0 
0,6 
2,1 
1,3 
-0,3 
-1,3 
1,8 
0,8 
1,0 
1,2 
-0,5 
0,4 
0,4 
1,1 
­u -2,7 
-0,5 
0,1 
0,8 
1,7 
1,6 
0,3 
0,5 
1,0 
0,1 
0,1 
2,3 
0,8 
0,4 
0,6 
1,3 
0,5 
0,3 
2,0 
0,7 
-1,6 
-1,1 
-0,7 
,-1.7 
-1,7 
-3,0 
0,5 
0,6 
1,4 
0,9 
-0,9 
0,8 
0,8 
0,4 
0,1 
0,1 
-0,4 
0,3 
1,4 
1,4' 
-0,8 
-0,8 
1,8 
2,5 
3,2 
1,0 
-0,1 
-0,6 
2,2 
2,0 
0,1 
1,5 
1,0 
0,5 
1,5 
1,9 
3,2 
2,7 
1,9 
2,8 
1,2 
-0,1 
-0,1 
-0,6 
0,5 
0,7 
0,5 
-0,9 
0,1 
0,2 
-0,7 
0,0 
0,2 
0,7 
1,3 
0,7 
0,3 
-0,3 
-0,5 
-0,5 
-2,6 
-0,2 
0,8 
-1,5 
2,1 
-0,3 
-0,9 
-0,1 
2,3 
0,3 
-0,4 
-0,8 
0,1 
0,6 
1,5 
-0,3 
0,1 
0,1 
1,6 
0,4 
-1,1 
0,1 
0,4 
0,3 
1,0 
0,4 
-0,4 
2,5 
4,3 
1,6 
-2,1 
2,8 
3,5 
5,0 
3,2 
0,2 
0,7 
0,5 
2,3 
-0,4 
-0,2 
0,8 
1,2 
1,0 
1,0 
0,7 
2,0 0,7 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-1,9 
-1,3 
-1,0 
-0,2 
0,6 
0,6 
0,5 
1,5 
1,6 
1,1 
-1,3 
0,4 
0,3 
1,7 
2,5 
2,6 
0,9 
-0,6 
-0,7 
-0,5 
-0,1 
-L2 
-1,4 
0,2 
0,7 
1,4 
0,7 
0,8 
1,5 
3,0 
4,9 
-0,8 
1,0 
0,3 
0,9 
0,3 
-0,1 
1,6 
0,4 
1,1 
-2,6 
-0,9 
-0,5 
-2,4 
-1,3 
1,4 
4,5 
3,4 
3,5 
2,8 
-0,6 
0Í 
-0,4 
-0,9 
-0,3 
0,1 
0,3 
0,8 
1,1 
1,0 
-0,9 
0,0 
-1,9 
-1,9 
-2,2 
0,2 
-ο,ι 
1,0 
-ο,ι 3,3 
0,0 
0,6 
0,6 
0,4 
0,9 
0,8 
0,4 
0,9 
0,1 
1,1 
0,3 
-0,3 
-0,3 
0,6 
1,4 
2,6 
2,8 
3,1 
3,7 
4,3 
-1,5 
-2,5 
-1,9 
-ο,ι 
1,5 
2,0 
1,4 
1,6 
1,9 
2,3 
1,0 
-1,9 
-υ -1,5 
0,0 
-2,7 
0,5 
0,1 
1,0 
0,9 
-3,9 
-1,8 
-1,2 
2,6 
1,3 
0,1 
2,1 
3,3 
3,0 
0,7 
-1,1 
-0,8 
-0,6 
0,2 
0,5 
0,7 
1,2 
1,6 
. 1,6 
1,6 
0,9 
-1,6 
1,0 
4,9 
2,4 
1,7 
3,5 
2,8 
2,4 
Μ i ·2 
0,8 
0,8 
1,5 
0,3 
0,6 
0,9 
0,9 
1,7 
2,0 
2,1 
1,9 1,1 
1991 
1992 
1993 
-0,3 
-0,7 
-0,7 
-0,9 
-0,7 
0,1 
2,6 
0,8 
­ ι ,ο 
-1,5 
-ι,ο 
-1,6 
-0,5 
­ο,ι 
0,2 
-1,6 
-1,6 
0,4 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-ο,ι 
0,1 
0,1 
0,8 
0,1 
0,0 
3,6 
1,5 
1,5 
1,3 
0,4 
-0,4 
0,9 
-0,2 
-0,5 
-3,1 
-2,3 
-1,7 
0,2 
-0,5 
-0,8 
­ ι ,ο 
-0,8 
-1,6 
0,7 
1,0 
1,9 
0,5 
0,2 
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Table 3 
Unemployment rate'1 
(Percentage of civilian labour force) 
Β DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR9­
b 
EUR 12­ USA 
1960 3,1 1,6 1,0 0,7 4,7 7,2 0,1 0,7 1,6 2,5 5,4 1,7 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1964-70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
2,5 
2,0 
1,5 
1,5 
1,4 
1,6 
1,7 
2,4 
2,8 
2,2 
1,8 
2,0 
1,7 
2,2 
2,2 
2,3 
4,2 
5,5 
6,3 
6,8 
7,0 
7,4 
1,2 
1,1 
1,5 
0,9 
1,2 
0,9 
1,1 
1,0 
1,0 
0,9 
0,6 
1,0 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
2,8 
3,9 
5,1 
5,9 
6,7 
4,8 
5,2 
0,7 
0,6 
0,7 
0,6 
0,5 
0,4 
0,5 
1,4 
1,0 
0,6 
0,5 
0,7 
0,6 
0,8 
0,8 
1,8 
3,3 
3,3 
3,2 
3,1 
2,7 
2,7 
4,6 
4,8 
5,0 
5,4 
5,6 
5,2 
4,2 
5,0 
3,1 
2,1 
2,0 
2,1 
2,3 
1,9 
1,7 
1,8 
1,9 
2,7 
1,4 
2,8 
2,6 
2,2 
3,0 
3,0 
2,5 
2,6 
2,7 
3,4 
2,9 
. 2,6 
3,1 
4,5 
4,9 
5,3 
7,1 
8,8 
11,6 
0,6 
0,7 
0,7 
0,6 
1,2 
1,5 
1,6 
2,1 
2,6 
2,3 
2,4 
2,0 
2,7 
2,8 
2,7 
2,8 
4,0 
4,4 
4,9 
5,1 
5,8 
6,2 
4,3 
4,2 
4,5 
4,3 
5,2 
5,0 
5,1 
5,5 
5,8 
5,5 
6,3 
5,5 
6,0 
6,7 
6,2 
5,8 
7,9 
9,8 
9,7 
9,0 
7,8 
8,0 
6,6 
5,5 
5,1 
5,2 
4,0 
5,0 
5,4 
5,0 
5,3 
5,3 
5,1 
5,0 
5,1 
6,0 
5,9 
5,0 
5,5 
6,2 
6,7 
6,7 
7,2 
7,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,2 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
1,2 
2,4 
2,4 
0,5 
0,5 
0,6 
0,5 
0,5 
0,6 
0,8 
1,7 
1,5 
1,1 
1,0 
1,0 
1,3 
2,3 
2,4 
2,9 
5,5 
5,8 
5,6 
5,6 
5,7 
6,4 
2,5 
2,5 
2,5 
2,5 
2,6 
2,6 
2,6 
2,5 
2,5 
2,5 
2,6 
1,7 
4,4 
6,2 
7,3 
7,9 
7,9 
7,6 
1,4 
1,9 
2,3 
1,6 
1,4 
1,2 
1,1 
2,0 
2,1 
2,0 
2,2 
1,7 
2,7 
3,1 
2,2 
2,0 
3,2 
4,8 
5,1 
5,0 
4,6 
5,6 
2,2 
2,0 
2,1 
1,9 
1,6 
1,8 
1,9 
2,5 
2,6 
2,3 
2,3 
2,1 
2,5 
2,9 
2,7 
2,8 
4,0 
4,7 
5,0 
5,1 
5,0 
5,4 
1,9 
2,0 
2,0 
2,6 
2,7 
2,4 
2,4 
2,3 
2,6 
2,8 
2,6 
2,8 
4,0 
4,7 
5,1 
5,3 
5,4 
6,0 
6,5 
5,4 
5,5 
5,0 
5,2 
4,5 
3,8 
3,8 
3,6 
3,5 
4,9 
4,2 
6,0 
5,6 
4,9 
5,6 
8,5 
7,7 
7,1 
6,1 
5,8 
7,1 
1,5 
1,3 
1,3 
1,1 
1,2 
1,2 
1,3 
1,3 
1,2 
1,1 
1,2 
1,2 
1,2 
1,4 
1,3 
1,4 
1,9 
2,0 
2,0 
2,3 
2,2 
2,0 
1971­80 4,6 3,7 2,2 2,2 5,4 4,1 7,7 6,1 0,6 4,4 5,1 3,8 4,0 4,1 6,4 1,8 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
9,5 
11,2 
12,5 
12,5 
11,8 
11,7 
11,3 
10,2 
8,6 
7,6 
8,3 
8,9 
9,2 
8,7 
7,2 
5,5 
5,6 
6,4 
7,7 
8,1 
3,9 
5,6 
6,9 
7,1 
7,1 
6,5 
6,3 
6,3 
5,6 
4,8 
4,0 
5,8 
7,9 
8,1 
7,7 
7,4 
7,4 
7,6 
7,4 
7,2 
14,4 
16,3 
17,8 
20,6 
21,6 
21,0 
20,4 
19,3 
17,1 
16,1 
7.3 
8,0 
8,2 
9.7 
10,1 
10,3 
10,4 
9,9 
9,4 
9,0 
10,8 
12,5 
15,2 
16,8 
18,2 
18,2 
18,0 
17,3 
15,7 
14,5 
7,4 
8,0 
8,7 
9,3 
9,6 
10,5 
10,3 
10,8 
10,6 
9,9 
2,4 
2,4 
3,5 
3,1 
2,9 
2,6 
2,5 
2,0 
1,8 
1,7 
8,9 
11,9 
12,4 
12,3 
10,5 
10,3 
10,0 
9,3 
8,5 
7,5 
7,3 
7,2 
8,1 
8,7 
8,8 
8,3 
6,9 
5,7 
5,0 
4,6 
8,9 
10,3 
11,0 
11,0 
11,4 
11,4 
10,4 
8,5 
7,1 
7,0 
7,1 
8,3 
9,1 
9,6 
9,7 
9,7 
9,4 
8,8 
8,1 
7,5 
7,7 
9,0 
9,9 
10,6 
10,8 
10,7 
10,3 
9,8 
8,9 
8,3 
7,6 
9,7 
9,6 
7,5 
7,2 
7,0 
6,2 
5,5 
5,3 
5,5 
2,2 
2,4 
2,7 
2,7 
2,6 
2,8 
2,8 
2,5 
2,3 
2,1 
1981­90 10,7 7,6 6,0 7,1 18,5 9,2 15,7 9,5 2,5 10,2 7,1 9,7 8,7 9,6 7,1 2,5 
1991 
1992 
1993 
7,5 
8,2 
9,3 
8,9 
9,5 
9,5 
4,2 
4,5 
6,0 
7,7 
7,7 
8,5 
16,3 
18,0 
19,5 
9,5 
10,1 
10,8 
16,2 
17,8 
19,2 
10,2 
10,2 
10,6 
1,6 
1,9 
2,0 
7,0 
6,7 
7,6 
4,1 
4,8 
5,4 
9,1 
10,8 
12,3 
8,1 
8,7 
9,7 
8,8 
9,5 
10,6 
6,7 
7,3 
7,2 
2,1 
2,1 
2,2 
■ Definition Eurostat. b EUR 12 cxcl. Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
« OECD. 
Table 4 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
Β DK WD D GR E F IRL I L NL Ρ UK EUR 12-
(PPS) 
(National currency; Mrd) 
EUR 12+ USA J 
(PPS) 
1960 557,0 41,15 302,7 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
592,4 
633,7 
681,3 
762,5 
830,0 
892,1 
955,4 
1 022,3 
1134,2 
1 262,1 
331,7 
360,8 
382,4 
420,2 
459,2 
488,2 
494,4 
533,3 
597,0 
675,3 
749,8 
823,1 
917,3 
983,9 
1 026,6 
1 120,5 
1195,3 
1 283,6 
1 388,4 
1 472,0 
1 535,0 
1 588,1 
1 668,5 
1 750,9 
1 823,2 
1 925,3 
1 990,5 
2 096,0 
2224,4 
2417,8 
1991 6722,9 833,12 2 612,6 2 798,8 
1992 7 038,2 862,01 2 772,0 3 003,5 
1993 7 289,4 892,18 2 854,7 3130,8 
1971 1382,0 
1972 1 545,4 
1973 1 755,0 
1974 2 056,8 
1975 2271,1 
1976 2 578,9 
1977 2 785,3 
1978 2987,5 
1979 3188,8 
1980 3451,2 
45,66 
51,45 
54,77 
62,60 
70,32 
77,18 
84,81 
94,36 
107,32 
118,63 
131,12 
150,73 
172,86 
193,63 
216,26 
251,21 
279,31 
311,38 
346,89 
373,79 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
3 577,7 
3 889,0 
4 124,1 
4432,6 
4 740,8 
4 990,8 
5 213,2 
5 571,0 
6052,8 
6 426,4 
407,79 
464,47 
512,54 
565,28 
615,07 
666,50 
699,91 
732,06 
769,80 
800,01 
105 706 300,7 0,631 24792 26,11 45,50 71 25,86 213,2 
119 
126 
141 
158 
180 
200 
216 
235 
266 
299 
330 
378 
484 
564 
672 
825 
964 
1 161 
1429 
1711 
2 050 
2 575 
3 079 
3 806 
4 618 
5 515 
6 258 
7 526 
8 778 
10 569 
12 863 
15 090 
17 286 
804 
929 
1097 
1238 
1441 
1667 
1872 
2 099 
2 387 
2 654 
2 995 
3 514 
4 237 
5189 
6091 
7 329 
9 298 
11376 
13 305 
15 379 
17179 
19 786 
22 484 
25 392 
28 201 
32 324 
36144 
40164 
45 025 
50 074 
54 775 
58 903 
62 283 
328,0 
366,2 
410,6 
455,4 
490,3 
530,7 
573,3 
623,1 
710,5 
793,5 
884,2 
987,9 
1129,8 
1 303,0 
1467,9 
1700,6 
1 917,8 
2 182,6 
2481,1 
2 808,3 
3164,8 
3 626,0 
4006,5 
4361,9 
4 700,1 
5 069,3 
5 336,7 
5 735,1 
6 159,1 
6492,0 
6766,5 
7 094,7 
7 370,7 
0,680 
0,736 
0,791 
0,901 
0,959 
1,010 
1,104 
1,245 
1,438 
1,620 
1,853 
2,238 
2,701 
2,988 
3,792 
4,653 
5,703 
6,757 
7,917 
9,361 
11,359 
13,382 
14,779 
16,407 
17,790 
18,874 
20,280 
27 573 
30979 
35 484 
38 843 
41796 
45 286 
49 884 
54 071 
59 692 
67178 
72994 
79 810 
96738 
122190 
138 632 
174 869 
214 398 
253 536 
309 834 
387 669 
464 030 
545 124 
633 436 
725 760 
810 580 
899903 
983 803 
21,886 1 091 837 
24,399 1193 462 
26,003 1311638 
26,984 1 427 342 
28,578 1 517 799 
29,870 1 598 668 
26,12 
27,50 
29,34 
33,50 
35,10 
36,88 
37,12 
40,61 
47,02 
55,04 
56,05 
63,21 
76,82 
93,64 
86,74 
99,81 
102,56 
112,22 
122,15 
132,93 
141,69 
158,79 
174,68 
193,67 
205,26 
223,30 
227,55 
250,21 
282,83 
300,41 
318,80 
333,01 
353,69 
48,03 
51,71 
56,10 
66,01 
73,73 
80,28 
88,07 
97,66 
110,60 
124,11 
139,83 
157,99 
180,30 
204,61 
225,28 
258,03 
281,58 
304,20 
323,61 
344,89 
361,39 
377,79 
390,24 
409,94 
428,30 
438,98 
440,58 
457,41 
484,67 
516,32 
543,56 
565,38 
584,69 
77 
82 
89 
96 
107 
118 
132 
146 
160 
178 
199 
232 
282 
339 
377 
469 
626 
787 
993 
1256 
1501 
1850 
2 302 
2 816 
3 524 
4420 
5175 
6003 
7130 
8 507 
9911 
11393 
12 465 
27,42 
28,82 
30,55 
33,39 
35,96 
38,28 
40,30 
43,67 
47,00 
51,61 
57,58 
64,46 
74,07 
83,70 
105,60 
125,03 
145,74 
168,13 
197,81 
231,23 
254,20 
278,09 
•303,38 
324,79 
356,10 
383,68 
422,29 
469,67 
513,60 
548,62 
572,40 
593,07 
622,01 
232,2 
254,0 
278,4 
308,0 
336,1 
363,1 
387,2 
421,2 
469,3 
524,6 
582,2 
650,0 
752,3 
868,3 
986,8 
1155,0 
1 328,4 
1 512,9 
1 733,8 
1 981,0 
2 198,7 
2448,4 
2 698,1 
2948,9 
3 201,4 
3476,0 
3 720,9 
4045,4 
4 390,1 
4 751,5 
5080,3 
5 371,3 
5 612,4 
514,7 16011 
533,0 
573,2 
604,8 
649,5 
704,1 
771,2 
815,1 
890,0 
961,1 
1 011,6 
1 098,1 
1 207,9 
1 350,5 
1460,6 
1 587,6 
1 770,4 
1 975,4 
2229,5 
2486,0 
2 708,1 
3 035,8 
3 152,5 
3 394,3 
3 763,5 
4016,6 
4230,8 
4496,6 
4 854,0 
5 204,5 
5464,8 
19336 
21943 
25114 
29 541 
32 866 
38170 
44 730 
52976 
62 228 
73 345 
80 701 
92 395 
112497 
134244 
148 328 
166 573 
185622 
204404 
221546 
240177 
257 963 
270 602 
281 767 
300 543 
320419 
334609 
348 425 
371 428 
396 197 
425 736 
5171,0 5 610,8 452 923 
5482,8 5 871,0 468451 
5 744,4 6163,9 484037 
185 
Table 5 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
(ECU; Mrd) 
Β DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + USA 
1960 10,5 5,6 68,2 3,3 11,1 57,7 1,7 37,6 0,5 11,3 2,4 68,5 278,5 487,3 42,1 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
11,1 
11,8 
12,7 
14,3 
15,5 
16,7 
17,9 
19,9 
22,2 
24,7 
27,2 
31,3 
36,7 
44,8 
49,8 
59,7 
68,1 
74,6 
79,4 
85,0 
86,6 
87,0 
90,8 
97,5 
105,6 
114,0 
121,1 
128,3 
139,5 
151,5 
159,2 
169,2 
180,9 
6,2 
7,0 
7,4 
8,5 
9,5 
10,4 
11,4 
12,2 
14,0 
15,5 
16,9 
19,4 
23,3 
26,9 
30,4 
37,2 
40,7 
44,4 
48,1 
47,8 
51,5 
56,9 
63,0 
69,4 
76,7 
84,0 
88,8 
92,1 
95,6 
101,8 
105,3 
110,4 
117,7 
77,0 
84,3 
89,4 
98,2 
107,3 
114,1 
116,1 
129,6 
148,3 
180,5 
205,7 
230,1 
280,0 
318,8 
336,7 
398,0 
451,3 
502,2 
552,9 
583,2 
610,6 
668,4 
734,9 
782,3 
818,9 
904,7 
960,9 
1 010,4 
1074,5 
1178,2 
1274,0 1364,1 
1372,1 I486,' 
1457,2 1598,: 
3,7 
3,9 
4,4 
4,9 
5,6 
6,2 
6,8 
7,6 
8,7 
9,7 
10,5 
11,2 
13,1 
15,8 
16,8 
20,2 
22,9 
24,8 
28,1 
28,8 
33,3 
39,4 
39,4 
43,0 
43,7 
40,1 
• 40,0 
44,9 
49,1 
52,5 
i 57,1 
1 61,1 
! 64,0 
12,6 
14,5 
17,1 
19,3 
22,5 
26,0 
28,8 
29,1 
33,4 
37,2 
41,3 
48,8 
59,0 
75,4 
86,7 
98,1 
107,1 
116,8 
144,7 
154,3 
167,3 
184,0 
176,3 
200,6 
218,4 
235,2 
254,2 
291,9 
345,3 
386,9 
426,4 
444,5 
445,2 
62,2 
69,3 
77,7 
86,2 
92,8 
100,5 
109,1 
122,7 
134,3 
139,8 
153,2 
174,6 
206,6 
229,6 
276,0 
318,2 
342,1 
380,3 
425,6 
478,5 
524,0 
563,8 
591,7 
634,8 
691,7 
745,5 
770,2 
815,1 
876,9 
938,9 
970,3 
1036,0 
1103,3 
1,8 
1,9 
2,1 
2,4 
2,5 
2,6 
2,8 
2,9 
3,4 
3,8 
4,3 
5,0 
5,4 
5,8 
6,8 
7,5 
8,7 
10,2 
11,8 
13,8 
16,4 
19,4 
20,7 
22,6 
24,9 
25,7 
26,2 
28,2 
31,4 
33,9 
35,1 
37,6 
40,3 
41,3 
46,3 
53,1 
58,1 
62,5 
67,7 
75,0 
84,1 
93,4 
105,1 
112,7 
122,0 
135,0 
154,3 
171,2 
188,0 
213,0 
234,7 
272,2 
326,0 
367,4 
411,8 
469,2 
525,4 
559,8 
615,6 
658,1 
710,2 
790,1 
861,8 
930,9 
951,3 
913,3 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,7 
0,7 
0,8 
0,9 
1,1 
1,1 
1,3 
1,6 
2,0 
1,9 
2,3 
2,5 
2,8 
3,0 
3,3 
3,4 
3,6 
3,8 
4,3 
4,6 
5,1 
5,3 
5,8 
6,5 
7,1 
7,6 
8,0 
8,8 
12,3 
13,4 
14,5 
17,0 
19,0 
20,7 
22,8 
26,2 
29,9 
33,5 
38,2 
43,9 
52,6 
64,5 
71,9 
87,3 
100,6 
110,5 
117,7 
124,9 
130,2 
144,5 
153,8 
162,5 
170,6 
182,8 
188,8 
195,9 
207,5 
223,3 
235,2 
248,5 
265,5 
2,5 
2,7 
2,9 
3,1 
3,5 
3,8 
4,3 
4,9 
5,4 
6,1 
6,7 
7,6 
9,3 
11,3 
12,0 
13,9 
14,3 
14,1 
14,8 
18,1 
21,9 
23,7 
23,3 
24,3 
27,1 
30,1 
31,8 
35,3 
41,1 
47,0 
55,5 
65,2 
70,9 
71,9 
75,4 
80,0 
87,4 
94,1 
100,2 
104,0 
101,9 
110,3 
121,2 
134,3 
143,6 
147,5 
163,0 
188,6 
201,1 
222,9 
253,2 
306,1 
386,4 
459,6 
496,2 
516,8 
549,9 
604,6 
571,3 
599,4 
706,9 
762,8 
768,5 
816,5 
804,0 
779,2 
303,2 
331,1 
361,7 
400,0 
435,6 
469,7 
499,6 
541,9 
604,2 
678,1 
752,2 
838,8 
970,1 
1112,3 
1248,6 
1 431,5 
1594,3 
1768,4 
2004,5 
2250,0 
2472,2 
2698,7 
2883,9 
3 116,6 
3 346,4 
3 554,0 
3744,7 
4064,9 
4420,4 
4751,5 
499,4 
535,8 
565,3 
607,2 
658,1 
720,9 
765,5 
865,0 
940,2 
989,6 
1048,1 
1076,8 
1096,4 
1215,0 
1 279,5 
1 583,4 
1 731,1 
1 749,9 
1 813,9 
1 945,1 
2719,2 
3 217,8 
3 812,9 
4 769,7 
5263,7 
4298,8 
3 895,0 
4104,9 
4 723,9 
4 291,4 
5073,2 5164,0 4527,9 
5307,8 5422,4 4 522,8 
5446,0 5 587,0 4995,6 
50,3 
57,0 
65,2 
76,7 
85,3 
99,1 
116,7 
143,0 
169,1 
199,3 
221,8 
272,0 
337,7 
395,2 
411,2 
502,9 
607,0 
765,3 
737,4 
762,4 
1051,3 
1111,1 
1 333,2 
1606,4 
1 774,6 
2028,0 
2 091,4 
2452,3 
2607,6 
2 318,1 
2720,4 
2852,5 
3 176,6 
186 
m M ■ 
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Table 6 
Gross domestic product at current market prit 
■ 
(PPS EUR 12-; Mrd) 
Β DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
1960 6,8 4,0 52,6 
1961 7,4 4,4 56,8 
1962 8,1 4,9 62,0 
1963 8,9 5,2 66,8 
1964 9,9 5,9 74,5 
1965 10,7 6,4 82,1 
1966 11,5 6,9 87,7 
1967 12,4 7,3 90,2 
1968 13,3 7,9 98,4 
1969 14,9 8,8 111,0 
1970 16,9 9,6 124,6 
1971 18,9 10,6 138,0 
1972 21,3 11,9 154,1 
1973 24,5 13,5 176,2 
1974 28,9 15,1 200,0 
1975 32,7 17,2 226,4 
1976 38,6 20,5 266,5 
1977 43,3 23,3 306,3 
1978 49,1 26,1 348,2 
1979 55,6 29,9 401,3 
1980 65,4 33,6 457,6 
1981 71,8 36,9 508,3 
1982 80,6 42,0 556,6 
1983 87,8 46,7 613,2 
1984 95,8 52,1 673,2 
1985 102,3 57,6 726,9 
1986 109,7 63,0 784,8 
1987 116,5 65,8 828,4 
1988 127,7 69,5 897,4 
1989 139,2 73,6 974,4 
1990 151,5 78,8 1077,7 
1991 162,8 84,2 1178,6 1262,6 
1992 172,0 88,9 1251,6 1346,0 
1993 179,4 93,9 1292,2 1396,3 
2,2 13,6 37,5 1,2 33,2 0,4 10,2 2,4 49,0 213,2 251,7 38,8 
2,5 
2,7 
3,1 
3,5 
4,0 
4,4 
4,8 
5,3 
6,1 
7,1 
8,2 
9,5 
11,1 
12,1 
14,8 
17,6 
20,3 
23,9 
27,4 
31,5 
34,9 
38,8 
42,2 
46,4 
50,7 
54,4 
56,2 
61,1 
66,4 
69,8 
75,0 
79,6 
84,0 
15,7 
17,9 
20,4 
22,7 
25,2 
28,1 
30,2 
33,3 
38,1 
42,4 
47,7 
55,1 
64,7 
77,2 
89,1 
102,8 
118,3 
132,5 
146,5 
167,3 
185,0 
207,0 
228,6 
248,6 
269,5 
293,8 
323,0 
354,8 
390,3 
425,6 
459,4 
486,2 
509,5 
40,9 
45,6 
50,3 
56,1 
61,4 
67,2 
72,5 
78,1 
87,8 
99,1 
111,7 
124,5 
143,0 
166,4 
190,3 
222,1 
256,9 
293,1 
334,9 
383,0 
429,8 
486,0 
531,3 
576,0 
621,5 
672,2 
714,7 
778,3 
848,1 
912,7 
973,2 
1037,9 
1087,9 
1,3 
1,4 
1,6 
1,7 
1,8 
1,9 
2,1 
2,4 
2,6 
2,9 
3,2 
3,6 
4,2 
4,9 
5,9 
6,7 
8,1 
9,6 
11,0 
12,8 
14,7 
16,6 
17,9 
20,0 
21,8 
23,0 
25,1 
27,5 
30,7 
35,0 
37,9 
40,8 
43,2 
37,1 
41,1 
45,6 
49,0 
52,9 
58,2 
64,4 
70,9 
79,0 
88,8 
97,0 
106,7 
124,6 
148,8 
166,2 
198,0 
228,7 
261,7 
307,1 
361,1 
402,7 
446,0 
488,5 
535,9 
582,6 
633,3 
679,8 
738,9 
798,6 
859,3 
919,1 
972,5 
1017,5 
0,4 
0,4 
0,4 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 
0,6 
0,6 
0,7 
0,8 
0,8 
1,0 
1,2 
1,5 
1,4 
1,6 
1,8 
2,0 
2,3 
2,6 
2,9 
3,3 
3,6 
4,0 
4,4 
5,0 
5,1 
5,7 
6,5 
7,0 
7,6 
8,1 
8,5 
10,9 
11,8 
12,9 
14,5 
16,0 
17,1 
18,6 
20,4 
22,8 
25,8 
28,9 
31,9 
36,5 
42,9 
49,2 
57,8 
66,1 
74,7 
84,7 
96,4 
106,2 
115,7 
127,2 
140,2 
152,4 
164,2 
172,2 
184,6 
202,9 
221,8 
239,2 
253,5 
264,8 
2,6 
2,9 
3,2 
3,6 
4,0 
4,4 
4,9 
5,5 
6,0 
6,9 
7,9 
9,1 
11,0 
12,6 
13,9 
16,6 
19,5 
22,2 
25,9 
30,6 
34,5 
38,9 
42,1 
44,1 
48,1 
52,9 
57,9 
62,9 
69,4 
76,3 
82,0 
87,2 
91,7 
52,2 
55,1 
60,0 
66,2 
70,9 
75,1 
79,2 
85,2 
91,4 
99,7 
109,4 
121,2 
141,8 
157,8 
179,7 
206,3 
235,8 
269,7 
307,2 
339,0 
371,0 
417,0 
468,9 
512,6 
563,5 
619,8 
676,2 
736,8 
789,9 
835,7 
861,4 
892,9 
939,8 
232,2 
254,0 
278,4 
308,0 
336,1 
363,1 
387,2 
421,2 
469,3 
524,6 
582,2 
650,0 
752,3 
868,3 
986,8 
1155,0 
1 328,4 
1 512,9 
1 733,8 
1 981,0 
2 198,7 
2448,4 
2698,1 
2948,9 
3 201,4 
3476,0 
3 720,9 
4045,4 
4390,1 
4 751,5 
5080,3 
5371,3 
5612,4 
266,8 
293,2 
320,0 
353,3 
389,8 
429,0 
453,7 
488,2 
527,4 
562,7 
622,4 
700,5 
803,3 
904,6 
1029,4 
1 207,2 
1409,2 
1627,0 
1 847,5 
2075,3 
2 345,8 
2 535,0 
2845,2 
3 226,1 
3 520,2 
3 813,2 
4087,7 
4438,2 
4781,0 
5065,1 
44,9 
51,1 
58,1 
67,9 
75,1 
86,4 
98,9 
115,4 
136,4 
161,2 
180,7 
209,4 
245,7 
276,5 
326,4 
380,2 
444,8 
514,9 
601,6 
703,4 
807,9 
921,2 
1026.3 
1 143,1 
1 271,7 
1 378,4 
1493.4 
1 656,8 
1 821,6 
2017,4 
5164,3 5271,8 2221,3 
5465,7 5624,2 2359,0 
5 716,5 5974,7 2484,9 
187 
Table 7 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
Β DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + 
(PPS) (PPS) 
USA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
6,4 
7,0 
7,5 
11,9 8,8 
7,5 
7,1 
7,0 
10,9 
11,3 
11,0 
12,7 
6,4 
14,3 
12,3 
9,8 
9,9 
11,3 
13,7 
10,5 
9,6 
8,8 
6,0 
9,9 
9,3 
6,3 
1,3 
7,9 
11,9 
13,1 
12,8 
6,2 
11,7 
12,3 
13,8 
11,2 
8,1 
8,5 
13,6 
12,2 
13,9 
15,6 
18,0 
12,9 
16,4 
15,7 
12,3 
12,1 
13,7 
11,2 
9,1 
11,7 
12,1 
10,9 
7,6 
8,3 
8,0 
8,7 
14,0 
11,7 
7,7 
8,3 
7,5 
13,8 
6,5 
5,4 
9,2 
12,8 
15,5 
12,6 
11,2 
12,4 
14,5 
9,5 
7,6 
8,4 
10,2 
8,4 
10,4 
12,5 
0,0 
5,3 
6,7 
14,2 
4,8 
5,1 
0,6 
9,4 
15,8 
17,1 
5,6 
7,7 
8,5 
17,7 
11,7 
8,9 
9,7 
10,9 
13,3 
12,2 
7,6 
6,4 
8,5 
8,5 
11,7 
9,6 
11,8 
10,7 
9,7 
11,3 
6,0 
5,1 
6,0 
9,3 
7,7 
6,5 
5,3 
8,4 
7,6 
9,8 
8,9 
9,4 
9,6 
10,6 
9,1 
8,0 
6,6 
8,8 
11,4 
11,8 
3,6 
7,5 
5,5 
7,4 
8,4 
9,5 
5,7 
9,2 
8,0 
5,3 
20,8 
13,5 
14,5 
17,6 
11,3 
16,1 
17,2 
18,4 
17,5 
17,9 
1961-70 8,5 11,2 8,4 11,0 14,2 10,2 9,9 10,5 7,7 10,6 9,5 7,2 9,4 7,0 16,4 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
9,5 
11,8 
13,6 
17,2 
10,4 
13,6 
8,0 
7,3 
6,7 
8,2 
10,5 
15,0 
14,7 
12,0 
11,7 
16,2 
11,2 
11,5 
11,4 
7,8 
11,0 
9,8 
11,4 
7,3 
4,3 
9,1 
6,7 
7,4 
8,2 
6,0 
10,5 
14,4 
28,2 
16,5 
19,1 
22,7 
16,8 
20,5 
23,0 
19,7 
12,9 
17,3 
20,6 
22,5 
17,4 
20,3 
26,9 
22,4 
17,0 
15,6 
11,4 
11,7 
14,4 
15,3 
12,7 
15,9 
12,8 
13,8 
13,7 
13,2 
14,4 
20,7 
20,7 
10,6 
26,9 
22,7 
22,6 
18,5 
17,2 
18,2 
8,7 
9,3 
21,2 
26,3 
13,5 
26,1 
22,6 
18,3 
22,2 
25,1 
1,8 
12,8 
21,5 
21,9 
-7,4 
15,1 
2,8 
9,4 
8,8 
8,8 
12,7 
13,0 
14,1 
13,5 
10,1 
14,5 
9,1 
8,0 
6,4 
6,6 
12,0 
16,4 
21,7 
20,2 
11,2 
24,3 
33,5 
25,8 
26,2 
26,5 
11,6 
12,0 
14,9 
13,0 
26,2 
18,4 
16,6 
15,4 
17,7 
16,9 
11,0 
11,6 
15,7 
15,4 
13,6 
17,0 
15,0 
13,9 
14,6 
14,3 
8,6 
10,0 
11,8 
8,2 
8,7 
11,5 
11,6 
12,9 
11,5 
8,9 
10,0 
14,5 
21,8 
19,3 
10,5 
12,3 
11,4 
10,1 
8,4 
8,4 
1971-80 10,6 12,2 8,1 19,1 19,2 13,5 19,2 19,2 9,2 10,8 21,6 16,2 14,2 10,3 12,6 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
3,7 
8,7 
6,0 
7,5 
7,0 
5,3 
4,5 
6,9 
8,6 
6,2 
9,1 
13,9 
10,4 
10,3 
8,8 
8,4 
5,0 
4,6 
5,2 
3,9 
4,3 
3,5 
5,1 
4,9 
4,1 
5,6 
3,4 
5,3 
6,1 
8,7 
19,8 
25,6 
19,6 
23,6 
21,3 
19,4 
13,5 
20,3 
16,6 
20,4 
11,7 
15,2 
13,6 
12,9 
11,1 
14,6 
11,8 
11,1 
12,1 
11,2 
12,7 
14,6 
10,5 
8,9 
7,8 
7,9 
5,3 
7,5 
7,4 
5,4 
21,3 
17,8 
10,4 
11,0 
8,4 
6,1 
7,4 
7,9 
11,5 
6,6 
19,7 
17,5 
16,2 
14,6 
11,7 
11,0 
9,3 
11,0 
9,3 
9,9 
6,6 
12,1 
10,0 
10,9 
6,0 
8,8 
1,9 
10,0 
13,0 
6,2 
4,8 
4,5 
3,3 
5,0 
4,5 
2,5 
0,4 
3,8 
6,0 
6,5 
19,5 
23,3 
24,4 
22,3 
25,2 
25,4 
17,1 
16,0 
18,8 
19,3 
9,9 
9,4 
9,1 
7,1 
9,6 
7,7 
10,1 
11,2 
9,4 
6,8 
11,0 
11,4 
10,2 
9,3 
8,6 
8,6 
7,0 
8,7 
8,5 
8,2 
2,1 
3,8 
7,7 
0,9 
6,7 
5,3 
6,3 
7,9 
7,2 
5,0 
7,4 
4,9 
4,1 
6,7 
6,6 
4,4 
4,1 
6,6 
6,7 
7,5 
1981-90 6,4 7,9 5,1 20,0 12,5 8,7 10,8 13,0 8,5 4,1 21,1 9,0 9,1 7,3 5,9 
1991 
1992 
1993 
4,6 
4,7 
3,6 
4,1 
3,5 
3,5 
8,1 
6,1 
3,0 
7,3 
4,2 
21,7 
17,3 
14,5 
9,4 
7,5 
5,7 
4,2 
4,8 
3,9 
3,8 
5,9 
4,5 
8,8 
6,3 
5,3 
6,1 
4,5 
6,2 
5,3 
4,0 
3,4 
16,5 
15,0 
9,4 
4,3 
3,6 
4,9 
6,9 
5,7 
4,5 
6,0 
4,8 
2,7 
4,6 
5,0 
6,4 
3,4 
3,3 
188 
Table 8 
Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population 
■ 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Β 
115,6 
112,4 
110,5 
109,0 
110,2 
110,1 
109,9 
111,2 
113,8 
114,5 
114,2 
113,9 
118,0 
120,0 
127,9 
126,9 
133,0 
136,5 
135,1 
127,3 
121,8 
113,3 
104,4 
102,2 
101,9 
102,9 
104,8 
105,9 
103,2 
103,5 
104,9 
103,7 
105,6 
110,4 
DK 
123,5 
124,9 
128,9 
125,8 
130,1 
134,4 
136,7 
140,2 
138,4 
142,4 
140,1 
138,2 
141,9 
147,7 
148,8 
149,7 
159,9 
157,6 
154,7 
148,3 
131,4 
129,5 
131,6 
136,8 
139,7 
144,1 
148,7 
149,4 
143,2 
137,3 
136,7 
132,8 
133,3 
138,9 
WD D GR 
123,5 
127,5 
127,6 
123,8 
122,8 
123,0 
121,1 
116,3 
120,0 
122,8 
132,8 
136,1 
136,6 
143,8 
143,3 
135,8 
141,3 
144,7 
145,8 
142,1 
133,6 
127,6 
128,3 
132,8 
131,6 
128,9 
134,4 
135,8 
131,2 
127,6 
128,6 
129,2 110,8 
131,7 114,9 
135,2 119,9 
40,0 
: 41,0 
: 40,0 
41,1 
41,9 
44,0 
45,4 
46,1 
47,9 
49,3 
49,5 
48,3 
46,2 
46,7 
49,1 
46,4 
48,1 
48,3 
46,9 
46,5 
42,1 
44,1 
47,6 
44,4 
44,7 
42,2 
36,5 
34,6 
35,8 
36,1 
35,7 
36,1 
36,8 
37,5 
E 
36,6 
37,8 
40,0 
43,3 
44,1 
47,1 
50,3 
52,0 
48,3 
49,5 
49,0 
49,0 
51,8 
54,0 
59,9 
60,9 
59,6 
58,0 
56,6 
61,5 
58,2 
57,1 
57,4 
51,3 
53,9 
54,5 
55,2 
56,7 
60,0 
65,4 
68,5 
71,0 
70,9 
69,5 
F 
126,6 
125,4 
126,9 
129,2 
129,4 
127,8 
128,2 
130,7 
135,4 
132,8 
122,9 
121,2 
123,6 
126,2 
122,1 
130,6 
131,3 
126,7 
126,8 
125,2 
125,3 
124,6 
122,4 
119,9 
118,7 
120,2 
121,7 
119,1 
115,9 
114,5 
114,2 
110,5 
112,6 
116,9 
IRL 
59,2 
58,8 
58,5 
57,8 
59,7 
58,6 
57,6 
58,3 
54,9 
57,4 
57,6 
58,9 
60,3 
55,7 
51,9 
53,2 
50,6 
52,5 
54,7 
55,4 
57,4 
61,5 
66,0 
65,5 
65,9 
67,5 
65,9 
63,7 
63,6 
65,9 
66,7 
64,8 
65,9 
68,7 
I 
75,0 
76,1 
78,4 
82,4 
81,6 
80,8 
81,2 
84,5 
87,4 
87,2 
87,5 
84,7 
82,1 
78,5 
78,1 
77,1 
73,7 
74,9 
74,4 
76,2 
81,5 
83,8 
86,0 
91,6 
94,8 
94,1 
97,5 
99,0 
98,6 
101,2 
103,1 
104,7 
102,5 
96,2 
L 
158,2 
143,6 
137,9 
134,5 
138,5 
133,0 
.129,6 
123,6 
129,5 
135,6 
141,7 
130,5 
135,2 
145,9 
160,2 
132,3 
140,0 
136,6 
137,8 
132,1 
126,7 
121,0 
115,0 
116,7 
119,8 
119,7 
125,5 
123,1 
123,0 
127,2 
127,9 
127,1 
129,6 
137,4 
NL 
99,0 
98,5 
97,3 
96,2 
101,9 
104,0 
104,5 
107,7 
113,5 
115,5 
114,9 
117,5 
120,5 
124,6 
132,9 
131,2 
138,5 
142,8 
141,1 
132,3 
124,6 
117,8 
119,5 
118,8 
115,9 
113,1 
113,8 
111,1 
105,9 
103,0 
103,1 
101,5 
102,1 
106,0 
Ρ 
28,0 
27,7 
27,2 
27,1 
26,7 
27,6 
28,3 
30,1 
31,9 
31,9 
32,0 
32,5 
33,3 
35,5 
37,3 
34,3 
34,1 
31,2 
27,6 
25,4 
27,4 
30,2 
29,8 
27,2 
26,2 . 
27,0 
28,1 
28,2 
28,9 
30,9 
33,1 
36,7 
43,5 
46,3 
UK 
131,3 
126,7 
121,7 
118,5 
117,4 
116,3 
115,1 
112,3 
101,6 
99,0 
97,2 
97,4 
93,7 
83,5 
80,9 
83,7 
78,1 
78,1 
80,3 
85,8 
96,8 
105,1 
104,3 
101,8 
100,2 
102,6 
91,3 
90,9 
98,9 
98,2 
92,4 
92,2 
86,9 
82,2 
(ECU; EUR 12-
EUR12- EUR 12+ USA 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
270,5 
252,8 
247,1 
237,4 
229,4 
227,5 
230,2 
228,8 
237,4 
230,8 
215,4 
204,7 
187,8 
164,7 
158,5 
147,8 
158,6 
154,7 
140,0 
127,1 
120,5 
152,3 
163,8 
180,2 
207,1 
211,3 
161,4 
137,8 
133,0 
140,0 
117,7 
100,0 97,1 115,7 
100,0 97,5 109,8 
100,0 98,0 117,8 
= 100) 
J 
44,9 
49,3 
51,1 
53,6 
56,9 
58,0 
62,4 
68,7 
77,2 
81,5 
85,0 
85,1 
92,9 
98,9 
100,1 
92,0 
97,4 
104,9 
118,6 
100,3 
92,1 
115,1 
111,0 
124,1 
137,7 
141,2 
151,4 
147,8 
159,6 
156,1 
129,5 
142,6 
143,1 
155,6 
189 
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Table 9 
Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population 
(PPS EUR 12-; EUR 12- 100) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Β 
97,5 
97,6 
98,7 
98,7 
99,7 
98,9 
98,2 
98,8 
98,0 
98,9 
101,1 
102,1 
103,4 
103,5 
105,9 
105,4 
106,5 
104,2 
104,0 
103,0 
106,4 
105,6 
106,6 
105,7 
105,7 
104,3 
103,1 
102,5 
103,2 
103,9 
104,9 
105,9 
106,1 
106,2 
DK 
115,2 
116,5 
117,8 
113,6 
117,4 
117,8 
116,3 
116,1 
114,7 
115,2 
112,2 
111,7 
112,8 
110,1 
107,1 
107,5 
109,4 
108,1 
106,4 
106,5 
105,0 
104,4 
107,1 
108,4 
110,9 
113,1 
114,2 
111,5 
108,7 
106,5 
105,8 
106,0 
106,0 
107,5 
WD E 
124,3 
122,6 
122,3 
120,2 
121,0 
121,9 
120,4 
116,7 
117,2 
118,4 
118,6 
118,0 
118,0 
116,7 
115,2 
115,6 
117,2 
117,8 
118,2 
119,2 
119,1 
119,4 
117,8 
118,4 
119,7 
119,6 
119,2 
117,8 
117,1 
116,5 
117,6 
119,4 102,4 
118,7 102.Í 
116,4 101,' 
GR 
34,8 
36,7 
35,7 
37,8 
38,9 
40,9 
41,8 
42,4 
43,1 
44,8 
46,4 
48,4 
50,5 
51,1 
48,4 
51,5 
51,8 
51,5 
52,7 
52,4 
52,3 
52,0 
51,7 
50,9 
50,9 
51,2 
50,6 
48,9 
49,0 
49,1 
47,5 
, 47,4 
47,4 
47,8 
E 
58,3 
61,7 
64,5 
67,2 
67,4 
68,5 
70,3 
70,5 
71,1 
72,8 
72,2 
73,1 
75,5 
76,4 
78,5 
79,2 
77,5 
76,9 
75,0 
72,0 
71,7 
71,1 
71,2 
71,1 
70,6 
70,4 
70,6 
72,5 
73,3 
74,5 
75,4 
76,4 
76,7 
77,2 
F 
107,7 
107,6 
108,7 
108,7 
109,2 
109,6 
110,9 
112,2 
110,9 
111,8 
112,7 
114,2 
113,7 
112,6 
113,3 
114,0 
113,6 
114,2 
114,3 
113,9 
113,9 
114,9 
116,3 
115,1 
113,9 
112,9 
112,2 
111,2 
111,2 
111,5 
111,0 
110,7 
111,5 
111,9 
IRL 
57,2 
57,8 
57,3 
57,6 
56,7 
55,6 
54,3 
55,6 
57,2 
57,3 
56,1 
56,1 
56,8 
55,5 
56,1 
59,1 
56,5 
58,8 
60,5 
59,5 
60,2 
61,7 
62,1 
60,7 
61,6 
61,9 
60,1 
61,5 
62,3 
64,9 
69,0 
69,7 
70,7 
71,6 
I 
86,6 
89,1 
90,7 
91,9 
89,3 
88,5 
90,4 
93,7 
94,8 
94,9 
95,5 
94,1 
92,7 
93,4 
96,5 
94,6 
96,2 
96,5 
97,0 
99,4 
102,5 
103,2 
102,7 
102,0 
102,2 
102,4 
102,6 
103,0 
103,1 
103,0 
102,8 
103,2 
103,5 
104,0 
L 
155,3 
146,3 
137,4 
134,5 
136,9 
133,1 
129,0 
126,4 
126,4 
135,2 
138,4 
128,0 
130,8 
138,8 
149,5 
123,9 
123,0 
116,6 
116,8 
116,1 
115,6 
114,5 
116,5 
116,4 
118,5 
120,2 
124,8 
119,5 
122,3 
128,2 
127,2 
128,1 
129,1 
129,8 
NL 
116,8 
113,6 
112,4 
111,0 
113,0 
113,4 
111,5 
113,0 
113,7 
113,6 
114,1 
114,6 
113,2 
111,3 
113,2 
113,7 
113,6 
112,7 
111,6 
110,0 
109,2 
108,0 
105,5 
105,1 
105,7 
105,6 
104,5 
102,0 
100,3 
101,4 
102,4 
103,0 
102,9 
102,6 
Ρ 
37,2 
37,4 
38,5 
39,2 
39,9 
41,4 
41,8 
44,0 
45,8 
45,1 
46,9 
49,1 
51,3 
54,1 
53,2 
50,1 
50,1 
51,0 
50,6 
51,4 
52,7 
53,3 
53,8 
52,6 
50,1 
50,1 
50,6 
51,7 
51,7 
52,6 
53,7 
54,2 
57,5 
58,1 
UK 
122,6 
120,1 
116,0 
115,6 
115,4 
113,6 
111,6 
110,5 
109,3 
105,5 
103,5 
102,5 
102,1 
103,5 
100,3 
100,9 
99,3 
99,1 
99,9 
99,6 
96,4 
95,4 
96,6 
98,7 
98,7 
100,0 
101,3 
103,2 
103,5 
102,4 
100,5 
97,1 
95,3 
96,2 
EUR 1 2 ­ EUR 12+ USA 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
182,5 
176,3 
176,2 
174,6 
173,3 
174,6 
177,2 
175,0 
172,4 
166,7 
158,4 
157,0 
157,6 
155,6 
151,1 
150,5 
149,9 
151,1 
152,1 
149,6 
146,0 
147,7 
142,2 
143,8 
148,0 
147,7 
146,3 
145,5 
144,5 
142,6 
139,0 
100,0 97,0 134,5 
100,0 97,1 134,9 
100,0 97,3 136,7 
J 
54,1 
57,4 
59,8 
62,0 
65,3 
66,1 
70,3 
75,2 
80,2 
84,6 
88,8 
89,6 
92,3 
92,8 
89,7 
92,4 
91,3 
92,3 
93,2 
94,6 
96,5 
99,5 
101,4 
102,1 
103,6 
105.8 
105,2 
106,2 
108,4 
109,8 
112,7 
116,3 
116,9 
118,1 
190 
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Table 10 
Gross domestic product at constant market prices 
■ 
1971­80 
1981­90 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
Β DK WD 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1961-70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
5,0 
5,2 
4,4 
7,0 
3,6 
3,2 
3,9 
4,2 
6,6 
6,4 
4,9 
3,7 
5,3 
5,9 
4,1 
-1,5 
5,6 
0,5 
2,7 
2,1 
4,3 
6,4 
5,7 
0,6 
9,3 
4,6 
2,7 
3,4 
4,0 
6,3 
2,0 
4,5 
2,7 
5,3 
3,6 
-0,9 
-0,7 
6,5 
1,6 
1,5 
3,5 
-0,4 
4,5 
4,6 
2,8 
6,7 
5,4 
2,8 
-0,3 
5,5 
7,4 
5,1 
4,4 
3,0 
4,3 
4,9 
0,3 
-1,4 
5,3 
2,8 
3,0 
4,1 
1,1 
3,2 2,2 
2,0 2,1 
2,7 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-1,0 
1,5 
0,4 
2,2 
0,8 
1,5 
2,0 
5,0 
3,8 
3,4 
-0,9 
3,0 
2,5 
4,4 
4,3 
3,6 
0,3 
1,2 
0,8 
1.7 
0,2 
-0,9 
1,6 
2,8 
1,9 
2,2 
1,4 
3,7 
3,4 
5,1 
2,1 
GR 
11,1 
1,5 
10,1 
8,3 
9,4 
6,1 
5,5 
6,7 
9,9 
8,0 
E 
11,8 
9,3 
8,8 
6,2 
6,3 
7,1 
4,3 
6,8 
8,9 
4,1 
F 
5,5 
6,7 
5,3 
6,5 
4,8 
5,2 
4,7 
4,3 
7,0 
5,7 
IRL 
5,0 
3,2 
4,7 
3,8 
1,9 
0,9 
5,8 
8,2 
5,9 
2,7 
I 
8,2 
6,2 
5,6 
2,8 
3,3 
6,0 
7,2 
6,5 
6,1 
5,3 
L 
3,8 
1,4 
3,4 
7,9 
1,9 
1,1 
0,2 
4,2 
10,0 
1,7 
NL 
3,1 
4,0 
3,6 
8,3 
5,2 
2,7 
5,3 
6,4 
6,4 
5,7 
Ρ 
5,2 
6,6 
5,9 
7,3 
7,6 
3,9 
8,1 
9,2 
3,4 
7,6 
UK 
3,3 
1,0 
3,8 
5,4 
2,5 
1,9 
2,3 
4,1 
2,1 
2,3 
EUR 12- EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
5,5 
4,7 
4,5 
5,8 
4,4 
3,9 
3,4 
5,3 
6,0 
4,7 
2,7 
5,2 
4,1 
5,6 
5,5 
5,9 
2,5 
4,1 
2,8 
-ο,ι 
J 
12,0 
8,9 
8,5 
11,7 
5,8 
10,6 
11,1 
12,9 
12,5 
10,7 
7,6 7,3 5,6 4,2 5,7 3,5 5,1 6,4 
4,7 3,5 
2,9 4,8 
7,1 
8,9 
7,3 
3,6 
6,1 
6,4 
3,4 
6,7 
3,7 
1,8 
4,6 
8,0 
7,7 
5,3 
0,5 
3,3 
3,0 
1,4 
-0,1 
1,2 
4,8 
4,1 
5,4 
2,7 
-0,3 
4,4 
3,5 
3,4 
3,2 
1,4 
3,5 
6,5 
4,7 
4,3 
5,7 
1,4 
8,2 
7,2 
3,1 
3,1 
1.6 
2,7 
7,1 
5,4 
-2,7 
6,6 
3,4 
3,7 
6,0 
4,2 
2,7 
6,6 
8,3 
4,2 
-6,6 
2,5 
1,6 
4,1 
2,3 
0,8 
4,2 
3,3 
4,7 
4,0 
­ο,ι 5,1 
2.3 
2,5 
2,4 
0,9 
6,6 
8,0 
11,2 
1,1 
-4,3 
6,9 
5,5 
2,8 
5,6 
4,6 
2,0 
3,5 
7,3 
-1,7 
-0,8 
2,7 
2,3 
3,6 
2,9 
-2,2 
3,2 
4,3 
6,2 
1,9 
-1,0 
4,7 
2,9 
3,2 
3,5 
1,3 
3,2 4,7 3,8 2,6 2,9 4,7 1,9 3,0 
0,1 
0,4 
0,4 
2,8 
3,1 
1,6 
0,7 
4,1 
3,5 
0,1 
-0,2 
1,2 
1,8 
1,8 
2,3 
3,2 
5,6 
5,2 
4,8 
3,6 
U 2,3 
0,8 
1,5 
1,8 
2,4 
1% 
4,3 
3,8 
2,2 
3,3 
2,3 
-0,2 
4,4 
3,1 
-0,4 
5,0 
4,9 
6,5 
8,3 
0,6 
0,2 
1,0 
2,7 
2,6 
2,9 
3,1 
4,1 
2,9 
2,2 
-0,6 
1,1 
3,0 
6,2 
2,9 
4,8 
2,9 
5,7 
6,7 
3,2 
-0,6 
-1,4 
1,4 
3,1 
2,6 
2,0 
0,8 
2,6 
4,7 
3,9 
1,6 
2,1 
-0,2 
-1,9 
2,8 
4,1 
5,3 
3,9 
5,2 
4,4 
-1,3 
1,7 
3,7 
2,3 
3,7 
4,1 
4,8 
4,3 
2,1 
0,5 
0,1 
0,7 
1,6 
2,3 
2,4 
2,8 
2,9 
4,1 
3,4 
2,8 
1,5 2,9 2,2 3,7 2,2 3,6 1,9 2,7 2,6 2,3 
3,8 10,5 
2,9 
5,1 
5,2 
0,6 
0,8 
4,9 
4,5 
4,6 
2,6 
0,4 
4,3 
8,2 
7,6 
-0,6 
2,9 
4,2 
4,7 
4,9 
5,5 
3,6 
2,8 4,5 
1,9 
2,2 
3,5 
6,1 
3,0 
2,6 
3,0 
3,9 
2,6 
0,7 
3,6 
3,2 
2,7 
4,3 
5,0 
2,6 
4,1 
6,2 
4,7 
5,2 
2,5 4,2 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1,9 
1,0 
0,5 
1,2 
1,0 
1,8 
3,7 
1,5 
-0,5 
1,9 
0,0 
1,8 
1,5 
1,6 
2,4 
1,2 
1,0 
1,1 
1,9 
1,0 
2,5 
2,9 
2,1 
1,4 
1,1 
0,8 
3,1 
2,2 
2,0 
2,2 
1,3 
0,6 
1,9 
1,7 
1,3 
-2,2 
-0,9 
1,4 
1,4 
1,1 
0,7 U 0,8 
-1,3 
2,0 
2,4 
4,4 
1,5 
1,5 
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■ Table 11 
Industrial production (construction excluded) 
1961­70 
1971­80 
1981­90 
( Annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
6,1 
5,8 
7,4 
6,5 
2,5 
2,1 
1,7 
5,6 
9,7 
3,1 
DK 
5,1 
8,9 
1,2 
11,5 
6,6 
2,9 
4,0 
7,4 
12,3 
2,6 
WD 
6,2 
8,4 
3,6 
7,6 
5,2 
1,4 
-2,5 
9,7 
12,6 
6,1 
GR 
10,7 
10,9 
8,4 
16,1 
4,3 
7,8 
11,8 
10,6 
E 
10,1 
12,0 
11,0 
14,4 
15,1 
6,1 
7,3 
15,6 
10,2 
F 
5,6 
5,1 
7,2 
6,0 
1,8 
5,4 
2,5 
3,7 
10,4 
5,2 
IRL 
8,7 
7,0 
5,9 
7,7 
4,3 
2,7 
8,3 
10,3 
7,1 
4,4 
I 
10,9 
9,6 
8,8 
1,2 
4,6 
11,4 
8,2 
6,5 
3,7 
6,4 
L 
2,9 
-4,2 
0,9 
9,1 
0,9 
-3,2 
-0,6 
6,0 
12,8 
0,5 
NL 
3,8 
3,5 
5,0 
9,8 
4,3 
4,2 
2,9 
9,1 
10,9 
8,7 
1 
7,Ç 
6,4 
Ρ UK 
0,3 
1,0 
3,5 
8,1 
2,8 
1,6 
0,7 
7,6 
3,5 
0,5 
EUR 12-
5,1 
6,2 
6,1 
6,7 
4,7 
5,5 
2,3 
7,1 
8,9 
5,3 
USA 
0,7 
8,4 
5,9 
6,6 
10,0 
8,8 
2,2 
5,6 
4,7 
-3,4 
J 
19,6 
8,5 
11,2 
15,8 
3,8 
13,5 
19,3 
15,4 
15,9 
13,9 
5,0 6,2 5,7 5,3 6,6 7,1 2,4 6,2 2,9 5,8 
2,2 1,9 2,3 6,9 5,0 3,1 4,5 3,3 0,0 2,8 6,5 1,0 2,8 
2,1 2,7 2,1 1,0 1,1 6,3 1,3 3,7 1,5 4,8 1,7 1,7 
4,9 13,6 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1,8 
7,5 
6,0 
4,1 
-9,9 
7,7 
0,6 
2,4 
4,5 
-1,3 
2,3 
4,4 
3,3 
-0,7 
-6,0 
9,7 
0,8 
2,2 
3,7 
0,2 
1,4 
4,4 
7,1 
-1,1 
-6,2 
7,4 
2,1 
2,9 
4,9 
0,5 
11,2 
14,2 
15,2 
-1,4 
4,3 
10,5 
1,6 
7,5 
5,9 
0,9 
3,2 
15,8 
15,2 
9,3 
-6,6 
5,1 
5,2 
2,4 
0,7 
1,3 
4,8 
6,8 -
6,7 
2,3 
-7,4 
8,6 
2,0 
2,3 
4,1 
1,9 
3,8 
4,2 
9,8 
3,0 
-6,0 
8,5 
8,0 
8,0 
7,7 
-0,6 
-0,5 
5,0 
9,7 
3,9 
-8,8 
11,6 
0,0 
2,1 
6,7 
5,1 
-1,1 
4,2 
11,9 
3,5 
-21,8 
3,8 
0,5 
3,1 
3,4 
-3,4 
5,5 
5,2 
7,6 
4,7 
-5,1 
7,6 
0,4 
0,8 
3,2 
-ι,ο 
7,8 
13,0 
11,9 
2,8 
-4,9 
3,3 
13,1 
6,9 
7,2 
5,4 
-0,6 
1,8 
9,0 
-2,0 
-5,4 
3,3 
5,1 
2,9 
3,8 
-6,5 
1,9 
5,7 
8,6 
1,6 
-6,7 
7,4 
2,6 
2,7 
4,5 
0,2 
1,4 
9,7 
8,2 
-1,5 
-8,8 
9,3 
8,0 
5,7 
3,8 
-1,9 
2,5 
7,3 
15,0 
-3,9 
-11,1 
11,1 
4,1 
6,4 
7,3 
4,7 
3,2 
2,6 
4,1 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-2,7 
0,0 
1,9 
2,5 
2,5 
0,8 
2,2 
5,7 
3,5 
5,1 
0,0 
2,7 
3,2 
9,7 
4,3 
6,5 
-3,5 
1,9 
2,3 
0,6 
-1,8 
-3,0 
0,8 
3,3 
4,9 
2,4 
0,3 
3,7 
5,3 
5,2 
0,9 
1,1 
0,0 
1,6 
3,4 
-0,2 
-1,7 
' 5,7 
1,5 
-1,9 
-ι,ο 
-1,1 
2,7 
0,8 
2,0 
3,1 
4,6 
3,1 
4,5 
0,0 
-0,9 
-0,8 
-0,6 
0,3 
0,2 
0,9 
1,9 
4,6 
4,2 
1,7 
5,4 
-0,7 
7,8 
9,9 
3,4 
2,2 
8,8 
10,7 
11,6 
4,7 
-2,2 
-3,1 
-2,4 
3,2 
1,4 
4,1 
2,6 
6,9 
3,9 
-0,7 
-5,6 
0,9 
5,4 
13,3 
6,8 
2,1 
-0,9 
8,7 
7,8 
-0,5 
-1,2 
-3,7 
2,9 
4,6 
4,1 
0,2 
0,9 
-ο,ι 
4,7 
3,2 
0,6 
4,6 
1,6 
-ο,ι 
10,9 
7,3 
4,4 
3,8 
6,8 
9,0 
-3,2 
2,0 
3,6 
0,1 
5,5 
2,4 
3,3 
3,5 
0,4 
-0,5 
-1,7 
-1,2 
0,9 
2,0 
3,3 
2,4 
2,1 
4,3 
3,7 
1,8 
1,9 
-4,5 
3,7 
9,3 
1,7 
0,9 
5,0 
5,5 
2,5 
1,0 
0,9 
0,4 
3,3 
9,3 
3,6 
-0,2 
3,5 
9,2 
6,1 
4,7 
4,0 
1991 
1992 
1993 
-2,4 
0,8 
0,2 
2,0 
1,0 
1,0 
2,8 
-ι,ο -2,0 
-1,9 
-ι,ι 
1,3 
-ο,ι 
-ο,ι 
0,7 
-0,5 
0,5 
0,3 
3,3 
8,0 
5,0 
-2,0 
0,5 
1,3 
0,5 
0,8 
0,9 
3,8 
0,8 
0,3 
0,6 
-0,5 
-0,8 
-2,9 
-0,7 
1,7 
-0,2 
-ο,ι 
0,3 
-2,0 
1,4 
2,7 
2,3 
-6,5 
2,2 
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Table 12 
Private consumption at current prices 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Β 
7,3 
7,5 
7,9 
8,6 
9,1 
10,0 
10,7 
11,3 
12,7 
13,8 
14,8 
16,4 
18,8 
22,2 
26,8 
30,5 
36,4 
42,2 
45,9 
49,9 
53,5 
56,5 
57,0 
59,2 
63,3 
69,2 
73,1 
78,1 
80,9 
86,9 
94,2 
99,9 
105,9 
114,4 
DK 
3,5 
3,8 
4,3 
4,6 
5,1 
5,6 
6,2 
6,8 
7,2 
8,0 
8,9 
9,4 
10,3 
12,7 
14,6 
16,8 
21,0 
23,2 
24,9 
27,2 
26,7 
28,9 
31,3 
34,4 
37,8 
42,1 
46,2 
47,9 
48,9 
50,5 
53,1 
55,3 
57,9 
61,8 
WD I 
40,5 
45,8 
50,2 
53,2 
57,4 
63,5 
68,1 
70,6 
77,8 
87,7 
105,3 
120,7 
136,6 
164,7 
190,1 
211,7 
248,7 
284,6 
314,3 
344,3 
367,8 
390,9 
428,2 
468,6 
497,6 
518,8 
559,7 
597,9 
624,1 
656,2 
716,3 
772,7 874,2 
823,5 941,3 
878,6 1013,6 
1 GR 
2,7 
2,8 
3,0 
3,3 
3,6 
4,1 
4,5 
4,9 
5,5 
6,0 
6,7 
7,1 
7,4 
8,3 
10,7 
11,4 
13,3 
15,1 
16,2 
17,8 
18,6 
22,4 
26,5 
26,3 
27,8 
28,6 
27,1 
27,8 
30,7 
34,5 
37,4 
40,1 
43,0 
45,2 
E 
7,5 
8,4 
9,6 
11,5 
12,8 
15,1 
17,3 
19,1 
19,2 
21,4 
23,8 
26,5 
31,2 
37,5 
48,4 
55,7 
64,4 
- 69r7 
74,6 
93,2 
100,8 
111,2 
121,8 
115,8 
128,9 
140,0 
148,7 
160,8 
182,7 
217,0 
241,5 
266,5 
281,6 
284,3 
F 
34,4 
37,3 
41,6 
47,0 
51,3 
54,8 
59,2 
64,4 
72,8 
79,3 
80,9 
88,6 
100,8 
118,0 
132,1 
162,1 
185,9 
199,3 
220,2 
247,4 
281,7 
315,8 
342,2 
359,7 
385,8 
422,5 
450,4 
469,0 
489,5 
524,0 
564,0 
585,9 
622,5 
664,5 
IRL 
1,3 
1,3 
1,4 
1,5 
1,7 
1,8 
1,9 
2,0 
2,1 
2,4 
2,6 
2,9 
3,2 
' 3,5 
4,0 
4,3 
4,8 
5,6 
6,5 
7,7 
9,1 
10,8 
11,6 
12,3 
13,3 
14,8 
15,4 
15,5 
16,6 
17,9 
19,0 
19,6 
21,0 
22,4 
I 
22,4 
24,2 
27,3 
31,9 
34,6 
37,0 
40,8 
45,4 
50,2 
55,4 
62,6 
67,4 
73,3 
81,6 
93,0 
106,2 
114,4 
128,3 
139,6 
162,5 
199,0 
224,9 
253,4 
286,8 
320,9 
344,0 
377,5 
406,0 
436,4 
490,1 
531,8 
578,5 
595,9 
575,2 
L 
0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,4 
0,4 
0,4 
0,4 
0,5 
0,5 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,8 
0,9 
1,1 
1,3 
1,5 
1,6 
1,8 
1,9 
2,1 
2,1 
2,3 
2,5 
2,7 
2,9 
3,1 
3,3 
3,6 
3,9 
4,3 
4,7 
5,2 
NI. 
6,6 
7,3 
8,0 
8,9 
10,0 
11,2 
12,2 
13,3 
15,0 
17,3 
19,4 
21,9 
24,9 
29,6 
36,3 
41,8 
50,8 
59,6 
66,0 
71,1 
75,7 
78,0 
86,2 
92,0 
95,2 
100,2 
108,3 
114,8 
116,3 
121,8 
131,0 
139,8 
148,5 
158,7 
ρ 
1,7 
1,8 
1.9 
2,0 
2,1 
2,4 
2,6 
2,8 
3,4 
3,8 
4,0 
4,6 
4,9 
6,0 
8,2 
9,3 
10,5 
10,3 
9,6 
10,0 
12,2 
15,3 
16,5 
16,2 
17,2 
18,4 
19,6 
20,5 
23,0 
26,1 
29,6 
35,1 
40,6 
44,6 
UK 
45,2 
47,1 
49,8 
53,0 
56,6 
60,3 
63,8 
66,1 
64,3 
68,7 
74,8 
83,4 
90,2 
92,2 
104,0 
117,4 
123,0 
133,6 
151,6 
184,7 
232,0 
279,4 
302,6 
316,5 
336,8 
369,2 
359,5 
377,4 
452,0 
488,2 
488,2 
522,0 
519,5 
507,2 
(ECU: Mrd) 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
173,4 
187,8 
205,2 
225,8 
244,9 
266,0 
287,7 
307,1 
330,5 
364,2 
404,5 
449,7 
502,3 
577,0 
669,2 
768,3 
874,4 
972,9 
1 071,1 
1 217,5 
1 379,0 
1 536,2 
1 679,6 
1 790,1 
1927,2 
2070,4 -
2188,3 
2318,7 
2504,4 
2 716,8 
2910,1 
310,6 
317,4 
. 336,4 
354,7 
380,6 
409,9 
443,7 
470,5 
534,5 
581,6 
621,8 
656,7 
672,5 
676,6 
757,4 
809,3 
1002,5 
1092,8 
1090,3 
1128,9 
1 226,9 
1690,5 
2058,7 
2473,4 
3 044,1 
3 405,2 
2 809,2 
2 564,5 
2704,6 
3104,6 
2 853,6 
3119,6 3 221,2 3 036,6 
3 264,5 3 382,4 3 048,8 
3 362,2 3497,2 3 364,7 
J 
24,7 
28,7 
32,9 
38,4 
44,2 
50,0 
57,5 
66,3 
78,2 
90,5 
104,2 
118,8 
146,9 
181,0 
214,7 
235,0 
289,2 
350,1 
441,5 
432,9 
448,6 
611,3 
660,4 
802,9 
954,8 
1045,4 
1187,7 
1 228,0 
1 420,3 
1 503,8 
1 329,7 
1544,2 
1 635,1 
1840,6 
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Table 13 
Private consumption at current prices 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Β 
4,7 
5,0 
5,4 
6,0 
6,4 
6,9 
7,4 
7,8 
8,5 
9,3 
10,1 
11,4 
12,8 
14,9 
17,3 
20,0 
23,5 
26,8 
30,2 
34,9 
41,2 
46,8 
52,8 
57,2 
62,2 
67,1 
70,3 
75,1 
80,5 
86,7 
94,2 
102,1 
107,7 
113,5 
DK 
2,5 
2,7 
3,0 
3,2 
3,5 
3,8 
4,1 
4,4 
4.6 
5,1 
5,5 
5,9 
6,4 
7,3 
8,2 
9,6 
11,6 
13,2 
14,6 
16,9 
18,8 
20,7 
23,1 
25,5 
28,4 
31,6 
34,7 
35,5 
36,9 
38,9 
41,1 
44,2 
46,6 
49,3 
WD E 
31,2 
33,7 
36,9 
39,8 
43,5 
48,6 
52,4 
54,8 
59,1 
65,7 
72,7 
81,1 
91,5 
103,6 
119,3 
142,3 
166,5 
193,1 
217,9 
249,9 
288,7 
325,5 
356,6 
391,0 
428,2 
460,5 
485,5 
515,4 
554,3 
595,1 
655,2 
714,8 808.Í 
751,2 852,1 
779,0 885,( 
GR 
1,8 
1,9 
2,1 
2,3 
2,6 
2,9 
3,2 
3,5 
3,8 
4,2 
4,9 
I 5,5 
6,2 
7,1 
8,2 
10,0 
11,5 
13,4 
15,6 
17,4 
20,3 
23,6 
26,1 
28,2 
30,0 
33,2 
36,7 
39,0 
41,8 
46,7 
49,8 
1 52,7 
! 56,0 
i 59,3 
E 
9,2 
10,5 
11,9 
13,8 
15,1 
16,9 
18,7 
20,1 
22,0 
24,5 
27,1 
30,6 
35,2 
41,1 
49,6 
57,3 
67,5 
77,0 
84,6 
94,4 
109,3 
123,0 
137,1 
150,1 
159,8 
172,8 
185,7 
204,2 
222,1 
245,3 
265,6 
287,1 
308,1 
325,4 
F 
22,4 
24,5 
27,3 
30,4 
33,4 
36,2 
39,6 
42,8 
46,3 
51,9 
57,4 
64,6 
71,8 
81,7 
95,7 
111,8 
129,7 
149,6 
169,8 
194,6 
225,5 
259,0 
295,0 
323,0 
350,1 
379,6 
406,1 
435,2 
467,5 
506,8 
548,3 
587,6 
623,7 
655,3 
IRL 
0,9 
1,0 
1,1 
1,2 
1,3 
1,3 
1,4 
1,5 
1,7 
1,8 
2,0 
2,2 
2,4 
2,7 
3,4 
3,8 
4,3 
5,2 
6,1 
7,2 
8,4 
9,7 
9,9 
10,7 
11,8 
13,0 
13,7 
14,9 
16,2 
17,5 
19,6 
21,1 
22,8 
24,1 
I 
19,8 
21,7 
24,2 
27,4 
29,2 
31,3 
35,1 
39,0 
42,3 
46,8 
52,9 
58,0 
64,1 
75,3 
89,7 
103,1 
120,4 
137,8 
155,7 
183,4 
220,4 
246,5 
274,5 
298,6 
327,3 
358,0 
388,4 
419,3 
454,0 
495,4 
530,2 
571,1 
609,2 
640,8 
L 
0,2 
0,2 
0,2 
Oí 
0,3 
0,3 
. 0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,4 
0,4 
0,5 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,8 
0,9 
1,1 
1,2 
1,3 
1,5 
1,8 
2,0 
2,1 
2,3 
2,6 
2,8 
3,0 
3,3 
3,6 
3,9 
4,4 
4,7 
5,0 
NL 
5,9 
6,4 
7,1 
7,9 
8,6 
9,4 
10,1 
10,8 
11,7 
13,2 
14,9 
16,5 
18,2 
20,5 
24,1 
28,6 
33,7 
39,2 
44,7 
51,1 
58,4 
63,6 
69,0 
76,1 
82,2 
89,5 
97,3 
104,7 
109,6 
119,1 
130,1 
142,1 
151,5 
158,3 
Ρ 
1,7 
1,9 
2,0 
2,2 
2,5 
2,7 
3,0 
3,2 
3,8 
4,1 
4,5 
5,4 
5,8 
7,1 
9,2 
10,7 
12,4 
14,0 
15,1 
17,5 
20,6 
24,0 
27,1 
29,2 
31,2 
32,7 
34,4 
37,4 
41,0 
44,1 
48,1 
51,9 
54,4 
57,7 
UK 
32,3 
34*2 
36,4 
39,8 
42,9 
45,4 
47,8 
50,3 
53,7 
56,8 
61,6 
67,9 
76,1 
88,6 
100,7 
111,9 
126,1 
141,3 
161,5 
185,4 
203,6 
225,6 
254,3 
287,2 
314,0 
344,1 
390,0 
425,8 
471,2 
505,5 
530,9 
550,7 
576,9 
611,8 
(PPS EUR 12 
EUR 1 2 ­ EUR 12+ USA 
132,8 
144,0 
157,6 
174,2 
189,1 
205,8 
223,0 
238,6 
257,9 
283,8 
314,1 
349,6 
391,1 
450,5 
526,1 
609,8 
708,3 
811,8 
917,0 
1054,0 
1 216,6 
1 369,7 
1 527,4 
1 678,9 
1 827,4 
1984,6 
2145,7 
2309,6 
2498,3 
2704,6 
2917,2 
160,4 
169,6 
184,1 
200,8 
221,4 
242,7 
264,1 
278,9 
301,7 
326,2 
353,6 
¡ 1 390,0 
437,5 
495,7 
563,9 
651,1 
764,3 
889,6 
1013,8 
1 149,7 
1309,1 
1458,4 
1 621,9 
1 845,7 
2058,9 
2277,3 
2491,8 
2 691,4 
2924,2 
3 142,1 
3 368,0 
3129,9 3223,8 3 535,5 
3 312,7 3413,7 3 791,3 
3479,6 3 586,1 4024,1 
-;Mrd) 
i 
22,8 
25,6 
29,5 
34,2 
39,1 
44,0 
50,1 
56,2 
63,1 
73,0 
84,2 
96,8 
113,1 
131,7 
150,2 
186,5 
218,6 
256,6 
297,0 
353,2 
413,9 
469,8 
547,5 
618,1 
679,4 
749,2 
807,3 
876,9 
959,6 
1050,5 
1157,2 
1260,9 
1 352,2 
1439,8 
194 
Table 14 
Private consumption at current prices 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
Β DK WD 
(ECU) (ECU) 
GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
I960 69,2 62,0 59,4 
1961-70 64,3 59,8 59,4 
0,3 67,5 59,7 76,6 59,7 54,0 57,9 73,1 66,0 62,3 
72,9 66,1 59,3 72,0 59,6 56,5 58,8 68,6 64,1 61,2 
63,7 58,7 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
67,9 
66,6 
67,1 
64,1 
64,3 
63,9 
62,9 
63,7 
62,2 
59,8 
62,1 
61,9 
61,4 
60,3 
58,9 
59,6 
59,9 
58,8 
57,5 
57,4 
59,5 
59,5 
59,6 
58,4 
59,2 
59,7 
60,8 
60,1 
59,1 
58,4 
76,8 
76,4 
74,3 
73,6 
72,8 
72,3 
72,4 
71,9 
69,2 
69,2 
66,9 
66,4 
67,5 
66,5 
67,1 
66,5 
66,4 
66,0 
64,1 
64,0 
60,0 
60,0 
60,5 
59,5 
59,0 
58,9 
59,1 
59,3 
59,1 
57,9 
75,0 
74,7 
74,1 
72,6 
71,7 
71,8 
70,1 
71,0 
69,8 
68,9 
58,6 
58,9 
60,2 
59,6 
59,2 
60,3 
60,6 
59,7 
59,3 
59,5 
56,9 
56,9 
57,5 
56,7 
58,2 
58,2 
59,1 
57,7 
53,4 
50,5 
59,1 
59,8 
61,2 
58,8 
58,9 
58,8 
58,2 
57,4 
58,0 
57,9 
73,6 
69,7 
69,4 
68,2 
67,9 
67,9 
65,4 
68,5 
69,1 
65,9 
65,4 
66,0 
66,3 
64,8 
64,1 
63,6 
63,5 
63,1 
62,2 
61,8 
61,9 
62,0 
62,4 
61,2 
61,1 
61,2 
61,5 
61,0 
60,3 
59,6 
63,6 
62,8 
62,7 
62,7 
62,3 
61,6 
61,5 
61,8 
61,9 
62,8 
57,0 
57,7 
58,8 
57,6 
58,5 
58,0 
56,8 
54,7 
53,5 
52,3 
62,4 56,5 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
60,3 
60,2 
60,6 
59,8 
61,2 
60,9 
61,9 
61,6 
62,8 
62,9 
55,8 
53,4 
54,5 
54,3 
55,5 
56,6 
56,9 
56,2 
56,4 
55,9 
58,7 
59,4 
58,8 
59,7 
62,9 
62,5 
63,1 
62,6 
62,3 
63,1 
1971-80 61,2 55,5 61,3 
1981-90 64,3 54,2 62,7 
68,0 
65,7 
63,4 
67,7 
67,5 
65,8 
65,9 
65,2 
63,3 
64,6 
64,3 
63,8 
63,5 
64,2 
64,3 
65,7 
65,0 
63,9 
64,5 
65,3 
57,8 
57,7 
57,1 
57,5 
58,7 
58,4 
58,2 
57,9 
58,1 
58,9 
68,0 
65,0 
64,4 
68,4 
64,1 
64,5 
64,1 
63,8 
65,3 
65,8 
59,8 
60,1 
60,5 
60,3 
62,0 
60,8 
60,3 
59,5 
59,7 
61,0 
54,8 
53,6 
48,9 
46,1 
57,8 
56,6 
59,6 
57,9 
57,8 
58,7 
57,3 
56,8 
56,2 
56,3 
58,1 
58,2 
59,2 
59,8 
60,4 
60,6 
68,3 
64,2 
64,8 
72,7 
77,1 
75,0 
72,0 
68,0 
67,5 
67,3 
62,1 
62,8 
62,5 
63,8 
62,2 
61,1 
59,9 
59,9 
60,3 
60,1 
59,8 
59,9 
59,5 
60,2 
61,5 
61,1 
61,0 
60,6 
60,7 
61,3 
65,7 64,5 58,0 65,3 60,4 55,2 58,3 69,7 61,5 60,6 
67,9 64,1 60,5 59,5 61,5 58,1 59,3 66,8 62,3 61,8 
62,7 
62,5 
61,7 
62,3 
63,3 
63,3 
63,1 
62,3 
62,2 
63,1 
53,6 
54,0 
53,6 
54,3 
57,1 
57,5 
57,7 
57,7 
58,7 
58,8 
62,6 56,3 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
65,2 
65,6 
65,2 
64,9 
65,5 
64,1 
64,5 
63,0 
62,3 
62,2 
56,0 
55,0 
54,6 
54,5 
54,8 
55,0 
54,0 
53,1 
52,8 
52,1 
64,0 
64,1 
63,8 
63,6 . 
63,4 
61,9 
62,2 
61,8 
61,1 
60,8 
67,5 
67,4 
66,7 
64,7 
65,5 
67,4 
69,5 
68,3 
70,4 
71,4 
66,5 
66,2 
65,7 
64,3 
64,1 
63,2 
63,2 
62,6 
62,9 
62,4 
60,3 
60,7 
60,8 
60,8 
61,1 
60,4 
60,9 
60,1 
59,8 
60,1 
65,9 
59,8 
59,6 
58,8 
59,6 
59,9 
59,3 
58,9 
56,9 
56,0 
61,2 
61,5 
61,1 
61,1 
61,4 
61,3 
61,7 
61,4 
62,0 
61,7 
60,9 
60,3 
59,6 
58,1 
58,7 
56,5 
59,2 
57,4 
54,7 
55,4 
59,9 
59,6 
59,8 
58,6 
58,7 
59,2 
60,8 
59,4 
58,7 
58,6 
69,6 
69,6 
69,3 
70,7 
67,9 
65,1 
64,5 
65,1 
63,5 
63,1 
60,8 
61,0 
61,2 
61,3 
61,1 
62,9 
63,0 
63,9 
64,0 
63,5 
62,1 
62,2 
62,1 
61,8 
61,9 
61,6 
61,9 
61,6 
61,5 
61,2 
62,2 
64,0 
64,9 
63,8 
64,7 
65,3 
65,8 
65,9 
65,7 
66,5 
58,1 
59,4 
60,2 
59,4 
58,9 
58,6 
58,7 
57,9 
57,7 
57,4 
64,9 58,6 
1991 
1992 
1993 
62,7 
62,6 
63,3 
52,5 
52,5 
52,5 
60,6 
60,0 
60,3 
64,1 
63,3 
63,4 
70,3 
70,4 
70,7 
62,5 
63,4 
63,9 
60,4 
60,1 
60,2 
55,8 
55,8 
55,7 
62,1 
62,6 
63,0 
57,3 
58,5 
58,9 
59,4 
59,7 
59,8 
63,3 
62,3 
63,0 
63,9 
64,6 
65,1 
61,5 
61,5 
61,7 
62,4 
62,4 
62,6 
67,1 
67,4 
67,4 
56,8 
57,3 
57,9 
195 
Table 15 
Private consumption at current prices per head of population 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Β 
128,4 
123,2 
118,8 
117,2 
115,4 
115,9 
114,6 
113,9 
118,9 
118,2 
114,6 
114,8 
118,6 
122,2 
127,2 
126,3 
132,7 
138,5 
137,3 
131,6 
125,0 
119,0 
110,0 
107,3 
106,9 
108,9 
109,1 
110,3 
105,6 
104,9 
106,5 
105,8 
107,4 
113,1 
DK 
122,9 
125,1 
128,7 
123,8 
128,1 
129,5 
132,9 
136,7 
133,4 
135,7 
134,8 
129,0 
126,4 
135,3 
134,4 
134,9 
148,1 
146,9 
143,5 
137,8 
119,8 
116,8 
116,4 
120,4 
123,0 
127,7 
132,9 
130,3 
123,5 
118,0 
116,4 
113,4 
113,7 
118,1 
WD E 
117,8 
122,4 
122,5 
118,1 
117,2 
119,1 
118,0 
115,0 
118,2 
120,5 
130,0 
133,6 
135,4 
142,2 
142,1 
138,8 
144,5 
149,5 
150,7 
145,7 
137,5 
131,4 
132,1 
136,4 
135,4 
132,0 
135,0 
136,4 
131,5 
126,8 
127,6 
127,4 115,4 
128,5 118,2 
132,1 123,2 
GR 
51,5 
50,9 
49,3 
48,9 
50,4 
52,4 
53,6 
54,3 
56,4 
56,6 
57,4 
54,9 
50,7 
49,8 
55,2 
50,9 
51,7 
52,2 
50,4 
48,5 
44,4 
47,8 
51,5 
47,8 
46,8 
44,7 
40,0 
38,8 
39,7 
41,3 
41,6 
41,3 
42,1 
42,9 
E 
39,6 
40,9 
42,9 
46,8 
48,0 
51,7 
54,6 
56,2 
52,3 
52,7 
52,7 
52,6 
55,2 
57,7 
63,9 
63,7 
64,1 
61,8 
59,7 
65,3 
62,1 
61,1 
61,0 
54,3 
56,0 
56,5 
56,7 
57,9 
61,0 
66,9 
69,8 
72,2 
73,1 
71,9 
F 
121,5 
121,4 
122,8 
125,1 
125,8 
123,5 
123,4 
125,6 
131,7 
130,1 
119,3 
117,2 
119,2 
121,1 
116,7 
124,7 
125,6 
120,9 
121,3 
119,8 
120,3 
120,9 
119,4 
117,4 
116,7 
118,7 
119,4 
117,1 
113,0 
111,4 
112,0 
108,5 
110,1 
114,1 
IRL 
72,8 
71,2 
70,5 
68,5 
70,7 
68,8 
67,5 
66,5 
63,9 
66,5 
66,5 
67,0 
65,4 
60,3 
59,1 
55,4 
53,5 
55,2 
57,6 
59,5 
61,6 
65,3 
63,4 
62,9 
62,7 
65,0 
64,1 
61,0 
60,9 
61,0 
61,0 
58,8 
59,8 
62,0 
I 
71,9 
72,0 
74,5 
79,4 
79,4 
78,3 
79,9 
83,4 
85,5 
85,8 
87,3 
84,7 
82,4 
79,8 
78,2 
77,7 
73,4 
74,0 
73,1 
74,9 
81,1 
82,5 
85,1 
90,2 
93,7 
93,5 
97,1 
98,7 
98,4 
102,1 
103,9 
105,8 
104,4 
98,2 
L 
137,2 
132,0 
126,6 
124,0 
128,3 
126,6 
123,1 
118,8 
122,5 
120,2 
120,0 
119,7 
121,0 
120,0 
122,8 
124,2 
129,7 
133,4 
131,8 
125,8 
121,5 
118,5 
111,4 
112,1 
112,7 
113,6 
115,2 
117,7 
114,6 
113,2 
115,8 
118,3 
123,2 
131,1 
NL 
92,1 
94,0 
93,9 
94,4 
98,0 
100,3 
100,3 
102,0 
106,8 
111,1 
111,6 
112,6 
114,3 
117,7 
124,3 
124,0 
132,0 
138,7 
139,3 
131,5 
123,1 
113,5 
114,5 
114,5 
109,9 
107,3 
109,5 
109,1 
102,1 
98,4 
98,7 
98,1 
99,2 
102,6 
Ρ 
32,9 
32,9 
30,6 
30,1 
29,7 
30,6 
31,4 
32,0 
35,9 
36,6 
35,4 
37,1 
35,7 
38,7 
45,0 
43,0 
41,8 
36,8 
30,9 
28,3 
30,1 
33,8 
33,3 
30,4 
29,9 
29,6 
29,7 
29,4 
30,5 
32,0 
34,1 
37,8 
44,1 
47,2 
UK 
139,1 
133,8 
129,6 
125,9 
124,2 
122,0 
119,6 
116,1 
105,1' 
102,2 
100,7 
101,2 
98,2 
87,7 
85,8 
84,6 
78,2 
76,7 
79,3 
85,3 
94,8 
102,8 
102,2 
100,4 
99,3 
101,2 
93,3 
92,4 
102,6 
102,3 
95,8 
95,8 
91,3 
86,7 
(ECU; EUR 12-
EUR12­ EUR 12+ USA 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
277,0 
259,5 
250,2 
238,6 
234,9 
232,0 
231,3 
228,8 
240,5 
236,9 
226,9 
214,5 
195,8 
170,8 
164,2 
151,9 
164,4 
160,0 
144,0 
130,2 
124,0 
152,3 
168,4 
188,4 
213,8 
221,0 
171,3 
146,5 
142,2 
149,7 
127,8 
100,0 98,5 126,2 
100,0 98,9 120,4 
100,0 99,4 128,5 
= 100) 
Ì 
42,3 
45,4 
47,6 
50,5 
53,5 
55,6 
59,1 
63,5 
69,3 
72,3 
74,5 
76,2 
83,8 
89,1 
90,3 
85,4 
91,7 
99,2 
112,9 
97,0 
88,4 
107,7 
106,0 
120,4 
132,4 
134,4 
144,0 
140,2 
150,0 
146,5 
121,3 
131,7 
133,3 
146,0 
1 % 
Table 16 
Private consumption at current prices per head of population 
(PPS EUR 12-; EUR 12- 100) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Β 
108,3 
106,8 
105,9 
105,9 
104,1 
103,7 
102,3 
100,9 
102,0 
101,8 
101,1 
102,5 
103,5 
104,7 
104,5 
104,5 
105,8 
105,6 
105,7 
106,4 
109,0 
110,6 
112,1 
110,7 
110,7 
110,2 
107,1 
106,4 
105,4 
105,1 
106,3 
107,8 
107,6 
108,4 
DK 
114,6 
116,6 
117,5 
111,5 
115,3 
113,2 
112,9 
113,0 
110,1 
109,5 
107,5 
103,8 
100,1 
100,2 
96,0 
96,5 
100,9 
100,6 
98,6 
98,9 
95,5 
93,9 
94,5 
95,2 
97,5 
100,0 
101,8 
97,0 
93,5 
91,3 
89,9 
90,3 
90,2 
91,1 
WD D GR 
118,6 
117,6 
117,3 
114,5 
115,2 
117,7 
117,1 
115,1 
115,0 
115,8 
115,6 
115,4 
116,5 
114,6 
113,4 
117,6 
119,4 
121,6 
122,0 
122,1 
122,3 
122,7 
121,0 
121,4 
122,9 
122,3 
119,4 
118,1 
117,1 
115,5 
116,4 : 
117,5 106,4 
115,5 105,5 
113,2 104,0 
44,8 
: 45,4 
44,0 
44,9 
46,6 
48,7 
49,2 
49,9 
50,6 
51,3 
53,7 
54,8 
55,1 
54,2 
54,1 
56,3 
55,6 
55,5 
56,7 
54,6 
55,0 
56,4 
55,8 
54,5 
53,2 
54,1 
55,3 
54,7 
54,2 
56,1 
55,2 
54,0 
54,1 
54,5 
E 
63,1 
66,6 
69,0 
72,5 
73,0 
75,0 
76,1 
76,0 
76,6 
77,3 
77,3 
78,2 
80,1 
81,0 
83,2 
82,5 
83,0 
81,9 
79,1 
76,3 
76,3 
75,8 
75,5 
75,0 
73,2 
72,8 
72,3 
73,8 
74,3 
76,0 
76,6 
77,5 
78,8 
79,5 
F 
103,3 
104,0 
105,1 
105,0 
105,9 
105,6 
106,5 
107,5 
107,5 
109,2 
109,0 
109,9 
109,1 
107,4 
107,6 
108,4 
108,2 
108,8 
109,2 
108,9 
109,2 
111,2 
113,2 
112,4 
111,7 
111,2 
109,8 
109,1 
108,2 
108,2 
108,6 
108,5 
108,7 
108,7 
R L 
70,3 
69,9 
68,9 
68,2 
67,0 
65,1 
63,4 
63,2 
66,3 
66,1 
64,5 
63,6 
61,3 
59,6 
63,3 
61,3 
59,4 
61,7 
63,7 
63,9 
64,5 
65,3 
59,5 
58,1 
58,5 
59,5 
58,3 
58,8 
59,5 
59,9 
62,9 
63,2 
64,0 
64,3 
I 
83,0 
84,3 
86,1 
88,3 
86,7 
85,6 
88,7 
92,2 
92,4 
93,0 
95,0 
93,8 
92,6 
94,3 
96,0 
95,0 
95,4 
95,2 
95,2 
97,7 
101,9 
101,4 
101,3 
100,2 
100,8 
101,5 
101,9 
102,3 
102,6 
103,7 
103,4 
104,1 
105,1 
105,7 
L 
134,7 
134,4 
126,0 
123,6 
126,4 
126,5 
122,2 
121,2 
119,2 
119,4 
116,8 
116,9 
116,5 
113,4 
113,8 
115,9 
113,5 
113,6 
111,7 
110,4 
110,5 
111,9 
112,6 
111,5 
111,2 
113,8 
114,3 
114,0 
113,8 
113,7 
114,8 
119,1 
122,4 
123,3 
NL 
108,7 
108,4 
108,3 
108,6 
108,3 
109,0 
106,8 
106,7 
106,6 
108,9 
110,4 
109,4 
106,9 
104,5 
105,1 
106,9 
107,9 
109,2 
110,1 
109,3 
107,7 
103,9 
100,8 
101,0 
100,0 
100,1 
100,3 
99,9 
96,4 
96,6 
97,8 
99,4 
99,7 
98,9 
Ρ 
43,6 
44,5 
43,3 
43,4 
44,3 
45,9 
46,2 
46,7 
51,3 
51,5 
51,7 
55,8 
54,7 
58,5 
63,8 
62,5 
61,3 
60,0 
56,8 
57,1 
57,8 
59,6 
60,0 
58,6 
57,2 
54,9 
53,4 
53,7 
54,5 
54,2 
55,2 
55,7 
58,1 
59,0 
UK 
129,8 
126,8 
123,3 
122,6 
121,8 
118,8 
115,7 
113,9 
112,7 
108,6 
106,7 
106,0 
106,5 
108,0 
105,6 
101,6 
99,0 
97,2 
98,7 
98,8 
94,3 
93,1 
94,4 
97,2 
97,6 
98,4 
103,2 
104,6 
107,2 
106,4 
103,9 
100,8 
99,9 
101,0 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
: 186,8 
180,8 
178,3 
175,1 
177,0 
177,6 
177,7 
174,6 
174,0 
170,5 
166,2 
163,8 
163,6 
160,3 
155,5 
154,0 
154,7 
156,1 
156,4 
153,2 
149,9 
147,4 
145,9 
149,9 
152,5 
154,2 
154,9 
154,4 
154,1 
152,1 
150,5 
100,0 98,2 146,5 
100,0 98,4 147,5 
100,0 98,4 148,5 
J 
50,9* 
52,8 
55,5 
58,3 
61,4 
63,2 
66,4 
69,3 
71,6 
74,9 
77,5 
79,9 
82,9 
83,1 
80,4 
85,4 
85,6 
87,1 
88,8 
91,4 
92,4 
92,9 
96,7 
98,8 
99,4 
100,5 
99,8 
100,5 
101,6 
102,8 
105,3 
107,2 
108,7 
110,4 
197 
Table 17 
Private consumption at constant prices 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
1,6 
3,9 
4,4 
2,6 
4,3 
2,7 
2,8 
5,3 
5,4 
4,4 
DK 
7,3 
5,9 
0,0 
7,8 
3,4 
4,3 
2,9 
1,9 
6,3 
3,5 
WD E 
6,0 
5,6 
2,9 
5,4 
7,0 
3,7 
1,5 
4,9 
7,7 
7,4 
GR 
6,8 
4,3 
5,1 
8,8 
7,7 
6,8 
6,2 
6,9 
6,2 
8,8 
E 
11,0 
8,8 
11,3 
4,3 
6,9 
6,9 
6,0 
6,0 
7,0 
4,2 
F 
5,9 
7,1 
6,9 
5,6 
4,0 
4,8 
5,1 
4,0 
6,0 
4,3 
IRL 
3,1 
3,5 
4,2 
4,3 
0,8 
1,5 
3,8 
9,0 
5,4 
- ι ,ο 
I 
7,5 
7,1 
9,3 
3,3 
3,3 
7,2 
7,4 
5,2 
6,6 
7,6 
L 
5,0 
4,4 
4,6 
9,2 
4,0 
1,6 
0,0 
4,3 
5,2 
6,1 
NL 
5,2 
6,1 
7,0 
5,9 
7,5 
3,2 
5,4 
6,6 
7,9 
7,4 
Ρ 
7,8 
- t f 
6,9 
5,8 
6,0 
4,0 
6,0 
11,1 
5,4 
2,9 
UK 
2,2 
tf 
4,9 
3,0 
1,5 
1,7 
2,4 
2,8 
0,6 
2,9 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
EUR 1 2 -
(PPS) 
5,5 
5,4 
5,9 
4,5 
4,5 
4,3 
4,0 
4,6 
5,5 
5,4 
EUR 12 + 
(PPS) 
USA 
2,0 
4,4 
3,7 
5,7 
5,7 
5,0 
2,9 
5,1 
3,6 
2,4 
J 
10,4 
7,5 
8,8 
10,8 
5,8 
10,0 
10,4 
8,5 
10,3 
7,4 
1961-70 3,7 4,3 5,2 6,7 7,2 5,4 3,4 6,4 4,4 6,2 5,4 2,4 5,0 4,0 9,0 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
4,7 
6,0 
7,8 
2,6 
0,6 
4,8 
2,4 
2,3 
4,8 
2,0 
-0,8 
1,7 
4,8 
-2,9 
3,7 
7,9 
1,1 
0,7 
1,4 
-3,7 
5,8 
5,1 
3,5 
1,2 
3,7 
4,0 
4,1 
3,6 
3,2 
1,5 
5,6 
7,0 
7,6 
0,7 
5,5 
5,3 
4,6 
5,7 
2,6 
0,2 
5,1 
8,3 
7,8 
5,1 
1,8 
5,6 
1,5 
0,9 
1,3 
0,6 
4,7 
4,9 
5,1 
0,9 
2,6 
4,7 
2,6 
3,8 
2,8 
1,0 
3,2 
5,1 
7,2 
1,6 
0,8 
2,8 
6,8 
9,1 
4,4 
0,4 
3,5 
3,3 
7,0 
3,7 
0,2 
5,0 
3,3 
3,1 
7,1 
6,2 
5.6 
4,8 
5,8 
4,5 
5,3 
3,1 
2,3 
2,9 
3,5 
2,8 
3,3 
3,5 
4,0 
3,7 
3,3 
5.3 
4.6 
4,3 
3,0 
0,0 
8,4 
2.9 
13,0 
9,1 
1,7 
2,3 
0,6 
-2,0 
0,0 
3,7 
3,2 
6,3 
5,3 
-1,5 
-0,4 
0.4 
-0,5 
5,6 
4,4 
0,1 
4,4 
5.1 
5.5 
1.7 
1,9 
4.0 
2,5 
3,6 
3,7 
1,7 
3,3 
6,5 
4,2 
-1,1 
2,1 
5,5 
4,5 
4,1 
2,2 
-0,3 
5,6 
9,1 
9,1 
-0,1 
4,5 
3,1 
4,1 
5,4 
6,5 
1,1 
1971-80 3,8 1,3 3,6 4,4 3,7 3,3 4,1 4,2 4,1 3,5 3,9 2,3 3,4 3,1 4,8 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-1,1 
1,3 
- ! , 6 
1,2 
1,9 
2,3 
3,0 
2,9 
3,7 
2,8 
-2,3 
1,4 
2,6 
3,4 
5,0 
5,7 
-1,5 
-1,0 
-0,4 
0,4 
-0,4 
-1,5 
1,3 
2,0 
1,6 
3,4 
3,2 
3,1 
1,8 
5,3 
2,0 
3,9 
0,3 
1,7 
3,9 
0,7 
1,0 
3,5 
4,3 
2,0 
-0,6 
0,2 
0,3 
-0,4 
2,4 
3,3 
5,8 
4,8 
5,6 
3,7 
1.8 
3,2 
0,9 
0,9 
2,2 
3,7 
2,7 
3,0 
3,1 
2,7 
1,7 
-7,1 
0,9 
2,0 
4,6 
2,0 
3,4 
4,6 
3,8 
3,0 
1,7 
0,9 
0,6 
2,2 
3,1 
4,4 
4.5 
4,6 
3,6 
3,3 
1,7 
0,4 
0,5 
1,4 
2,7 
3.4 
5,0 
3.9 
3.9 
4,0 
-2,0 
-1,4 
0,7 
0,8 
2,4 
3,2 
4,0 
0,8 
3,5 
4,1 
2,9 
2,4 
-1,4 
-2,9 
0,7 
5,6 
5,4 
6,6 
3,3 
5,3 
0,1 
1,0 
4,5 
1,9 
3,8 
6,4 
5,5 
7,5 
3,3 
0,7 
0,4 
0,6 
1,3 
1,4 
2,6 
4,1 
3,9 
4,2 
3,2 
3,2 
1,5 
1,1 
5,0 
4,8 
4.7 
4,1 
2,8 
3,7 
2.0 
1.1 
1.6 
4.4 
3.4 
2.7 
3.4 
3,4 
4.2 
5,2 
4,3 
4,2 
1981-90 1,6 1,3 2,0 2,3 2,5 2,4 1,8 2,9 2,7 1,6 2,7 3,4 2,5 3.1 3,7 
1991 
1992 
1993 
2,6 
2,0 
1,8 
2,3 
1,4 
1,9 
3,7 
0,9 
-0,1 
1,3 
0,3 
1,2 
1,3 
1,3 
3,0 
2,8 
1,0 
1,5 
1,7 
1,4 
0,3 
2,9 
2,0 
2,6 
1,8 
0,1 
6,5 
3,1 
2,2 
3,3 
1.4 
0,8 
4,5 
3,7 
3,5 
-2,1 
-0,4 
0,5 
1,9 
1.3 
0,7 
1,4 
0,7 
-0,6 
2.0 
2,1 
2,7 
2,0 
1,8 
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Table 18 
Public consumption at current prices 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + 
(ECU) (ECU) 
USA 
1960 12,4 13,3 10,7 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
11,9 
12,3 
13,0 
12,5 
12,8 
13,1 
13,5 
13,6 
13,6 
13,4 
14,4 
15,2 
15,4 
15,6 
16,3 
17,1 
17,8 
18,6 
18,9 
20,0 
11,1 
11,9 
12,6 
11,9 
12,1 
12,1 
12,6 
11,8 
11,9 
12,0 
1961-70 13,0 16,9 12,0 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1971-80 16,0 23,6 13,6 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
18,6 
18,0 
17,5 
17,0 
17,1 
16,8 
16,2 
15,2 
14,6 
14,5 
27,8 
28,2 
27,4 
25,9 
25,3 
23,9 
25,2 
25,7 
25,5 
25,2 
14,3 
14,2 
13,9 
13,6 
13,6 
13,4 
13,4 
13,0 
12,6 
12,2 
1981-90 16,5 26,0 13,4 
11,7 8,3 14,2 12,5 12,0 9,8 12,2 10,5 16,4 13,1 
11,3 
11,6 
11,3 
11.7 
11.7 
11,8 
13,0 
12,9 
12,7 
12,6 
8,2 
8,1 
8,5 
8,2 
8,4 
8,7 
9,5 
9,2 
9,3 
9,6 
14,4 
14,5 
14,7 
14,5 
14,4 
14,2 
14,2 
14,8 
14,6 
14,7 
12,4 
12,5 
12,7 
13,3 
13,6 
13,6 
13,4 
13,4 
13,5 
14,6 
11,9 
12,3 
13,1 
13,5 
14,2 
14,0 
13,6 
13,6 
13,4 
13,0 
9,9 
10,9 
12,3 
10,8 
10,9 
11,4 
12,1 
12,1 
11,0 
10,5 
12,7 
13,2 
13,9 
14,1 
14,0 
14,4 
14,7 
14,4 
14,5 
14,9 
12,5 
12,9 
12,3 
12,3 
12,0 
12,1 
13,1 
13,1 
12,9 
13,8 
16,7 
17,0 
16,9 
16,4 
16,7 
17,1 
17,9 
17,6 
17,1 
17,5 
13,3 
13,6 
14,0 
13,7 
13,9 
13,9 
14,3 
14,1 
13,9 
14,0 
12,1 8,8 14,5 13,3 13,3 11,2 14,1 12,7 17,1 13,9 
14,5 11,1 16,4 17,2 14,3 14,0 16,4 13,9 19,9 15,6 
18,0 
18,3 
18,8 
19,5 
20,4 
19,4 
19,6 
20,0 
20,5 
19,4 
13,9 
14,1 
14,6 
14,4 
14,7 
14,7 
15,1 
14,8 
15,2 
15,2 
18,8 
19,3 
19,5 
19,6 
19,4 
18,9 
18,8 
18,5 
18,0 
17,9 
19,9 
19,8 
19,3 
18,7 
18,6 
18,8 
17,7 
16,3 
15,2 
15,7 
16,0 
16,0 
16,4 
16,3 
16,4 
16,2 
16,7 
16,9 
16,6 
17,4 
17,4 
16,4 
15,8 
15,4 
15,7 
15,7 
16,8 
16,1 
15,4 
16,4 
17,2 
17,0 
16,9 
16,0 
15,6 
15,4 
15,8 
15,3 
14,8 
14,5 
15,0 
14,9 
15,1 
15,0 
15,5 
15,4 
15,2 
16,0 
16,1 
16,7 
21,8 
21,7 
21,7 
21,5 
20,7 
20,7 
20,2 
19,5 
19,3 
20,0 
17,5 
17,6 
17,6 
17,3 
17,2 
16,9 
16,9 
16,6 
16,3 
16,4 
19,4 14,7 18,9 18,0 16,5 16,1 15,9 15,5 20,7 17,0 
16,8 8,0 
17,7 
17,8 
17,5 
17,2 
16,7 
17,7 
18,9 
18,7 
18,4 
18,7 
7,7 
8,0 
8,2 
8,0 
8,2 
8,0 
7,6 
7,4 
7,3 
7,4 
17,9 7,8 
14,1 
14,5 
14,5 
14,7 
16,4 
16,4 
16,8 
17,4 
17,6 
17,8 
21,3 
21,3 
21,3 
23,4 
24,6 
24,1 
23,9 
24,5 
25,0 
26,7 
12,7 
12,7 
13,0 
13,9 
14,4 
13,7 
13,7 
13,7 
13,7 
14,0 
12,5 
12,2 
11,5 
13,8 
15,2 
15,1 
16,0 
15,9 
16,3 
16,4 
9,7 
9,6 
9,6 
10,0 
10,6 
11,4 
11,6 
12,1 
12,6 
13,3 
14,9 
14,9 
14,8 
15,4 
16,6 
16,9 
17,2 
17,6 
17,6 
18,1 
15,2 
15,3 
15,7 
17,2 
18,6 
18,0 
17,1 
17,1 
18,1 
19,9 
14,6 
15,1 
14,4 
13,8 
14,1 
13,4 
13,8 
14,1 
14,5 
14,7 
11,7 
11,8 
11,3 
11,5 
14,9 
14,7 
15,9 
15,6 
16,0 
16,7 
15,4 
15,3 
15,0 
15,7 
16,8 
16,7 
16,8 
17,1 
17,5 
17,3 
13,5 
13,4 
12,8 
14,1 
15,0 
13,7 
14,0 
13,9 
13,9 
14,5 
17,9 
18,2 
18,1 
20,0 
21,9 
21,6 
20,2 
19,9 
19,6 
21,2 
14,6 
14,7 
14,5 
15,2 
16,2 
15,9 
15,9 
16,1 
16,2 
16,8 
18,1 
18,0 
17,4 
18,0 
18,6 
18,0 
17,5 
17,0 
16,9 
17,6 
8,0 
8,2 
83 9,1 
10,0 
9,9 
9,8 
9,7 
9,7 
9,8 
17,7 9,2 
17,4 
18,4 
18,3 
17,8 
18,1 
18,5 
18,5 
18,1 
17,6 
17,9 
9,9 
9,9 
9,9 
9,8 
9,6 
9,7 
9,5 
9,2 
9,2 
9,1 
18,0 9,6 
1991 
1992 
1993 
14,7 
14,6 
14.7 
24,8 
24,6 
24,7 
11,6 
11,8 
11,9 
13,2 
13,6 
13,6 
18,2 
17,2 
16,7 
15,4 
15,9 
15,8 
18,3 
18,4 
18,7 
16,3 
17,0 
17,3 
17,5 
17,2 
16,8 
17,1 
17,3 
17,5 
14,3 
14,3 
14,2 
17,8 
18,2 
18,4 
21,3 
21,9 
21,9 
16,5 
16,6 
16,5 
16,9 
17,0 
16,9 
18,2 
17,8 
17,5 
9,2 
9,3 
9,3 
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Table 19 
Public consumption at constant prices 
1961-70 5,5 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
1,9 
8,6 
11,6 
4,2 
5,5 
4,7 
5,7 
3,5 
6,3 
3,1 
DK 
5,3 
9,9 
2,9 
7,3 
3,4 
5,8 
7,6 
4,7 
6,8 
6,9 
WD E 
6,6 
10,6 
6,4 
0,7 
4,0 
1,0 
3,0 
-1,4 
4,5 
4,3 
GR 
4,4 
6,7 
4,2 
9,3 
9,0 
6,3 
8,5 
1,3 
7,7 
5,9 
E 
5,6 
6,7 
9,7 
1,3 
3,7 
1,7 
2,3 
1,8 
4,2 
5,3 
F 
4,8 
4,7 
3,4 
4,2 
3,2 
2,7 
4,3 
5,6 
4,1 
4,2 
IRL 
2,1 
3,1 
4,0 
3,0 
3,7 
1,0 
4,5 
5,8 
6,9 
11,3 
I 
4,4 
3,9 
4,3 
4,2 
4,0 
4,0 
4,4 
5,2 
2,8 
2,6 
L 
1,3 
2,4 
5,8 
-0,8 
2,5 
5,8 
4,2 
5,6 
3,3 
4,1 
NL 
2,8 
3,3 
4,7 
1,7 
1,5 
1,7 
2,4 
2,2 
4,5 
6,0 
Ρ 
26,7 
8,5 
3,0 
6,8 
7,4 
6,6 
13,6 
8,4 
3,2 
12,7 
UK 
3,5 
3,1 
1,8 
1,6 
2,6 
2,7 
5,7 
0,4 
-1,8 
1,7 
EUR 12- EUR 12+ USA (PPS) (PPS) 
4,7 
5,6 
4,3 
2,6 
3,5 
2,6 
4,4 
2,3 
2,7 
3,6 
7,7 
5,2 
2,6 
4,9 
3,2 
7,5 
5,3 
3,4 
2,3 
0,2 
j 
5,9 
8,7 
8,3 
3,3 
3,8 
5,7 
4,0 
6,4 
5,9 
7,1 
6,0 3,9 6,3 4,2 4,1 4,5 4,0 3,4 3,1 9,5 2,1 3,6 4,2 5,9 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
5,5 
5,9 
5,3 
3,4 
4,5 
3,7 
2,3 
6,0 
2,5 
1,5 
5,5 
5,7 
4,0 
3,5 
2,0 
4,5 
2,4 
6,2 
5,9 
4,3 
3,8 
2,2 
3,7 
2,4 
1,6 
-0,2 
1,7 
3,8 
3,6 
2,2 
4,9 
5,7 
6,8 
12,1 
11,9 
5,1 
6,5 
3,5 
5,8 
0,2 
4,3 
5,2 
6,4 
9,3 
5,2 
6,9 
3,9 
5,4 
4,2 
4,2 
3,9 
3,5 
3,4 
1,2 
4,4 
4,2 
2,4 
5,1 
3,0 
2,5 
8,6 
7,5 
6,7 
7,6 
8,7 
2,6 
2,1 
7,9 
4,6 
7,1 
5,2 
5,1 
2,7 
2,4 
2,4 
2,1 
3,0 
3,5 
3,0 
2,1 
3,0 
4,2 
3,4 
3,8 
3,3 
2,8 
2,9 
1,8 
2,2 
3,1 
4,4 
0,8 
0,8 
2,2 
4,1 
4,1 
3,4 
3,9 
2,8 
0,6 
6,4 
8,6 
7,8 
17,3 
6,6 
7,0 
12,2 
3,3 
6,5 
7,9 
3,0 
4,2 
4,3 
1,9 
5,6 
1,2 
-1,7 
2,3 
2,2 
1,6 
4,1 
3,9 
3,8 
2,8 
3,9 
2,5 
1,7 
3,9 
3,2 
2,3 
-0,4 
-1,2 
0,1 
2,3 
0,2 
1,8 
1,1 2,3 
1,9 
1,3 
5,3 
5,4 
5,3 
3,2 
7,8 
4,5 
4,1 
5,1 
4,3 
3,3 
1971-80 4,1 4,4 2,5 6,2 5,5 3,4 6,3 3,1 3,0 2,7 8,3 2,4 3,2 0,9 4,8 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
0,3 
-1,4 
0,1 
.2 
2,4 
1,7 
0,3 
-ι,ο 0,2 
1,1 
2,6 
3,1 
0,0 
-0,4 
2,5 
0,5 
2,5 
0.9 
-0,3 
-ι,ο 
1,1 
-0,8 
0,1 
1,1 1,5 
2,3 
1,2 
0,2 
0,3 
1,4 
6,8 
2,3 
2,7 
'. 3,0 
3,2 
-0,8 
0,9 
4,7 
4,2 
-ο,ι 
1,9 
4,9 
3,9 
2,9 
4,6 
5,4 
8,9 
4,0 
8,3 
4,2 
3,1 
3,7 
2,0 
1,2 
2,2 
1,7 
2,8 
3,4 
0,2 
1,8 
0,3 
3,2 
-0,4 
-0,7 
1,8 
2,6 
-4,3 
-4,7 
-1,1 5,2 
2,3 
2,6 
3,5 
2,2 
3,4 
2,6 
3,5 
2,8 
0,8 
1,3 
1,4 
1,5 
1,9 
2,2 
2,0 
3,1 
2,7 
3,8 
1,9 
3,2 
2,5 
0,4 
1,0 
-0,8 
1,3 
2,5 
2,9 
1,4 
1,5 
2,1 
5,2 
3,6 
3,7 
0,1 
0,1 
7,2 
4,9 
5,3 
2,8 
1,5 
0,3 
0,8 
1,8 
1,0 
0,0 
1,8 
1,2 
0,6 
0,9 
3,2 
1,8 
1,8 
1,9 
1,3 
2,0 
2,3 
2,6 
1,9 
1,3 
2,1 
1.1 2.4 
3.6 
4,5 
5,3 
4,9 
3,4 
2,1 
0,3 
2,8 
4,8 
2,0 
3,0 
2,7 
1,7 
4,5 
0,4 
2,1 
2,0 
1,9 
1981-90 0,4 1,0 0,8 2,7 4,9 2,2 0,2 2,5 2,4 1,5 3,4 1,2 1,9 3,0 2,5 
1991 
1992 
1993 
0,9 
0,5 
0,3 
-1.2 
0.4 
2,2 
-1,9 
3,3 
-0,1 
4,5 
-0,4 
-0,7 
0,0 
0,0 
4,4 
3,5 
1,1 
4,1 
2,5 
2,6 
1,3 
3,9 
1,2 
1,7 
0,8 
0,4 
3,8 
2,2 
2,3 
1,6 
0,0 
-0,1 
4,2 
1,5 
0,6 
2,8 
0,1 
0,6 
2,0 
1,7 
0,9 
1,9 
0,8 
1,2 
-1,5 
-0,4 
3,4 
1,7 
1,4 
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Table 20 
Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
Total economy 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
EUR 12 + 
(ECU) 
USA 
1960 19,3 21,6 24,3 19,0 20,4 20,9 14,4 26,0 20,9 24,8 23,2 16,4 21,4 18,0 29,0 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
20,7 
21,3 
20,7 
22,4 
22,4 
22,9 
22,9 
21,5 
21,3 
22,7 
23,2 
23,1 
22,0 
24,5 
24,1 
24,1 
24,2 
23,4 
24,6 
24,7 
25,2 
25,7 
25,6 
26,6 
26,1 
25,4 
23,1 
22,4 
23,3 
25,5 
1961-70 21,9 23,8 24,9 
1971-80 21,7 22,5 22,3 
18,2 
20,1 
19,2 
21,0 
21,6 
21,7 
20,3 
23,2 
24,6 
23,6 
21,4 
21,9 
22,1 
23,6 
24,8 
25,1 
25,4 
26,0 
26,5 
26,4 
22,0 
22,2 
23,0 
23,8 
24,2 
24,6 
24,8 
24,3 
24,4 
24,3 
16,3 
17,9 
19,5 
20,5 
21,4 
19,8 
20,1 
20,9 
23,3 
22,7 
26,8 
27,2 
27,7 
25,6 
22,2 
21,6 
22,5 
23,4 
24,2 
24,6 
24,2 
25,9 
30,1 
33,7 
28,0 
26,6 
23,9 
22,1 
22,2 
23,1 
25,5 
25,1 
24,4 
26,2 
25,8 
27,0 
27,1 
27,6 
25,2 
26,6 
23,2 
22,4 
23,7 
22,8 
22,8 
25,1 
26,6 
22,2 
22,6 
23,2 
17,3 
17,0 
16,8 
18,3 
18,4 
18,4 
19,1 
19,5 
18,8 
18,9 
22,4 
22,7 
22,8 
23,6 
23,1 
23,1 
22,9 
22,9 
23,1 
23,8 
21,4 24,3 23,8 20,2 24,6 26,0 26,0 23,4 18,3 23,0 
24,2 24,8 23,9 25,6 24,0 26,1 22,5 26,5 19,1 22,6 
17,5 
17,6 
18,1 
18,5 
19,0 
18,8 
18,1 
18,4 
18,6 
18,0 
31,9 
32,2 
31,6 
31,7 
29,8 
30,3 
31,9 
33,2 
34,5 
35,5 
18,3 32,2 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
22,1 
21,3 
21,4 
22,7 
22,5 
22,1 
21,6 
21,7 
20,7 
21,1 
24,2 
24,6 
24,8 
24,0 
21,1 
23,0 
22,1 
21,7 
20,9 
18,8 
26,2 
25,4 
23,9 
21,6 
20,4 
20,1 
20,3 
20,6 
21,7 
22,6 
25,2 
27,8 
28,0 
22,2 
20,8 
21,2 
23,0 
23,9 
25,8 
24,2 
24,2 
25,3 
26,8 
28,3 
26,8 
25,3 
24,3 
23,0 
21,9 
22,5 
24,7 
24,7 
25,2 
25,8 
24,1 
23,9 
22,9 
22,4 
22,4 
23,0 
23,6 
23,7 
25,3 
24,6 
22,7 
25,0 
24,8 
27,7 
30,5 
28,6 
23,9 
23,1 
24,9 
25,9 
24,9 
23,9 
23,5 
22,7 
22,8 
24,3 
28,4 
27,8 
27,3 
24,6 
27,7 
24,9 
25,1 
24,1 
24,4 
27,1 
26,0 
24,2 
23,7 
22,5 
21,6 
20,0 
21,6 
21,9 
21,6 
21,6 
24,7 
27,1 
26,8 
26,0 
25,9 
25,1 
26,5 
27,9 
26,6 
28,6 
18,9 
18,5 
19,9 
20,9 
19,9 
19,6 
18,6 
18,5 
18,7 
18,0 
23,9 
23,6 , 
23,9 
23,7 
22,5 
22,0 
21,6 
21,4 
21,6 
22,0 
18,5 
19,2 
19,5 
18,9 
17,6 
17,9 
19,3 
20,7 
21,3 
20,2 
34,2 
34,1 
36,4 
34,8 
32,5 
31,2 
30,2 
30,4 
31,7 
31,6 
19,3 32,7 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
18,0 
17,3 
16,2 
16,0 
15,6 
15,7 
16,0 
17,6 
19,3 
20,2 
15,6 
16,1 
16,0 
17,2 
18,7 
20,8 
19,7 
18,1 
17,8 
17,7 
21,6 
20,4 
20,4 
20,0 
19,5 
19,4 
19,4 
19,6 
20,2 
21,0 
22,3 
19,9 
20,3 
18,5 
19,1 
18,5 
17,2 
17,5 
19,2 
19,4 
22,1 
21,6 
20,9 
19,0 
19,2 
19,5 
20,8 
22,6 
24,2 
24,6 
22,1 
21,4 
20,2 
19,3 
19,3 
19,3 
19,8 
20,7 
21,2 
21,2 
29,7 
26,5 
23,1 
21,4 
19,0 
18,0 
16,4 
16,3 
17,7 
18,6 
23,9 
22,3 
21,3 
21,0 
20,7 
19,7 
19,7 
20,1 
20,2 
20,2 
25,4 
25,0 
21,2 
20,0 
17,7 
22,1 
25,5 
27,0 
27,1 
26,9 
19,7 
18,7 
18,7 
19,1 
19,7 
20,6 
20,8 
21,3 
21,5 
21,3 
30,8 
31,1 
29,2 
23,6 
21,8 
22,1 
24,2 
26,8 
26,4 
26,4 
16,2 
16,1 
16,0 
16,9 
16,9 
16,8 
17,5 
19,1 
20,1 
19,3 
20,9 
20,0 
19,5 
19,2 
19,0 
19,0 
19,3 
20,0 
20,7 
20,9 
19,9 
18,7 
18,5 
19,3 
19,5 
19,1 
18,5 
18,3 
17,7 
16,8 
30,6 
29,5 
28,0 
27,7 
27,5 
27,3 
28,5 
29,9 
31,0 
32,2 
1981-90 17,2 17,8 20,1 19,2 21,4 20,4 20,7 20,9 23,8 20,1 26,2 17,5 19,9 18,6 29,2 
1991 
1992 
1993 
19,8 
19,9 
19,1 
17,1 
15,6 
15,7 
21,6 
21,5 
21,4 
23,2 
23,5 
23,6 
18,2 
17,5 
17,9 
24,1 
22,6 
22,0 
20,8 
20,0 
19,6 
17,1 
16,8 
16,7 
19,8 
19,4 
19,3 
29,0 
29,7 
29,6 
20,8 
20,6 
20,4 
25,5 
25,1 
25,4 
16,7 
15,6 
15,5 
20,3 
19,8 
19,6 
20,8 
20,4 
20,3 
15,4 
15,4 
15,3 
31,6 
31,1 
31,2 
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Table 21 
Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
Total economy 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
12,4 
5.9 
0,1 
14,7 
4,1 
6,8 
2,9 
-1,3 
5,3 
8,4 
DK 
13,9 
6,7 
-2.4 
23,5 
4,7 
4,3 
5,4 
1,9 
11,8 
2,2 
WD E 
6,6 
3,9 
1,2 
11,2 
4,8 
tf 
-6,9 
3,4 
9,9 
9,2 
GR 
8,1 
8,4 
5,5 
20,7 
12,8 
3,2 
-1,6 
21,4 
18,6 
-1,4 
E 
17,9 
11,4 
11,4 
15,0 
16,6 
12,7 
6,0 
9,4 
9,8 
3,0 
F 
10,9 
8,5 
8,8 
10,5 
7,0 
7,3 
6,0 
5,5 
9,2 
4,6 
IRL 
16,9 
14,8 
12,0 
10,8 
10,5 
-3,0 
6,8 
13,2 
20,5 
-3,3 
I 
11,6 
9,8 
8,1 
-5,8 
-8,4 
4,3 
11,7 
10,8 
7,8 
3,0 
L 
9,0 
7,8 
14,2 
22,1 
-13,9 
-5,1 
-7,9 
- 4 3 
10,5 
7,5 
NL 
6,0 
3,4 
1,1 
19,2 
5,3 
8,0 
8,5 
11,2 
-2,2 
7,5 
Ρ 
6,7 
1,7 
15,3 
4,0 
10,3 
17,9 
53 
-9,3 
8,1 
11,4 
UK 
9,8 
0,7 
1,4 
16,6 
5,2 
2,6 
8,7 
6,3 
-0,6 
2,5 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
9,8 
5,9 
4,8 
9,0 
3,6 
4,8 
3,9 
6,4 
6,9 
5,1 
1,4 
6,7 
73 
6,6 
9,4 
3,9 
- ι , ο 
6,4 
1,8 
-3,7 
J 
23,4 
14,1 
11,9 
15,7 
4,6 
14,0 
18,1 
20,5 
18,9 
16,9 
1961-70 5,8 7,0 4,3 9,3 11,2 7,8 9,6 5,1 3,4 6,7 6,9 5,2 6,0 3,8 15,7 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
-1,9 
3,4 
7,0 
6,9 
-1,9 
4,0 
0,0 
• 2,8 
-2,7 
4,6 
1,9 
9,3 
3,5 
-8,9 
-12,4 
17,1 
-2,4 
1,1 
-0,4 
-12,6 
6,0 
2,6 
-0,3 
-9,7 
-5,2 
3,7 
3,8 
4,3 
6,9 
2,3 
14,0 
15,4 
7,7 
-25,6 
03 
6,8 
7,8 
6,0 
8,8 
-6,5 
-3,0 
14,2 
13,0 
6,2 
-4,5 
-0,8 
-0,9 
-2,7 
-4,4 
0,7 
7,3 
5,6 
7,2 
0,8 
-6,8 
2,8 
-1,6 
2,3 
33 
2,7 
8,9 
7,8 
16,2 
-11,6 
-3,6 
13,6 
4,1 
18,9 
13,6 
-4,7 
0,2 
1,3 
8,8 
2,0 
-7,3 
0,0 
1,8 
0,6 
5,7 
8,7 
10,7 
7,0 
11,8 
-7,0 
-7,4 
-4,2 
-0,1 
1,1 
3,8 
12,7 
1,5 
-2,3 
4,2 
-4,0 
-4,4 
- 2 3 
9,7 
2,5 
-1,7 
-0,9 
10,2 
14,0 
10,3 
-6,1 
-10,6 
1,3 
11,5 
6,2 
-1,3 
8,5 
1,8 
-0,2 
6,5 
-2,4 
-2,0 
1,7 
-1,8 
3,0 
2,8 
-5,4 
3,4 
3,8 
5.9 
-2.3 
-5,4 
2,0 
1,3 
2,3 
3,3 
1,9 
5,8 
8,7 
63 
-6,0 
-10,7 
6,9 
11,3 
9,5 
2,4 
-6,8 
4,4 
9,7 
11,6 
-8,3 
-1.0 
2,7 
2,8 
7,8 
6,2 
0,0 
1971-80 2,2 -0,8 1,3 2,8 1,6 2,3 5,9 2,1 2,6 0,2 4,1 0,4 1,6 2,5 3,4 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-16,1 
-1,7 
-4,4 
1,7 
0,7 
4,4 
5,6 
15,4 
13,7 
8,4 
-19,2 
7,1 
1,9 
12,9 
12,6 
17,1 
-3,8 
-6,6 
-0,6 
-0,5 
-4,9 
-5,3 
3,3 
0,3 
0,0 
3,6 
2,1 
4,6 
6,5 
8,7 
-7,5 
-1,9 
-13 
-5,7 
53 
r6,2 
-5,1 
8,9 
10,0 
5,7 
-3,3 
0,5 
-2,5 
-5,8 
4,1 
9,9 
14,0 
14,0 
13,8 
6,9 
-1,9 
- t f 
-3,3 
-2,6 
3,4 
4,6 
5,0 
9,6 
6,8 
3,1 
9,5 
-3,4 
-9,3 
-2,5 
-7,7 
-2,8 
-3,2 
1,5 
15.1 
10,2 
-3,1 
-4,7 
-0,6 
3,6 
0,6 
23 
5,0 
6,9 
4,3 
33 
-7,4 
-0,5 
-11,8 
0,1 
-9,5 
31,2 
14,7 
14,1 
8,9 
2,5 
-10,0 
-4,3 
1,9 
53 
6,7 
7,9 
1,5 
4,5 
4,9 
3,6 
5,5 
2,3 
-7,1 
-17,4 
-3,5 
10,9 
15,1 
15,0 
5,6 
5,9 
-9,6 
5,4 
5,0 
8,5 
4,0 
2,4 
9,6 
14,2 
7,2 
-3,1 
-5,0 
-1,9 
ο,ι 
0,9 
23 
4.3 
5,5 
8,8 
7,1 
4.0 
-ο,ι 
-8,7 
8,8 
15,9 
6,9 
2,0 
2,9 
5,0 
2,7 
-2,8 
2,4 
-ο,ι 
- ι , ο 
4,7 
5,3 
4,8 
9,6 
11,9 
9,3 
9,5 
1981-90 2,4 1,5 1,8 0,0 4,9 2,3 0,5 1,7 3,5 2,1 2,7 43 2,5 3,0 5,5 
1991 
1992 
1993 
0,3 
2,5 
-3,3 
-2,8 
-8,3 
1,9 
6,5 
1,7 
-1,7 
4,4 
0,3 
-2,0 
0,6 
4,5 
1,6 
-2,0 
-1,9 
-1,3 
-1,5 
-0,7 
-7,2 
1,6 
2,2 
0,9 
-0,2 
-13 
9,8 
4,5 
2,3 
0,1 
-0,4 
-0,7 
2,8 
3,6 
3,3 
-9,9 
-0,4 
-0,8 
0,0 
0,1 
-1,0 
0,6 
-0,5 
-8.5 
5,2 
4,6 
3.4 
-0.7 
1.0 
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Table 22 
Net Stockbuilding at current prices 
Total economy 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
EUR 12+ 
(ECU) 
USA 
1960 -0,1 4,4 3,0 -0,4 -0,5 3,0 2,0 2,1 2,4 3,3 1,4 2,2 2,4 0,7 3,9 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
0,5 
0,0 
0,4 
1,5 
0,8 
1,0 
0,4 
0,9 
1,9 
1,6 
1,9 
2,9 
0,8 
1,7 
2,3 
0,8 
0,0 
0,6 
1,3 
1,0 
2,0 
1,6 
0,7 
1,5 
2,3 
1,1 
-0,1 
2,1 
2,9 
2.1 
1,8 
1,1 
2,1 
4,7 
4,7 
0,6 
2,0 
-0,1 
1,3 
4,5 
1,7 
3,6 
3,4 
2,6 
3,0 
2,9 
1,4 
0,8 
2,5 
0,8 
1,7 
2,3 
1,5 
2.4 
1,6 
2,0 
1,8 
1,8 
2,6 
2,5 
1,4 
1,6 
0,9 
13 
2.3 
0,8 
-0,4 
1,1 
2,4 
1,7 
2,3 
1,7 
1,0 
0,5 
0,7 
0,8 
1,1 
0,0 
0,7 
2,8 
23 
5,6 
-0,1 
-13 
2,1 
1,7 
-3,0 
-1,9 
- 1 3 
33 
2,7 
1,5 
1,1 
3,0 
1.9 
1,3 
0,9 
0,6 
2,1 
2,0 
3,9 
1,8 
2,0 
3,3 
4,4 
1,8 
0,6 
3,1 
1,8 
5,9 
1,0 
0,0 
0,5 
2,1 
1,3 
0,8 
0,7 
1,0 
1,1 
0,7 
1,7 
1,4 
1,0 
1,9 
1,7 
1,3 
0,8 
13 
2.0 
2,0 
0,4 
1,1 
0,9 
0.7 
1.2 
1,5 
13 
1,0 
1,1 
0,1 
5,0 
2,0 
23 
2,9 
2,1 
2,1 
3,4 
3,6 
3,1 
3,5 
1961-70 0,9 1,3 1.6 2,3 2,3 2,0 1,3 1,2 0,7 1,7 2,9 0,9 1,5 0,9 3,0 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1,4 
0,5 
1,3 
23 
-0,6 
03 
0,3 
0,1 
0.7 
0,7 
0,6 
03 
1.3 
13 
-0,2 
1,0 
0,8 
-0,2 
0,5 
-0,3 
0,6 
0,5 
1,3 
0,4 
-0,6 
1,4 
0,6 
0,6 
1,7 
0,8 
2,7 
1,8 
7,8 
7,1 
63 
5,1 
3,5 
3,7 
4,3 
4,4 
0,9 
0,9 
0,8 
23 
2,1 
2,0 
1,1 
0,2 
0,8 
13 
1,5 
1,6 
2,0 
2,3 
-0,7 
1,4 
1,5 
0,8 
1,3 
1,2 
0,3 
1,4 
1,6 
4,4 
0,6 
0,4 
33 
1,4 
2,5 
-0,8 
1,0 
0,9 
2,3 
43 
-1,0 
3,0 
1,4 
1,4 
1,8 
2.7 
1.7 
13 
03 
-3,0 
-4,4 
-1,7 
-43 
1,4 
-1,9 
-1,9 
1,1 
0,5 
1,4 
2,3 
-0,4 
13 
0,6 
0,6 
0,5 
0,5 
33 
3,6 
5,9 
5,2 
-3,3 
1,8 
2,5 
2,6 
2,9 
43 
03 
0,0 
2,1 
13 
-1,3 
0,7 
13 
1,1 
1,1 
-1,1 
0,9 
0,8 
1.8 
1,9 
-0,5 
1,5 
1,1 
0,8 
1.4 
0,9 
0,7 
0,7 
13 
0,9 
0.3 
0.9 
1,3 
13 
0,6 
03 
1,5 
1.4 
1,7 
2,5 
0,3 
0,7 
0,7 
0,5 
0,8 
0,7 
1971-80 0,7 0,5 0,7 4,6 13 13 1,5 1,8 -1,3 0,8 2,9 0,5 1,1 0,7 1,1 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
-0,1 
0,1 
-0,7 
0,4 
-0,7 
-0,6 
03 
0,3 
0,5 
03 
-0,1 
-0,1 
0,0 
0.0 
-0,2 
03 
0,0 
1,2 
0,8 
0,8 
-0,7 
-0,2 
0,5 
-0,2 
0,2 
-0,5 
-0,1 
0,0 
-0,7 
-1,0 
-0,1 
0,3 
0,1 
03 
0,0 
0,5 
0,7 
0,1 
0,0 
-0,3 
-0,5 
-0,2 
-03 
-0,5 
-0,1 
3,1 
1,2 
1,6 
1,0 
■ W 
1,4 
0,5 
1,7 
13 
0.3 
1,4 
1,7 
1,1 
1,1 
-0,3 
-0,1 
-0,5 
0,0 
0,0 
0,5 
0,7 
1,1 
U 
1,1 
0,4 
1,1 
1,1 
13 
-0,2 
0,5 
-0,4 
-0,3 
-0,4 
03 
0,4 
0,7 
0,9 
0,8 
0,2 
03 
0.1 
0,1 
-13 
1,3 
0,7 
13 
0,9 
0,8 
0,1 
-0,6 
0,7 
1,8 
0,6 
2,0 
-0,9 
-13 
0,9 
1,2 
0,5 
1,9 
1,8 
13 
13 
1,4 
1,2 
0,5 
13 
0,6 
0,6 
0,5 
-0,9 
-0,1 
3,1 
4,7 
2,6 
1,4 
-0,7 
0,0 
0,5 
XA 
13 
2,4 
2,5 
2,4 
-0,9 
-0,3 
0,1 
0,5 
0,6 
-0,4 
-0,1 
0,1 
1,1 
0,9 
0,2 
0,3 
0,0 
0,0 
3,7 
3,0 
-0.9 
-1,3 
- 1 3 
0,2 
33 
2,8 
2,7 
2,7 
1,5 
2,6 
2,7 
2,8 
-1,1 
-0,4 
0,5 
0,4 
03 
0,2 
03 
1,0 
0,6 
-0,3 
0,1 
-0,9 
-0,4 
-0,3 
-0,3 
0,0 
0,1 
0,5 
0,3 
0,4 
0,4 
0,8 
0,9 
0,4 
0,4 
0,1 
0,1 
03 
),1 
),1 
)3 
1,0 
-0,4 
0,0 
1,9 
0,7 
0,4 
0,6 
03 
0,7 
0,2 
0,5 
-0,1 
-0,1 
0,1 
0,6 
0,4 
0,1 
0,3 
0,7 
0,5 
03 
0,7 
0,8 
0,6 
0,5 
0,6 
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Table 23 
Price deflator gross domestic product at market prices 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
Β DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(PPS) 
EUR 12 + 
(PPS) 
USA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1,3 
1,7 
3,0 
4,6 
5,1 
43 
3,1 
2,7 
4,0 
4,6 
4,3 
6,6 
5,8 
4,6 
7,4 
6,8 
6,3 
7,0 
7,0 
8,3 
4,8 
4,0 
3,1 
3,0 
3,7 
3,4 
1,5 
2,2 
4,2 
7,6 
1,5 
4,6 
1,4 
3,7 
4,0 
4,9 
2,4 
1,7 
3,4 
3,9 
1,8 
5,7 
8,5 
6,3 
9,4 
8,1 
7,7 
5,0 
4,4 
6,8 
3,4 
4,7 
6,4 
4,1 
2,7 
2,9 
3,2 
43 
6,6 
5,6 
2,5 
4,9 
2,7 
9,7 
4,5 
4,4 
33 
43 
9,1 
9,7 
2,8 
5,8 
8,5 
6,5 
43 2,2 
2,8 
1,7 
4,1 
6,9 
-3,7 
3,9 
3,1 
5,8 
2,8 
3,9 
0,4 
5,0 
5,3 
15,1 
2,4 
3,5 
4,7 
8,7 
6,1 
6,0 
43 4,2 
6,4 
6,2 
2,3 
-0,2 2,5 
1,1 3,8 
5,5 
3,4 
1,4 
6,1 
3,4 
2,7 
4,0 
2,1 
3,7 
5,1 
4,5 
2,9 
4,1 
5,4 
7,4 
3,2 
4,5 
4,9 
4,5 
4,6 
4,0 
3,1 
3,3 
5,1 
6,8 
0,9 
2,2 
1,3 
1,7 
2,7 
3,4 
3,1 
4,8 
5,0 
5,3 
7,8 
4,2 
5,5 
5,3 
5,1 
5,0 
5,5 
4,9 
4,4 
6,5 
1961-70 3,4 6,4 3,8 3,1 6,4 4,4 5,5 4,5 4,1 5,2 2,9 4,2 4,4 3,0 5,4 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
5,6 
6,2 
7,2 
12,6 
12,1 
7,6 
7,5 
4,4 
4,5 
3,8 
7,7 
93 
10,7 
13,1 
12,4 
9,1 
9,4 
9,9 
7,6 
8,2 
7,8 
5,3 
6,3 
7,0 
5,8 
3,6 
3,7 
4,3 
3,9 
4,9 
3,2 
5,0 
19,4 
20,9 
12,3 
15,4 
13,0 
12,9 
18,6 
17,7 
7,9 
8,6 
12,0 
16,3 
16,8 
16,5 
23,2 
20,6 
17,1 
14,2 
6,4 
7,4 
8,5 
12,3 
13,0 
11,0 
8,9 
10,1 
10,2 
11,6 
10,5 
13,4 
15,3 
6,1 
20,1 
21,0 
13,3 
10,5 
13,7 
14,7 
6,9 
6,5 
13,2 
19,8 
16,5 
18,4 
18,6 
14,1 
15,3 
20,0 
-0,8 
5,8 
12,2 
17,0 
-0,9 
12,2 
13 
5,1 
6,4 
7,9 
8,1 
9,4 
9,0 
9,2 
10,2 
9,0 
6,7 
5,4 
3,9 
5,7 
5,1 
7,8 
9,4 
18,9 
16,2 
16,3 
26,5 
22,3 
19,4 
20,9 
9,4 
8,2 
7,1 
15,0 
27,1 
15,3 
13,9 
11,3 
14,4 
19,5 
7,5 
7,1 
9,0 
13,3 
14,7 
11,8 
11,7 
10,4 
10,7 
12,8 
5,5 
4,7 
6,3 
8,8 
9,6 
6,3 
6,8 
7,9 
8,7 
9,4 
5,5 
5,8 
13,1 
20,1 
7,4 
7,8 
6,4 
5,0 
2,7 
4,6 
1971-80 7,1 9,7 53 13,7 15,2 9,9 13,8 14,8 6,5 7,6 16,1 14,0 10,9 7,4 7,7 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
4,7 
7,1 
5,6 
5,2 
6,1 
3,8 
2,4 
1,8 
4,7 
2,7 
10,1 
10,6 
7,6 
5,7 
4,3 
4,6 
4,7 
3,4 
4,3 
2,1 
4,1 
4,4 
3,5 
2,1 
2,2 ·. 
3,3 
1,9 
1,5 
2,6 
3,4 
19,8 
25,1 
19,1 
20,3 
17,7 
17,5 
14,3 
15,6 
12,7 
20,5 
12,0 
13,8 
11,6 
10,9 
8,5 
11,1 5,8 
5,7 
7,0 
7,3 
11,4 
12,0 
9,6 
7,3 
5,8 
5,3 
3,0 
3,1 
3,5 
3,1 
17,4 
15,2 
10,7 
6,4 
53 6,5 
2,3 
2,9 
4,7 
-1,6 
19,0 
17,2 
15,1 
11,6 
8,9 
7,9 
6,0 
6,6 
6,2 7,5 
7,2 
10,8 
6,8 
4,4 
3,0 
3,8 
-1,0 
4,0 
6,0 
2,9 
5,5 
6,1 
1,9 
1,9 
1,8 
0,5 
-0,4 
13 13 
2,5 
17,6 
20,7 
24,6 
24,7 
21,7 
20,5 
113 
11,6 
13,0 
14,3 
11,4 
7,6 
53 
4,6 
5,7 
3,5 
5,0 
6,6 
7,1 
6,3 
10,9 
10,5 
8,5 
6,8 
6,0 
5,6 
4,1 
4,5 
5,0 
5,3 
10,0 
6,2 
4,1 4,5 
3,6 
2,7 
3,2 3,9 
4,5 
4,3 
3,7 
1,7 
1,4 
2,3 
1,6 
1,8 
0,0 
0,4 
1,9 
2,1 
1981-90 4,4 5,7 2,9 18,2 9,3 6,4 6,8 10,5 4,8 2,2 17,9 6,3 6,7 4,7 1,7 
1991 
1992 
1993 
2,7 
3,6 
3,1 
2,9 
2,5 
1,7 
43 4,5 
3,5 
5,3 
4,3 
19,5 
15,6 
12,7 
6,9 
6,3 
4,7 
3,1 
2,9 
2,9 
1,2 
2,9 
2,3 
7,3 
5,2 
4,5 
3,0 
2,2 
4,1 
3,0 
2,7 
2,8 
14,3 
13,1 8,0 
6,7 
4,6 
3,4 
5,4 
4,6 
3,8 
4,8 
4,0 
4,0 
2,6 
2,6 
1,9 
1,9 
1,8 
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Table 24 
Price deflator private consumption 
1961-70 
1971-80 
1981-90 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
2,7 
1,1 
3,7 
4,2 
4,6 
4,1 
2,5 
2,9 
2,8 
2,5 
DK 
3,5 
6,2 
5,6 
4,0 
6,1 
6,5 
7,4 
7,1 
4,6 
6,6 
WD I 
3,5 
3,0 
3,1 
2,3 
3,4 
3,5 
1,5 
1,6 
2,3 
4,0 
1 GR 
1,1 
1,3 
3,4 
2,2 
4,6 
3,5 
1,9 
0,7 
3,0 
3,1 
E 
1,8 
5,3 
7,8 
6,7 
9,7 
7,3 
5,8 
5,1 
3,4 
6,6 
F 
3,3 
4,4 
5,7 
3,4 
2,6 
3,2 
3,0 
5,0 
7,1 
5,0 
IRL 
2,3 
4,1 
2,4 
7,0 
4,4 
3,9 
2,8 
4,8 
7,8 
12,4 
I 
1,7 
5,3 
7,0 
4,9 
3,6 
2,9 
3,2 
1,5 
2,9 
5,0 
L 
0,5 
0,8 
3,1 
3,0 
3,4 
3,4 
2,3 
2,5 
1,9 
4,3 
NL 
2,4 
2,6 
3,8 
6,8 
4,0 
5,4 
3,0 
2,6 
6,1 
4,4 
Ρ 
0,6 
2,0 
1,1 
0,8 
4,8 
5,5 
1,5 
4,3 
4,9 
33 
UK 
2,9 
3,7 
1,6 
3,6 
4,9 
4,0 
2,6 
4,7 
5,5 
5,9 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
2,8 
3,9 
4,3 
3,8 
43 
3,9 
2,8 
3,3 
4,3 
5,0 
1,3 
1,8 
1,7 
1,5 
1,9 
3,1 
2,6 
4,4 
4,4 
4,4 
J 
6,4 
6,7 
7,3 
4,1 
6,8 
4,6 
3,9 
5,1 
4,2 
73 
3,1 5,8 2,8 
7,1 10,4 5,2 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
8,7 
7,8 
7,1 
5,7 
5,9 
.7 
1,9 
1,6 
3,5 
3,1 
12,0 
10,2 
6,8 
6,4 
4,3 
2,9 
4,6 
4,0 
5,0 
2,1 
63 
5,1 
3,3 
2,6 
2,1 
-0,3 
0,8 
1,4 
3,1 
2,7 
4,6 5,8 2,7 
2,5 5,9 4,3 5,1 3,8 2,5 4,1 2,8 3,9 3,8 
13,2 15,1 10,0 13,9 14,6 6,5 7,5 17,3 13,3 10,7 
22,7 
20,7 
18,1 
17,9 
18,3 
22,1 
15,7 
14,3 
15,2 
19,7 
14,3 
14,5 
12,3 
11,0 
83 
9,4 
5,7 
5,0 
6,6 
6,4 
13,4 
11,8 
9,7 
7,9 
6,0 
2,9 
3,3 
2,9 
3,6 
3,2 
19,6 
14,9 
9,2 
7,3 
5,0 
4,6 
2,9 
2,5 
3,7 
1,7 
18,0 
17,1 
14,8 
12,1 
9,0 
63 
5,3 
5,7 
6,5 
5,9 
8,6 
10,6 
8,3 
6,5 
4,3 
1,3 
1,7 
2,7 
3,6 
3,6 
5,8 
5,5 
2,9 
23 
2,2 
03 
-0,9 
0,5 
1,2 
2,3 
20,2 
20,3 
25,8 
28,5 
19,4 
13,8 
10,0 
10,0 
12,1 
12,6 
113 
8,7 
4,8 
5,0 
5,3 
4,3 
4,4 
5,1 
5,9 
5,3 
12,1 
10,8 
8,5 
7,3 
5,9 
3,8 
3,6 
3,8 
4,9 
4,5 
18,4 9,3 6,4 7,0 9,9 5,1 2,2 17,1 6,0 6,5 
2,7 5,6 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
5,3 
5,4 
6,1 
12,8 
12,3 
7,8 
73 
43 
3,9 
6,4 
8,3 
83 
11,7 
15,0 
9,9 
9,9 
10,6 
93 
10,4 
10,7 
5,5 
5,7 
6,7 
7,5 
6,1 
4,2 
3,4 
2,8 
4,3 
5,9 
2,9 
3,3 
15,0 
23,5 
12,7 
13,4 
11,9 
12,8 
16,5 
21,9 
7,8 
7,6 
11,4 
17,8 
15,5 
16,5 
23,7 
19,0 
16,5 
16,5 
63 
6,4 
7,6 
15,1 
12,1 
10,0 
9,6 
9,0 
10,9 
13,5 
9,4 
9,7 
11,6 
15,7 
18,0 
20,0 
14,1 
7,9 
14,9 
18,6 
5,5 
6,3 
13,9 
21,4 
16,5 
17,8 
17,6 
13,2 
14,5 
20,4 
4,7 
5,1 
4,9 
10,0 
10,2 
9,3 
5,7 
3,4 
4,9 
7,5 
7,9 
8,3 
8,5 
9,5 
10,1 
9,0 
6,1 
4,5 
4,3 
6,9 
7,0 
6,3 
8,9 
23,5 
16,0 
18,1 
27,3 
21,3 
25,2 
21,6 
8,7 
6,5 
8,6 
17,1 
23,6 
15,8 
14,8 
9,1 
13,7 
16,3 
6,6 
6,4 
93 
14,9 
13,8 
11,7 
11,8 
9,1 
10,8 
13,5 
4,8 
3,0 
6,0 
10,5 
8,0 
5,8 
Ρ 6,5 
7,0 
9,0 
10,7 
6,8 
5,8 
10,8 
21,0 
113 
9,6 
7,4 
4,5 
3,6 
7,5 
7,1 8,7 
8,8 
5,7 
3,9 
4,1 
3,3 
2,3 
43 
4,2 
4,8 
5,0 
4,5 
2,7 
2,0 
2,5 
23 
0,4 
0,2 
-ο,ι 
1,8 
2,6 
4,6 1,9 
1991 
1992 
1993 
2,9 
2,4 
2,8 
2,4 
2,1 
1,6 
3,9 
4,1 
3,6 
4,7 
4,1 
18,4 
16,0 
13,5 
6,3 
6,0 
5,5 
3,2 
2,6 
2,7 
3,2 
2,9 
2,2 
6,8 
5,3 
5,8 
2,9 
3,4 
4,7 
3,3 
3,1 
2,7 
11,9 
9,1 
6,8 
7,2 
5,1 
5,1 
5,3 
4,5 
4,4 
4,6 
4,5 
4,2 
3,1 
2,7 
2,6 
2,4 
2,6 
205 
ΕίΰΑΐΑ usa 
Table 25 
Price deflator exports of goods and services 
National accounts 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
0,6 
1,0 
2,1 
4,2 
1,4 
3,7 
0,5 
03 
4,6 
5,7 
DK 
- 1 , 2 
2,5 
2,8 
3,4 
23 
3,0 
1,2 
3,0 
6,7 
6,5 
WD I 
-1 ,1 
2,0 
0,9 
2,5 
2,5 
2,5 
- 0 , 3 
-0 ,3 
3,7 
4,7 
1 GR 
0,2 
1,1 
8,0 
0,9 
-1 ,1 
3,9 
- 2 , 7 
- 1 3 
0,5 
3,1 
E 
2,0 
4,8 
6,3 
2,8 
5,6 
5,7 
7,9 
9,2 
1,6 
5,0 
F 
03 
1,2 
2,8 
4,4 
1,1 
2,0 
- 0 , 4 
- 0 , 4 
4,8 
7,8 
IRL 
-0 ,1 
1,9 
2,1 
4,7 
1,9 
1,9 
0,6 
6,2 
6,1 
-6 ,1 
I 
- 0 , 8 
0,9 
3,3 
4,1 
0,0 
0,2 
1,1 
0,3 
2,7 
6,1 
L 
- 3 , 0 
- 1 , 7 
0,0 
23 
1,4 
0,8 
0,4 
1,3 
6,5 
13,2 
NL 
- 1 , 7 
-ο,ι 
2,6 
2,5 
2,3 
0,7 
0,0 
- 0 , 5 
23 
5,8 
Ρ 
-υ 
- 0 , 9 
33 
3,9 
3,0 
- 1 , 8 
3,7 
2,3 
- 1 , 5 
5,4 
UK 
13 
0,8 
3,9 
2,4 
2,0 
2,5 
2,7 
7,7 
23 
8,0 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
-ο,ι 
1,4 
33 
2,9 
1.8 
2.0 
1,2 
2,1 
33 
63 
1,4 
0,0 
0,0 
0,8 
4,0 
3,6 
3,1 
6,8 
3.4 
5,1 
J 
- 0 , 7 
- 1 , 5 
2,5 
1,6 
- 0 , 4 
-0 ,2 
03 
0,1 
1,5 
2,9 
1961-70 2,4 3,0 1,7 1,2 5,1 2,3 1,9 1,8 2,0 1,3 1,6 3,3 2,4 2,8 0,6 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
2,1 
1,7 
8,3 
24,5 
5,5 
5,8 
3,7 
13 
9,0 
9,3 
3,5 
6,9 
12,0 
20,5 
7,7 
7,0 
6,7 
6,3 
8,2 
14,6 
4,1 
2,1 
6,6 
15,5 
4,2 
3,6 
1,8 
1,5 
4,9 
63 
1,7 
5,7 
26,1 
31,6 
12,9 
10,0 
9,9 
8,2 
14,5 
34,0 
6,0 
6,1 
9,4 
22,4 
10,7 
16,4 
19,4 
15,8 
9,3 
19,3 
5,4 
1,4 
8,3 
24,5 
4,9 
9,7 
93 
6,3 
9,9 
12,0 
73 
11,5 
19,7 
23,0 
18,4 
23,0 
14,8 
6,6 
9,6 
10,8 
4,6 
4,3 
14,8 
38,2 
13,5 
23,0 
15,8 
9,0 
16,4 
23,6 
-2 ,9 
0,9 
14,9 
26,9 
- 0 , 9 
8,6 
- 2 , 8 
2,0 
7,9 
7,5 
33 
1,8 
7,2 
26,0 
5,1 
6,6 
3,6 
- 1 3 
8,3 
12,3 
2,9 
53 
9,4 
39,5 
1.0 
7,1 
35,5 
25,9 
27,6 
25,2 
5,0 
4,1 
11,8 
24,9 
20,7 
19,8 
15,4 
7,6 
11,4 
13,9 
43 
2,9 
10,1 
25,2 
9,9 
12,4 
10,6 
6,5 
10,8 
14,2 
5,4 
- 2 , 3 
12,7 
23,7 
10,9 
3,9 
4,9 
6,8 
13,2 
10,2 
2,8 
- 0 , 6 
9,7 
31,3 
5,0 
2,0 
- 3 , 6 
- 6 , 3 
8,1 
9,7 
1971-80 6,9 9,2 5,0 15,0 13,3 9,0 14,3 15,9 5,9 7,1 17,2 13,3 10,6 8,7 5,4 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
9,6 
13,1 
7,3 
8,1 
2,9 
- 8 , 4 
-3 ,8 
2,9 
7,1 
- 1 . 7 
12,7 
10,6 
53 
7,7 
3,6 
- 5 , 4 
- 1 , 9 
0,7 
5.6 
-1 ,8 
5,7 
3,7 
1,8 
3,4 
2,8 
- 1 , 4 
-1 ,1 
1,9 
2,8 
0,4 
25,5 
20,7 
19,3 
15,7 
17,0 
■10,6 
7,5 
7,5 
10,6 
11,9 
17,9 
13,8 
16,8 
12,6 
6,7 
- 1 , 7 
2,5 
3,0 
4,5 
1,7 
14,1 
12,7 
9,9 
9,6 
4,6 
-3 ,1 
- 0 , 3 
2,5 
4,7 
- 1 3 
16,4 
10,8 
9,1 
8,1 
3,1 
- 6 , 3 
0,4 
5,6 
7,3 
- 8 , 4 
20,0 
16,9 
9,1 
9,6 
8,7 
-2 ,7 
1,1 
4,2 
7,3 
33 
9,6 
15,5 
5,9 
53 
3,9 
- 2 , 2 
- 6 , 4 
3,6 
7,3 
- 0 , 8 
13,4 
43 
0,1 
5,5 
1,5 
-15,3 
- 6 , 3 
0,5 
4,5 
- 0 , 5 
18,5 
19,8 
30,0 
30,2 
17,6 
4,5 
11,4 
8,9 
10,7 
6,0 
8,4 
6,9 
7,9 
7,7 
5,1 
-8 ,1 
3,0 
0,7 
93 
4,2 
13,0 
10,5 
7,9 
8,5 
5,3 
- 4 , 3 
03 
2,9 
63 
1,5 
9,0 
1,5 
0,1 
2,5 
-3 ,1 
- 5 , 7 
- 2 , 2 
3,1 
2,5 
1,5 
2,6 
2,8 
-4 ,8 
0,0 
- 2 . 5 
-13,5 
- 5 , 0 
- 3 , 3 
3,6 
1,0 
1981-90 3,5 3,5 2,0 14,5 7,6 5,2 4,4 7,5 4,0 0,5 15,4 4,4 5,0 0,8 - 2 , 0 
1991 
1992 
1993 
- 0 , 5 
0,2 
2,5 
1,8 
0,0 
1.0 
1.7 
1,0 
1,7 
0,8 
1,8 
24,3 
11,5 
12,8 
1,9 
3,3 
6,3 
-0 ,1 
- 0 , 5 
2,8 
- 0 , 4 
- 0 , 5 
1,4 
2,9 
2,1 
7,2 
-ο,ι 
- 0 , 5 
2,6 
0,0 
- 1 , 0 
1,9 
1,6 
0,5 
2,6 
0,9 
0,8 
7,8 
2,0 
1,0 
4,0 
0,9 
43 
1,5 
-ο,ι 
1,1 
-3 ,1 
0,4 
-1 ,1 
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Table 26 
Price deflator imports of goods and services 
National accounts 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
2,6 
0,8 
4,0 
33 
0,2 
3,2 
0,5 
0,6 
33 
5,1 
DK 
ο,ι 
-ο, ι 
1,9 
13 
1,6 
1,6 
2,5 
5,0 
2,9 
5.6 
WD t 
-2,5 
-0.2 
2,4 
1,8 
2,9 
1,9 
-1,9 
ο,ο 
2,0 
- ι , ο 
> GR 
-1,7 
-0,7 
3,0 
3,0 
0,3 
3,3 
-3,0 
03 
0,0 
4,0 
E 
2,0 
2,0 
2,0 
2,4 
03 
03 
2,8 
10,7 
3,0 
5,1 
F 
0,1 
2,7 
1,1 
0,9 
1,4 
33 
-13 
-υ 4,9 
9,7 
IRL 
1.1 
0,5 
1,9 
1,3 
2,6 
0,2 
-0,3 
7,9 
43 
0,7 
I 
-2,2 
0,4 
1,5 
3,4 
0,6 
1,9 
0,7 
0,7 
1,4 
3,7 
L 
1,4 
0,8 
13 
2,1 
1,7 
1,4 
-0,7 
0,0 
3,1 
7,4 
NL 
-1,9 
-0,9 
1,4 
2,4 
0,5 
0,7 
-0,9 
-2,9 
3,3 
6,6 
Ρ 
1,0 
-1,3 
1,6 
2,2 
2,8 
0,0 
-2,4 
-2,5 
0,9 
9,3 
UK 
0,0 
-0,2 
4,5 
2,4 
1,1 
1,3 
1,4 
10,6 
2,5 
63 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
-0,7 
0,6 
2,8 
tf 
13 
13 
-0,2 
2,7 
tf 
4,6 
-1,4 
-1,3 
3,0 
2,2 
2,5 
4,3 
2,5 
2.3 
1 2,6 
6,1 
J 
13 
-2,2 
1,8 
1,5 
-0,7 
23 
-ο,ι 
0,7 
2,9 
2,1 
1961-70 2,3 2,2 0,5 0,8 3,0 2,1 2,0 tf 1,8 0,8 1,1 2,9 1,6 2,3 1,0 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
3,4 
0,4 
7,5 
27,5 
6,7 
6,4 
3,1 
1,1 
8,9 
13,6 
6,1 
2,0 
16,8 
32,7 
4,9 
8,5 
7,7 
2,7 
13,7 
21,7 
1,2 
1,7 
8,4 
24,1 
2,1 
6,0 
1,7 
-1,9 
8,4 
12,6 
2,9 
7,7 
21,9 
41,6 
17,4 
113 
5,8 
9,7 
17,7 
35,2 
5,4 
1,5 
10,4 
41,9 
7,0 
14,9 
22,1 
7,6 
73 
37,9 
4,8 
0,4 
73 
48,6 
2,6 
12,0 
12,2 
3,0 
11,4 
22,0 
5,4 
5,7 
13,9 
44,4 
20,5 
19,0 
16,8 
4,7 
13,7 
18,0 
4,9 
4,5 
27,1 
55,9 
9,9 
25,3 
14,9 
7,7 
19,7 
29,0 
5,4 
-0,2 
9,6 
22,3 
10,8 
6,5 
1,8 
3,1 
7,5 
7,8 
43 
-0,4 
7,5 
32,7 
4,3 
6,4 
33 
-1,6 
10,9 
14,5 
1,4 
3,4 
14,1 
43,8 
13,9 
113 
30,7 
22,1 
30,5 
31,3 
4,1 
2,7 
23,3 
41,5 
13,6 
21,1 
13,7 
2,9 
9,3 
9,6 
3.7 
1.7 
14,4 
39,0 
7,0 
13,6 
10,4 
3,6 
12,5 
19,3 
5,0 
5,4 
113 
45,5 
7,6 
33 
7,8 
9,9 
17,6 
26,6 
-3,0 
-4,7 
18,5 
64,2 
9,5 
53 
-3,8 
-15,7 
27,7 
37,5 
1971-80 7,6 11,3 6,2 16,5 14,9 11,7 15,7 19,1 7,3 7,8 19,5 13,7 12,1 13,4 11,4 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
13,9 
13,3 
7,4 
8,1 
2,1 
-12,3 
-4,6 
2,7 
6,6 
- 1 3 
17,7 
10,1 
3,7 
7,9 
33 
-9^ 
-2,4 
2,2 
6,6 
-1,8 
12,0 
2,7 
0,6 
4,9 
2,4 
-11,6 
-4,8 
1,8 
5,0 
-0,9 
19,5 
24,0 
17,6 
22,8 
17,8 
8,4 
0,4 
6,4 
10,7 
9,5 
29,8 
13,0 
21,5 
11,5 
3,8 
-14,6 
0,8 
1,1 
2,3 
- 1 3 
19,3 
12,8 
8,5 
10,1 
2,3 
-12,3 
-0,5 
2,6 
6,7 
-1,5 
18,6 
7,5 
5,2 
9,4 
2,6 
-10,2 
1,1 
6,3 
6,7 
-4,5 
24,8 
11,9 
4,8 
9,8 
83 
-13,5 
0,6 
4,4 
9,1 
1,4 
10,1 
13,8 
7,9 
7,4 
3,1 
-4,4 
-2,4 
2,4 
5,0 
0,0 
14,3 
1,3 
0,4 
5,7 
13 
-16,2 
-4,6 
-0,4 
4,8 
-1,7 
25,6 
18,1 
29,9 
31,2 
13,0 
-6,8 
12,6 
11,6 
8,5 
6,5 
7,7 
7,0 
7,5 
8,8 
4,0 
-4,4 
2,6 
-0,6 
6,5 
2,4 
17,3 
9,1 
6,9 
93 
4,2 
-10,5 
-0,9 
2,3 
6,3 
03 
5,6 
-2,4 
-3,5 
03 
-1,8 
-2,4 
33 
3,1 
0,5 
3,4 
2,1 
6,6 
-5,4 
-2,6 
-2,3 
-31,9 
-5,7 
-2,8 
7,6 
7,4 
1981-90 3,3 3,6 1,0 13,5 6,1 4,4 4,0 5,7 4,2 0,2 14,5 4,1 43 0,6 - 3 ,4 
1991 
1992 
1993 
-0,2 
-13 
2,4 
13 
-1,5 
13 
2,1 
-1.3 
2,1 
-1.6 
1,9 
19,2 
7,9 
13,5 
-0,3 
1,0 
7,8 
-0,4 
-1,4 
2,6 
2,3 
-13 
1,0 
0,2 
1,6 
10,9 
1,1 
1,0 
2,8 
0,0 
-0,4 
1,9 
0,5 
-2,9 
3.4 
-1,9 
0,9 
12,8 
0,6 
-0,3 
5,7 
-0,4 
5,7 
-0,8 
-0,9 
-0,3 
-5,8 
-6,8 
- ι , ο 
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Table 27 
Terms of trade: goods and services 
National accounts 
(1980 - 100) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK USA 
1960 106,0 112,1 99,7 109,8 93,9 125,3 114,7 123,4 112,1 101,9 116,8 99,7 144,5 181,5 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
103,9 
104,1 
102,2 
103,2 
104,4 
105,0 
105,0 
104,5 
106,0 
106,6 
105,3 
106,7 
107,5 
104,9 
103,8 
103,2 
103,8 
103,8 
103,9 
100,0 
96,2 
96,0 
95,9 
95,9 
96,6 
100,9 
101,8 
102,0 
102,5 
102,0 
101,7 
103,2 
110,7 
113,5 
114,5 
116,9 
117,5 
119,1 
117,6 
115,4 
119,7 
120,7 
117,8 
123,5 
118,5 
107,6 
110,4 
108,9 
107,8 
111,5 
106,2 
100,0 
95,7 
96,1 
97,5 
97,3 
97,6 
101,8 
102,3 
100,8 
99,9 
99,8 
100,4 
102,0 
101,2 
103,4 
101,9 
102,7 
102,3 
103,0 
104,6 
104,3 
106,1 
112,2 
115,5 
115,9 
114,0 
106,1 
108,3 
105,9 
106,0 
109,6 
106,1 
100,0 
94,4 
95,4 
96,5 
95,1 
95,4 
106,3 
110,5 
110,6 
108,2 
109,6 ' 
109,1 
111,7 
111,9 
114,0 
119,6 
117,1 
115,5 
116,1 
116,5 
114,7 
115,2 
114,2 
112,8 
110,7 
114,5 
106,4 
102,3 
101,2 
105,2 
103,7 
100,9 
100,0 
105,0 
102,2 
103,7 
97,6 
97,0 
99,0 
105,9 
107,1 
107,0 
109,3 
114,1 
117,9 
93,9 
96,4 
100,5 
100,9 
106,3 
112,1 
117,6 
116,0 
114,4 
114,3 
114,9 
120,2 
119,1 
102,7 
106,4 
107,7 
105,4 
113,4 
115,6 
100,0 
90,8 
91,5 
88,0 
88,9 
91,4 
105,1 
107,0 
109,0 
111,3 
114,6 
117,1 
119,8 
125,6 
123,6 
125,7 
130,0 
129,5 
128,0 
129,3 
130,1 
130,0 
127,6 
128,3 
129,6 
131,0 
109,7 
112,2 
109,9 
107,0 
110,4 
108,9 
100,0 
95,6 
95,5 
96,8 
96,4 
98,5 
108,9 
109,1 
109,0 
107,0 
107,3 
107,5 
108,5 
113,3 
114,9 
115,0 
118,9 
118,1 
120,0 
121,1 
119,3 
121,4 
113,2 
115,2 
121,5 
127,7 
108,8 
106,9 
110,5 
108,5 
110,5 
106,5 
100,0 
98,1 
101,1 
104,8 
103,5 
104,1 
108,6 
107,8 
107,1 
107,7 
103,4 
100,6 
101,4 
125,3 
125,9 
128,0 
128,9 
128,1 
126,0 
126,5 
126,0 
127,6 
130,6 
130,1 
129,9 
117,3 
104,0 
107,4 
105,4 
106,1 
107,4 
104,4 
100,0 
96,2 
100,5 
104,6 
104,4 
104,8 
117,8 
118,3 
118,1 
116,2 
118,2 
121,4 
122,1 
107,2 
104,6 
103,3 
103,4 
103,1 
102,5 
103,6 
104,9 
108,4 
114,3 
105,3 
106,5 
111,6 
115,9 
103,7 
105,7 
100,9 
99,9 
100,3 
100,0 
99,6 
101,0 
99,1 
97,1 
97,9 
100,1 
96,1 
97,3 
99,4 
98,6 
97,4 
95,9 
102,1 
102,9 
104,1 
104,2 
106,0 
106,0 
106,9 
109,4 
108,2 
107,3 
106,2 
108,6 
108,2 
102,8 
103,6 
103,7 
104,1 
104,4 
101,9 
100,0 
99,3 
102,0 
101,7 
101,5 
101,7 
102,9 
101,0 
102,0 
101,7 
102,9 
102,9 
102,4 
114,4 
114,9 
116,7 
118,6 
118,9 
116,7 
124,0 
130,1 
126,9 
122,3 
124,1 
126,2 
121,0 
117,3 
104,1 
100,3 
103,9 
107,2 
104,8 
100,0 
94,4 
95,7 
95,8 
95,1 
98,9 
110,9 
109,7 
107,1 
109,2 
108,8 
110,0 
113,9 
100,9 
102,0 
101,4 
101,3 
102,2 
103,5 
104,8 
102,1 
101,8 
103,5 
104,4 
105,8 
96,0 
84,7 
90,0 
89,0 
90,3 
94,4 
96,2 
100,0 
100,6 
100,5 
100,9 
99,9 
100,9 
96,9 
97,3 
98,5 
101,0 
102,8 
105,8 
105,7 
148,5 
150,5 
146,1 
144,0 
146,1 
145,1 
145,8 
152,2 
153,4 
152,0 
152,6 
141,4 
143,2 
121,8 
125,5 
126,3 
122,8 
119,4 
114,9 
100,0 
103,2 
107,4 
111,5 
113,8 
112,3 
108,6 
102,9 
102,8 
104,9 
102,9 
105,4 
106,2 
178,0 
179,1 
180,4 
180,5 
181,0 
176,6 
177,1 
176,0 
173,6 
174,9 
185,3 
193,1 
178,8 
143,0 
137,1 
132,9 
133,1 
148,0 
125,3 
100,0 
100,5 
96,9 
97,5 
100,0 
99,7 
126,6 
127,6 
127,0 
122,3 
115,0 
118,4 
127,6 
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Table 28 
Nominal compensation per employee 
Total economy 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + 
(PPS) (PPS) 
USA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
3,2 
7,2 
8,0 
9,7 
9,5 
8,6 
7,4 
6,3 
8,4 
9,2 
12,9 
11,1 
4,6 
10,7 
13,8 
10,2 
10,9 
10,0 
11,0 
11,0 
10,2 
9,1 
6,1 
8,2 
9,5 
7,6 
3,3 
6,7 
9,5 
16,0 
53 
6,9 
7,9 
13,6 
12,5 
12,8 
9,7 
10,0 
9,9 
9,1 
12,9 
15,2 
21,1 
13,7 
15,6 
18,1 
14,7 
8,8 
11,8 
9,4 
10,6 
11,6 
11,4 
93 
6,5 
6,0 
6,9 
11,3 
11,1 
10,3 
8,3 
8,5 
53 
13,7 
5,3 
8,5 
8,0 
10,6 
13,9 
16,8 
8,2 
13,5 
19,7 
12,3 
7,7 
7,9 
8,4 
7,4 
7,6 
15,7 
2,9 
4,8 
8,0 
13,3 
4,2 
5,0 
2,8 
5,9 
5,6 
15,1 
7,4 
6,8 
9,3 
16,5 
11,7 
11,1 
9,3 
8,6 
13,2 
12,4 
5,1 
4,9 
8,6 
83 
10,5 
10,5 
13,8 
3,6 
10,0 
18,2 
6,8 
4,6 
5,0 
7,0 
6,8 
6,4 
63 
7,8 
73 
13,0 
8,8 
9,1 
9,9 
9,7 
8,6 
8,0 
6,9 
8,1 
9,4 
13,1 
33 
4,3 
4,0 
5,1 
3,7 
5,1 
4,3 
7,4 
7,4 
7,6 
13,2 
14,1 
13,2 
13,1 
11,9 
113 
12,1 
13,7 
15,8 
16,7 
1961-70 7,7 10,6 8,6 9,7 14,1 9,5 9,8 10,8 6,7 10,6 9,3 7,0 9,1 5,2 13,5 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
11,7 
14,0 
13,0 
18,2 
16,5 
16,0 
8,8 
73 
5,5 
9,6 
11,6 
8,0 
13,1 
18,4 
13,9 
11,7 
9,7 
93 
9,4 
10,0 
11,4 
9,6 
11,9 
11,4 
7,0 
7,7 
6,6 
5,5 
5,8 
6,8 
8,4 
12,9 
17,5 
19,6 
20,6 
20,7 
22,3 
23,3 
23,4 
16,1 
13,6 
17,7 
18,3 
21,3 
22,5 
23,4 
26,8 
24,8 
19,0 
17,3 
113 
10,1 
12,2 
18,1 
18,8 
14,9 
12,4 
12,6 
13,0 
15,3 
14,8 
15,8 
18,8 
18,0 
28,9 
19,6 
14,9 
15,5 
18,9 
21,1 
13,4 
10,6 
17,7 
22,6 
20,8 
20,9 
20,8 
16,5 
19,9 
21,4 
7,8 
9,7 
11,4 
22,9 
12,3 
11,1 
9,9 
5,9 
6,7 
9,0 
13,8 
12,8 
15,4 
15,7 
13,3 
10,8 
8,5 
73 
6,0 
5,5 
15,3 
16,0 
17,5 
34,9 
38,1 
24,3 
23,2 
18,7 
20,0 
25,6 
11,3 
13,0 
13,2 
18,8 
31,2 
14,8 
10,7 
13,4 
15,3 
19,7 
11,9 
11,5 
14,2 
17,9 
18,8 
14,9 
13,3 
12,5 
13,0 
14,9 
73 
7,4 
7,0 
8,1 
9,0 
8,2 
7,5 
7,8 
8,8 
0,0 
14,6 
14,2 
21,0 
25,7 
16,2 
11,1 
10,1 
7,5 
6,0 
6,5 
1971-80 12,0 11,5 8,3 18,4 20,4 13,8 18,6 18,4 10,6 10,8 23,1 16,0 14,3 8,1 13,1 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
63 
7,9 
6,3 
6,6 
4,5 
4,7 
1,8 
2,4 
3,5 
7,7 
93 
11,9 
83 
5,5 
4,7 
4,4 
7,9 
5,0 
3,8 
3,4 
4,8 
4,2 
3,6 
3,4 
2,9 
3,6 
33 
3,0 
2,9 
4,7 
21,5 
27,7 
21,4 
20,7 
23,4 
12,8 
11,4 
19,1 
18,1 
19,7 
15,3 
13,7 
13,8 
10,0 
9,4 
9,5 
6,7 
6,8 
6,3 
7,9 
14,3 
14,1 
10,1 
83 
6,6 
4,6 
3,7 
4,4 
4,7 
5,0 
18,1 
14,2 
12,8 
10,7 
8,9 
5,3 
5,3 
6,1 
6,2 
4,4 
22,6 
16,2 
16,0 
11,8 
10,1 
7,5 
8,2 
8,8 
8,8 
10,5 
8,5 
6,9 
6,9 
7,1 
4,2 
3,6 
4,8 
3,1 
6,7 
6,9 
3,5 
5,8 
3,2 
0,2 
1,4 
1,6 
1,5 
0,9 
0,7 
4,1 
21,0 
21,6 
21,8 
21,2 
22,5 
21,6 
17,9 
13,4 
12,8 
18,7 
14,0 . 
8,5 
8,6 
53 
7,6 
7,8 
6,9 
7,8 
8,3 
9,5 
13,0 
11,0 
9,6 
7,3 
7,0 
6,3 
5,5 
5,8 
5,8 
7,5 
9,5 
7,7 
5,1 
4,3 
43 
4,0 
3,3 
53 
3,5 
4,9 
6,4 
3,8 
2,2 
3,9 
2,9 
33 
33 
3,6 
4,6 
5,3 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
5,2 6,4 
6,8 
5,4 
4,7 
3,7 
33 
2,5 
3,6 
5,8 
5,4 
3,6 
9,6 
19,5 9,9 7,5 9,1 12,0 5,9 2,3 19,2 8,4 7,8 
15,1 
12,4 
113 
8,7 
9,0 
7,3 
43 
4,1 
3,9 
4,4 
6,3 
5,9 
8,7 
5,1 
4,1 
5,4 
5,1 
6,0 
4,3 
4,8 
3,3 
19,0 
14,9 
9,9 
8,9 
6,0 
3,7 
7,2 
5,8 
4,4 
6,9 
5,1 3,9 
5,1 
2,4 
2,1 
4,4 
33 
1,9 
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Table 29 
Real compensation per employee 
Total economy, deflator GDP 
W—v ■ 
(Annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
1,9 
5,5 
4,8 
4,8 
4,2 
43 
4,1 
3,5 
43 
4,4 
DK 
8,2 
4,2 
-1,1 
5,8 
5,9 
3,1 
4,4 
2,8 
3,7 
2,4 
WD E 
5,1 
4,9 
2,9 
5,0 
5,6 
4,1 
1,7 
4,4 
5,1 
7,8 
GR 
3,6 
23 
6,5 
9,5 
8,2 
7,6 
7,1 
8,2 
6,3 
5,0 
E 
10,9 
8,9 
11,6 
6,9 
5,6 
9,3 
6,5 
3,7 
7,1 
2,4 
F 
6,9 
6,6 
4,7 
4,8 
3,7 
3,0 
3,6 
6,8 
4,2 
4,5 
IRL 
5,6 
3,4 
2,4 
3,7 
0,8 
3,9 
4,6 
6,1 , 
4,4 
6,5 
I 
5,3 
7,3 
10,4 
5,5 
3,4 
5,5 
5,5 
5,5 
1 3,4 
83 
L 
6,8 
0,9 
4,7 
7,1 
1,3 
1,0 
2,3 
0,8 
0,3 
0,0 
NL 
4,9 
33 
4,4 
7,2 
53 
4,8 
4,8 
43 
6,3 
5,9 
Ρ 
2,8 
5,1 
6,0 
7,1 
6,5 
4,8 
10,0 
23 
3,7 
14,3 
UK 
4,0 
0,6 
2,8 
3,2 
1,6 
1,9 
3,1 
3,5 
1,7 
5,2 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
5,4 
4,4 
4,8 
4,9 
3,9 
3,9 
3,6 
4,7 
4,1 
5,9 
2,3 
2,1 
2,6 
3,3 
0,9 
1,6 
1,2 
2,4 
tf 
23 
J 
5,1 
9,5 
7,3 
7,4 
6,4 
5,9 
.6.2 
8.4 
10,9 
9,6 
1961-70 4,2 3,9 4,6 6,4 7,3 4,9 4,1 6,0 2,5 5,1 6,2 2,8 4,6 2,1 7.7 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
5.7 
7,3 
5,4 
5,0 
4.0 
7,8 
1,2 
2,7 
1,0 
5,6 
3,7 
-1,1 
2,2 
4,7 
13 
2,3 
03 
-0,6 
1,7 
1,7 
3,4 
4,1 
5,3 
4,1 
1,1 
3,9 
2,8 
13 
1,8 
1,8 
1971-80 4,6 1,6 2,9 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1,5 
0,7 
0,7 
1,3 
-1,5 
0,9 
-0,5 
0,6 
-M 
4,9 
-0,8 
13 
0,5 
-ο,ι 0,4 
-0,2 
3,0 
1,5 
-0,5 
1,3 
0,7 
-0,2 
0,1 
13 
0.7 
0,3 
13 
1,5 
03 
13 
5,1 
7,5 
-1,6 
-1,1 
7,3 
4,6 
8,3 
93 
4,0 
-1,3 
5,3 
8,4 
5,7 
4,3 
4,9 
5,9 
2,9 
3,5 
1,6 
2,7 
4,6 
2,5 
3,4 
5,1 
5,1 
3,5 
33 
2,3 
2,6 
3,3 
3,8 
2,1 
3,1 
113 
73 
- 1 3 
1.4 
4,5 
4,6 
5,6 
6,0 
3,9 
4,0 
2,3 
3,7 
2,2 
1,8 
2,1 
4,0 
1,2 
8,7 
3,7 
-0,7 
5,1 
13,3 
- ι ,ο 
8,6 
0,7 
0,3 
1,0 
5,3 
33 
5,8 
6,0 
2,8 
1,7 
1,7 
9,7 
7,6 
7,4 
13,5 
18,8 
6,9 
-2,6 
1,6 -3,0 
2,0 0,5 
-0,2 3,9 
4,1 4,5 3,6 4,2 3,1 3,9 3,0 6,1 
1,7 
4,5 
5,7 
3,4 
33 
-0,4 
-2,9 
1,9 
0,8 
0,2 
1,8 
4,1 
43 
4,8 
4,1 
3,5 
2.9 
1,4 
2,0 
2,1 
1,9 
3,1 
1,4 
2,1 
1,9 
0,3 
4,8 
4,0 
2,5 
3,0 
4,8 
0,7 
3,0 
-ο,ι 1,9 
-0,9 
0,8 
-1,4 
0,8 
1,1 
-0,7 
0,5 
2.7 
1.9 
0,5 
0,9 
0.7 
-0.7 
0,6 
13 
13 
1,9 
0,6 
-0,8 
1,9 
4,1 
3,5 
-13 
2,9 
3,1 
1,4 
6,0 
3,0 
-0,9 
0,8 
03 
1,1 
-0,3 
2,1 
2,0 
2,5 
2,8 
13 
-3,5 
0,1 
2,6 
13 
-0,2 
5,9 
-0,9 
0,7 
3,9 
-1,9 
-0,3 
1,3 
-1,6 
-0,4 
1,2 
1,9 
-0,3 
-0,5 
1,5 
2,9 
0.7 
-2,3 
-2,8 
0,6 
0,9 
6,0 
1,5 
-0,2 
3,9 
2,3 
0,8 
3,2 
0,5 
1,8 
4,2 
1,8 
1,1 
1,1 
3.0 
1,9 
0,4 
1,1 
0,5 
0,9 
0,6 
1,3 
13 
0,8 
2,1 
1,6 
2,6 
0,7 
0,6 
0,5 
1,8 
0,6 
0,1 
0,1 
0,6 
0,7 
0,4 
1,4 
1,0 
03 
0,5 
13 
0,1 
1,3 
1,0 
0,5 
8,6 
8,0 
•6,9 
4,7 
8,2 
3,1 
3,5 
2,3 
3,2 
1,8 
5,0 
2,6 
2,1 
0,8 
1,6 
13 
1,4 
3,1 
3,3 
2,7 
3.1 
1981-90 0,7 0,6 0,7 1,1 0,5 1,1 2,1 1,3 1,1 0,1 1,1 2,0 1,1 0,5 2,2 
1991 
1992 
1993 
4,0 
1,7 
1,6 
0,8 
0,7 
0,8 
1,5 
0,8 
0.1 
4,0 
-3,7 
-2,8 
-13 
1,7 
2,5 
2,5 
1,1 
13 
1,0 
3,1 
3,3 
3,4 
1,3 
-0.1 
-0.4 
2,3 
2,8 
1,8 
1,3 
2,1 
0,5 
4,1 
1,7 
1,7 
2,0 
1,3 
0,3 
1,7 
1,1 
0,6 
2,0 
1,0 
-0,2 
-0,5 
2,4 
1,3 
ο,ι 
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Table 30 
Real compensation per employee 
Total economy, deflator private consumption 
1961-70 
(Annual percentage change) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Β 
0,6 
6,1 
4,2 
5,3 
4,7 
4,3 
4,7 
3,3 
5,4 
6,5 
DK 
9,0 
4,7 
-0,9 
6,4 
7,3 
3,4 
33 
2,7 
6,1 
4,1 
WD I 
6,5 
5,9 
2,9 
5,8 
5,9 
4,0 
1,7 
5,0 
7,0 
11,5 
( GR 
4,0 
5,6 
4,4 
11,1 
7,6 
9,0 
7,6 
93 
6,6 
5,8 
E 
10,9 
9,3 
12,4 
6,6 
5,4 
10,0 
8,4 
3,5 
8,1 
2,7 
F 
7,0 
7,0 
5,4 
5,6 
3,9 
2,8 
3,7 
6,0 
3,7 
5,0 
IRL 
5,9 
4,2 
2,7 
6,3 
0,9 
4,4 
5,1 
5,5 
5,7 
4,0 
, 
6,4 
7,8 
11,8 
7,1 
4,0 
4,8 
5,1 
5,8 
4,5 
10,1 
L 
2,4 
4,0 
4,7 
10,0 
0,8 
1,6 
0,5 
3,3 
3,7 
10,3 
NL 
4,9 
4,1 
5,3 
9,1 
7,4 
5,4 
6,1 
5,9 
6,7 
7,7 
Ρ 
4,5 
2,9 
7,4 
7,4 
5,4 
4,8 
12,0 
-0,7 
4,9 
14,5 
UK 
3,7 
0,9 
3,3 
3,3 
1,8 
2,4 
3,5 
3,0 
1,6 
6,6 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(PPS) (PPS) 
5,8 
5,0 
5.4 
5,6 
4,2 
4,0 
3,9 
4,7 
4,9 
7,7 
1,9 
2,5 
2,3 
3,5 
1,7 
2,0 
1,7 
2,9 
2,8 
3,1 
j 
6,5 
7,0 
5,5 
8,7 
4,7 
6,3 
7,8 
8,2 
113 
8,9 
4,5 4,6 5,6 7,1 7,7 5,0 4,4 6,7 4,1 6,3 6,2 3,0 5,1 2,4 7,5 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
6,0 
83 
6,5 
4,9 
3,8 
7,6 
1,5 
2,9 
1,6 
3,0 
3,1 
-0,2 
1,3 
3,0 
3,6 
1,6 
-0,8 
-ο,ι 
-0,9 
-0,6 
5,6 
3,7 
4,8 
3,6 
0,9 
3,3 
3,1 
2,6 
1,5 
0,9 
5,4 
9,3 
2,2 
-3.2 
7,0 
6,4 
9,3 
9,3 
5,9 
-4,7 
5,4 
9,4 
63 
3,0 
6,0 
5,9 
2,4 
4,8 
2,1 
0,6 
4,8 
3,5 
4,3 
2,5 
6,0 
4,4 
2,6 
3,3 
1,9 
1,6 
4,9 
5,6 
6,5 
1,9 
9,3 
-0,4 
0,6 
7,0 
3,5 
2,1 
7,4 
4,0 
3,3 
0,9 
3,7 
2,6 
2,7 
2,9 
4,7 
0,8 
3,0 
4,4 
63 
11,7 
1,9 
1,7 
4,0 
2,4 
1,6 
1,4 
5,4 
4,2 
6,3 
5,6 
2,9 
1,7 
2,2 
2,5 
1,6 
-1,3 
7,8 
9,1 
7,9 
9,2 
19,0 
5,2 
-3,2 
-2,2 
-4,1 
3,3 
2,4 
6,1 
4,2 
1,5 
63 
-0,9 
-3,6 
4,0 
1,4 
3,0 
5,0 
4,8 
4,6 
2,7 
4,3 
2,9 
1,4 
33 
2,0 
13 
2,3 
4,3 
1,0 
-2,1 
1,0 
2,3 
0,9 
0,7 
-0,2 
-0,6 
7,3 
7,9 
9,2 
3,9 
4,5 
1,4 
2,6 
2,9 
2,4 
-0,9 
1971-80 4,6 1,0 3,0 4,6 4,6 3,5 4,1 3,3 3,8 3,1 5,0 2,4 3,2 0,9 4,1 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
-2,2 
0,0 
-0,8 
0,8 
-1,3 
4,1 
-0,2 
0,9 
0,0 
4,4 
0,6 
3,8 
2,9 
1,8 
-2,5 
1,5 
1,3 
-0,8 
0,4 
1,5 
3,1 
1,0 
- 1 3 
1,3 
0,5 
1,2 
1,1 
0,9 
-1,3 
-0,8 
0,3 
0,7 
0,8 
3,9 
2,4 
1,6 
-0,2 
2,0 
0,9 
1,8 
1,3 
0,0 
4,7 
1,0 
5,8 
2,8 
2,4 
4,3 
7,6 
3,7 
4,2 
2,6 
0,0 
0,8 
-0,7 
1,3 
-0,9 
1,1 
0,1 
0,9 
1,8 
-0,3 
1,4 
0,9 
2,0 
0,4 
0,4 
0,6 
1,7 
0,4 
1,4 
. 1,0 
1,8 
-1,3 
-0,6 
33 
33 
3,7 
0,7 
2,4 
3,5 
2,4 
2,6 
3,9 
-0,8 
1,1 
-0,3 
1,0 
1,3 
2,8 
2,9 
2,2 
4,4 
-0,1 
-3,3 
-13 
0,5 
0,0 
2,3 
3,1 
0,4 
3,0 
3,2 
-2,2 
0,2 
0,2 
-1,9 
-0,8 
1,4 
2,4 
0,3 
-0,5 
1,8 
0,7 
1,1 
-3,2 
-5,6 
2,6 
6,8 
7,2 
3,1 
0,6 
5,4 
2,5 
-0,2 
3,6 
0,1 
23 
3,4 
2,4 
2,5 
2,2 
3,9 
0,8 
0,2 
1,1 
0,0 
1,0 
2,4 
1,8 
1,9 
0,9 
2,8 
0,9 0,5 1,0 2,0 1,8 0,8 0,1 1,8 2,3 1.3 
2,8 
3,1 
1,9 
2,2 
2,8 
1,7 
1,0 
1,5 
13 
1,1 
3,3 
3,6 
1,7 
-0,2 
-1,6 
2,4 
1,6 
1,2 
0,9 
1,7 
0,6 
6,4 
5,3 
2,8 
1,5 
0,8 
-1,3 
1,8 
1,3 
0,0 
2,2 
0,7 
1,9 
1,1 
0,2 
0,8 
1,7 
0,8 
1,0 
1,3 
03 
1,9 
1,1 
0,2 
1,4 
0,7 
2,8 
3,0 
3,7 
2,7 
2,7 
0,5 2,0 
0,9 
0,7 
0,6 
1,8 
0,8 
-0,7 
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Table 31 
Adjusted wage share" 
Total economy 
(Percentage of GDP at factor cost) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(PPS) 
EUR 12 + 
(PPS) 
USA 
1960 69,0 71,4 70,6 97,0 71,1 72,8 87,4 74,2 66,1 63,6 70,2 71,2 73,7 72,4 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1961-70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
68,2 
69,5 
70,3 
69,8 
70,0 
71,7 
72,0 
71,2 
70,6 
68,7 
70,2 
70,7 
71,2 
71,3 
73,2 
75,7 
77,0 
77,3 
77,4 
77,3 
78,3 
72,4 
73,0 
73,4 
72,6 
75,4 
76,6 
77,4 
78,0 
77,1 
78,1 
75,4 
79,4 
76,0 
75,2 
78,0 
78,9 
77,6 
77,9 
77,9 
78,3 
79,3 
72,1 
72,5 
72,6 
71,4 
71,6 
72,2 
71,5 
70,0 
70,5 
72,1 
71,6 
72,7 
72,8 
73,6 
75,2 
75,0 
73,6 
73,7 
73,0 
72,7 
74,5 
91,1 
91,2 
87,3 
87,2 
85,6 
86,5 
87,0 
88,0 
85,3 
82,5 
70,5 
70,8 
72,9 
74,0 
74,0 
76,2 
78,4 
76,4 
76,1 
75,4 
73,6 
73,7 
74,1 
74,1 
73,3 
72,4 
71,4 
72,1 
71,8 
71,5 
87,0 
87,4 
86,6 
87,4 
86,5 
89,9 
87,9 
86,4 
86,2 
88,6 
72,6 
72,3 
74,3 
75,6 
74,3 
72,8 
72,8 
71,6 
69,9 
71,8 
68,9 
68,3 
68,7 
68,9 
69,4 
69,5 
70,3 
67,7 
62,7 
63,3 
65,9 
66,8 
68,2 
68,7 
69,4 
71,6 
71,2 
70,8 
71,3 
72,6 
69,2 
69,0 
68,8 
68,9 
68,5 
68,9 
70,3 
65,4 
65,5 
73,7 
72,4 
72,8 
72,1 
71,8 
72,2 
73,0 
72,7 
72,3 
73,1 
74,8 
74,1 
74,1 
74,4 
74,2 
73,9 
74,0 
73,7 
72,9 
72,7 
73,6 
87,2 74,5 72,8 .87,4 72,8 67,8 69,7 68,8 72,7 73,8 
80,5 
79,5 
72,7 
73,4 
75,8 
76,2. 
81,0 
83,3 
84,5 
81,2 
75,9 
76,5 
76,9 
75,8 
77,4 
78,5 
77,8 
77,2 
77,5 
76,2 
71,6 
71,0 
70,3 
72,3 
75,5 
75,8 
75,4 
75,2 
75,3 
76,8 
88,7 
84,9 
84,4 
90,0 
88,2 
87,7 
80,5 
78,5 
81,7 
86,6 
74,5 
74,4 
73,6 
72,8 
75,7 
74,3 
74,3 
73,4 
72,6 
72,2 
69,9 
70,4 
65,6 
67,1 
83,6 
80,0 
85,4 
82,8 
81,4 
83,1 
74.2 
73,5 
73,9 
74,9 
76,8 
74,1 
74,4 
74,4 
74,7 
74,5 
75,7 
75,0 
71,8 
79,4 
96,4 
96,6 
89,6 
81,9 
79,4 
79,8 
73,0 
72,9 
72,7 
75,3 
77,9 
75,3 
72,4 
71,6 
72,4 
74,5 
74,1 
73,9 
73,7 
75,0 
77,1 
76,0 
75,3 
74,6 
74,5 
75,3 
71,9 
71,2 
70,8 
70,5 
69,6 
69,4 
70,3 
71,0 
72,5 
73,8 
76,0 
77,1 
76,8 
74,5 
75,9 
73,9 
71,9 
70,0 
69,4 
69,6 
71,1 73,5 
72,7 
72,5 
72,3 
73,5 
72,1 
71,7 
71,3 
71,2 
71,4 
72,5 
73,0 
73,1 
74,4 
77,5 
81,1 
81,0 
81,3 
80,0 
79,5 
78,6 
1971-80 74,9 77,9 73,7 78,8 77,0 73,9 85,1 73,8 76,9 74,5 82,6 73,8 74,9 72,1 78,0 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
78,8 
77,4 
76,7 
75,7 
74,4 
74,4 
73,5 
71,4 
69,4 
71,1 
78,3 
76,4 
75,2 
73,4 
72,9 
73,1 
75,5 
74,7 
72,4 
71,3 
74,8 
74,3 
72,3 
71,3 
70,7 
70,0 
70,4 
69,3 
68,5 
68,0 
84,8 
86,5 
89,7 
88,3 
89,4 
85,9 
85,2 
85,6 
85,4 
87,4 
77,2 
75,5 
75,8 
72,3 
70,8 
69,8 
69,6 
68,8 
67,7 
67,4 
77,1 
77,3 
76,6 
75,6 
74,6 
72,1 
71,3 
70,2 
69,1 
69,6 
85,3 
83,6 
84,0 
81,7 
79,2 
79,0 
77,2 
76,2 
74,6 
73,7 
73,7 
73,3 
74,1 
72,6 
72,2 
70,6 
70,7 
70,4 
70,3 
72,0 
84,1 
80,7 
79,7 
78,0 
78,1 
76,2 
80,7 
78,4 
77,2 
80,8 
72,4 
71,0 
69,6 
66,3 
65,4 
66,4 
68,2 
67,4 
65,2 
65,6 
81,6 
80,4 
78,7 
76,5 
75,1 
73,1 
73,0 
72,3 
68,9 
69,2 
75,0 
73,4 
71,8 
72,1 
71,6 
72,5 
72,0 
72,1 
73,1 
74,2 
75,9 
75,2 
74,5 
73,2 
72,5 
71,7 
71,6 
70,9 
70,2 
70,7 
71,7 
73,1 
72,0 
71,0 
71,0 
71,2 
71,6 
71,6 
70,9 
71,8 
78,6 
78,5 
78,0 
76,6 
74,6 
74,2 
74,7 
74,0 
73,9 
73,9 
1981-90 74,3 74,3 71,0 86,8 71,5 73,3 79,5 72,0 79,4 67,8 74,9 72,8 72,6 71,6 75,7 
1991 
1992 
1993 
72,1 
72,6 
73,2 
70,1 
69,0 
68,8 
68,9 
69,3 
69,5 
70,8 
71,5 
82,5 
80,3 
79,6 
67,0 
67,5 
67,6 
69,6 
68,8 
68,6 
74,0 
74,1 
75,0 
72,7 
71,9 
71,2 
83,8 
86,0 
87,1 
65,8 
66,7 
66,3 
70,9 
71,6 
71,7 
75,5 
75,3 
73,0 
71,2 
71,0 
70,6 
71,4 
71,4 
72,6 
71,7 
70,6 
74,2 
74,4 
73,5 
a Compensation of employees adjusted for the share of self-employed in occupied population. 
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Table 32 
Nominal unit labour costs3 
Total economy 
1960 
(National currency; 1980 = 100) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 -
(PPS) 
31,2 20,1 38,4 24,1 12,0 23,5 15,6 15,9 29,2 24,9 15,1 17,6 22,3 
USA 
35,8 27,9 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
a Compensatioi 
31,0 
32,1 
33,4 
34,7 
36,8 
39,0 
40,1 
40,9 
42,3 
43,2 
47,0 
50,8 
55,0 
63,3 
73,9 
80,7 
87,2 
91,1 
95,2 
100,0 
105,3 
110,4 
115,7 
120,5 
125,7 
130,6 
130,8 
129,5 
131,3 
138,1 
144,4 
149,6 
154,9 
21,6 
23,0 
24,3 
25,1 
27,8 
30,0 
31,9 
34,0 
36,0 
39,4 
43,1 
45,1 
49,9 
59,4 
67,3 
71,8 
78,2 
85,0 
90,9 
100,0 
108,8 
118,7 
125,6 
129,1 
132,9 
137,4 
149,1 
153,8 
157,1 
158,9 
161,2 
163,7 
165,0 
41,1 
43,0 
44,5 
45,2 
47,2 
49,3 
49,4 
50,0 
51,7 
57,8 
62,8 
66,2 
71,4 
78,4 
82,8 
84,2 
87,4 
90,2 
93,2 
100,0 
104,5 
108,7 
109,3 
110,1 
112,1 
115,2 
118,1 
118,2 
119,3 
122,4 
128,1 
134,1 
138,3 
of employees adjusted for the share 
22,9 
23,9 
23,1 
24,0 
24,5 
25,8 
26,6 
27,1 
27,0 
27,3 
27,6 
28,8 
31,8 
39,6 
45,0 
52,2 
62,3 
72,3 , 
86,5 
100,0 
127,4 
160,9 
196,5 
231,6 
279,7 
311,5 
348,9 
405,5 
464,9 
563,0 
626,6 
690,3 
755,4 
12,1 
12,9 
14,4 
15,5 
16,9 
18,8 
20,8 
21,4 
22,1 
23,4 
25,6 
28,0 
31,3 
36,3 
43,5 
51,5 
62,9 
76,0 
89,0 
100,0 
112,6 
125,3 
139,4 
147,0 
155,1 
166,9 
176,1 
184,9 
194,3 
208,0 
221,4 
234,7 
245,5 
24,7 
25,8 
27,6 
28,6 
29,2 
29,6 
30,3 
32,3 
34,0 
36,0 
38,4. 
40,9 
44,1 
51,2 
60,4 
67,0 
73,3 
80,2 
87,9 
100,0 
112,3 
125,4 
136,5 
144,3 
150,6 
153,9 
156,6 
158,1 
161,3 
167,3 
173,1 
176,4 
180,9 
16,1 
17,0 
17,2 
18,9 
19,5 
20,9 
21,2 
21,7 
23,5 
26,4 
29,2 
31,8 
36,6 
42,0 
50,8 
59,4 
64,2 
70,8 
84,3 
100,0 
113,3 
126,5 
140,3 
146,1 
151,0 
159,9 
160,2 
163,7 
163,1 
162,4 
165,2 
170,7 
177,1 
15,9 
16,8 
18,8 
20,4 
20,9 
21,0 
21,5 
21,6 
22,0 
24,2 
27,0 
28,9 
32,4 
38,4 
47,7 
55,0 
64,9 
73,3 
84,2 
100,0 
121,9 
142,1 
164,3 
179,5 
194,4 
204,7 
215,6 
227,3 
240,4 
262,8 
283,7 
295,1 
304,6 
29,2 
30,3 
31,5 
33,7 
34,7 
36,2 
36,7 
37,2 
36,2 
41,8 
45,3 
47,9 
50,2 
60,9 
74,0 
80,2 
86,7 
87,7 
91,9 
100,0 
109,4 
115,4 
119,5 
121,2 
124,5 
126,3 
132,2 
132,8 
137,8 
148,9 
157,8 
164,6 
173,6 
26,3 
27,6 
29,5 
32,3 
34,6 
37,7 
39,0 
40,1 
43,4 
46,7 
51,2 
55,4 
61,1 
68,1 
76,7 
80,9 
86,0 
90,6 
94,9 
100,0 
102,6 
107,4 
107,2 
104,1 
104,5 
106,2 
108,4 
108,3 
106,2 
108,9 
112,5 
116,9 
119,4 
af self-employed in occupied population per unit of GDP at constant pnces. 
15,2 
15,0 
15,4 
15,5 
16,0 
16,9 
17,7 
16,7 
17,7 
20,4 
22,1 
23,7 
24,9 
33,0 
46,4 
53,8 
63,3 
72,0 
83,5 
100,0 
120,3 
140,5 
169,4 
206,1 
245,5 
278,8 
314,0 
342,7 
371,3 
426,0 
501,6 
565,9 
610,9 
18,3 
19,1 
19,4 
19,9 
20,9 
22,0 
22,5 
23,2 
24,4 
26,8 
29,0 
31,6 
34,1 
41,4 
54,5 
60,4 
65,4 
72,0 
81,9 
100,0 
111,0 
116,3 
120,4 
126,9 
133,3 
138,2 
143,9 
153,5 
167,6 
183,9 
198,6 
207,6 
208,7 
23,2 
24,2 
25,5 
26,6 
27,7 
28,8 
29,5 
30,3 
31,5 
34,3 
37,2 
39,9 
43,6 
50,6 
60,0 
65,9 
72,8 
79,7 
87,8 
100,0 
111,7 
122,1 
130,9 
137,6 
144,4 
150,3 
155,9 
160,9 
167,3 
177,6 
188,1 
196,0 
201,6 
35,9 
36,3 
36,6 
37,1 
37,6 
39,1 
40,7 
43,0 
46,0 
49,2 
51,1 
53,5 
56,8 
62,7 
67,5 
71,5 
76,2 
82,5 
90,3 
100,0 
108,4 
117,5 
120,5 
124,1 
128,6 
132,6 
137,7 
143,4 
148,1 
156,1 
163,5 
165,4 
166,6 
28,6 
30,3 
31,9 
32,8 
35,2 
36,1 
37,1 
38,0 
39,4 
42,0 
46,5 
49,3 
56,7 
71,4 
80,5 
86,5 
92,0 
95,2 
96,7 
100,0 
103,5 
105,1 
106,1 
106,1 
104,6 
106,1 
106,0 
105,2 
107,1 
109,5 
111,5 
113,9 
114,6 
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Table 33 
Real unit labour costs" 
Total economy 
(1980 - 100) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(PPS) 
USA 
1960 86,9 94,3 92,7 119,0 91,4 92,9 96,8 98,5 81,4 86,5 89,5' 97,9 96,4 98,6 99,6 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
85,1 
86,7 
87,7 
87,1 
87,8 
89,2 
89,1 
88,4 
87,8 
85,9 
88,4 
90,1 
90,8 
92,9 
96,8 
98,2 
98,7 
98,7 
98,8 
00,0 
00,6 
98,5 
97,7 
96,8 
95,1 
95,3 
93,2 
90,7 
87,8 
90,0 
91,6 
91,6 
92,0 
97,3 
97,4 
96,9 
95,7 
98,8 
99,7 
100,0 
99,6 
98,4 
99,5 
101,1 
96,9 
96,8 
102,0 
102,7 
100,5 
100,0 
98,9 
98,4 
100,0 
98,8 
97,5 
95,9 
93,3 
92,1 
91,0 
94,3 
94,1 
92,2 
91,3 
90,0 
89,2 
88,4 
94,5 
95,1 
95,4 
94,0 
94,8 
95,6 
94,3 
93,4 
92,8 
96,4 
97,1 
97,3 
98,7 
101,3 
101,1 
99,2 
99,3 
98,3 
97,8 
100,0 
100,4 
100,0 
97,2 
95,9 
95,5 
95,0 
95,5 
94,2 
92,6 
91,9 
92,3 
92,4 
92,1 
111,4 
111,1 
105,9 
105,9 
104,0 
104,5 
104,9 
105,2 
101,4 
98,5 
96,8 
96,0 
88,9 
91,3 
92,5 
93,1 
98,2 
100,9 
101,8 
100,0 
106,4 
107,4 
110,1 
107,9 
110,7 
104,9 
102,9 
103,5 
105,3 
105,8 
98,5 
93,9 
91,2 
90,8 
91,3 
94,2 
95,3 
95,2 
97,6 
100,4 
98,3 
97,5 
96,6 
97,7 
98,3 
98,4 
98,2 
100,8 
102,2 
101,4 
101,6 
101,7 
100,0 
100,5 
98,3 
98,0 
93,1 
90,6 
87,7 
87,5 
86,9 
85,3 
85,1 
84,8 
84,5 
84,4 
94,2 
94,3 
94,7 
94,2 
93,5 
92,3 
91,6 
93,5 
92,5 
92,7 
93,0 
92,1 
91,6 
94,6 
98,9 
98,9 
99,3 
98,6 
98,1 
100,0 
100,8 
100,6 
99,8 
98,3 
97,0 
94,1 
93,0 
91,0 
89,7 
90,3 
90,7 
89,8 
89,5 
97,1 
98,0 
96,3 
96,7 
95,4 
98,0 
96,4 
94,7 
93,7 
96,0 
95,9 
92,3 
92,1 
99,6 
100,3 
96,9 
92,5 
92,4 
96,7 
100,0 
96,5 
93,5 
93,7 
91,7 
90,1 
89,6 
87,7 
87,1 
82,9 
83,9 
84,3 
84,6 
85,8 
96,1 
96,0 
98,9 
100,9 
99,2 
97,3 
96,8 
95,9 
93,9 
96,4 
100,5 
101,1 
100,3 
99,2 
105,8 
103,0 
102,4 
101.5 
101,1 
100,0 
102,4 
101,8 
102,3 
100,2 
99,6 
97,3 
96,7 
95,5 
95,2 
96,8 
97,4 
96,3 
95,2 
84,6 
84,5 
85,2 
86,0 
86,2 
86,6 
87,5 
84,4 
78,0 
78,2 
85,5 
85,4 
79,8 
82,7 
101,4 
97,9 
104,6 
100,6 
99,1 
100,0 
102,1 
97,2 
94,2 
91,5 
91,2 
89,2 
94,3 
91,1 
89,1 
93,6 
96,3 
98,3 
99,6 
89,3 
90,4 
92,3 
92,9 
93,7 
96,4 
95,7 
94,6 
96,1 
97,3 
98,8 
97,7 
98,9 
101,0 
103,3 
99,9 
99,5 
99,5 
100,3 
100,0 
97,3 
96,0 
94,1 ' 
89,7 
88,4 
89,4 
91,7 
90,5 
87,7 
87,7 
88,0 
89,0 
88,5 
87,9 
87,1 
87,1 
86,8 
86,3 
86,5 
87,5 
81,5 
81,2 
90,8 
93,7 
93,0 
89,3 
99,7 
120,6 
120,3 
111,9 
104,0 
101,0 
100,0 
102,3 
99,0 
95,8 
93,5 
91,4 
86,2 
87,3 
85,4 
81,9 
82,2 
84,7 
84,5 
84,4 
99,6 
99,9 
99,0 
98,1 
98,2 
98,8 
98,2 
97,1 
96,8 
99,2 
98,1 
98,9 
99,7 
105,1 
108,9 
104,7 
99,5 
98,4 
97,9 
100,0 
99,7 
97,0 
95,5 
96,2 
95,6 
95,8 
95,0 
95,1 
96,9 
100,1 
101,2 
101,2 
98,4 
96,9 
96,9 
97,3 
96,9 
96,7 
96,7 
96,1 
95,5 
94,6 
96,4 
97,3 
97,3 
97,5 
100,0 
103,3 
101,5 
100,4 
99,5 
99,1 
100,0 
100,7 
99,6 
98,5 
96,9 
95,9 
94,5 
94,2 
93,1 
92,2 
93,0 
93,4 
93,1 
92,2 
97,9 
97,0 
96,4 
96,0 
94,9 
95,2 
96,3 
97,0 
98,8 
100,3 
98,7 
98,7 
98,6 
100,1 
98,3 
98,1 
97,8 
98,1 
98,8 
100,0 
98,6 
100,6 
99,2 
97,8 
97,7 
98,1 
98,8 
99,0 
97,8 
98,9 
99,6 
98,2 
96,4 
94,7 
96,5 
96,3 
93,8 
95,8 
93,6 
91,2 
89,1 
88,5 
88,5 
92,9 
93,1 
94,6 
99,2 
104,1 
103,8 
103,8 
102,3 
101,1 
100,0 
99,9 
99,7 
99,3 
97,0 
94,2 
93,9 
93,8 
92,7 
92,7 
92,7 
92,7 
93,0 
91,9 
Table 34 
Nominal unit labour costs3 
Total economy 
Relative to 19 industrial countries; double export weights 
(USD; 1980 = 100) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR12­b USA 
1960 95,1 77,9 81,2 166,9 66,5 101,4 95,6 108,5 66,1 123,5 98,3 76,4 167,8 67,8 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
For a detailed 
89,6 
89,1 
88,7 
89,0 
90,8 
92,0 
92,5 
92,0 
90,8 
85,9 
86,5 
90,3 
91,1 
93,5 
97,3 
101,2 
107,5 
107,9 
106,2 
100,0 
91,1 
80,5 
78,6 
77,6 
78,9 
83,7 
84,7 
80,9 
79,0 
83,4 
82,8 
85,0 
80,3 
82,2 
83,7 
83,6 
88,9 
91,8 
94,2 
93,9 
94,6 
95,6 
96,0 
94,8 
102,7 
107,3 
108,7 
109,2 
109,2 
110,7 
109,5 
100,0 
92,2 
89,8 
90,7 
86,8 
87,1 
92,1 
100,7 
99,0 
95,0 
97,8 
92,4 
93,6 
commentary on the method usee 
87,5 
88,2 
87,4 
85,5 
85,1 
85,2 
82,8 
82,4 
83,6 
95,2 
98,6 
100,0 
109,3 
109,4 
101,0 
99,2 
102,2 
103,3 
103,1 
100,0 
89,5 
89,9 
89,1 
84,8 
83,3 
91,3 
96,8 
93,4 
89,8 ■ 
92,1 
90,5 
95,1 
152,1 
152,1 
142,0 
142,5 
139,9 
141,9 
142,1 
143,4 
137,1 
126,1 
115,7 
106,0 
99,2 
108,0 
97,5 
99,6 
107,0 
105,4 
110,7 
100,0 
105,0 
113,4 
108,2 
105,5 
103,5 
87,7 
85,9 
90,5 
93,1 
98,7 
92,4 
90,9 
64,7 
66,3 
71,5 
74,6 
78,4 
83,6 
88,5 
78,5 
77,5 
75,7 
76,0 
79,6 
83,5 
86,7 
88,6 
89,1 
88,3 
89,9 
106,6 
100,0 
92,9 
89,9 
79,0 
78,4 
77,9 
79,7 
81,6 
86,1 
91,2 
97,4 
98,1 
98,9 
102,4 
103,1 
105,8 
105,8 
103,3 
100,3 
99,7 
105,0 
100,9 
90,9 
«7,4 
89,3 
91,3 
86,3 
98,0 
97,3 
93,8 
94,5 
96,8 
100,0 
93,6 
89,2 
86,3 
83,9 
85,4 
87,9 
87,4 
83,8 
81,6 
85,0 
81,7 
83,2 
see European Economy No 8, March 1981. 
' Compensation of employees adjusted for the share of self­employed i 
b Against nine industrial non­i nember countries. 
n occupied population pei 
94,7 
96,7 
95,5 
101,8 
100,4 
102,8 
100,5 
93,6 
96,1 
99,4 
102,4 
101,8 
100,8 
96,7 
92,6 
89,6 
86,5 
89,1 
97,4 
100,0 
94,7 
97,7 
99,8 
96,1 
96,8 
102,7 
97,6 
95,2 
90,1 
89,7 
85,4 
87,8 
104,0 
105,7 
113,8 
119,4 
117,5 
113,0 
112,5 
111,8 
108,5 
109,4 
112,4 
112,3 
104,4 
97,9 
103,2 
92,1 
93,4 
92,7 
96,1 
100,0 
98,7 
99,8 
107,0 
106,8 
106,1 
112,1 
116,0 
115,4 
119,0 
128,6 
129,9 
127,3 
unit of GDP at constant 
69,5 
70,4 
72,5 
76,8 
79,0 
82,4 
83,7 
85,0 
88,3 
86,5 
88,6 
91,4 
95,9 
98,5 
99,8 
100,6 
104,6 
105,7 
104,8 
100,0 
90,1 
92,3 
90,0 
83,0 
80,5 
85,0 
88,5 
86,0 
80,9 
81,9 
79,9 
82,1 
prices. 
119,5 
113,9 
112,4 
109,4 
108,4 
110,1 
112,0 
106,1 
108,1 
115,3 
115,4 
114,3 
112,6 
128,1 
150,7 
147,2 
125,6 
105,7 
96,1 
100,0 
106,0 
100,1 
91,0 
88,3 
89,8 
90,8 
92,0 
92,8 
94,1 
101,1 
113,9 
128,9 
99,6 
100,7 
97,9 
96,8 
98,0 
99,0 
96,2 
84,6 
84,8 
86,5 
87,0 
86,1 
76,3 
77,9 
83,7 
73,5 
70,4 
72,6 
81,7 
100,0 
102,4 
95,0 
87,7 
. 85,4 
86,6 
80,3 
80,4 
88,7 
91,1 
94,7 
98,1 
96,1 
79,8 
81,3 
82,8 
83,4 
84,0 
84,3 
82,2 
78,1 
77,4 
81,0 
83,0 
85,4 
87,6 
86,3 
91,8 
83,4 
84,2 
85,8 
94,0 
100,0 
85,6 
80,3 
75,6 
69,6 
69,4 
76,0 
81,5 
79,8 
77,3 
86,3 
84,1 
88,0 
162,9 
160,1 
155,4 
152,3 
147,6 
147,2 
148,3 
156,1 
160,0 
157,5 
147,6 
135,3 
120,4 
115,6 
107,1 
110,2 
108,0 
99,9 
99,4 
100,0 
112,4 
127,5 
133,5 
144,6 
152,0 
123,0 
109,4 
104,6 
109,5 
103,3 
102,9 
98,9 
67,6 
70,0 
72,0 
71,9 
75,0 
73,9 
73,4 
73,8 
73,0 
72,0 
76,5 
85,1 
95,7 
99,0 
96,3 
101,0 
110,8 
129,9 
112,3 
100,0 
107,5 
95,6 
103,2 
105,5 
103,1 
128,4 
134,0 
141,6 
133,1 
115,7 
121,9 
127,8 
215 
Table 35 
Exports of goods and services at current prices 
National accounts 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1961-70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Β 
39,9 
41,2 
42,8 
44,0 
44,9 
44,3 
46,1 
45,1 
47,3 
51,5 
53,9 
46,1 
52,5 
53,1 
57,8 
63,7 
55,8 
58,7 
57,6 
55,6 
60,8 
62,9 
DK 
32,2 
29,9 
28,5 
30,3 
29,7 
29,2 
28,4 
27,2 
27,5 
27,4 
27,9 
28,6 
27,6 
27,1 
28,5 
31,8 
30,1 
28,8 
28,8 
27,8 
29,2 
32,7 
WD I 
19,0 
18,0 
17,4 
17,8 
18,1 
18,0 
19,2 
20,4 
21,4 
21,7 
21,2 
19,3 
20,8 
20,6 
21,8 
26,4 
24,7 
25,7 
25,5 
24,8 
25,1 
26,4 
GR 
9,1 
9,3 
9,7 
10,0 
93 
9,0 
11,3 
10,7 
9,6 
9,7 
10,0 
9,8 
10,3 
11,7 
14,2 
16,1 
16,9 
17,6 
16,8 
17,6 
17,5 
20,9 
E 
9,9 
9,6 
9,8 
9,2 
10,5 
10,2 
10,7 
9,8 
11,3 
11,6 
12,9 
10,5 
13,8 
14,2 
14,2 
14,0 
13,2 
13,4 
14,1 
14,8 
14,6 
15,4 
F 
14,5 
14,0 
12,9 
12,7 
12,7 
13,3 
13,4 
13,2 
13,3 
14,1 
15,8 
13,5 
16,4 
16,7 
17,6 
20,7 
19,1 
19,6 
20,5 
20,4 
21,2 
21,5 
IRL 
31,8 
34,6 
32,3 
33,6 
33,4 
34,8 
37,2 
37,8 
38,8 
37,3 
37,0 
35,7 
36,1 
34,6 
38,0 
42,6 
42,7 
46,3 
49,4 
49,9 
49,7 
49,6 
I 
13,0 
13,3 
13,2 
12,7 
13,3 
14,9 
15,3 
15,0 
15,8 
16,5 
16,4 
14,6 
16,9 
17,7 
17,4 
20,2 
20,5 
22,1 
23,2 
23,4 
24,3 
21,9 
L 
86,7 
86,9 
79,9 
77,7 
78,8 
80,7 
77,2 
78,5 
80,5 
84,3 
88,9 
81,3 
88,1 
82,9 
89,3 
102,6 
92,5 
88,1 
86,9 
83,8 
90,9 
88,5 
NL 
45,0 
42,9 
42,3 
42,4 
41,1 
40,5 
39,4 
38,3 
38,7 
40,1 
42,3 
40,8 
42,9 
42,5 
44,8 
51,0 
47,1 
48,2 
44,9 
42,4 
46,4 
49,6 
Ρ 
17,5 
16,4 
18,7 
19,1 
25,6 
26,8 
27,1 
27,2 
25,0 
24,4 
24,4 
23,5 
25,1 
27,2 
26,7 
26,9 
20,4 
17,4 
18,4 
20,1 
27,1 
27,4 
UK 
20,9 
20,6 
20,1 
20,0 
19,4 
19,2 
19,4 
19,1 
21,4 
22,3 
23,1 
20,5 
23,2 
21,8 
23,7 
28,0 
25,9 
28,5 
30,1 
28,5 
28,0 
27,3 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12+ USA 
(ECU) (ECU 
19,6 
19,0 
18,4 
18,3 
18,5 
18,7 
19,2 
19,1 
20,1 
20,9 
21,7 
19,4 
21,9 
21,8 
23,0 
26,9 
25,0 
26,3 
26,7 
26,1 
26,8 
27,1 
) 
53 
5,1 
5,0 
5,1 
5,3 
5,2 
5,3 
5,3 
5,3 
5,3 
5,8 
5,3 
5,7 
5,8 
6,9 
8,6 
8,6 
8,3 
8,0 
8,3 
9,1 
10,2 
J 
10,7 
9,3 
9,4 
9,0 
9,5 
10,5 
10,6 
9,6 
10,1 
10,5 
10,8 
9,9 
11,7 
10,6 
10,0 
13,6 
12,8 
13,6 
13,1 
11,1 
11,6 
13,7 
1971-80 57,8 29,2 24,2 16,0 14,2 19,4 43,9 20,8 89,4 46,0 23,7 26,5 25,2 8,0 12,2 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
68,2 
71,9 
74,7 
79,1 
76,9 
70,7 
69,4 
72,5 
76,7 
73,9 
73,4 
72,5 
69,5 
69,4 
36,5 
36,4 
36,4 
36,7 
36,7 
32,0 
31,4 
32,6 
34,4 
35,1 
34,8 
36,4 
36,6 
36,5 
28,7 
29,9 
28,7 
30,6 
32,5 
30,2 
29,0 
29,6 
31,5 
32,2 
30,3 
34,1 
33,6 
33,8 
25,< 
23,i 
23,' 
20,6 
18,4 
19,8 
21,7 
21,2 
22,4 
24,6 
23,9 
23,0 
21,6 
21,7 
22,6 
23,7 
25,2 
17,6 
18,2 
20,7 
23,0 
22,7 
19,9 
19,4 
18,9 
18,1 
17,1 
19,5 
17,3 
17,5 
18,5 
22,6 
21,8 
22,5 
24,1 
23,9 
21,2 
20,6 
21,3 
22,9 
22,6 
22,4 
22,6 
22,6 
22,9 
48,5 
48,1 
52,4 
59,5 
60,4 
54,8 
58,1 
61,8 
65,5 
61,3 
57,1 
61,7 
63,0 
63,1 
23,3 
23,0 
22,1 
22,8 
22,8 
20,2 
19,5 
19,2 
20,4 
20,9 
21,4 
19,5 
19,5 
21,0 
86,6 
89,0 
90,2 
101,1 
108,6 
100,7 
98,4 
99,6 
101,1 
96,9 
97,2 
94,3 
90,8 
88,8 
54,8 
54,4 
54,5 
58,7 
60,0 
51,2 
49,8 
52,5 
55,2 
54,4 
54,6 
54,1 
53,0 
53,6 
25,9 
26,4 
31,3 
37,2 
37,3 
33,2 
34,3 
35,5 
37,5 
36,4 
33,5 
31,6 
28,9 
27,9 
26,7 
26,3 
26,5 
28,5 
28,8 
25,8 
25,5 
23,1 
23,9 
24,5 
26,0 
23,7 
23,7 
26,1 
28,5 
28,5 
28,6 
30,5 
30,9 
27,8 
27,1 
27,0 
28,4 
28,4 
28,6 
28,4 
28,3 
29,4 
26,2 
25,8 
26,6 
9,9 
8,9 
8,0 
7,9 
7,4 
7,4 
7,9 
9,0 
9,6 
10,0 
8,6 
10,5 
10,7 
10,9 
14,7 
14,6 
13,9 
15,0 
14,5 
11,4 
10,4 
10,1 
10,7 
10,8 
12,6 
10,3 
10,3 
10,1 
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Table 36 
Exports of goods and services at constant prices 
National accounts 
(National currency: annual percentage change) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + 
(PPS) (PPS) 
USA 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
93 10,1 
8,2 
9,4 
6,1 
7,7 
4,3 
12,2 
15,3 
10,2 
4,3 
4,9 
10,0 
8,5 
7,9 
3,9 
4,0 
9,3 
6,2 
5,6 
53 
2,7 
7,9 
8,4 
6,5 
10,1 
8,3 
13,1 
9,6 
5,5 
14,5 
10,0 
6,7 
1,6 
12,7 
34,4 
5,1 
-ι,ο 14,6 
12,4 
7.9 
12,8 
3,8 
25,5 
6,9 
15,2 
-4,7 
18,4 
15,6 
17,4 
5,1 
1,8 
7,1 
6,7 
11,5 6,6 
7,3 
9,4 
15,7 
16,1 
17,2 
-1,0 
9,6 
83 8,9 
10,6 
10,3 
9,0 
4,6 
18,8 
14,7 
10,3 
6,5 
10,8 
20,0 
113 
73 
13,9 
11,8 
5,8 
3,5 
-1,6 
3,8 
13,3 
5,8 
-0,2 
1,9 
10,7 
13,8 
9,0 
2,3 
63 
6,0 
11,3 
7,6 
53 6,6 
12,8 
14,9 
11,9 
1,9 
22,7 
7,2 
39,9 
13,5 
12,8 
83 
-0,5 
8,7 
5,4 
3,1 
1,8 
1,5 
3,5 
4,4 
5,2 
1,0 
12,7 
9,3 
5,4 
5,8 
4,7 
5,8 
8,7 
8,5 
83 
53 
12,2 
11,7 
8,6 
0,7 
53 
7,1 
11,7 
1,9 
6,4 
3,1 
33 
4,7 
9,4 
5,3 
17,2 
7,0 
21,7 
23,7 
17,0 
6,7 
23,9 
20,8 
17,5 
1961-70 9,2 6,4 7,7 10,7 11,6 8,6 9,5 11,1 5,9 8,4 11,5 4,7 7,9 5,3 15,9 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
4,5 
11,1 
14,2 
3,8 
-8,2 
12,9 
23 
2,3 
7,0 
2,5 
5,6 
5,6 
7,8 
3,5 
-1,8 
4,1 
4,1 
1,2 
8,4 
5,2 
4,6 
6,8 
10,7 
12,3 
-6,4 
9,6 
3,9 
2,9 
4,3 
53 
11,9 
22,9 
23,4 
0,1 
10,6 
16,4 
1,8 
16,4 
6,7 
6,9 
14,2 
13,4 
10,0 
-ι,ο -0,4 
5,0 
12,1 
10,7 
5,6 
2,3 
9,8 
12,1 
11,0 
9,1 
-1,1 8,5 
8,0 
6,6 
7,7 
2,4 
4,1 
3,6 
10,9 
0,7 
7,6 
8,1 
14,0 
12,3 
6,5 
6,4 
7,0 
9,5 
3,9 
5,9 
1,8 
10,2 
11,6 
9,4 
8,7 
-8,5 
4,0 
5,1 
14,0 
10,3 
-15,8 
1,0 
4,2 
3,4 
9,4 
-1,4 
10,7 
10,0 
12,1 
2,6 
-3,1 
9,9 
-1,8 
3,3 
7,4 
1,5 
11,9 
20,2 
93 
-13,3 
-16,4 
-0,8 
4,1 
9,1 
33,0 
2,2 
6,8 
0,8 
11,9 
6,9 
-3,2 
8,8 
6,5 
1,6 
3,8 
-0,2 
7,3 
8,0 
10,5 
6,6 
-3,4 
9,2 
5,8 
4,8 
6,5 
1,0 
ο,ι 15,2 
18,6 
7,8 
-1,1 3,9 
1,6 
9,8 
8,8 
10,8 
16,0 
4,1 
5,2 
23,2 
-ι,ο 16,6 
11,7 
-0,3 
4,3 
17,0 
1971-8 5,0 4,3 5,3 11,4 7,0 7,4 7,3 5,8 3,1 5,1 5,0 4,3 5,6 7,4 9,4 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
2,6 
1,3 
2,7 
5,3 
1,1 5,6 
6,6 
8,6 
7,3 
4,1 
8,2 
2,5 
4,9 
3,5 
5,0 
0,0 
5,1 
7,8 
5,0 
8,0 
7,2 
3,7 
-0,7 
8,2 
7,6 
-0,6 
0,4 
5,5 
10,1 
10,4 
1981-90 4,5 5,0 5,1 
-5,9 
-7,2 8,0 
16,9 
1,3 
14,0 
16,0 
9,0 
1,3 
0,9 
8,4 
4,8 
10,1 
11,7 
2,7 
1,9 
6,3 
5,1 
3,0 
33 
3,6 
-1,8 
3,7 
6,7 
2,0 
-1,3 
2,8 
83 
10,3 
5,4 
2,0 
5,5 
10,5 
16,6 
6,6 
2,9 
13,4 
8,7 
10,1 
8,8 
6,3 
-13 
2,6 
7,7 
3,1 
1,1 4,6 
4,8 
7,8 
9,5 
-4,8 
-0,3 
5,3 
18,0 
9,5 
33 
6,3 
7,5 
6,9 
2,6 
2,1 
-0,3 
3,3 
7,2 
5,3 
3,4 
4,0 
9,0 
6,7 
5,5 
-4,4 
4,7 
13,6 
11,6 
6,7 
6,8 
8,6 
10,2 
13,3 
9,5 
-0,8 
0,9 
2,0 
6,6 
5,8 
4,7 
5,7 
-ο,ι 3,8 
4,9 
3,8 
1,0 
2,8 
7,7 
4,6 
1,8 
4,1 
5,6 
7,6 
6,9 
5,1 5,7 3,9 8,4 4,6 5,3 4,6 7,9 3,3 4,6 
-0,4 
-8,4 
-2,8 
6,6 
2,7 
12,0 
16,4 
18,8 
11,8 
8,1 
12,5 
0,9 
4,8 
14,8 
5,4 
-4,9 
0,1 
7,0 
9,0 
7,3 
6,2 5,6 
1991 
1992 
1993 
3,1 
0,1 
1,0 
6,0 
3,8 
2,2 
12,8 
3,4 
1,8 
0,0 
1,5 
2,6 
10,2 
8,2 
8,4 
5,5 
5,3 
4,1 
5,6 
2,4 
4,9 
8,7 
3,1 
-1,4 
3,9 
6,0 
3,5 
1,1 1,3 
4,6 
3,0 
2,5 
-0,6 
4,7 
3,0 
0,3 
2,8 
7,0 
5,0 
3,7 
3,6 
3,0 
3,6 
5,8 
7,0 
5,8 
53 
2,4 
2,7 
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Table 37 
Intra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
Foreign trade statistics 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
B/L DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
1960 19,6 14,1 6,4 2,5 3,6 4,3 19,6 3,7 20,6 5,1 3,3 6,0 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
20,1 
21,7 
23,9 
25,0 
26,2 
26,2 
25,3 
27,5 
31,9 
33,1 
31,4 
33,4 
35,8 
36,1 
32,6 
35,8 
34,0 
33,3 
37,0 
38,3 
39,3 
42,3 
44,0 
45,0 
44,7 
42,9 
42,4 
42,0 
46,3 
44,0 
43,2 
41,0 
41,0 
Γ 
12,7 
12,0 
12,8 
12,3 
11,6 
10,9 
9,8 
9,5 
93 
9,1 
8,9 
8,9 
10,3 
10,7 
10,7 
10,1 
9,6 
10,0 
10,9 
12,6 
12,9 
13,1 
13,3 
12,3 
12,2 
11,3 
11,3 
11,9 
12,6 
13,1 
13,9 
14,4 
14,2 
6,6 
6,6 
7,4 
7,4 
7,3 
7,9 
8,4 
8,9 
9,6 
9,2 
9,1 
9,1 
9,9 
11,3 
10,1 
113 
11,0 
10,8 
11,6 
12,1 
12,6 
13,5 
13,0 
13,9 
14,6 
13,9 
14,0 
14,7 
15,9 
14,5 
13,7 
13,1 
13,1 
2,3 
2,8 
2,6 
2,7 
2,6 
2,7 
3,3 
33 
3,3 
3,5 
3,4 
3,7 
5,1 
5,7 
5,6 
5,8 
5,1 
5,5 
5,0 
63 
5,0 
5,3 
6,7 
7,9 
7,4 
9,1 
9,4 
63 
8,8 
7,7 
7,8 
7,5 
7,6 
3,1 
2,7 
2,3 
2,7 
23 
2,2 
2,1 
2,3 
2,5 
3,1 
3,4 
3,4 
3,7 
4,0 
3,4 
4,0 
4,1 
4,4 
4,7 
5,1 
5,0 
5,5 
6,3 
7,5 
7,6 
7,1 
7,4 
7,7 
7,8 
7,8 
8,1 
8,1 
8,6 
4,7 
4,6 
4,7 
4,9 
5,3 
5,4 
53 
5,3 
6,2 
73 
7,5 
8,0 
8,5 
9,6 
8,1 
8,6 
8,9 
8,9 
9,6 
93 
9,0 
8,8 
93 
9,8 
9,9 
9,4 
9,7 
10,3 
10,9 
11,0 
113 
11,0 
11,0 
21,6 
18,5 
19,5 
20,3 
19,3 
19,0 
20,5 
20,8 
19,6 
20,3 
21,4 
22,2 
25,0 
28,8 
30,5 
30,6 
34,3 
34,5 
35,0 
33,5 
30,3 
30,7 
33,1 
37,8 
37,8 
35,8 
39,0 
41,7 
44,5 
41,3 
41,5 
42,3 
42,2 
4,0 
4,3 
4,1 
4,7 
5,5 
5,7 
5,4 
5,9 
6,3 
6,4 
6,8 
7,4 
7,4 
83 
8,1 
9,1 
9,4 
9,7 
10,4 
8,8 
8,4 
8,8 
8,4 
8,4 
8,9 
8,6 
8,6 
8,7 
9,1 
9,0 
8,7 
8,4 
9,0 
20,4 
20,7 
21,6 
22,1 
21,8 
20,9 
20,4 
21,6 
23,4 
24,9 
25,9 
26,4 
27,8 
30,8 
28,6 
30,4 
27,6 
26,0 
29,5 
31,3 
34,4 
34,6 
35,4 
37,7 
38,8 
33,5 
31,9 
31,4 
33,4 
33,3 
33,0 
32,1 
32,4 
4,8 
5,3 
5,5 
6,5 
6,8 
6,6 
6,6 
6,4 
6,8 
6,7 
6,9 
7,5 
83 
8,5 
7,0 
6,3 
6,7 
7,9 
10,0 
10,8 
9,7 
10,9 
13,9 
16,8 
17,2 
16,5 
17,8 
18,9 
20,3 
20,3 
17,9 
16,3 
15,8 
3,6 
3,7 
4,0 
3,8 
3,8 
3,8 
3,7 
4,2 
4,6 
5,0 
5,1 
5,0 
5,9 
7,2 
6,6 
7,9 
9,0 
9,0 
9,6 
9,5 
8,7 
8,8 
9,3 
10,2 
10,7 
9,1 
9,4 
8,7 
93 10,1 
10,4 
10,2 
11,3 
6,2 
6,3 
6,6 
6,8 
7,0 
7,2 
7,1 
7,7 
8,5 
8,9 
9,1 
9,4 
10,3 
11,6 
10,4 
11,6 
11,6 
11,5 
12,3 
12,2 
12,1 
12,5 
12,7 
13,4 
13,8 
12,9 
12,9 
13,0 
13,8 
13,5 
13,3 
13,0 
13,5 
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Table 38 
Extra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
Foreign trade statistics 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
B/L DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
1! 
960 
961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
12,7 10,6 9,5 3,3 2,6 6,9 4,6 5,5 13,1 8,1 11,0 8,7 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
11,6 
11,0 
10,1 
10,1 
10,7 
10,6 
10,2 
10,9 
10,7 
10,9 
10,4 
10,5 
11,7 
13,8 
12,2 
11,5 
12,4 
12,1 
12,6 
13,8 
15,6 
16,0 
17,3 
19,0 
18,7 
15,7 
14,5 
14,2 
16,4 
14,4 
14,0 
13,3 
13,1 
10,2 
9,9 
10,8 
10,7 
10,7 
10,6 
10,6 
11,0 
11,4 
11,7 
11,4 
11,0 
11,0 
13,1 
12,3 
11,5 
11,7 
10,6 
10,8 
12,1 
14,4 
13,7 
14,5 
16,0 
15,9 
13,6 
12,8 
13,6 
14,0 
13,7 
13,5 
13,3 
13,4 
8,9 
8,1 
7,9 
8,0 
8,3 
8,6 
93 
9,7 
9,5 
9,3 
9,0 
8,8 
9,6 
12,0 
11,4 
11,7 
11,9 
11,4 
11,0 
11,5 
13,1 
13,3 
12,8 
13,8 
14,7 
13,4 
12,5 
12,3 
.12,9 
12,0 
11,1 
10,6 
10,7 
3,4 
3,1 
3,6 
3,1 
2,9 
3,4 
3,6 
2,7 
3,0 
3,0 
2,6 
3,2 
3,9 
5,0 
5,3 
5,6 
5,4 
5,1 
5,0 
6,6 
6,4 
5,8 
5,9 
6,4 
6,2 
5,2 
4,6 
3,5 
4,8 
4,4 
4,5 
4,1 
4,3 
2,2 
2,0 
1,7 
1,9 
1,9 
2,3 
2,4 
3,0 
3,0 
33 
•3,4 
3,6 
3,4 
3,8 
3,7 
4,0 
43 
4,5 
4,5 
4,6 
5,9 
5,8 
6,3 
73 
7,0 
4,7 
43 
4,0 
3,9 
3,5 
3,3 
3,3 
3,6 
63 
5,3 
5,0 
4,9 
4,9 
4,7 
4,6 
4,7 
4,6 
53 
5,2 
53 
5,5 
6,8 
7,0 
7,0 
7,4 
6,9 
7,2 
7,4 
8,3 
7,9 
8,1 
8,8 
8,5 
6,8 
6,4 
6,4 
6,9 
6,5 
6,5 
6,4 
6,6 
4,9 
4,4 
4,6 
3,8 
3,5 
4,3 
4,5 
5,2 
5,4 
5,3 
6,9 
6,1 
7,2 
8,8 
7,4 
9,0 
9,9 
9,3 
93 
10,5 
12,1 
11,7 
13,7 
16,2 
16,9 
13,9 
13,9 
14,5 
15,3 
13,9 
14,2 
14,5 
14,6 
5,5 
5,1 
4,8 
4,9 
53 
5,3 
5,5 
5,9 
6,0 
5,9 
6,0 
6,1 
6,0 
8,1 
8,3 
8,4 
9,2 
9,0 
9,0 
8,3 
10,0 
9,4 
9,0 
9,3 
9,6 
7,5 
6,7 
6,5 
7,0 
6,4 
6,0 
6,1 
6,8 
12,4 
11,4 
10,4 
9,8 
9,6 
9,6 
9,5 
9,3 
93 
9,4 
8,9 
8,9 
9,2 
11,4 
10,6 
10,7 
10,4 
9,6 
9,9 
113 
12,9 
12,3 
12,6 
13,7 
13,6 
113 
10,7 
13,1 
13,8 
12,9 
12,8 
12,7 
13,0 
7,4 
7,7 
'8,0 
8,9 
8,6 
8,6 
8,7 
8,6 
8,6 
8,6 
8,1 
7,7 
7,9 
8,3 
6,0 
5,4 
5,6 
5,5 
6,6 
7,6 
7,4 
7,0 
8,3 
10,3 
10,3 
7,7 
7,2 
7,4 
8,0 
73 
5,9 
5,5 
5,3 
10,4 
9,4 
9,4 
8,9 
9,3 
93 
8,8 
10,0 
10,3 
10,6 
10,8 
10,1 
10,9 
12,6 
12,1 
12,5 
13,6 
13,2 
11,9 
11,7 
113 
11,1 
10,7 
11,5 
113 
9,8 
9,6 
8,6 
9,0 
8,9 
7,9 
8,2 
93 
8,1 
7,3 
7,0 
6,9 
7,1 
7,2 
7,1 
7,6 
7,6 
7,8 
7,8 
7,6 
8,0 
9,8 
9,4 
9,6 
10,1 
9,7 
9,5 
9,7 
10,7 
10,5 
10,5 
113 
11,4 
9,7 
9,1 
8,9 
9,3 
8,8 
8,2 
8,1 
8,5 
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Table 39 
Imports of goods and services at current prices 
National accounts 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
EUR 12 + 
(ECU) 
USA 
1960 40,8 33.' 16,5 16,7 7,2 12,4 37,3 13,5 73,7 43,6 23,7 22,3 19,0 4,4 10,2 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
42,1 
43,0 
45,2 
45,3 
44,5 
46,9 
44,7 
47,0 
50,4 
51,3 
31,5 
31,6 
30,0 
31,8 
30,7 
30,0 
29,2 
28,9 
29,6 
30,9 
15,8 
16,1 
16,3 
16,5 
17,8 
17,5 
16,8 
17,7 
18,9 
19,1 
16,4 
16,9 
18,0 
19,0 
20,3 
18,8 
18,0 
18,4 
18,7 
18,4 
9,1 
10,8 
11,5 
11,8 
13,5 
13,9 
12,3 
13,2 
13,8 
13,9 
12,2 
12,0 
12,3 
12,9 
12,4 
13,1 
13,0 
13,3 
14,6 
15,3 
39,8 
38,9 
40,8 
41,0 
43,9 
43,2 
40,9 
45,2 
46,3 
45,0 
13,5 
13,9 
15,1 
13,4 
12,7 
13,7 
14,2 
14,0 
15,3 
16,3 
80,2 
79,2 
77,5 
78,8 
79,9 
75,1 
70,6 
70,4 
69,7 
76,1 
43,1 
42,2 
43,3 
43,3 
41,4 
41,0 
39,4 
39,0 
40,6 
44,2 
27,7 
23,5 
24,3 
29,9 
31,5 
31,0 
29,5 
29,8 
28,6 
30,9 
20,9 
20,3 
20,4 
21,1 
20,0 
19,5 
20,2 
22,2 
21,8 
22,2 
18,4 
18,3 
18,6 
18,9 
18,8 
18,9 
18,7 
19,4 
20,4 
21,2 
4,3 
4,4 
4,3 
4,3 
4,5 
4,8 
4,9 
5,2 
5,3 
5,5 
10,9 
9,3 
9,8 
9,7 
9,1 
9,0 
9,4 
9,0 
8,9 
9,5 
1961-70 46,1 30,4 17,3 18,3 12,4 13,1 42,5 14,2 75,8 41,7 28,7 20,9 19,2 4,7 9,5 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1971-80 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
50,2 
49,4 
55,4 
63,0 
55,3 
58,2 
58,2 
56,3 
62,6 
65,4 
57,4 
69,8 
72,9 
72,8 
77,4 
74,4 
66,7 
66,2 
68,7 
73,3 
71,0 
29,4 
26,5 
30,4 
34,7 
31,0 
33,5 
32,5 
29,9 
32,1 
33,8 
31,4 
35,8 
35,9 
34,4 
35,5 
36,3 
32,5 
29,6 
29,4 
31,0 
30,0 
19,0 
18,6 
18,9 
22,0 
21,8 
23,4 
23,1 
22,3 
24,4 
26,9 
22,0 
27,9 
27,5 
26,7 
28,2 
29,0 
25,0 
23,9 
24,3 
26,1 
26,3 
18,4 
20,0 
25,2 
25,6 
26,9 
25,8 
25,2 
24,6 
25,3 
26,2 
24,3 
27,1 
28,7 
30,1 
29,9 
32,8 
30,9 
31,9 
30,4 
32,0 
32,6 
13,1 
14,1 
15,1 
18,8 
17,0 
17,8 
16,2 
14,1 
14,4 
17,8 
15,9 
19,8 
20,2 
21,4 
20,9 
20,8 
17,7 
19,2 
20,0 
21,4 
20,5 
15,3 
15,7 
16,7 
21,7 
17,9 
20,3 
20,4 
19,1 
20,6 
22,7 
19,0 
23,5 
23,7 
22,6 
23,5 
23,2 
20,2 
20,5 
21,2 
22,8 
22,6 
43,4 
39,9 
44,8 
57,2 
48,8 
54,2 
58,5 
59,8 
66,1 
63,0 
53,6 
62,7 
55,4 
55,2 
59,8 
58,4 
52,2 
51,6 
52,8 
56,1 
53,3 
16,2 
16,9 
19,4 
24,3 
20,6 
23,2 
22,2 
21,2 
23,2 
24,6 
21,2 
25,3 
24,0 
21,4 
23,0 
23,2 
18,7 
18,9 
19,1 
20,4 
20,8 
84,8 
77,2 
77,0 
81,7 
88,5 
82,7 
83,2 
82,8 
87,2 
89,2 
83,4 
89,5 
90,6 
90,0 
99,3 
103,3 
96,3 
99,2 
100,2 
98,8 
97,0 
43,4 
40,1 
42,0 
48,7 
44,2 
45,2 
44,0 
42,6 
47,1 
50,4 
44,8 
51,8 
50,7 
51,2 
54,1 
55,8 
47,2 
47,1 
48,6 
51,3 
49,7 
32,1 
31,9 
33,7 
42,2 
32,8 
30,9 
33,5 
32,5 
37,9 
42,0 
34,9 
45,2 
45,0 
44,1 
45,2 
41,4 
35,9 
41,5 
46,3 
46,2 
45,4 
21,7 
21,8 
26,1 
33,0 
27,6 
29,6 
29,3 
27,1 
27,7 
25,0 
26,9 
23,8 
24,5 
25,6 
28,6 
27,8 
26,4 
26,5 
26,7 
27,9 
27,0 
20,9 
20,9 
22,7 
27,7 
24,6 
26,6 
26,3 
24,9 
26,7 
28,1 
24,9 
28,6 
28,4 
27,9 
29,5 
29,5 
25,7 
25,6 
26,1 
27,7 
27,4 
5,7 
6,1 
6,8 
8,7 
7,7 
8,5 
93 
9,5 
10,2 
10,9 
8,3 
10,5 
9,6 
9,7 
10,8 
10,4 
10,7 
11,3 
11,4 
113 
11,5 
9,0 
8,3 
10,0 
14,3 
12,8 
12,8 
U.5 
9.4 
12,5 
14,6 
11,5 
13,9 
13,8 
12,2 
12,3 
11,1 7,4 
7,2 
7,8 
9,3 
10,1 
1981-90 71,3 33,0 26,5 30,6 20,2 22,4 55,8 21,5 96,4 50,7 43,6 26,5 27,7 10,7 10,5 
1991 
1992 
1993 
69,6 
66,4 
66,4 
30,3 
29,1 
29,4 
27,7 
26,5 
26,8 
25,6 
23,8 
23,7 
33,1 
32,5 
34,2 
20,4 
20,5 
21,4 
22,3 
21,3 
21,6 
52,9 
51,5 
51,5 
19,4 100,0 
19,3 98,7 
20,6 97,0 
48,9 
47,7 
48,0 
41,3 
37,9 
38,3 
24,6 
25,3 
28,2 
26,9 
26,3 
27,4 
26,3 11,0 
25,6 11,3 
26,5 11,3 
8,5 
7,6 
7,5 
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Table 40 
Imports of goods and services at constant prices 
National accounts 
(National currency; annual percentage change) 
-
DK WD GR 
12,7 
10,1 
15,4 
15,3 
21,2 
-0,5 
7,1 
10,3 
15,5 
6,2 
E 
40,1 
34,4 
23,5 
13,0 
33,1 
19,0 
-3,3 
8,1 
15,7 
7,0 
F 
6,9 
6,7 
14,1 
15,1 
2,2 
10,6 
8,3 
12,9 
19,5 
6,3 
IRL 
13,7 
5,4 
10,6 
12,9 
11,0 
3,5 
3,7 
15,7 
13,4 
8,6 
I 
13,7 
14,9 
22,5 
-6,1 
2,0 
14,0 
13,5 
5,9 
19,3 
16,0 
L 
7,3 
3,2 
3,1 
13,6 
4,5 
-2,5 
-4,8 
9,1 
113 
19,0 
NL 
6,4 
6,5 
9,8 
14,9 
6,1 
7,0 
6,3 
13,0 
14,1 
14,7 
Ρ 
24,9 
-8,7 
10,4 
30,8 
14,3 
8,1 
8,9 
14,6 
4,3 
9,9 
UK 
-0,6 
2,1 
2,0 
10,5 
1,1 
2,5 
7,2 
7,9 
2,9 
5,1 
EUR 12- EUR 12+ USA (PPS) (PPS 
7,0 
8,3 
9,3 
9,5 
7,3 
7,1 
5,1 
10,5 
13,9 
10,6 
) 
0,7 
11,5 
1,6 
5,2 
9,4 
12,6 
5,0 
m i4,o 5,8 
4,1 
J 
26,4 
-1,1 
19,5 
13,7 
5,6 
12,2 
22,7 
12,1 
13,7 
22,9 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
7,2 
8,2 
8,6 
8,9 
6,6 
9,9 
1,6 
11,7 
15,5 
7,6 
4,4 
13,4 
-1,1 
19,6 
6,9 
5,4 
4,5 
4,9 
13,1 
9,3 
7,8 
11,1 4,9 
9,3 
14,3 
2,6 
-0,8 
13,9 
16,9 
15,9 
1961-70 8,5 7,9 9,4 11,2 18,3 10,2 9,8 11,3 6,1 9,8 11,3 4,0 6,9 14,5 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
3,6 
9,6 
18,5 
4,4 
-9,0 
12,2 
4,8 
2,6 
9,0 
-0,4 
-0,7 
1,5 
12,8 
-3,8 
-4,8 
15,6 
0,0 
0,1 
5,0 
-6,8 
8,7 
5,9 
4,5 
0,4 
13 
10,8 
3,4 
5,6 
9,3 
3,7 
7,6 
15,4 
32,2 
-16,3 
6,3 
6,1 
8,0 
73 73 
-8,0 
0,7 
24,3 
16,7 
8,0 
-0,9 
9,8 
-5,5 
-ι,ο 11,4 
3,3 
6,7 
13,7 
13,7 
0,8 
-9,5 
17,6 
0,8 
3,5 
10,4 
2,3 
4,7 
5,1 
19,0 
-2,3 
-10,2 
14,7 
13,3 
15,7 
13,9 
-4,5 
2,9 
9,1 
9,3 
1,4 
-12,5 
13,4 
1,9 
4,9 
11,5 
3,1 
7,6 
2,8 
10,6 
5,9 
-9,4 
0,9 
1,5 
5,7 
6,7 
3,2 
6,1 
4,8 
11,0 
-0,8 
-4,1 
10,1 
2,9 
6,3 
6,0 
-0,4 
14,6 
12,1 
12,7 
4,6 
-24,2 
5,2 
10,8 
03 12,6 
6,9 
53 
9,4 
11,5 
0,8 
-6,9 
4,7 
1,4 
3,8 
9,7 
-3,5 
5,7 
9,4 
11,3 
1.1 
-6,3 
11,1 2,1 
4,1 
9,6 
1,0 
6,5 
12,9 
10,4 
-3,9 
-10,5 
19,3 
12,0 
5,9 
1,3 
-8,2 
7,0 
10,5 
24,3 
4,2 
-10,3 
6,7 
4,1 
6,9 
12,9 
-7,8 
1971-80 5,3 1,7 5,3 5,9 6,3 5,7 6,5 4,3 3,4 4,1 4,9 3,5 4,8 4,2 5,4 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-2,9 
0,2 
-1,3 
5,6 
0,7 
7,6 
8,8 
8,0 
8,8 
4,2 
-1,7 
3,8 
1,8 
5,5 
8,1 
6,8 
-2,0 
1,5 4,4 
2,1 
-3,3 
-0,9 
1,6 
5,4 
4,7 
2,8 
43 5,1 
8,5 
10,2 
3,6 
7,0 
6,6 
0,2 
12,8 
3,8 
16,6 
8,0 
10,8 
12,0 
-4,2 3,9 
-0,6 
-ι,ο 63 
14,4 
20,1 
14,4 
17,2 
7,8 
-2,3 
2,3 
-2,7 
2,6 
43 
6,7 
7,6 
8,5 
8,0 
6,4 
1,7 
-3,1 
4,7 
9,9 
3,2 
5,6 
5,0 
3,9 
10,9 
6,0 
-1,4 
-0,2 
-1,3 
12,4 
4,0 
3,3 
9,7 
7,3 
7,2 
10,5 
-2,9 
-0,3 
13 
13,9 
7,0 
6,0 
7,6 
8,5 
6,1 
4,3 
-5,8 
1,1 3,9 
5,0 
6,5 
3,6 
4,9 
7,6 
6,7 
4,9 
2,3 
3,9 
-6,1 
-4,4 
1,4 
16,9 
20,0 
16,1 
9,1 
10,1 
-2,8 
4,9 
6,3 
9,9 
2,5 
6,8 
7,9 
12,5 
7,4 
1,0 
-2,7 
1,5 
1,0 
6,0 
43 
5,7 
8,1 
8,6 
8,6 
6,7 
2,4 
-2,2 
12,2 
23,0 
5,0 
10,9 
8,7 
5,6 
5,9 
3,0 
0,4 
-2,5 
-3,0 
10,4 
-1,4 
2,4 
7,8 
18,7 
17,6 
8,6 
1981-90 3,9 3,0 3,8 8,0 7,5 4,1 4,7 5,0 5,0 3,8 6,6 5,6 4,7 7,3 5,6 
1991 
1992 
1993 
2,7 
1,1 
1,1 
3,9 
1,1 3,1 
11,7 
2,8 
2,0 
1,5 
3,6 
6,8 
6,3 
9,4 
7,0 
23 
2,9 
1,8 
2,5 
0,7 
4,5 
3,5 
1,6 
4,2 
1,4 
8,3 
2,1 
1,5 
3,7 
1,7 
2,1 
5,6 
8,6 
7,0 
-3,1 
5,6 
3,6 
4,3 
3,6 
2,5 
3,4 
2,4 
-ο,ι 7,9 
5,5 
-4,6 
-0,8 
2,8 
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Table 41 
Intra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
Foreign trade statistics 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
B/L DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
1960 19,2 16,5 5,6 9,0 2,2 3,6 22,9 4,4 20,5 11,3 3,9 6,0 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
20,3 
20,8 
22,3 
23,2 
23,4 
25,0 
23,3 
25,1 
28,0 
28,6 
30,8 
31,0 
33,4 
35,3 
32,6 
35,0 
34,3 
34,4 
36,6 
37,3 
38,4 
41,6 
44,2 
46,9 
46,6 
42,3 
413 
42,0 
44,2 
43,6 
42,7 
40,2 
40,2 
15,5 
15,1 
13,8 
14,5 
13,8 
13,2 
12,3 
12,2 
13,0 
13,5 
12,1 
11,1 12,9 
14,3 
13,0 
14,5 
13,9 
13,2 
14,3 
14,4 
14,5 
14,9 
14,1 
14,4 
15,1 
143 
12,8 
12,4 
12,5 
12,5 
12,9 
12,2 
12,3 
5,5 
5,7 
5,8 
6,1 
7,1 
6,9 
6,7 
7,4 
8,4 
8,4 
8,6 
8,7 
8,6 
9,1 
93 
10,0 
10,0 
9,8 
10,7 
113 
11,8 
11,8 
11,9 
12,4 
12,9 
11,2 
10,8 
10,8 
.11,6 
11,9 
12,9 
12,0 
12,1 
9,1 
9,5 
9,2 
93 9,9 
9,7 
9,1 
9,7 
9,5 
10,0 
9,9 
10,4 
11,1 
10,2 
11,5 
11,1 11,8 
11,1 113 
10,7 
12,1 
12,3 
13,2 
13,8 
14,7 
16,7 
17,1 
14,1 
18,6 
18,9 
18,4 
18,2 
18,9 
2,9 
4,2 
4,8 
5,2 
6,1 
6,3 
5,3 
5,1 
5,4 
5,1 
.4,8 
5,3 
5,7 
6,2 
5,3 
53 5,0 
4.4 
4,7 
4,9 
5,1 
5,5 
6,1 
6,2 
6,6 
7,7 
9,1 
10,0 
10,7 
10,6 
10,6 
10,7 
11,1 
3,8 
43 
4,6 
5,0 
4,8 
5,4 
5,4 
6,0 
73 
7,4 
7,6 
8,0 
8,5 
9,6 
8,2 
9,5 
9,5 
9,3 
9,8 
10,0 
9,9 
10,7 
10,8 
11,3 
11,4 
10,5 
10,8 
11,1 
11,8 
11,6 
113 
10,6 
10,6 
25,3 
25,1 
26,5 
26,3 
26,3 
24,8 
23,6 
27,0 
28,7 
29,1 
27,5 
26,5 
30,8 
37,9 
31,5 
35,3 
37,4 
39,1 
44,2 
41,7 
41,7 
36,3 
34,3 
35,9 
35,1 
30,7 
29,6 
30,8 
33,0 
32,0 
31,2 
30,8 
30,7 
4,5 
4,9 
5,6 
4,8 
4,2 
4,7 
5,1 
5,1 
5,9 
6,6 
6,6 
7,2 
8,5 
9,7 
8,0 
9,3 
8,8 
8,8 
9,7 
10,1 
9,4 
9,3 
8,5 
9,2 
10,0 
9,2 
9,3 
9,5 
10,0 
9,4 
9,1 
9,1 
9,7 
22,5 
22,1 
23,2 
23,5 
22,6 
22,3 
21,2 
21,5 
23,0 
24,7 
22,8 
22,0 
22,6 
24,3 
22,2 
22,7 
22,3 
22,2 
24,2 
24,2 
24,4 
24,6 
24,8 
26,7 
29,2 
26,8 
26,9 
27,4 
28,4 
27,9 
27,5 
26,5 
27,0 
13,8 
11,0 
10,7 
11,5 
12,8 
13,1 
12,3 
12,1 
12,6 
13,6 
13,6 
13,3 
13,5 
16,4 
11,6 
12,8 
14,7 
15,0 
15,2 
16,7 
18,3 
19,4 
17,9 
17,9 
16,9 
18,7 
23,2 
28,8 
28,6 
29,2 
27,5 
25,9 
26,4 
3,8 
3,8 
3,9 
4,2 
4,1 
4,3 
4,6 
5,2 
5,0 
5,0 
5,2 
5,8 
7,5 
9,7 
8,9 
9,6 
10,2 
10,4 
11,2 
9,5 
8,9 
9,6 
10,4 
11,6 
11,6 
11,6 
11,8 
11,9 
12,4 
12,0 
10,7 
113 
12,8 
63 
6,4 
6,7 
7,0 
7,1 
7,3 
7,3 
7,8 
8,7 
9,0 
9,1 
9,4 
10,3 
11,5 
10,5 
11,6 
11,6 
11,5 
12,2 
12,1 
12,0 
12,3 
12,5 
13,2 
13,7 
12,7 
12,8 
13,0 
13,7 
13,5 
13,3 
13,0 
13,5 
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Table 42 
Extra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
Foreign trade statistics 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
B/L DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-
(ECU) 
14,7 13,7 8,5 11,0 4,0 6,7 12,9 7,5 17,4 10,6 13,6 9,9 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
13,8 
13,7 
13,7 
14,0 
13,4 
13,6 
12,8 
14,1 
14,3 
14,5 
12,6 
11,7 
13,0 
17,0 
14,5 
15,7 
15,5 
14,5 
16,7 
20,6 
22,7 
22,9 
19,5 
21,2 
19,6 
15,8 
15,4 
15,4 
17,5 
15,7 
15,8 
14,9 
14,7 
12,7 
13,4 
12,9 
14,3 
13,8 
13,5 
13,4 
13,3 
13,6 
14,2 
13,8 
12,1 
14,0 
16,1 
14,4 
15,3 
14,6 
12,9 
13,6 
14,6 
16,0 
15,3 
14,7 
15,8 
15,7 
13,3 
11,9 
11,9 
12,8 
11,8 
11,7 
11,3 
11,4 
7,9 
7,9 
7,8 
7,8 
8,1 
7,8 
7,4 
7,7 
8,0 
7,8 
7,4 
6,8 
7,2 
8,9 
8,5 
9,7 
9,6 
9,0 
10,1 
11,7 
12,1 
11,7 
11,3 
12,4 
12,4 
10,1 
9,7 
10,0 
11,1 
10,9 
11,4 
10,6 
10,7 
9,0 
7,2 
8,0 
7,6 
9,1 
8,7 
7,3 
8,1 
8,5 
9,6 
9,1 
83 
10,4 
12,9 
14,0 
15,8 
14,5 
13,1 
13,6 
15,6 
11,6 
13,6 
13,8 
14,5 
15,8 
11,8 
10,9 
8,4 
113 
10,6 
12,1 
11,5 
12,1 
53 
5,9 
5,9 
5,7 
6,4 
6,6 
6,0 
6,6 
7,0 
7,3 
6,6 
7,0 
7,4 
10,7 
9,7 
10,5 
9,5 
8,1 
8,1 
10,8 
12,1 
11,8 
12,3 
11,9 
11,4 
7,6 
7,6 
7,6 
8,0 
73 
7,0 
6,9 
73 
6,2 
6,0 
5,9 
6,0 
5,6 
5,6 
5,2 
5,0 
5,3 
5,8 
5,6 
5,6 
6,1 
9,3 
7,5 
8,5 
8,5 
7,6 
8,5 
10,2 
10,6 
10,2 
93 
9,4 
9,0 
7,0 
6,9 
7,2 
7,9 
7,8 
8,0 
7,3 
7,5 
13,1 
12,1 
12,2 
12,3 
12,4 
12,1 
11,8 
12,3 
12,3 
11,2 
13,0 
11,1 
11,4 
16,7 
13,3 
14,8 
16,7 
15,7 
16,6 
16,1 
16,0 
14,7 
15,5 
18,3 
17,8 
14,9 
15,5 
15,8 
17,4 
16,0 
16,4 
15,3 
15,1 
7,4 
7,3 
7,7 
6,9 
6,8 
73 
7,1 
6,8 
7,2 
7,3 
6,9 
6,9 
83 
12,3 
9,8 
11,0 
10,4 
9.6 
10,7 
11,5 
12,3 
11,5 
10,2' 
10,6 
10,7 
7,2 
6,8 
6,7 
73 
6,6 
6,3 
6,1 
6,5 
16,3 
15,4 
15,3 
153 
14,0 
13,8 
13,1 
12,9 
13,0 
14,3 
14,4 
13,0 
14,1 
17,6 
16,4 
17,7 
17,3 
15,5 
17,5 
20,0 
21,1 
19,6 
20,2 
21,8 
20,9 
15,2 
15,0 
15,6 
17,2 
16,4 
15,7 
15,0 
15,2 
10,7 
9,6 
10,6 
11,6 
11,9 
11,9 
10,8 
11,1 
10,7 
12,1 
12,3 
12,8 
13,2 
■17,7 
14,4 
14,9 
15,6 
14,2 
16,8 
20,3 
22,4 
21,9 
21,9 
23,7 
20,1 
13,1 
13,4 
14,1 
13,4 
13,1 
10,8 
9,4 
9,5 
12,2 
11,8 
11,9 
12,4 
11,9 
11,3 
11,4 
12,9 
12,7 
12,5 
11,8 
11,5 
13,9 
17,9 
13,9 
15,3 
14,8 
13,9 
13,2 
12,4 
10,8 
10,8 
11,2 
12,8 
12,1 
10,7 
10,5 
10,8 
113 
10,9 
10,0 
10,1 
11,0 
9,1 
8,9 
8,9 
8,9 
8,8 
8,6 
8,3 
8,5 
8,8 
8,9 
8,5 
8,1 
9,0 
12,1 
10,3 
11,5 
11,2 
10,3 
11,1 
12,4 
12,6 
12,2 
11,7 
12,5 
12,2 
9,5 
9,2 
9,4 
10,1 
9,7 
9,6 
93 
9,5 
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Table 43 
Balance on current transactions with the rest of the world 
National accounts 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
Β DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12-(ECU) 
EUR 12 + 
(ECU) USA 
1960 0,1 -1,1 1,6 -2,9 3,8 1,5 -0,1 0,8 12,5 3,0 -4,0 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,5 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
-0,1 
0,6 
-0,5 
03 
0,6 
-0,3 
0,8 
0,9 
13 
2,8 
-1,7 
-3,2 
0,1 
-2,2 
-1,8 
-1,9 
-2,4 
-1,7 
-2,8 
-3,9 
1,0 
-0,1 
0,2 
0,2 
-1,3 
0,2 
23 
2,3 
1,4 
0,6 
-2,2 
-1,6 
-2,2 
-4,3 
-5,8 
-2,0 
-2,2 
-3,6 
-4,0 
-3,1 
1,9 
-0,1 
-1,5 
0,1 
-2,1 
-2,1 
-1,5 
-0,8 
-M 
03 
1,1 
1,0 
0,3 
-0,3 
0,8 
0,1 
0,0 
-0,5 
-1,1 
0,8 
0,2 
-1,8 
-2,8 
-3,5 
-4,4 
-1,6 
1,4 
-1,3 
-4,8 
-4,0 
13 
0,6 
-1,4 
1,1 
3,6 
33 
23 
3,3 
2,7 
0,8 
6,5 
0,6 
03 
-0,1 
0,7 
1,7 
7,4 
9,7 
14,0 
15,0 
1,4 
1,0 
0,7 
-1,1 
0,1 
-1,0 
-0,3 
0,3 
0,2 
-1,4 
-10,0 
-3,4 
-3,3 
0,0 
-0,4 
0,8 
3,7 
1,5 
3,6 
1,9 
0,0 
0,4 
0,3 
-1,3 
-0,4 
0,1 
-0,9 
-0,8 
0,6 
1,3 
0,6 
0,3 
-0,1 
-0,3 
0,1 
0,3 
0,6 
0,7 
0,5 
0,6 
0,8 
0,7 
0,8 
13 
0,9 
0,5 
0,4 
03 
0,2 
0,4 
-1,6 
0,1 
-1,0 
-0,5 
1,1 
1,3 
0,0 
0,8 
13 
1,0 
1961-70 0,6 -2,1 0,7 -3,1 -0,7 0,2 .-2,3 1,7 5,6 0,0 -0,6 0,3 0,6 0,2 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
2,1 
3,6 
2,0 
0,4 
-0,1 
0,3 
-1,1 
-1,3 
-2,9 
-4,3 
-2,4 
-0,4 
-1,7 
-3,1 
-1,5 
-4,9 
-4,0 
-2,7 
-4,7 
-3,7 
0,4 
0,6 
1,5 
2,7 
13 
0,8 
0,8 
1,4 
-0,5 
-1,7 
-1,5 
-13 
-3,8 
-2,8 
-3,7 
-1,9-
-1,9 
-13 
-1,9 
0,5 
2,2 
1,5 
0,8 
-3,5 
-2,9 
-3,9 
-1,7 
1,0 
0,5 
-2,4 
0,9 
1,0 
0,6 
-13 
0,8 
-0,9 
-0,1 
1,4 
0,9 
-0,6 
-3,8 
-2,2 
-3,5 
-9,9 
-1,5 
-5,3 
-5,4 
-6,8 
-13,4 
-11,8 
1,4 
1,6 
-1,6 
-4,2 
-0,2 
-13 
1,1 
23 
1,6 
-2,2 
6,2 
10,1 
16,1 
26,1 
16,5 
21,1 
21,2 
19,2 
21,3 
19,0 
-0,3 
2,8 
3,8 
3,1 
2,5 
2,9 
0,8 
-0,9 
-13 
-1,5 
2,5 
5,5 
3,0 
-6,2 
-5,5 
-8,0 
-9,4 
-5,7 
-1,7 
-5,9 
1,8 
0,1 
-1,9 
-4,5 
-2,0 
-1,6 
0,0 
0,5 
0,2 
1,5 
0,9 
1,0 
0,3 
-0,9 
0,0 
-0,6 
0,0 
0,9 
-0,1 
-13 
0,1 
-0,3 
0,6 
0,5 
13 
0,5 
-0,5 
-0,5 
0,0 
0,4 
2,5 
2,2 
0,0 
-1,0 
-0,1 
0,7 
1,5 
1,7 
-0,9. 
-1,0 
1971-80 -0,1 -2,9 0,7 •1,9 -0,8 0,3 -6,3 -0,1 17,7 1,2 -3,1 -0,6 0,0 0,2 0,6 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-3,8 
-3,7 
-0,8 
-0,6 
0,3 
2,1 
1,3 
1,7 
1,7 
0,9 
-3,0 
-4,2 
-2,6 
-3,3 
-4,6 
-5,4 
-2,9 
-1,3 
-1,5 
0,5 
-0,6 
0,8 
0,9 
1,4 
2,4 
4,3 
4,1 
4,3 
4,8 
3,5 
-0,7 
-4,4 
-5,0 
-4,0 
-8,2 
-5,3 
-3,1 
-2,0 
-5,0 
-6,1 
-2,7 
-2,5 
-1,5 
1,4 
1,4 
1,6 
0,1 
-1,1 
-3,2 
-3,7 
-0,8 
-2,1 
-0,8 
0,0 
0,1 
0,5 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-0,4 
-0,8 
-14,7 
-10,6 
-6,9 
-5,8 
-3,9 
-2,9 
1,2 
1,5 
0,8 
1,3 
-2,2 
-1,5 
0,3 
-0,6 
-0,9 
0,5 
-0,2 
-0,7 
-1,3 
-1,4 
21,3 
34,4 
39,5 
39,1 
43,8 
38,8 
30,3 
30,8 
34,0 
34,2 
2,2 
33 
3,1 
4,2 
4,1 
2,7 
1,9 
2,8 
3,5 
4,0 
-12,2 
-13,5 
-8,3 
-3,4 
0,4 
2,4 
-0,4 
-4,4 
-2,3 
-2,5 
2,5 
1,5 
0,9 
-0,2 
0,5 
-0,8 
-2,0 
-4,8 
-5,4 
-4,2 
-0,6 
-0,6 
0,1 
0,3 
0,7 
1,3 
0,8 
0,1 
-0,1 
-0,3 
0,3 
-0,1 
-ι,ο 
-2,5 
-2,9 
-3,3 
-3,4 
-2,4 
-1,7 
-1.4 
0,5 
0,7 
1,8 
2,8 
3,6 
4,3 
3,6 
2,8 
2,0 
13 
1981-90 -0,1 -2,8 2,6 -4,4 ■1,0 -0,5 -4,0 -0,8 34,6 3,2 -4,4 -1,2 03 1,9 2,4 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1,7 
1,8 
1,8 
1,3 
3,0 
3,0 
13 
0,9 
-0,1 
-0,9 
-1,1 
-1,1 
-5,1 
-3,3 
-3,0 
-3,5 
-3,7 
-3,4 
-0,5 
0,1 
03 
6,0 
6,7 
6,6 
-1,9 
-2,4 
-2,4 
27,9 
19,9 
18,7 
3,9 
3,6 
3,6 
-3,5 
-2,1 
-4,2 
-1,8 
-2,7 
-3,5 
-0,5 
-0,6 
-0,9 
-1,0 
-1,1 
-13 
0,2 
-1,0 
-1,0 
2,5 
33 
3,3 
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Table 44 
Structure of EC exports by country and region, 1958 and 1991 
to 
Export of B/L 
1958 1991 
DK 
1958 1991 
D GR 
1958 1991 1958 1991 
(Percentage of total exports) 
E F IRL I NL Ρ UK EUR 12 
1958 1991 1958 1991 1958 1991 1958 1991 1958 1991 1958 1991 1958 1991 1958 1991 
B/L 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
1.6 0,8 
11,6 23,7 
0.8 0,6 
0,7 2,5 
10.6 19,1 
0,3 0,4 
2,3 6,0 
20.7 13,7 
1,1 0,7 
5.7 7,7 
— 1.2 2,1 
20,0 22,4 
0,3 0,8 
0,8 1,9 
3,0 5,9 
0,3 0,5 
5,3 4,8 
2,2 4,8 
0,3 0,6 
25,9 10,3 
6,6 
3,0 
1.3 
1.2 
7.3 
1.9 
7,6 13,1 
0.3 0,4 
5,0 
8,1 
0,9 
3,9 
1,0 2,3 2,1 2,9 6,3 8,5 
0,2 0,8 1,7 0,8 0,7 0,9 
20,5 23,9 10,2 15,0 10,4 20,7 
— — 0,1 0,7 0,6 0,7 
0,2 1,7 — — 1,6 6,4 
12,8 7,5 10,1 18,8 — — 
0,4 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,4 
6,0 16,7 2,7 10,7 3,4 11,1 
2,0 3,4 3,2 3,9 2,0 4,7 
0,3 0,3 0,4 64 0,8 1,4 
0,8 4,9 2^ 3,4 15,0 14,2 
0,1 1,0 0,8 0,8 2,6 1,6 
2,2 12,7 14,1 21,0 19,0 29,3 
0,1 0,6 1,9 1,8 0,6 1,0 
0,8 2,3 0,7 5,1 
0,8 9,5 5,3 154 
0,1 0,3 
3.7 
1,2 
3,2 
2,1 
0,4 4,3 
0,5 6,6 
0,1 0,5 
2,0 34 
0,7 1,5 
7,7 19,1 
0,6 0,4 
0,7 14,9 
6,6 14,4 
0,3 0,5 
4.3 4,0 
2,5 5,7 
0,4 0,7 — — 
0,8 2,5 
4,9 10,6 
0,4 0,6 
2,7 6,4 
1,9 5,7 
2,4 1,3 
4,2 13,7 
0,7 0,6 
0,8 4,1 
2.4 11,0 
3.5 5,1 
2.1 5,8 
3.2 7,9 
0,4 1,0 
7,6 6,8 15,9 7,1 4,9 8,9 76,8 32,0 6,8 6,7 11,9 9,3 11,3 10,8 
4.8 6,4 
2,0 1,3 
7.6 14,5 
0,8 0,9 
1.0 4,1 
4.7 114 
1.1 1,0 
3,1 7,2 
5,3 6,3 
0,8 1,3 
5.9 7,4 
Total intra-EC trade 
Other European OECD countries 
55,4 754 59,3 54,1 37,9 53,8 50,9 63,5 46,8 66,4 30,9 63,6 82,4 74,4 34,5 59,0 
8,7 6,4 16,6 23,8 22,7 17,9 10,3 9,7 12,4 5 4 9,0 7,4 0,9 5,7 18,9 11,6 
58,3 76,2 
11,9 7,5 
38,9 75,1 
5,1 9,9 
21,7 56,3 37,2 61,6 
9,1 9,4 13,7 11,4 
9,4 3,8 9,3 4,8 7,3 6,3 13,6 5,6 10,1 4,6 5,9 6,0 5,7 8,7 9,9 6,9 5,6 3,8 8,3 3,8 8,8 11,0 7,9 6,4 
1,1 0,3 0,7 0,5 14 0,8 0,3 0,6 1,3 0,6 0,8 1,0 0,7 1,0 14 0,8 0,8 0,4 1,1 0,8 5,8 1,6 2,3 0,8 
0,6 1,2 0,2 3,6 0,9 2,5 1,4 1,0 1,7 0,8 0,3 2,0 0,0 2,3 0,3 24 0,4 0,9 0,5 0,9 0,6 24 0,6 2,0 
0,5 04 0,3 0,4 1,0 0,5 0,1 0,8 04 04 0,5 0,5 0,1 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,7 0,4 0,6 04 7,2 1,3 2,4 0,6 
Developing countries 
of which: 
OPEC 
Other developing countries 
18,0 10.0 9,3 9,0 20,9 11,0 7,2 13,5 18,4 18,6 46,9 16,7 1,6 5,4 26,2 14,3 17,6 7,8 42,3 7,4 33,6 15,8 27,4 12,8 
3,3 2,1 2,3 2,1 4,8 3,2 0,9 3,7 
14,7 7,9 7,0 6,9 16,1 7,8 6,3 9,8 
2,6 3,3 
15,8 15,3 
21,3 44 
25,6 12,5 
0,2 1,3 
1,4 4,1 
7,5 4,8 
18,7 9,5 
4,5 2,1 
13,1 5,7 
2,0 0,6 
40,3 6,8 
7,0 4,9 7,6 3,5 
26,6 10,9 19,8 9,3 
Rest of the world and unspecified 6,3 2,6 
World (exci. EC) 44,6 24,8 
World (incl. EC) 100 100 
4,3 3,1 
404 45,9 
100 100 
8,1 5,4 
62,1 46,2 
100 100 
164 
49,1 
100 
5,9 
36,5 
100 
9,0 
534 
100 
3,7 
33,6 
100 
5,7 2,6 
69,1 36,4 
100 100 
8,6 2 4 
17,6 25,6 
100 100 
8 4 4,6 
65,5 41,0 
100 100 
4,7 3,0 
41,7 23,8 
100 100 
34 
61,1 
100 
2,3 
24,9 
100 
13,2 2,9 
78,3 43,7 
100 100 
8,5 
62,8 
100 
3,8 
38,4 
100 
D: 1958: West Germany; 1991: unified Germany. 
Table 45 
Structure of EC imports by country and region, 1958 and 1991 
(Percentage of total imports) 
Import of B/L GR IKI. NL UK EUR 12 
from 1958 
_ 
0,5 
174 
0,1 
0,5 
11,6 
0,1 
2,1 
15,7 
0,4 
7,4 
1991 
_ 
0,6 
22,3 
0,2 
1.4 
14,9 
0,6 
4,3 
17,9 
0,4 
7,9 
1958 
3,8 
— 19,9 
0,0 
0,7 
3,4 
0,0 
1.7 
7,3 
0,3 
22,8 
1991 
3,3 
— 23.1 
0,2 
1.1 
5.9 
0,6 
4,0 
7.2 
l.l 
7,8 
1958 
4,5 
3,4 
— 0,7 
1,6 
7,6 
0,1 
5,5 
8,1 
0,4 
4,3 
1991 
7,9 
2 4 
— 0,6 
2,5 
124 
0,8 
9,2 
11,8 
0,8 
6,4 
1958 
3,3 
0.7 
20,3 
— 0,1 
5,4 
0,0 
8,8 
4,8 
0 4 
9,9 
1991 
3,4 
1.1 
19,4 
— 2 4 
7,8 
0,6 
14,2 
6,0 
0,3 
5,4 
1958 
1.8 
1,3 
8,7 
0 4 
— 6,8 
0,6 
1.8 
2,6 
0,3 
7,8 
1991 
2,9 
0,7 
16,1 
0 4 
— 15,5 
0,5 
9,8 
3,9 
2,8 
74 
1958 
5,4 
0,6 
11,6 
0,6 
■4 — 0,0 
2,4 
2,5 
0,4 
3,5 
1991 
104 
0,9 
20,7 
0,3 
4,9 
— 1.0 
li .o 
6,6 
1.0 
7,6 
1958 
1,8 
0,7 
4,0 
0,2 
0,4 
1.6 
— 0,8 
2,9 
04 56,3 
1991 
24 
0,9 
8,0 
0,1 
0,8 
4 4 
— 2,3 
5.1 
0,4 
45,4 
1958 
2,0 
2,2 
12,0 
0,4 
0,4 
4,8 
0,0 
— 2,6 
0,4 
5,5 
1991 
4,9 
1,0 
20,9 
0,8 
3,5 
144 
0,7 
— 5,7 
0,4 
5,7 
1958 
17,8 
0,7 
19,5 
0,2 
0,4 
2,8 
0,0 
1.8 
— 0,2 
7,4 
1991 
13,0 
1,1 
23,5 
0,2 
1.4 
7,0 
0,8 
3,4 
— 0,6 
8,0 
1958 
7,3 
0,8 
17,6 
0,1 
0,4 
7,7 
0,1 
3,7 
2,9 
— 12,9 
1991 
4.1 
0,8 
14,8 
0,1 
15,8 
11,9 
0,4 
10,3 
6,1 
— 7,5 
1958 
1,6 
3.1 
3.6 
04 1,0 
2,7 
2,9 
2,1 
4,2 
0,4 
— 
1991 
4,4 
1.9 
14,7 
0,3 
2 4 
9,2 
3,7 
5,4 
7,6 
0,9 
— 
1958 
4,4 
2,0 
8,7 
0,4 
0,9 
4,4 
0,9 
2,7 
5 4 
0,3 
5,4 
1991 
6,6 
1.4 
14,3 
0,4 
2,8 
9,6 
1.2 
6,8 
8,2 
0,8 
6,5 
B/L 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
Ρ 
UK 
Total intra-EC trade 
Other European OECD countries 
55,5 70,5 60,0 54,2 36,3 54,5 53,7 60,3 31,8 59,8 
7,7 5,8 18,6 23,6 154 14,9 11,5 7,6 8,4 6,0 
28,3 64,2 
6,7 7,3 
68,9 69,1 304 57,7 50,7 59,0 
3,4 4,8 13,1 10,9 7,2 6,8 
53,4 71,9 
8,6 6,3 
21,8 50,1 354 58,6 
8,7 11,8 10,1 10,4 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Australia 
9,9 
1,4 
0.6 
1.7 
194 
5,7 
13,5 
6,1 
0,6 
3,7 
0.3 
8.9 
1.9 
7,0 
9.1 5,8 13,6 6,1 13,7 4,3 21,6 7,9 10,0 8,3 
04 0,5 3,1 0,7 
1,5 3,1 0,6 5,3 
0,0 0,3 14 0,3 
0,8 0,3 0,5 0,5 1,0 0,8 
2,0 6,7 0,7 4,4 04 2,9 
0,3 0,1 0,8 04 2,4 04 
7,0 15,1 16.4 5.6 11,3 8,1 
3,0 0,7 1,5 0,8 1,4 0,9 
1,1 3,8 
14 0,1 
0,4 2,4 
3,0 0,5 
0,8 5,4 
04 0,4 
7,0 3,4 
0,5 0,6 
0,0 2,9 
0,9 0,1 
9,4 12,5 11,4 7,7 
8,2 1,6 3,6 0,8 
0,9 5,7 
5,4 0,7 
0,7 4,3 
2,6 0,4 
Developing countries 
of which: 
OPEC 
Other developing countries 
5,9 7,7 23,9 10,8 9,6 14,8 32,0 184 45,6 12,8 9,3 4,3 29,4 15,0 24,4 15,6 27,6 13,1 34,7 12,3 29,5 12,5 
0,3 0,6 6,7 2,3 
5,6 7,1 174 8,5 
1,7 74 17,7 6,9 19,7 4,5 0,7 0,5 13,9 7,1 11,5 6,1 6,3 4,8 11,3 2,2 10,8 3,9 
7,9 7,5 14,3 11,3 25,9 84 8,6 3,8 15,5 7,9 12,9 9,5 21,3 8,3 23,4 10,1 18,7 8,6 
Rest of the world and unspecified 4,0 
World (excl. EC) 44,5 
World (incl. EC) 100 
4,1 
29,3 
100 
4,7 4,8 
40,0 46.2 
100 100 
6.1 
63,7 
100 
7,4 
45,7 
100 
8,4 5.9 
46,3 35,9 
100 100 
4 4 
684 
100 
3,0 
40,9 
100 
5,8 3,4 
71,7 354 
100 100 
6,1 
31,1 
100 
2,1 
294 
100 
6,0 7,1 
69,8 42,6 
100 100 
4,0 3,8 
49,3 40,1 
100 100 
2,0 
46,6 
100 
1,7 
30,9 
100 
10,9 5,3 
78,2 49,0 
100 100 
6,9 5,3 
64,8 41,2 
100 100 
D: 1958: West Germany; 1991: unified Germany. 
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Table 46 
Money supply ( M 2 / M 3 ) 
(End year; annual percentage change) 
B/L DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 0 ­ EUR 12­ USA 
1960 4,3 8,0 11,1 20,2 16,7 5,5 19,6 7,0 4,9 20,1 
1961­70 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
9,9 
7,4 
10,3 
7,6 
9,6 
83 
7,1 
8,6 
7,0 
10,0 
9,8 
8,5 
12,5 
11,1 
9,7 
12,8 
9,8 
14,5 
10,2 
3,3 
12,9 
10,4 
9,9 
9,4 
10,6 
8,3 
12,0 
11,8 
9,4 
9,1 
17,0 
21,5 
21,4 
16,1 
12,9 
18,2 
16,1 
17,8 
16,2 
19,3 15,4 
17,2 
18,7 
14,1 
9,8 
10,9 
10,6 
13,1 
11,6 
6,1 
15,3 
7,3 
9,6 
5,8 
9,4 
6,7 
10,6 
12,7 
16,9 
113 
14,0 
14,9 
17,0 
13,5 
12,7 
15,2 
13,0 
13,7 
13,1 
12,5 
15,9 
5,4 
6,6 
9,8 
10,4 
6,2 
5,9 
10,9 
14,8 
10,2 
11,0 
11.' 
14,1 
17.Í 
12,1 
7,6 
9,4 
6,5 
12,8 
8,5 
5,1 
12,0 
9,7 
10,8 
9,3 
12,4 
11,5 
8,4 
12,3 12,« 
7,4 
8,1 
8,4 
8,0 
8,1 
4,5 
9,2 
8,0 
4,1 
6,6 
20,2 
20,3 
24,0 
18,7 
18,0 
16,3 
15,5 
14,8 
18,5 
16,9 
8,6 10,2 10,4 17,6 12,7 10,4 14,1 9,1 7,2 18,3 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
12,9 
17,0 
15,4 
14,0 
15,1 
14,3 
10,3 
10,2 
8,2 
6,5 
8,5 
15,0 
12,6 
8,9 
25,1 
10,9 
9,8 
8,3 
9,7 
8,8 
13,5 
14,4 
10,1 
8,5 
8,6 
8,4 
11,2 
11,0 
6,0 
63 
22,4 
23,6 
14,5 
20,9 
26,5 
26,7 
22,7 
26,0 
18,4 
24,7 
23,4 
23,4 
25,8 
19,9 
19,2 
18,6 
19,2 
19,9 
19,3 
16,6 
18,0 
18,8 
14,7 
15,6 
18,1 
12,3 
14,2 
12,4 
14,0 
9,6 
12,9 
14,2 
26,0 
20,6 
18,9 
14,5 
17,1 
29,0 
18,7 
17,7 
17,2 
19,0 
23,1 
15,7 
23,7 
20,8 
21,7 
22,6 
20,8 
12,7 
9,0 
11,9 
21,9 
20,0 
5,7 
22,7 
3,6 
4,2 
6,9 
4,4 
21,0 
23,4 
28,9 
12,1 
13,1 
16,4 
21,8 
26,0 
31,0 
28,4 
16,2 
23,2 
21,8 
10,8 
11,7 
11,3 
14,8 
15,0 
14,4 
17,1 
15,3 
17,8 
16,1 
12,8 
14,5 
13,2 
13,6 
13,4 
12,0 
10,3 
15,8 
18,2 
16,9 
13,3 
14,8 
13,6 
14,0 
13,9 
12,6 
10,9 
13,5 
13,0 
6,9 
5,5 
12,6 
13,7 
10,6 
8,0 
7,8 
8,9 
24,3 
24,7 
16,8 
11,5 
16,5 
15,4 
13,4 
14,0 
10,8 
9,5 
1971­80 12,4 11,8 9,8 22,6 20,5 14,8 19,0 19,7 11,0 22,2 15,6 13,9 14,4 10,1 15,7 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981­90 
1991 
B: M3H; DK: M2; 
weighted arithmetic 
5,9 
5,4 
9,0 
5,8 
7,8 
12,7 
10,2 
7,7 
13,3 
4,5 
83 
5,3 
10,0 
11,4 
25,4 
17,8 
15,8 
8,4 
4,1 
3,5 
8,3 
7,1 
11,2 
6,4 
D: M3, until 1990 WD 
5,0 
7,1 
5,3 
4,7 
5,0 
6,6 
5,9 
6,9 
5,6 
43 
5,6 
6,3 
34,7 
29,0 
20,3 
29,4 
26,8 
19,0 
24,0 
23,2 
24,2 
15,3 
24,6 
12,3 
from 1991 onwards D 
mean; weights: GDP at current market prices 
■ EUR 12 excl. Spain and Portugal. 
16,6 
17,9 
15,6 
15,6 
13,8 
14,0 
15,4 
14,4 
14,6 
15,3 
15,3 
10,9 
GR: M3; 
md ECU; 
11,1 
12,4 
13,1 
11,0 
7,4 
6,8 
9,8 
8,4 
. 9,6 
8,9 
9,8 
2,5 
E: ALP; F: 
17,4 
13,0 
5,6 
10,1 
5,3 
­ 1 , 0 
10,9 
6,3 
5,0 
15,4 
8,8 
3,1 
M3; IRL: M3; 
10,0 
18,0 
12,3 
12,1 
11,1 
10,7 
73 
7,6 
9,9 
83 
10,7 
9,0 
I: M2; NL 
5,3 
7,6 
10,7 
6,9 
10,7 
5,1 
4,4 
10,6 
13,7 
83 
8,3 
4,7 
M2. breaks 
USA: M2; i: M2 plus certificates of deposit. 
24,1 
24,3 
17,0 
24,9 
28,6 
26,3 
19,7 
17,7 
10,4 
113 
20,4 
19,0 
in series 
20,4 
12,0 
13,3 
13,6 
13,0 
15,9 
16,4 
17,6 
19,1 
11,5 
15,3 
5,8 
1976, 1977, 
11,0 
11,5 
10,9 
10,0 
93 
93 
9,1 
9,7 
10,8 
7,8 
9,9 
5,9 
1978 and 1982 
11,5 
12,1 
11,3 
10,5 
9,6 
9,7 
9,6 
10,1 
11,1 
8,5 
10,4 
6,5 
P: L­ ; UK 
10,0 
8,9 
12,0 
8,6 
8,3 
9,4 
3,5 
5,5 
5,1 
3,5 
7,5 
3,0 
11,0 
7,9 
7,3 
7,8 
8,7 
93 
10,8 
10,2 
12,0 
7,4 
9,2 
2,3 
M4; EUR: chain­
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Table 47 
Nominal short-term interest rates 
(%) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12- USA 
1960 5,1 4,1 3,5 2,1 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
4,6 
3,4 
3.6 
4,9 
5,0 
5,6 
5,5 
4,5 
7,3 
8,1 
6,3 
6,5 
6,1 
6,2 
6,5 
6,5 
6,6 
6,6 
8,2 
9,0 
3,6 
3,4 
4,0 
4,1 
5,1 
6,6 
43 
3,8 
5,8 
9,4 
3,7 
3,6 
4,0 
4,7 
4,2 
4,8 
4,8 
6,2 
93 
8,6 
: 3,5 
: 3,5 
: 3,5 
: 3,5 
: 3,5 
: 3,5 
: ■ 3,5 
: 3,5 
: 3,7 
: 5,3 
1,1 
1,9 
2,0 
3,5 
4,0 
4,9 
4,7 
4,6 
5,7 
6,2 
3,0 
3,1 
3,4 
3,4 
4,0 
53 
4,1 
3,7 
5,0 
6,8 
7,0 
63 
7,9 
93 
8,1 
4,0 
3,6 
3,8 
4,4 
5,0 
5,6 
4,8 
5,3 
7,0 
8,0 
2,4 
2,8 
33 
3,6 
4,0 
4,9 
4,3 
5,4 
6,7 
6,3 
1961-70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1971-80 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
5,2 6,8 5,0 5,4 3,7 3,8 6,3 53 4,3 
5,4 
4,2 
6,6 
10,6 
7,0 
10,1 
73 
7,3 
10,9 
14,2 
8,4 
15,6 
14.1 
10,5 
11,5 
9,6 
8,1 
7,1 
6,7 
8,7 
9,8 
7,6 
73 
7,6 
10,0 
8,0 
8,9 
14,5 
15,4 
12,5 
16,9 
10,9 
14,9 
16,4 
12,0 
11,5 
10,0 . 
9,1 
9,9 
8,3 
9,4 
10,8 
7,1 
5,7 
12,2 
9,8 
4,9 
4,3 
4,3 
3,7 
6,9 
9,5 
6,9 
12,4 
8,8 
5,8 
6,0 
5,4 
4,6 
4,0 
43 
7,1 
8,4 
16,8 
18,9 
16,6 
15,7 
17,0 
19,8 
14,9 
15,9 
18,7 
19,9 
15,5 
17,6 
15,5 
16,5 
16,2 
16,3 
20,1 
14,9 
12,2 
11,7 
15,8 
11,6 
15,0 
15,2 
6,0 
5,3 
93 
13,0 
7,6 
8,7 
9,1 
7,8 
9,7 
12,0 
8,8 
15,3 
14,6 
12,5 
11,7 
10,0 
7,7 
8,3 
7,9 
9,4 
10,3 
6,6 
7,1 
12,2 
14,6 
10,9 
11,7 
8,4 
9,9 
16,0 
16,2 
11,4 
16,7 
17,5 
14,0 
13,2 
12,0 
12,4 
11,1 
8,1 
9,8 
11,4 
5,7 
5,2 
7,0 
14,9 
10,4 
16,0 
14,0 
11,5 
12,0 
16,9 
11,3 
19,3 
19,9 
18,3 
17,3 
15,0 
12,8 
11,4 
11,3 
12,7 
12,3 
4,5 
2,7 
7,5 
10,4 
5,4 
7,4 
4,8 
7,0 
9,6 
10,6 
7,0 
11,8 
83 
5,7 
6,1 
6,3 
5,7 
5,4 
4,8 
7,4 
8,7 
4,3 
4,4 
4,4 
5,3 
6,8 
8,4 
11,1 
15,5 
16,1 
16,3 
9,3 
' 16,0 
16,8 
20,9 
22,5 
21,0 
15,6 
13,9 
13,0 
14,9 
16,9 
63 
6,8 
11,8 
13,4 
10,6 
11,6 
8,0 
9,4 
13,9 
16,8 
10,8 
14,1 
12,2 
10,1 
10,0 
12,2 
10,9 
9,7 
10,3 
13,9 
14,8 
6,2 
5,5 
9,9 
11,9 
7,6 
8,8 
8,4 
8,1 
10,5 
13,4 
9,0 
14,8 
13,4 
11,4 
10,9 
10,2 
8,7 
8,4 
83 
10,6 
11,4 
4,3 
43 
73 
7,9 
5,8 
5,0 
53 
7,4 
10,1 
11,6 
6,9 
14,0 
10,6 
8,7 
9,5 
7,5 
6,0 
5,9 
6,9 
8,4 
7,8 
6,5 
5,2 
83 
14,7 
10,1 
7,3 
6,4 
5,1 
5,9 
10,7 
8,0 
7,4 
6,9 
6,5 
6,3 
6,5 
5,0 
3,9 
4,0 
5,4 
7,7 
1981-90 10,2 11,2 6,7 17,4 14,9 10,8 12,6 15,0 7,0 17,2 11,8 10,8 8,5 6,0 
1991 
1992 
9,4 
9,4 
9,5 
11,5 
9,2 
9,5 
22,7 
24,5 
13,2 
13,3 
9,6 
10,4 
10,4 
12,4 
12,2 
14,0 
9,3 
9,4 
17,7 
16,2 
11,5 
9,6 
10,8 
11,1 
5,5 
3,5 
7,4 
4,4 
B: 1961-84 four-month certificates of 'Fonds des Rentes'; 1985-88 three-month treasury certificates; 1989-92 three-month interbank deposits. DK: 1961-76 discount rate; 1977-88 call money; 1989-
92 three-month interbank deposits. D: three-month interbank deposits. GR: 1960-April 1980 credit for working capital to industry; May 1980-87 interbank sight deposits; 1988-92: three-month 
interbank deposits. E: three-month interbank deposits. F: 1960-68 call money; 1969-81 one-month sale and repurchase agreements on private sector paper; 1982-92 three-month sale and repurchase 
agreements on private sector paper. IRL: 1961-70 three-month interbank deposits in London; 1971-92.three-month interbank deposits in Dublin. I: 1960-70 12-month treasury bills; 1971-92 
interbank sight deposits. NL: 1960-September 1972 three-month treasury bills; October 1972-92 three-month interbank deposits. P: 1966-July 198S six-month deposits; August 1985-92 three-month 
treasury bills. UK: 196' -September 1964 three-month treasury bills; October 1964-92 three-month interbank deposits. EUR 12: weighted geometric mean; weights: gross domestic product at current 
market prices and ECU. USA: three-month treasury bills. J: bonds traded with three-month repurchase agreements; certificate of deposit three-months since January 1989. 
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Table 48 
Nominal long-term interest rates 
(%) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 12- USA 
1960 6,3 5,7 5,3 4,2 5,4 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
5,9 
5,2 
5,0 
5,6 
6,4 
6,7 
6,7 
6,6 
7,3 
7,8 
6,6 
6,6 
6,5 
7,1 
8,6 
8,7 
9,1 
8,7 
9,7 
11,1 
5,9 
5,9 
6,1 
63 7,1 
8,1 
7,0 
6,5 
6,8 
8.3 
5,5 
5,4 
5,3 
5,5 
6,2 
6,6 
6,7 
7,0 
7,9 
8,6 
5,2 
5,8 
6,1 
7,4 
6,9 
6,5 
6,6 
6,7 
6,9 
9,0 
3,9 
43 
43 
4,9 
5,2 
6,2 
6,0 
6,2 
7,0 
7,8 
6,3 
5,9 
5,4 
6,0 
6,6 
6,9 
6,8 
7,6 
9,1 
9,3 
5,7 
5,7 
5,6 
6,1 
6,6 
7,1 
6,8 
6,9 
7,6 
8,7 
3,9 
3,9 
4,0 
4,1 
4,2 
4,7 
4,9 
5,3 
6,2 
6,6 
1961-70 6,3 8,3' 6,8 6,5 6,7 5,6 7,0 6,7 4,8 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
7,3 
7,0 
7,5 
8,8 
8,5 
9,1 
8,8 
8,5 
9,7 
12,2 
11,0 
11,0 
12,6 
15,9 
12,7 
14,9 
16,2 
16,8 
16,7 
18,7 
8,0 
7,9 
9,3 
10,4 
8,5 
7,8 
6,2 
5,7 
7,4 
8,5 
9,3 
10,5 
9,4 
10,2 
9,5 
10,0 
11,2 
17,1 
13,3 
16,C 
8,4' 
8,0 
9,0 
11,0 
10,3 
10,5 
11,0 
10,6 
10,9 
13,1 
93 
9,1 
10,7 
14,6 
14,0 
14,6 
12,9 
12,8 
15,1 
15,4 
8,3 
7,5 
7,4 
9,9 
11,5 
13,1 
14,6 
13,7 
14,1 
16,1 
6,8 
7,3 
6,7 
7,2 
7,0 
6,6 
6,8 
7,4 
7,1 
6,7 
7,3 
10,7 
93 
9,2 
8,5 
8,1 
93 
10,7 
8,9 
9,0 
10,8 
15,0 
14,5 
14,6 
12,5 
12,6 
13,0 
13,9 
8,3 
8,0 
9,1 
11,3 
10,5 
10,6 
10,1 
9,7 
10,8 
12,6 
5,7 
5,6 
6,3 
7,0 
7,0 
6,8 
7,1 
7,9 
8,7 
10,8 
6,9 
7,0 
8,1 
8,4 
8,2 
7,4 
6,3 
8,3 
8,9 
1971-80 8,7 14,6 8,0 10,3 12,8 11,6 8,7 12,5 10,1 7,3 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
13,8 
13,5 
11,8 
12,0 
10,6 
7,9 
7,8 
7,9 
8,7 
10,1 
19,3 
20,5 
14,4 
14,0 
11,6 
10,6 
11,9 
10,6 
10,2 
11,0 
10,4 
9,0 
7,9 
7,8 
6,9 
5,9 
5,8 
6,1 
7,0 
8,9 
17,7 
15,4 
18,2 
18,5 
15,8 
15,8 
17,4 
16,6 
15,8 
16,0 
16,9 
16,5 
13,4 
11,4 
12,8 
11,8 
13,8 
14,7 
15,9 
15,7 
13,6 
12,5 
10,9 
8,4 
9,4 
9,0 
8,8 
9,9 
17,3 
17,0 
13,9 
14,6 
12,7 
11,1 
11,3 
9,4 
9,0 
10,1 
20,6 
20,9 
18,0 
15,0 
14,3 
11,7 
11,3 
12,1 
12,9 
13,4 
8,7 
10,4 
9,8 
10,3 
9,5 
8,7 
8,0 
7,1 
7,7 
8,6 
12,2 
10,5 
8,8 
8,6 
7,3 
6,4 
6,4 
6,3 
73 9,0 
25,4 
17,9 
15,4 
143 
14,9 
16,8 
14,8 
12,7 
10,8 
10,7 
10,6 
9,8 
9,5 
93 
9,6 
11,1 
14,8 
13,9 
12,3 
11,5 
10,6 
8,9 
9,0 
9,1 
9,6 
10,9 
12,9 
12,2 
10,8 
12,0 
10,8 
8,1 
8,7 
9,0 
8,5 
8,6 
8,4 
8,3 
7,8 
7,3 
6,5 
5,2 
4,7 
4,7 
53 7,5 
1981-90 10,4 13,4 7,6 14,3 1,4 12,6 15,0 8,9 8,3 10,9 11,1 10,2 6,6 
1991 
1992 
9,3 
8,6 
10,1 
10,1 
8,6 
8,0 
12,4 
: 12,2 
9,0 
8,6 
93 
9,1 
13,0 
13,7 
83 7,9 
8,9 
8,1 
17,1 
15,0 
9,9 
9,1 
10,2 
9,8 
8,1 
7,7 
6,7 
5,3 
B: State bonds over five years, secondary market. DK: State bonds. D: public-sector bonds outstanding. GR: State bonds. E: 1979-87 Sute bonds of two to four years; 1988-92 State bonds of 
more than two years. F: 1960-79 public-sector bonds; 1980-92 Sute bonds over seven years. IRL: 1960-70 Sute bonds 20 years in London; 1971-92 Sute bonds IS years in Dublin. I: 1960-84 
Crcdiop bonds; 1985-91 rate of specialized industrial credit institutions (gross rate); from January 1992: public-sector bonds outstanding. NL: 1960-73 3,25% Sute bond 1948; 1974-84 private 
loans to public enterprises; 1985-92 five Sute bonds with the longest maturity. P: Weighted average of public and private bonds over five years. UK: Sute bonds 20 years. EUR 12: weighted 
geometric mean; weights: gross domestic product at current market prices and ECU. USA: 1960-88 federal government bonds over 10 years; 1989-92 federal government bonds over 30 years. J: 
1961-78 Sute bonds; 1979-Junc 1987: over-the- counter sales of Sute bonds; 1987-April 1989: benchmark: bonds No 111-1988; 1989-92: benchmark: bonds No 119-1999. 
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Table 49 
Gross official reserves 
B/L DK WD GR E F IRL I NL Ρ 
(End year; Mrd ECU) 
UK EUR 1 2 -
1960 1,44 0,27 6,67 0,23 0,51 2,17 0,31 3,10 1,78 0,61 3,55 20,62 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Source: 
1,69 
1,64 
1,84 
2,08 
2,18 
2,21 
2,52 
2,42 
2,35 
2,87 
3,37 
4,56 
6,82 
9,10 
8,58 
8,12 
8,95 
9,89 
10,41 
20,54 
18,28 
16,24 
20,94 
21,97 
19,02 
17,70 
20,55 
19,92 
19,09 
17,60 
17,21 
15,43 
0,26 
0,24 
0,44 
0,60 
0,55 
0,56 
0,52 
0,46 
0,44 
0,48 
0,66 
0,82 
1,23 
0,95 
0,91 
0,96 
1,56 
2,60 
2,59 
3,28 
3,01 
2,94 
5,17 
4,99 
6,78 
4,79 
8,30 
9,80 
5,89 
8,31 
5,96 
9,60 
6,68 
6,49 
7,13 
7,36 
6,94 
7,53 
7,92 
10,55 
7,01 
13,54 
17,47 
24,44 
35,07 
39,32 
36,70 
40,61 
44,29 
54,76 
57,59 
76,57 
79,81 
82,14 
98,20 
100,90 
88,94 
84,32 
96,13 
85,10 
82,27 
77,74 
72,11 
98,09 
0,25 
0,27 
0,27 
0,26 
0,23 
0,26 
0,28 
0,34 
0,31 
0,31 
0,48 
1,02 
1,09 
1,16 
1,27 
1,22 
1,36 
1,57 
1,47 
2,49 
2,19 
2,31 
2,95 
3,21 
2,63 
2,64 
3,38 
4,36 
3,86 
3,56 
4,81 
4,95 
MF: international financial statistics and Commission departments. Gold 
0,83 
0,97 
1,07 
1,41 
1,33 
1,18 
1,07 
1,27 
1,26 
1,81 
3,03 
4,90 
6,58 
6,81 
6,45 
5,87 
6,83 
9,74 
12,28 
15,26 
15,84 
13,27 
15,92 
23,51 
19,62 
17,97 
28,31 
36,71 
39,99 
42,62 
53,06 
42,07 
3,14 
3,78 
4,58 
5,35 
5,93 
6,32 
6,80 
4,83 
3,78 
5,07 
7,98 
11,54 
13,21 
18,63 
19,43 
17,03 
18,49 
23,52 
29,44 
57,10 
52,52 
46,30 
63,69 
66,18 
62,53 
59,71 
57,53 
50,82 
47,42 
50,75 
44,89 
44,90 
s valued at market-related 
0,32 
0,33 
0,38 
0,42 
0,38 
0,46 
0,43 
0,55 
0,68 
0,68 
0,90 
1,03 
0,89 
1,06 
1,35 
1,66 
1,98 
2,02 
1,62 
2,25 
2,59 
2,84 
3,33 
3,03 
3,45 
3,16 
3,83 
4,41 
3,46 
3,88 
4,26 
2,85 
ι rices. 
3,55 
3,79 
3,38 
3,57 
4,48 
4,60 
5,30 
5,76 
4,96 
5,41 
6,59 
7,53 
10,34 
14,99 
11,14 
12,76 
17,79 
21,75 
26,69 
45,94 
45,48 
39,02 
56,31 
59,67 
44,24 
43,35 
49,45 
53,44 
61,17 
66,08 
60,69 
44,53 
1,83 
1,81 
1,96 
2,19 
2,26 
2,30 
2,55 
2,72 
2,49 
3,28 
3,71 
5,66 
8,77 
11,78 
10,75 
11,07 
12,05 
12,71 
14,52 
27,50 
26,26 
26,52 
33,25 
32,89 
29,55 
26,52 
29,44 
29,27 
28,34 
25,40 
24,70 
26,23 
0,52 
0,63 
0,68 
0,81 
0,88 
1,01 
1,20 
1,49 
1,42 
1,53 
1,89 
2,75 
4,04 
5,07 
3,68 
3,46 
3,55 
4,27 
5,32 
10,03 
9,41 
8,57 
10,21 
9,95 
9,74 
8,69 
10,27 
10,07 
13,66 
15,18 
19,51 
20,21 
3,10 
3,09 
2,94 
2,16 
2,81 
2,91 
2,62 
2,64 
2,48 
2,85 
8,10 
5,64 
6,73 
7,95 
6,49 
5,50 
19,42 
15,41 
17,39 
23,69 
22,13 
19,71 
23,17 
22,51 
21,02 
23,44 
37,64 
45,32 
39,09 
34,06 
37,85 
39,76 
22,15 
23,03 
24,66 
26,21 
27,97 
29,33 
31,20 
33,03 
27,17 
37,82 
54,18 
69,91 
94,76 
116,81 
106,74 
108,24 
136,27 
158,23 
179,33 
284,62 
277,53 
259,85. 
333,13 
348,82 
307,52 
292,28 
344,84 
349,21 
344,24 
345,19 
345,05 
348,60 
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Table 50 
Exchange rates 
(Annual average, national currency units per ECU) 
B/L DK WD GR IRL NL UK USA 
1960 52,810 7,2954 4,4361 31,69 63,37 5,2145 0,37722 660,1 4,0136 30,37 0,37722 1,0562 380,23 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
53,367 
53,490 
53,490 
53,490 
53,490 
53,490 
53,240 
51,444 
51,109 
51,112 
50,866 
49,361 
47,801 
45,912 
45,569 
43,166 
40,883 
40,061 
40,165 
40,598 
41,295 
44,712 
45,438 
45,442 
44,914 
43,798 
43,041 
43,429 
43,381 
42,426 
42,223 
41,593 
7,3722 
7,3893 
7,3893 
7,3893 
7,3893 
7,3893 
7,4229 
7,7166 
7,6664 
7,6668 
7,7526 
7,7891 
7,4160 
7,1932 
7,1227 
6,7618 
6,8557 
7,0195 
7,2079 
7,8274 
7,9226 
8,1569 
8,1319 
8,1465 
8,0188 
7,9357 
7,8847 
7,9515 
8,0493 
7,8565 
7,9086 
7,8093 
4,3074 
4,2792 
4,2792 
4,2792 
4,2792 
4,2792 
4,2592 
4,1155 
4,0262 
3,7414 
3,6457 
3,5768 
3,2764 
3,0867 
3,0494 
2,8155 
2,6483 
2,5561 
2,5110 
2,5242 
2,5139 
2,3760 
2,2705 
2,2381 
2,2263 
2,1282 
2,0715 
2,0744 
2,0702 
2,0521 
2,0508 
2,0203 
32,02 
32,09 
32,09 
32,09 
32,09 
32,09 
31,94 
30,87 
30,67 
30,67 
31,43 
33,65 
36,95 
35,78 
39,99 
40,88 
42,16 
46,80 
50,76 
59,42 
61,62 
65,34 
78,09 
88,42 
105,74 
137,42 
156,27 
167,58 
178,84 
201,41 
225,22 
247,03 
64,04 
64,14 
64,14 
64,14 
64,14 
64,14 
65,11 
72,02 
71,55 
71,36 
72,57 
72,00 
71,81 
68,84 
70,27 
74,74 
86,82 
97,42 
91,97 
99,70 
102,68 
107,56 
127,50 
126,57 
129,13 
137,46 
142,16 
137,60 
130,41 
129,41 
128,47 
132,53 
5,2695 
5,2817 
5,2817 
5,2817 
5,2817 
5,2817 
5,2570 
5,0797 
5,2903 
5,6777 
5,7721 
5,6572 
5,4678 
5,6745 
5,3192 
5,3449 
5,6061 
5,7398 
5,8298 
5,8690 
6,0399 
6,4312 
6,7708 
6,8717 
6,7950 
6,7998 
6,9291 
7,0364 
7,0239 
6,9141 
6,9733 
6,8484 
0,38119 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38765 
0,42870 
0,42591 
0,42593 
0,42858 
0,44894 
0,50232 
0,51350 
0,55981 
0,62192 
0,65370 
0,66389 
0,66945 
0,67600 
0,69102 
0,68961 
0,71496 
0,72594 
0,71517 
0,73353 
0,77545 
0,77567 
0,77682 
0,76777 
0,76781 
0,76072 
667,1 
668,6 
668,6 
668,6 
668,6 
668,6 
665,5 
643,1 
638,9 
638,9 
647,4 
654,3 
716,5 
791,7 
809,5 
930,2 
1 006,8 
1 080,2 
1 138,4 
1 189,2 
1 263,2 
1 323,8 
1 349,9 
1 381,4 
1448,0 
1 461,9 
1 494,9 
1 537,3 
1 510,5 
1 522,0 
1 533,2 
1 595,5 
3,8985 
3,8727 
3,8727 
3,8727 
3,8727 
3,8727 
3,8546 
3,7246 
3,7003 
3,7005 
3,6575 
3,5999 
3,4285 
3,1714 
3,1349 
2,9552 
2,8001 
2,7541 
2,7488 
2,7603 
2,7751 
2,6139 
2,5372 
2,5234 
2,5110 
2,4009 
2,3342 
2,3348 
2,3353 
2,3121 
2,3110 
2,2748 
30,69 
30,76 
30,76 
30,76 
30,76 
30,76 
30,61 
29,58 
29,39 
29,38 
29,64 
30,48 
30,27 
29,93 
31,44 
33,62 
43,62 
55,87 
67,01 
69,55 
68,49 
78,01 
98,69 
115,68 
130,25 
147,09 
162,62 
170,06 
173,41 
181,11 
178,61 
174,71 
0,38119 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38207 
0,38765 
0,42870 
0,42591 
0,42593 
0,42858 
0,44894 
0,50232 
0,51350 
0,56003 
0,62158 
0,65370 
0,66391 
0,64630 
0,59849 
0,55311 
0,56046 
0,58701 
0,59063 
0,58898 
0,67154 
0,70457 
0,66443 
0,67330 
0,71385 
0,70101 
0,73765 
1,0673 
1,0698 
1,0698 
1,0698 
1,0698 
1,0698 
1,0648 
1,0289 
1,0222 
1,0222 
1,0478 
1,1218 
1,2317 
1,2021 
1,2408 
1,1180 
1,1411 
1,2741 
1,3705 
1,3923 
1,1164 
0,9797 
0,8902 
0,7890 
0,7631 
0,9842 
1,1544 
1,1825 
1,1017 
1,2734 
1,2392 
1,2981 
384,24 
385,13 
385,13 
385,13 
385,13 
385,13 
383,33 
370,40 
367,99 
368,00 
363,83 
339,72 
333,17 
339,68 
360,73 
331,21 
305,81 
267,08 
300,46 
315,04 
245,38 
243,55 
211,35 
187,09 
180,56 
165,00 
166,60 
151,46 
151,94 
183,66 
166,49 
164,22 
230 
Table 51 
Central rates against the ecu 
(National currency units per ECU) 
13.3.1979e 
24.9.1979 
30.11.1979 
23.3.1981 
5.10.1981 
22.2.1982 
14.6.1982 
21.3.1983 
18.5.1983 
17.9.1984f 
22.7.1985 
7.4.1986 
4.8.1986 
12.1.1987 
19.6.1989 
21.9.19898 
8.1.1990h 
8.10.1990' 
14.9.1992 
17.9.1992) 
23.11.1992 
1.2.1993 
B/L 
39,4582 
39,8456 
39,7897 
40,7985 
40,7572 
44,6963 
44,9704 
44,3662 
44,9008 
44,9008 
44,8320 
43,6761 
43,1139 
42,4582 
42,4582 
42,4582 
42,1679 
42,4032 
42,0639 
41,9547 
40,6304 
40,2802 
DK 
7,08592 
7,36594 
7,72336 
7,91917 
7,91117 
8,18382 
8,23400 
8,04412 
8,14104 
8,14104 
8,12857 
7,91896 
7,81701 
7,85212 
7,85212 
7,85212 
7,79845 
7,84195 
7,77921 
7,75901 
7,51410 
7,44934 
D 
2,51064 
2,48557 
2,48208 
2,54502 
2,40989 
2,41815 
2,33379 
2,21515 
2,24184 
2,24184 
2,23840 
2,13834 
2,11083 
2,05853 
2,05853 
2,05853 
2,04446 
2,05586 
2,03942 
2,03412 
1,96992 
1,95294 
GR 
a 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
(87,4813) 
(100,719) 
(135,659) 
(137,049) 
(150,792) 
(150,792)· 
(150,792) 
(187,934) 
(205,311) 
(251,202) 
(250,550) 
(254,254) 
(259,306) 
E 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
133,804 
133,804 
132,889 
133,631 
132,562 
139,176 
143,386 
142,150 
F 
5,79831 
5,85522 
5,84700 
5,99526 
6,17443 
6,19564 
6,61387 
6,79271 
6,87456 
6,87456 
6,86402 
6,96280 
6,87316 
6,90403 
6,90403 
6,90403 
6,85684 
6,89509 
6,83992 
6,82216 
6,60683 
6,54988 
IRL 
0,662638 
0,669141 
0,668201 
0,685145 
0,684452 
0,686799 
0,691011 
0,717050 
0,725690 
0,725690 
0,724578 
0,712956 
0,764976 
0,768411 
0,768411 
0,768411 
0,763159 
0,767417 
0,761276 
0,759300 
0,735334 
0,809996 
I 
b 
1 148,18 
1 159,42 
1 157,79 
1 262,92 
1 300,67 
1 305,13 
1 350,27 
1 386,78 
1 403,49 
1 403,49 
1 520,60 
1 496,21 
1 476,95 
1 483,58 
1 483,58 
1 483,58 
1 529,70 
1 538,24 
1 636,61 
(1 632,36) 
(1 690,76) 
(1 796,22) 
NL 
2,72077 
2,74748 
2,74362 
2,81318 
2,66382 
2,67296 
2,57971 
2,49587 
2,52595 
2,52595 
2,52208 
2,40935 
2,37833 
2,31943 
2,31943 
2,31943 
2,30358 
2,31643 
2,29789 
2,29193 
2,21958 
2,20045 
Ρ 
c 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
(172,085) 
(177,743) 
(178,735) 
177,305 
176,844 
182,194 
180,624 
UK 
d 
(0,663247) 
(0,649821) 
(0,648910) 
(0,542122) 
(0,601048) 
(0,557037) 
(0,560453) 
(0,629848) 
(0,587087) 
(0,585992) 
(0,555312) 
(0,630317) 
(0,679256) 
(0,739615) 
(0,739615) 
(0,728627) 
(0,728615) 
0,696904 
0,691328 
(0,689533) 
(0,805748) 
(0,808431) 
Notional central rates. 
Temporary notional central rates as from 17 September 1992. 
Notional central rates until escudo entry into the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) on 6 April 1992. 
Notional central rates until 8 October 1990 (sterling entry into ERM) and as from 17 September 1992 (suspension of sterling participation in the ERM). 
Initial parities at the start of the European monetary system. 
Revised composition of the ecu and inclusion of the drachma. 
Revised composition of the ecu and inclusion of the peseta and the escudo. The central rate of the peseta was fixed on 19 June 1989 when it entered the ERM. 
Accompanied by a narrowing of the Italian lira fluctuation band from 6% to 2,25%. 
Sterling entry into the ERM with a fluctuation margin of 6%. 
Accompanied by a suspension of their participation in the ERM by sterling and the Italian lira. 
Table 52 
Bilateral central rates since 1 February 1993 
BFR/LFR 100 
DKR 100 
DM100 
PTA 100 
FF 100 
IRLI 
HFL 100 
ESC 100 
+ 2,25 
+ 2,25 
+ 2,25 
+ 6,00 
+ 2,25 
+ 2,25 
+ 2,25 
+ 6,00 
BFR/LFR 
(Bruxelles) 
100 
540,723 
2 062,55 
28,3364 
614,977 
49,7289 
1 830,54 
22,3006 
DKR 
(København) 
18,4938 
100 
381,443 
5,24047 
113,732 
9,19676 
338,537 
4,12423 
DM 
(Frankfurt) 
4,84837 
26,2162 
100 
1,37386 
29,8164 
2,41105 
88,7526 ■ 
1,08122 
PTA 
(Madrid) 
352,903 
1908,23 
7 278,77 
100 
2 170,27 
175,495 
6460,05 
78,6999 
The drachma does not participate in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM). Italian lira intervention limits temporarily not 
September 1992. Their notional central rales are DRA 259,306. LIT I 796,22 and UKL 0,808431 respectively for one ecu. 
FF 
(Paris) 
16,2608 
87,9257 
335,386 
4,60772 
100 
8,08631 
297,661 
3,62626 
IRL 
(Dublin) 
2,0109 
10,8734 
41,4757 
0,569818 
12,3666 
1 
36,8105 
0,448443 
applicable and sterling participation 
HFL 
(Amsterdam) 
5,46286 
29,5389 
112,673 
1,54798 
33,5953 
2,71662 
100 
1,21825 
ESC 
(Lisboa) 
448,418 
2424,69 
9248,80 
127,065 
2 757,66 
222,994 
8 208,49 
100 
n the ERM suspended, as from 17 
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Table 53 
Nominal effective exchange rates 
Relative to 19 industrial countries; double export weights 
(¡980 - 100) 
DK WD GR IRL NL UK EUR 1 2 - USA 
1960 82,6 104,1 52,8 192,6 150,4 117,1 149,7 196,9 74,8 214,5 158,6 98,4 125,0 71,8 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
For a detailed 
81,7 
81,7 
81,5 
81,7 
82,0 
81,9 
82,1 
82,9 
83,1 
83,2 
83,1 
85,5 
86,7 
87,9 
89,2 
91,3 
96,5 
99,3 
100,5 
100,0 
94,2 
85,5 
83,1 
81,3 
82,0 
86,5 
90,0 
88,9 
88,1 
92,7 
92,4 
94,5 
commentary on 
1 Against nine industrial non-
103,1 
103,1 
103,2 
103,0 
103,1 
103,3 
102,6 
99,0 
98,6 
97,8 
96,9 
97,6 
103,6 
104,0 
107,6 
110,0 
109,4 
109,4 
108,5 
100,0 
92,5 
88,4 
87,9 
84,7 
85,7 
91,1 
95,0 
93,2 
90,7 
97,6 
95,7 
98,4 
54,7 
54,9 
55,2 
55,3 
55,1 
55,1 
55,4 
56,4 
57,9 
62,8 
64,7 
66,4 
73,4 
77,4 
78,6 
83,1 
89,7 
95,0 
99,6 
100,0 
94,4 
99,1 
103,1 
101,4 
101,7 
112,6 
120,4 
119,5 
118,0 
124,7 
123,3 
127,4 
191,1 
190,9 
191,0 
191,0 
191,2 
191,4 
191,8 
195,1 
195,4 
192,6 
188,2 
176,2 
162,2 
162,6 
146,7 
138,7 
134,7 
122,4 
115,5 
100,0 
89,8 
82,7 
67,7 
58,0 
48,8 
38,4 
34,6 
32,1 
29,7 
27,3 
24,2 
22,3 
149,6 
150,0 
150,1 
150,1 
150,2 
150,2 
147,9 
132,2 
132,3 
131,8 
130,2 
132,6 
134,7 
138,7 
135,2 
124,2 
108,7 
98,3 
107,4 
100,0 
90,4 
84,9 
70,3 
68,6 
67,1 
66,0 
66,2 
68,2 
71,0 
74,7 
74,4 
73,0 
116,1 
116,1 
116,2 
116,2 
116,2 
116,1 
116,2 
117,9 
112,1 
103,1 
100,8 
103,2 
106,7 
99,5 
109,3 
105,2 
100,2 
98,9 
99,6 
100,0 
91,2 
83,6 
77,6 
73,9 
74,7 
78,0 
78,9 
77,0 
76,0 
80,7 
79,0 
81,8 
the method used see European Economy No 8, March 1981. 
member countries. 
149,4 
149,8 
149,7 
149,5 
149,6 
149,6 
148,6 
139,5 
139,6 
139,4 
139,5 
136,7 
127,3 
124,1 
117,0 
105,1 
101,5 
102,0 
102,2 
100,0 
91,3 
90,3 
86,6 
82,9 
83,9 
87,0 
85,2 
84,0 
83,0 
87,8 
86,7 
89,1 
195,2 
195,0 
194,8 
193,9 
193,9 
194,3 
194,8 
198,7 
198,3 
196,1 
194,3 
193,0 
173,3 
156,4 
149,9 
124,3 
114,4 
107,3 
103,7 
100,0 
87,6 
81,6 
78,5 
73,9 
70,1 
72,7 
73,5 
70,9 
71,2 
73,9 
72,4 
70,4 
77,1 
77,6 
77,7 
77,5 
77,7 
77,4 
77,9 
79,1 
79,2 
78,0 
78,7 
79,8 
82,4 
86,7 
88,8 
91,2 
96,0 
98,3 
99,8 
100,0 
95,7 
100,5 
102,6 
101,0 
101,2 
109,0 
114,6 
114,1 
112,9 
117,3 
116,4 
119,3 
213,4 
213,8 
213,4 
212,9 
213,1 
213,3 
214,1 
222,8 
224,6 
223,4 
222,0 
219,6 
223,5 
220,5 
213,9 
195,4 
153,1 
121,9 
103,3 
100,0 
96,2 
83,8 
66,1 
54,6 
48,3 
44,6 
41,4 
39,3 
38,1 
37,6 
37,8 
39,2 
157,8 
158,3 
158,0 
157,5 
157,8 
157,8 
155,3 
137,1 
137,2 
136,7 
136,7 
131,8 
118,0 
113,9 
104,8 
89,7 
85,5 
85,7 
90,9 
100,0 
100,2 
95,8 
89,1 
84,9 
84,8 
78,6 
77,8 
82,3 
79,5 
78,8 
79,1 
76,3 
99,9 
100,5 
100,6 
100,5 
100,4 
100,3 
100,1 
96,5 
96,2 
97,5 
98,3 
100,3 
103,0 
101,1 
102,5 
92,8 
91,9 
92,4 
98,4 
100,0 
83,9 
78,0 
71,4 
64,8 
63,5 
69,7 
74,5 
73,3 
71,1 
79,3 
76,7 
78,5 
125,3 
126,3 
126,6 
126,7 
126,7 
126,8 
127,2 
130,0 
130,2 
128,5 
125,1 
116,7 
107,4 
109,6 
108,7 
114,4 
113,6 
103,1 
100,2 
100,0 
112,8 
126,3 
133,6 
144,0 
149,9 
121,3 
106,7 
100,2 
105,1 
98,6 
97,9 
95,7 
71,4 
71,5 
71,5 
71,4 
71,5 
71,4 
71,6 
73,1 
73,7 
73,3 
74,5 
82,8 
87,4 
81,6 
79,3 
83,3 
92,4 
112,5 
104,2 
100,0 
113,6 
107,9 
119,7 
126,6 
130,5 
166,0 
179,7 
198,4 
189,7 
170,3 
185,1 
194,3 
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Table 54 
Current receipts 
General government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR E« IRL NLb UK EUR 9 -
(ECU)C 
EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + 
(ECU) (ECU) 
USA 
1960 27,9 27,3 35,5 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
29,0 
29,8 
30,0 
30,6 
31,3 
33,1 
33,9 
34,5 
35,0 
35,9 
26,6 
28,2 
29,9 
29,7 
31,2 
33,5 
34,1 
36,9 
37,2 
41,7 
36,6 
37,0 
37,3 
36,8 
36,1 
36,7 
37,4 
38,4 
39,8 
38,9 
1961-70 32,3 32,9 37,5 
21,1 
22,0 
23,2 
23,2 
24,0 
23,7 
25,3 
26,2 
27,3 
27,2 
26,8 
24,9 
22,2 
34,9 
36,2 
36,3 
37,1 
38,0 
38,4 
38,4 
38,2 
38,8 
39,8 
39,0 
38,0 
24,8 
25,7 
25,2 
26,1 
26,9 
27,9 
30,0 
30,6 
31,0 
31,6 
35,3 
29,0 
28,8 
28,2 
29,1 
29,5 
30,6 
30,1 
30,1 
31,0 
31,6 
30,7 
30,4 
30,1 
31,0 
33,4 
31,7 
31,8 
31,8 
33,5 
33,9 
34,3 
33,2 
32,8 
34,4 
33,1 
33,9 
34,9 
34,4 
35,6 
35,7 
37,3 
39,2 
40,6 
42,4 
43,2 
41,2 
38,4 
19,1 
20,0 
20,8 
20,5 
20,7 
21,7 
22,2 
22,3 
23,1 
24,0 
26,0 
22,1 
29,9 
31,3 
32,8 
31,5 
31,4 
33,0 
34,2 
36,2 
37,7 
39,3 
40,2 
34,8 
32,3 
33,3 
34,0 
34,1 
34,4 
34,7 
35,4 
36,2 
37,2 
38,1 
37,9 
35,5 
27,6 
27,7 
27,9 
28,5 
27,4 
27,3 
28,0 
28,6 
30,2 
31,4 
30,5 
28,7 
21,1 
1970 35,9 46,1 38,9 22,2 39,0 33,2 28,8 36,4 41,2 26,0 39,8 37,5 30,5 21,1 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1971-80 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
• Break in 
b Break in 
36,4 
36,2 
37,1 
38,5 
413 
41,1 
42,7 
43,6 
44,3 
43,8 
40,5 
44,6 
46,3 
45,6 
46,8 
47,0 
46,3 
46,6 
45,3 
44,0 
44,5 
45,7 
44,6 
44,6 
45,1 
198S/86. 
46,8 
46,4 
46,0 
47,9 
45,7 
46,1 
46,6 
48,4 
49,8 
51,6 
47,5 
51,7 
50,9 
53,2 
54,8 
56,1 
57,7 
58,2 
58,6 
57,6 
55,8 
55,5 
55,1 
55,8 
55,8 
1968/69 and 1986/87 
40,1 
40,4 
42,9 
43,4 
43,4 
44,7 
45,8 
45,4 
45,2 
45,6 
43,7 
45,7 
46,4 
46,0 
46,2 
46,5 
45,8 
45,5 
44,8 
45,6 
43,9 
45,6 
45,6 46,6 
46,4 47,4 
46,8 47,5 
' EUR 12 excl. Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
26,7 
27,1 
29,2 
29,6 
29,9 
30,4 
30,2 
28,8 
32,0 
33,2 
34,2 
34,2 
35,1 
36,0 
34,1 
31,7 
33,9 
33,3 
36,3 
37,8 
39,7 
22,4 
22,9 
23,6 
22,9 
24,5 
25,3 
26,5 
27,2 
28,4 
29,9 
25,4 
31,3 
31,5 
33,6 
33,5 
34,7 
35,9 
37,7 
37,7 
39,4 
39,3 
35,5 
40,0 
41,4 
42,3 
38,6 
38,9 
39,0 
39,7 
41,4 
43,5 
43,2 
43,1 
44,7 
46,5 
41,9 
47,3 
48,2 
48,8 
49,8 
49,9 
49,4 
49,8 
49,2 
48,7 
48,9 
49,0 
48,7 
48,5 
49,0 
34,1 
32,9 
32,2 
36,8 
34,4 
38,0 
36,7 
35,1 
34,6 
37,8 
35,3 
38,7 
413 
42,7 
43,3 
42,5 
42,6 
42,6 
43,3 
39,5 
39,5 
41,6 
40,1 
40,5 
40,8 
29,5 
29,4 
28,5 
28,0 
28,5 
29,7 
30,6 
31,8 
31,3 
33,3 
30,1 
34,3 
36,1 
37,9 
37,7 
38,3 
39,1 
39,2 
39,6 
41,5 
42,2 
38,6 
43,3 
44,8 
45,6 
39,7 
39,8 
40,2 
41,3 
49,9 
51,4 
55,4 
56,5 
53,4 
55,1 
48,3 
55,8 
55,7 
58,3 
56,4 
58,2 
55,6 
57,5 
56,0 
53,9 
53,9 
56,1 
48,5 
49,7 
49,7 
42,9 
44,0 
45,3 
46,3 
48,7 
49,0 
49,9 
50,2 
50,9 
52,5 
48,0 
53,1 
53,4 
54,7 
53,4 
53,7 
52,5 
53,5 
53,0 
50,1 
50,1 
52,7 
52,7 
51,6 
51,7 
25,2 
25,3 
24,9 
25,0 
27,7 
30,7 
30,5 
29,5 
29,7 
30,9 
27,9 
32,4 
33,4 
37,0 
34,6 
33,4 
37,3 
36,2 
37,6 
39,5 
38,8 
36,0 
40,0 
41,3 
41,1 
38,1 
36,0 
35,4 
39,3 
40,0 
39,4 
38,5 
37,1 
37,8 
39,7 
38,1 
41,7 
42,2 
41,5 
41,4 
41,3 
40,2 
39,5 
39,1 
38,7 
38,7 
40,4 
38,0 
37,2 
36,8 
37,8 
37,6 
38,5 
39,6 
40,3 
41,6 
41,9 
41,9 
42,1 
43,2 
40,4 
43,9 
44,7 
45,0 
45,1 
45,4 
45,1 
45,0 
44,5 
44,6 
44,3 
44,8 
45,0 
45,4 
45,8 
38,1 
38,9 
40,2 
40,6 
40,6 
40,9 
42,0 
42,7 
43,5 
44,0 
44,1 
44,4 
44,3 
44,3 
43,8 
44,0 
43,7 
43,9 
44,4 44,7 
44,9 45,2 
45,4 45,7 
29,9 
31,0 
31,2 
32,0 
30,4 
31,3 
31,4 
31,7 
32,1 
32,4 
31,3 
33,2 
33,0 
32,7 
32,7 
33,3 
33,6 
34,3 
33,8 
34,3 
34,2 
33,5 
34,2 
33,9 
33,7 
22,0 
21,9 
22,9 
24,9 
24,5 
24,0 
25,1 
25,0 
26,9 
28,1 
24,5 
29,6 
30,0 
30,3 
30,8 
31,5 
31,7 
33,3 
33,7 
34,0 
35,2 
32,0 
33,8 
• 
• 
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Table 55 
Total expenditure 
General government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR E' IRL NLb UK EUR9- EUR 1 2 - EUR 12 + 
(ECU)' (ECU) (ECU) 
USA 
1960 30,7 24,8 32,5 34,6 28,0 30,1 29,1 33,7 18,5 32,2 32,3 27,0 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
30,1 
30,9 
31,9 
31,3 
32,7 
33,9 
35,0 
36,9 
36,7 
37,0 
27,1 
28,1 
28,6 
28,4 
29,9 
31,7 
34,3 
36,3 
36,3 
40,2 
33,8 
35,6 
36,4 
36,1 
36,7 
36,9 
38,8 
39,2 
38,8 
38,7 21,5 
35,7 
37,0 
37,8 
38,0 
38,4 
38,5 
39,0 
40,3 
39,6 
38,9 
29,7 
29,5 
30,5 
31,8 
33,1 
33,6 
34,8 
35,2 
36,6 
39,6 
29,4 
30,5 
31,1 
31,8 
34,3 
34,3 
33,7 
34,7 
34,2 
34,2 
29,7 
30,5 
30,4 
30,7 
31,6 
33,1 
36,0 
35,8 
32,6 
32,5 
35,4 
35,6 
37,6 
37,8 
38,7 
40,7 
42,5 
43,9 
44,4 
42,4 
20,9 
20,3 
21,8 
21,8 
21,5 
21,7 
22,2 
22,4 
22,4 
23,2 
33,1 
33,9 
35,4 
33,5 
35,9 
35,2 
38,3 
39,3 
41,0 
38,8 
33,2 
34,4 
35,3 
35,0 
36,3 
36,4 
37,8 
38,8 
38,8 
38,2 
28,3 
28,4 
28,2 
27,6 
27,1 
28,2 
30,2 
30,7 
30,4 
31,6 19,3 
1961-70 33,7 32,1 37,1 38,3 33,5. 32,8 32,3 39,9 21,8 36,5 36,4 29,1 
1970 38,3 42,0 38,7 21,5 38,1 37,4 32,1 33,2 42,4 23,2 36,8 37,4 31,6 19,3 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
40,1 
41,0 
41,3 
41,6 
46,8 
47,4 
49,0 
50,4 
51,9 
53,1 
42,9 
42,5 
40,8 
44,8 
47,0 
46,4 
47,2 
48,7 
51,5 
54,8 
40,2 
40,9 
41,7 
44,7 
49,0 
48,1 
48,2 
47,9 
47,8 
48,5 
22,9 
22,5 
22,4 
22,6 
24,4 
25,6 
27,1 
28,9 
30,1 
32,5 
38,0 
38,3 
38,4 
39,4 
43,8 
44,3 
44,1 
45,2 
45,6 
46,6 
38,3 
37,0 
36,8 
45,0 
47,0 
46,6 
44,3 
44,8 
46,0 
50,5 
34,3 
36,4 
35,0 
34,4 
39,1 
37,8 
37,7 
40,4 
39,7 
41,9 
37,1 
37,5 
36,4 
36,0 
48,7 
49,4 
52,1 
51,5 
52,6 
55,9 
43,9 
44,4 
44,6 
46,6 
51,5 
51,7 
51,6 
52,9 
54,6 
56,5 
23,0 
24,5 
23,3 
26,4 
31,9 
36,6 
35,2 
36,4 
35,8 
36,7 
37,3 
38,1 
43,1 
44,5 
44,4 
41,7 
41,5 
41,0 
43,1 
38,3 
39,1 
39,4 
41,6 
45,5 
45,2 
44,9 
45,6 
45,6 
46,8 
31,6 
31,3 
30,7 
32,3 
34,5 
33,4 
32,3 
31,5 
31,7 
33,7 
20,7 
21,8 
22,4 
24,5 
27,2 
27,7 
29,0 
30,5 
31,6 
32,6 
1971-80 46,3 46,7 45,7 25,9 42,3 43,6 37,7 45,7 49,8 41,1 43,2 32,3 26,8 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
58,1 
57,8 
57,4 
56,3 
56,0 
55,6 
54,1 
52,0 
50,8 
50,2 
54,8 
51,2 
51,5 
51,3 
58,6 
60,0 
60,4 
58,9 
58,1 
54,3 
55,7 
58,0 
58,1 
57,2 
57,9 
57,1 
58,1 
58,5 
49,4 
49,7 
48,5 
48,1 
47,7 
47,1 
47,4 
47,0 
45,5 
45,9 
47,6 
49,2 
49,9 
50,7 
49,S 
50,'/ 
51,1 
39,6 
39,6 
41,3 
44,1 
47,9 
47,2 
47,7 
47,9 
49,4 
52,5 
45,7 
51,5 
51,2 
49,5 
35,2 
37,1 
38,4 
38,9 
41,6 
41,9 
40,8 
41,0 
42,2 
43,3 
40,0 
45,0 
46,0 
46,5 
49,2 
50,9 
52,0 
52,5 
52,7 
52,2 
51,7 
50,8 
49,8 
50,3 
51,2 
50,6 
51,3 
52,2 
52,1 
55,0 
54,4 
53,1 
53,7 
53,7 
51,5 
48,1 
41,3 
42,0 
50,5 
42,2 
43,2 
43,8 
45,8 
47,4 
48,6 
49,4 
50,9 
50,7 
50,2 
50,3 
51,4 
53,2 
49,8 
53,5 
55,4 
55,8 
59,8 
57,3 
56,9 
53,6 
51,9 
51,3 
55,2 
52,9 
48,6 
48,9 
53,6 
49,3 
50,1 
50,6 
58,6 
60,5 
61,0 
59,6 
58,5 
58,5 
59,4 
57,6 
54,8 
55,0 
58,4 
55,2 
55,1 
55,2 
41,7 
43,8 
46,1 
46,6 
43,5 
44,6 
43,0 
43,0 
42,9 
44,3 
43,9 
46,4 
46,9 
45,9 
44,4 
44,7 
44,8 
45,3 
44,2 
42,6 
40,8 
38,1 
37,8 
40,0 
42,3 
40,8 
43,5 
45,1 
48,8 
49,8 
50,0 
50,0 
49,9 
49,3 
48,9 
47,8 
47,1 
48,1 
49,0 
49,4 
50,7 
51,5 
47,7 
48,7 
49,1 
49,2 
49,3 
48,8 
48,3 
47,3 
46,7 
47,8 
48,3 
49,0 
50,3 
51,0 
49,2 
50,! 
51,1 
34,2 
36,4 
36,8 
35,6 
36,4 
37,1 
36,8 
35,8 
35,8 
36,7 
36,2 
37,7 
38,7 
38,5 
33,4 
33,6 
33,9 
32,9 
32,3 
32,6 
32,8 
32,2 
31,5 
32,3 
32,8 
31,4 
' Break in 198S/86. 
b Breaks in 1968/69 and 1986/87. 
c EUR 12 excl. Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
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Table 56 
Net lending ( + ) or net borrowing (—) 
General government 
(Percentage of GDP at market prices) 
DK WD GR IRL NLb UK E U R 9 -
(ECU)· 
EUR 1 2 -
(ECU) 
EUR 12 + 
(ECU) 
USA 
1960 -2,9 3,1 3,0 0,9 -2,4 -0,9 3,0 0,8 0,6 -1,0 0,6 0,7 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
-1,3 
-13 
-2,2 
-0,8 
-1,6 
-1,0 
-1,3 
-2,6 
-1,8 
-1,3 
0,1 
0,6 
1,9 
1,8 
1,8 
2,3 
0,4 
1,1 
1,4 
2,1 
2,8 
1,4 
0,9 
0,7 
-0,6 
-0,2 
-1,4 
-0,8 
1,1 
0,2 0,7 
1,0 
0,1 
0,1 
0,7 
0,7 
0,6 
0,0 
0,8 
0,9 
0,9 
-3,2 
-3,6 
-3,6 
-4,1 
-4,3 
-2,8 
-3,3 
-3,3 
-4,2 
-3,7 
-0,8 
-1,0 
-13 
-0,8 
-3,8 
-3,8 
-2,2 
-2,8 
-3,1 
-3,5 
4,7 
2,2 
2,5 
2,1 
2,8 
1,8 
-0,7 
-1,6 
U 
2,8 
0,1 
-0,6 
-1,3 
-1,5 
-0,8 
-0,9 
-13 
-0,9 
-0,5 
-13 
-0,9 
0,6 
-1,3 
-1,1 
0,3 
0,5 
0,1 
0,7 
1,6 
2,8 
-0,7 
0,0 
-2,8 
-1,1 
-1,9 
0,0 
-1,0 
-0,5 
-0,6 
2,4 
0,6 
0,1 
-0,7 
-0,1 
- U 
-0,5 
-1,1 
-1,1 
-0,2 
0,1 
-0,6 
-0,5 
0,3 
-0,2 
0,2 
-0,1 
-1,7 
-0,5 
1,0 
-1,1 1,8 
1961-70 ■ 1,5 1,3 0,4 0,4 -3,6 -2,3 1,8 -0,9 0,3 -0,6 -0,4 -0,3 
1970 -2,4 4,1 0,2 0,7 0,9 -4,3 -3,3 3,2 -1,2 2,8 3,0 0,2 1,1 1,8 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
-3,7 
-4,8 
-43 
-3,1 
-5,5 
-6,3 
-6,4 
-6,8 
-7,6 
-9,3 
3,9 
3,9 
5,2 
• 3,1 
-1,4 
-0,3 
-0,6 
-0,4 
-1,7 
-3,3 
-0,2 
-0,5 
13 
-1,3 
-5,6 
-3,4 
-2,4 
-2,4 
-2,6 
-2,9 
0,5 
0,3 
1,1 
0,2 
0,0 
0,3 
0,6 
1,7 
1,6 
2,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,3 
-2,4 
-0,7 
-0,8 
-2,1 
-0,8 
0,0 
-4,2 
-4,1 
-4,6 
-8,2 
-12,5 
-8,6 
-7,6 
-9,7 
-11,4 
-12,7 
-4,8 
-7,0 
-6,5 
-6,4 
-10,6 
-8,1 
-7,0 
-8,5 
-8,3 
-8,6 
2,6 
2,3 
3,8 
5,3 
1,1 
2,0 
3,3 
5,0 
0,7 
-0,8 
-1,0 
-0,4 
0,8 
-0,2 
-2,9 
-2,6 
-1,8 
-2,8 
-3,7 
-4,0 
2,3 
0,9 
1,6 
-1,4 
-4,1 
-5,9 
-4,7 
-6,9 
-6,1 
13 
-13 
-2,7 
-3,8 
-4,5 
-4,9 
-3,2 
-4,4 
-3,3 
-3,4 
-0,6 
-1,5 
-0,9 
-2,0 
-5,1 
-3,7 
-3,0 
-3,7 
-3,5 
-3,6 
1,8 
0,3 
0,5 
0,3 
4,1 
23 
0,9 
0,1 
0,4 
13 
13 
03 
0,5 
0,4 
-2,8 
-3,7 
-3,8 
-5,5 
-4,7 
-4,4 
1971-80 -5,8 0,9 -2,0 -0,6 -0,5 -8,4 -7,6 2,5 -1,9 -3,0 -2,8 ■1,0 -2,3 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1981-90 
1991 
1992 
1993 
• Break i 
b Break ι 
-13,4 
-11,5 
-11,8 
-9,5 
-9,0 
-9,4 
-7,5 
-6,7 
-6,7 
-5,7 
-9,1 
-6,6 
-6,9 
-6,2 
-6,9 
-9,1 
-7,2 
-4,1 
-2,0 
3,4 
2,4 
0,6 
-0,5 
-1,4 
-2,5 
-2,0 
-2,3 
-2,7 
n series 198S/86. 
-3,7 
-3,3 
-2,6 
-1,9 
- 1 3 
-1,3 
-1,9 
-2,2 
0,1 
-2,0 
-2,0 
-3,6 ■ 
-3,5 ■ 
-3,9 ■ 
n series 1968/69,1986/87. 
c EUR 12 excl. Greece, Spain and Portugal 
-3,2 
-3,2 
-3,6 
-10,7 
-7,6 
-8,1 
-9,8 
-13,6 
-12,0 
-11,6 
-13,8 
-17,7 
-18,6 
-12,4 
-15,2 
-13,4 
-9,8 
-3,9 
-5,6 
-4,7 
-5,4 
-6,9 
-6,0 
-3,1 
-3,3 
-2,8 
-4,0 
-4,6 
-4,9 
-4,6 
-4,2 
-1,9 
-2,8 
-3,2 
-2,8 
-2,9 
-2,7 
-1,9 
-1,7 
-1,1 
-1,4 
-2,2 
-1,9 
-2,8 
-3,2 
-13,4 
-13,8 
-11,8 
-9,8 
-113 
-n,i 
-8,9 
-4,8 
-1,8 
-2,5 
-8,9 
-2,1 
-2,7 
-3,0 
-11,4 
-11,3 
-10,6 
-11,6 
-12,6 
-11,6 
-11,0 
-10,7 
-9,9 
-10,9 
-113 
-10,2 
-10,5 
-10,2 
-3,9 
-1,6 
1,5 
2,8 
6,2 
4,3 
2,4 
3,1 
5,3 
5,0 
2,5 
-0,8 
-0,4 
-1,0 
-5,5 
-7,1 
-6,4 
-6,3 
-4,8 
-6,0 
-5,9 
-4,6 
-4,7 
-4,9 
-5,6 
-2,5 
-3,5 
-3,5 
-9,3 
-10,4 
-9,0 
-12,0 
-10,1 
-7,2 
-6,8 
-5,4 
-3,4 
-5,5 
-7,9 
-6,4 
-5,6 
-4,8 
-2,6 
-2,5 
-3,3 
-3,9 
-2,9 
-2,4 
-1,3 
1,0 
0,9 
-1,3 
-1,8 
-2,8 
-6,2 
-8,3 
-4,9 
-5,1 
-5,0 
-4,9 
-4,5 
-4,3 
-3,9 
-3,3 
-2,5 
-3,8 
-4,2 
-4,4 
-5,3 
-5,7 
-5,0 
-5,2 
-5,1 
-5,1 
-4,9 
-4,5 
-4,0 
-3,4 
-2,7 
-4,0 
-4,4 
-4,6 
-5,3 
-5,6 
-4,5 
-5,2 
-5,4 
-1,0 
-3,4 
-4,1 
-2,9 
-3,1 
-3,5 
-2,5 
-2,0 
-1,5 
-2,5 
-2,7 
-3,4 
-4,8 
-4,8 
-3,8 
-3,6 
-3,6 
-2,1 
-0,8 
-0,9 
0,5 
1,5 
2,5 
3,0 
-0,7 
2,4 
* 
• 
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Table 57 
Budgetary expenditure of the European Communities 
(Mio UA/EUA/ECU) ' 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
ECSC 
opera­
tional 
budget 
21,7 
30,7 
23,5 
26,5 
13,6 
21,9 
18,7 
37,3 
28,1 
10,4 
21,2 
40,7 
56,2 
37,4 
43,7 
86,9 
92,0 
127,4 
94,0 
93,0 
159,1 
173,9 
175,7 
261,0 
243,0 
300,0 
408,0 
453,0 
439,0 
399,3 
567,0 
404,0 
488,0 
495,0 
536,0 
European 
Develop­
ment 
Fund 
51,2 
63,2 
172,0 
162,3 
55,5 
35,0 
248,8 
157,8 
105,8 
121,0 
104,8 
10,5 
236,1 
212,7 
210,0 
157,0 
71,0 
320,0 
244,7 
394,5 
480,0 
508,5 
658,0 
750,0 
752,0 
703,0 
698,0 
846,7 
837,9 
1 196,3 
1 297,0 
1 256,5 
1 191,1 
Euratom b 
7,9 
39,1 
20,0 
72,5 
88,6 
106,4 
124,4 
120,0 
129,2 
158,5 
73,4 
59,2 
63,4 
— 
— 
— 
— ' 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
EAGGF' 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
102,7 
310,3 
562,0 
2250,4 
3 818,0 
5 228,3 
1 883,6 
2 477,6 
3 768,8 
3 651,3 
4 586,6 
6 033,3 
6463,5 
9602,2 
10 735,5 
11 596,1 
11446,0 
12 792,0 
16331,3 
18 985,8 
20 546,4 
23 067,7 
23 939,4 
27 531,9 
25 868,8 
27 233,8 
35458,0 
38 461,6 
Social 
Fund' 
— 
— 
8,6 
11,3 
4,6 
7,2 
42,9 
26,2 
35,6 
43,0 
50,5 
64,0 
56,5 
97,5 
269,2 
292,1 
360,2 
176,7 
325,2 
284,8 
595,7 
502,0 
547,0 
910,0 
801,0 
1116,4 
1 413,0 
2 533,0 
2 542,2 
2 298,8 
2 676,1 
3 212,0 
4069,0 
4 817,2 
Regional 
Fund 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
150,0 
300,0 
372,5 
254,9 
671,5 
751,8 
2 264,0 
2 766,0« 
2 265,5 
1 283,3 
1 624,3 
2 373,0 
2 562,3 
3 092,8 
3 920,0 
4 554,1 
6 309,0 
7 578,7 
EC general budget 
Industry, 
energy, 
research 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
65,0 
75,1 
69,1 
82,8 
99,0 
113,3 
163,3 
227,2 
288,0 
212,8 
217,6 
346,0 
1 216,2 
1346,4 
706,9 
760,1 
964,8 
1 203,7 
1 353,0 
1 738,7 
2 077,1 
2423,7 
Admini­
stration d 
8,6 
20,3 
23,4 
27,9 
34,2 
37,2 
43,0 
48,1 
55,4 
60,4 
91,8 
105,6 
114,7 
132,1 
177,2 
239,4 
336,7 
375,0 
419,7 
497,0 
676,7 
863,9 
938,8 
1 035,4 
I 103,3 
1 161,6 
1 236,6 
1 332,6 
1 603,2 
1740,0 
1 947,0 
2 063,0 
2 298,1 
2 827,7 
2 927,4 
Other 
0,0 
4,9 
4,9 
2,9 
46,8 
42,3 
42,9 
7,4 
10,4 
17,1 
23,5 
77,1 
41,4 
152,2 
247,1 
294,4 
•675,2 
642,8 
909,5 
883,4 
1 302,4 
1447,9 
2056,1 
3 024,6 
3 509,7 
2 989,9 
2 150,8 
2 599,8 
4 526,2 
3 720,5 
6 186,8 
9 978,9 ! 
7 567,9 
6681,2 
6619,0 
Total 
EC 
8,6 
25,2 
28,3 
39,4 
92,3 
84,1 
93,1 
201,1 
402,3 
675,1 
2408,7 
4051,2 
5 448,4 
2 289,3 
3 074,5 
4 641,0 
5038,2 
6213,6 
7952,6 
8 704,9 
12348,2 
14602,5 
16 057,5 e 
18 546,0r 
21 427,0h 
24 765,5i 
26119,3i 
28 223,0k 
34863,2 
35 469,2 
42261,0 
45 859,8 
46 604,6™ 
57 422,0" 
62 827,6° 
Total 
35,5 
146,2 
135,0 
305,0 
356,8 
267,9 
271,1 
607,2 
717,3 
949,8 
2 624,2 
4255,9 
5 578,5 
2 562,8 
3 330,9 
4937,9 
5 287,2 
6412,0 
8 366,6 
9042,6 
12 901,8 
15 256,4 
16 741,7 
19465,0 
22420,0 
25 817,5 
27 230,3 
29 374,0 
36 148,9 
36 706,4 
44 024,3 
47 560,8 
48 349,1 
59 108,1 
» UA until 1977, EU A/ECU 1978 onwards. 
b Incorporated in the EC budget from 1971. 
c This column includes, for the years to 1970, substantial amounts carried forward to following years. 
d Commission, Council, Parliament, Court of Justice and Court of Auditors. 
e Including surplus of ECU 82,4 Mio carried forward to 1981. 
f Including ECU 1 173 Mio carried forward to 1982. 
■ Including ECU 1819 Mio UK special measures. 
h Including ECU 2 211 Mio carried forward to 1983. 
' Including ECU I 707 Mio carried forward to 1984. 
J There was a small deficit in 1984 in respect of the EC budget due largely to late payment of advances by some Member States. 
k There was a cash deficit in 1985 of ECU 25 Mio due to late payment of advances by some Member States. 
1 Includes a surplus of ECU 5 080 Mio carried forward to 1990. 
m Court of Auditors report 1991. 
" Rectifying and supplementary budget No 1 of 1991. 
0 General budget of the EC for 1992. 
Source: 1958­90: management accounts. 
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Table 58 
Budgetary receipts of the European Communities 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
ECSC 
levies 
and 
other 
44,0 
49,6 
53,3 
53,1 
45,3 
47,1 
61,3 
66,1 
71,2 
40,3 
85,4 
106,8 
100,0 
57,9 
61,1 
120,3 
124,6 
189,5 
129,6 
123,0 
164,9 
168,4 
226,2 
264,0 
243,0 
300,0 
408,0 
453,0 
439,0 
399,3 
567,0 
404,0 
488,0 
495,0 
536,0 
European 
Development 
Fund 
contri­
butions 
116,0 
116,0 
116,0 
116,0 
116,0 
— 
— 
— 
— 
40,0 
90,0 
110,0 
130,0 
170,0 
170,0 
150,0 
150,0 
220,1 
311,0 
410,0 
147,5 
480,0 
555,0 
658,0 
750,0 
700,0 
703,0 
698,0 
846,7 
837,9 
1196,3 
1 297,0 
1 256,5 
1467,0 
' UA until 1977, EUA/ECU from 1978 onwards. 
b GNP until 1978, 
Euratom 
contri­
butions (research 
only) 
7,9 
39,1 
20,0 
72,5 
88,6 
106,4 
124,4 
98,8 
116,5 
158,5 
82,0 
62,7 
67,7 
— 
■ — 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Miscella­
neous and 
contri­
butions 
under 
special keys 
0,02 
0,1 
0,2 
2,8 
2,1 
6,7 
2,9 
3,5 
3,9 
43 
— 
78,6 
121,1 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
VAT from 1979 until 1987; GNP from 1988 onwards. 
c This column includes, for the years 1 
Miscel­
laneous 
— 
. — 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
69,5 
80,9 
511,0 
65,3 
320,5 
282,8 
504,7 
344,4 
230,3 
1055,9 e 
1 219,0 
187,0 
1 565,0 
1060,7' 
2 491,0 k 
396,5 
74,8 
1 377,0 
4018,4 
4840,2 
4 356,0 
385,9 
EC budget 
Own resource! 
Agri­
cultural 
levies 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
713,8 
799,6 
478,0 
323,6 
590,0 
1163,7 
1 778,5 
2283,3 
2 143,4 
2002,3 
1 747,0 
2 228,0 
2295,0 
2436,3 
2 179,0 
2287,0 
3097,9 
2606,0 
2 397,9 
2084,1 
2295,4 
2 328,6 
:o 1970, surplus revenue from previous years carried forward to following years. 
I 
Import 
duties 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
582,2 
957,4 
1564,7 
2 684,4 
3 151,0 
4 064,6 
3927,2 
4 390,9 
5 189,1 
5 905,8 
6 392,0 
6815,0 
6988,7 
7960,8 
8 310,0 
8 172,9 
8 936,5 
9310,0 
10312,9 
11427,9 
11 949,7 
11 599,9 
d As a result of the calculations to establish the relative shares of the Member States in the 1976 budget, an excess of revenue over expendii 
carried forward to 1977. 
c Including surplus brought forward from 1979 and balance of 1979 VAT and financial contributions. 
' Including surplus of ECU 82.4 Mio carried forward to 1981. 
s Including surplus of ECU 661 Mio. 
h Includes surplus of ECU 307 Mio. 
1 Includes ECU 593 Mio of repayable 
i See note (j) to Table 57. 
advances by Member States. 
k Includes non­repayable advances by Member Sutes of 1981, ECU 6 Mio. 
1 Court of Auditors report 1991. 
m Rectifying and supplementary budget No I of 1990. 
■ General budget of the EC for 1992. 
GNP 
contri­
butions 
o r V A T b c 
5,9 
25,1 
28,1 
31,2 
90,2 
77,4 
90,1 
197,6 
398,3 
670,9 
— 
3 972,6 
5 327,3 
923,8 
1 236,6 
2 087,3 
1964,8 
2 152,0 
2482,1 
2494,5 
5 329,7 
7039,8 
7 093,5 
9 188,0 
12 197,0 
13 916,8 
14 594,6 
15 218,0 
22 810,8 
23 674,1 
28 968,0 
29 170,6 
29 252,4 
38 821,8 
48 513,2 
lure occurred . 
Note: From 1988 onwards agricultural levies, sugar levies and customs duties are net of 10% collection costs previously included as an expenditure item. 
Source: 1958­90: management accounts. 
(Mio 
Total 
EC 
5,9 
25,2 
28,3 
34,0 
92,3 
84,1 
93,1 
201,1 
402,2 
675,1 
2408,6 
4051,2 
5448,4 
2289,3 
3 074,5 
4 641,0 
5 038,2 
6213,6 
7 993,1d 
8704,9 
12348,2 
14602,5 
16 057,5f 
18 546,0« 
21 427,0 
24 765,5 h 
26052,41 
28 198,0 
33 667,2 
35 783,3 
42261,0 
45 899,8 
47 604,6' 
57 420,0 m 
62 827,6 n 
UA/EUA/ECU) » 
Total 
173,8 
229,9 
217,6 
275,6 
342,2 
237,5 
278,7 
366,0 
590,0 
913,9 
2 666,0 
4 330,7 
5746,1 
2 517,2 
3 305,6 
4911,3 
5 312,8 
6623,1 
8433,7 
9237,9 
12660,6 
15251,0 
16838,7 
19468,0 
22420,0 
25 765,5 
27 163,4 
29 349,0 
34 952,9 
37020,5 
44024,3 
47 600,8 
49 349,1 
59 109,0 
: 
amounting to UA 40,5 Mio. This was 
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Table 59 Table 60 
Borrowing operations of the European Communities 
and of the European Investment Bank 
ECSC 
(Mio UA/EUA/ECU) ' 
EIB Euratom EECb EEC­
NCI ' 
Total 
Net outstanding borrowing of the European Communities 
and of the European Investment Bank 
(Mio UA/EUA/ECU) ■ 
ECSC EIB Euratom EECb EEC­NCIc Total 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
50 
— 
35 
23 
70 
33 
128 
54 
103 
58 
108 
52 
60 
102 
230 
263 
528 
731 
956 
729 
981 
837 
1004 
325 
712 
750 
822 
1265 
1517 
1487 
880f 
913 
1086 
1446 
— 
— 
— 
21 
32 
35 
67 
65 
139 
195 
213 
146 
169 
413 
462 
608 
826 
814 
732 
1030 
1863 
2 437 
2 384 
2 243 
3146 
3 508 
4339 e 
5 699 e 
6 786 
5 593 
7 666 
9 034 
10996 
13 672 
— 
— 
— 
— 
5° 
8" 
11« 
14d 
3d 
— 
— 
— 
ld 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
99 
72 
153 
181 
373 
363 
369 
214 
344 
488 
853 
93 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1249 
571 
— 
— 
— 
— 
4 247 
— 
— 
862 
860 
— 
— 
350« 
16958 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
178 
305 
339 
773 
1617 
967 
860 
541 
611 
945f 
522 
76 
49 
50 
— 
35 
44 
102 
73 
203 
130 
256 
256 
321 
198 
229 
516 
692 
871 
1354 
1545 
2 937 
2 429 
2 916 
3 605 
3 874 
3 280 
4 994 
10 491 
6 342 
8168 
10194 
9404 
9 584 
10469 
12 508 
16862 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989» 
1990° 
1991" 
212 
209 
236 
248 
304 
322 
436 
475 
560 
601 
686 
719 
741 
802 
963 
1157 
1615 
2 391 
3 478 
3 955 
4 416 
4 675 
5 406 
5 884 
6178 
6 539 
7119 
7 034 
6 761 
6 689 
6 825 
6 738 
6 673 
7139 
— 
— 
— 
21 
54 
88 
154 
217 
355 
548 
737 
883 
1020 
1423 
1784 
2287 
3124 
3 926 
4 732 
5 421 
6 715 
8 541 
10604 
13 482 
16 570 
20 749 
25 007 
26 736 
30 271 
31957 
36 928 
42 330 
48459 
58 893 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
99 
172 
323 
502 
902 
1272 
1680 
1892 
2 013 
2168 
2 500 
2164 
1945 
1687 
1563 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1161 
1500 
1361 
965 
1016 
1062 
591 
4 610 
4932 
3 236 
1890 
2997 
2 459 
2075 
2045B 
3 5168 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
178 
491 
894 
1747 
3 269 
4 432 
4 960 
5 202 
5 229 
5 514 
5 122 
4 542 
3 817 
212 
209 
236 
269 
358 
410 
590 
692 
915 
1149 
1423 
1602 
1761 
2 225 
2 747 
3444 
4739 
6317 
9 371 
10 975 
12 664 
14 682 
18 019 
22 224 
26 358 
36 847 
43 382 
43 979 
46292 
49 372 
53 890 
58 210 
63 406 
74928 
» ECSC: 1958­74 UA, 1975­89 EUA/ECU. EIB: 1961­73 UA, 1974­89 EUA. Euratom: 1963­73 UA, 1974­89 EUA/ECU. b EEC balance­of­payments financing. c EEC New Community Instrument (for investment). d Drawings under credit lines opened with Eximbank (USA). c Including short­term borrowing. r Including the Community loan 'Jean Monnet1 of ECU 500 Mio which has been divided equally under the headings ECSC and NCI. 
* EEC balance­of­payments financing and financial assistance to non­member countries. h Including short term, new EIB approach. 
Source: European Economy: Report on the borrowing and lending activities of the Community. 
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Table 61 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
EUR 1 2 - b 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
3, 
4 
: 
9 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
incl. West Germany 
incl. Unified Germany 
. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— constructionc 
— equipment0 
Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general governmentd 
— other sectors d 
Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 9 other OECD countries 
Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
against 9 other OECD countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
Employment 
incl. West Germany 
incl. Unified Germany 
Unemployment rate e 
(% of civilian labour force) 
Current balance (% of GDP) 
incl. West Germany 
incl. unified Germany 
Net lending ( + ) or net borrowing ( - ) of general 
government (% of GDP) ' 
incl. West Germany 
incl. unified Germany 
Gross debt of general governmentf (% of GDP) 
Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
Money supply (end of year) 8 
Long-term interest rate (%) 
Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
10,2 
4,8 
5,6 
23,2 
4,9 
-0,6 
4,6 
5,2 
9,9 
5,0 
4,5 
1974-84 
13,2 
1,9 
-0 ,3 
-1 ,3 
1,4 
21,3 
3,2 
18,1 
1,5 
-0,8 
11,3 
11,1 
13,3 
1,8 
2,0 
1985 
8,6 
2,4 
2,2. 
-1 ,7 
8,0 
19,0 
2,8 
16,2 
2,3 
-1 ,7 
5,9 
6,0 
7,0 
1,0 
0,9 
1986 
8,6 
2,8 
4,3 
3,9 
4,3 
19,0 
2,8 
16,3 
3,9 
0,2 
3,8 
5,6 
6,3 
2,4 
0,6 
1987 
7,0 
2,9 
5,5 
3,2 
8,5 
19,3 
2,6 
16,7 
4,0 
-0,3 
3,6 
4,1 
5,5 
1,8 
1,3 
1988 
8,7 
4,1 
8,8 
6,8 
10,6 
20,0 
2,6 
17,5 
5,0 
0,1 
3,8 
4,5 
5,8 
1,9 
1,2 
1989 
8,5 
3,4 
7,1 
6,1 
9,0 
20,7 
2,8 
17,9 
3,6 
-0 ,2 
4,9 
5,0 
5,8 
0,9 
0,8 
1990 
8,2 
2,8 
4,0 
3,7 
4,8 
20,9 
2,9 
18,0 
2,8 
1,3 
4,5 
5,3 
7,5 
2,8 
2,1 
1991 
6,9 
1,4 
0,0 
0,5 
-0 ,2 
20,3 
2,9 
17,4 
1,2 
1,8 
5,3 
5,4 
7,2 
1,8 
1,7 
1992 
5,7 
1,1 
1,2 
-0,1 
1,1 
-1 ,3 
19,8 
2,8 
17,0 
1,0 
0,4 
4,5 
4,6 
5,8 
1,3 
1,1 
1993 
4,5 
0,7 
0,8 
-1 ,0 
-0 ,5 
-1 ,6 
19,6 
2,8 
16,8 
0,3 
-1 ,2 
4,4 
3,8 
4,4 
0,0 
0,6 
4,4 2,0 1,9 2,1 1,7 2,5 1,8 1,2 1,2 1,5 1,5 
100,0 103,4 
0,1 -0,1 
100,0 103,4 
1,1 -2,1 
99,3 97,8 
-1 ,0 -1 ,4 
84,3 92,4 
-0 ,3 9,6 
97,5 
-0 ,3 
99,0 
7,2 
0,3 -0,1 0,5 0,7 1,2 
2,1 
0,4 
-0 ,5 
12,6 
7,1 
100,0 
6,4 
-0 ,2 
-4,1 
46,1 
3,1 
12,6 
11,7 
70,9 
10,8 
0,7 
-4 ,9 
58,5 
4,9 
9,6 
10,6 
75,9 
10,7 
1,3 
-4 ,5 
59,3 
4,9 
9,7 
8,9 
81,9 
10,3 
0,8 
-4 ,0 
60,8 
4,7 
9,6 
9,0 
84,0 
96,4 95,4 96,3 96,7 96,3 95,4 
-1 ,2 -1 ,0 0,9 0,4 -0 ,4 -0 ,9 
97,0 93,9 104,8 102,2 106,9 104,2 
-2,1 -3 ,2 11,7 -2 ,6 4,6 -2 ,5 
1,6 1,6 1,6 0,2 -0 ,5 -0,8 
: : : : -1 ,0 -0,8 
9,8 8,9 8,3 8,8 9,5 10,6 
0,1 -0,1 -0 ,3 -0 ,5 -0 ,6 -0 ,9 
: : : -1 ,0 -1,1 -1 ,2 
-3 ,4 -2 ,7 -4 ,0 -4 ,6 -5 ,3 -5 ,6 
: : : -4 ,5 -5 ,2 -5 ,4 
60,1 59,5 59,5 61,4 63,9 66,9 
4,6 4,7 4,9 5,0 5,4 5,7 
10,1 11,1 8,5 6,5 : 
9,1 9,6 10,9 10,2 9,8 : 
88,7 91,9 90,3 88,9 89,7 89,5 
1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
incl. West Germany, unless otherwise stated. 
1974-84: EUR 12 excl. Portugal. 
EUR 12 excl. Greece. 
1961-73: EUR 12 excl. Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
1961-73,1974-84: EUR 12 excl. Greece, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal. 
Broad money supply M2 or M3 according to country; 1961-73: EUR 12 excl. Spain, Portugal and United Kingdom. 
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Table 62 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Belgium 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(% of GDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+ ) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year)*5 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
9,2 
4,9 
5,1 
21,8 
4,8 
-0 ,1 
0,0 
3,7 
4,1 
8,9 
5,0 
4,6 
4,3 
100,0 
0,3 
100,0 
-0 ,3 
100,0 
-0 ,8 
0,6 
1,1 
-2 ,2 
3,1 
10,1 
6,5 
100,0 
1974-84 
8,8 
1,9 
-0 ,8 
-2 ,7 
3,4 
20,0 
3,8 
16,2 
1,3 
-0 ,5 
-0 ,3 
7,6 
6,8 
9,8 
2,1 
2,8 
2,3 
111,3 
0,6 
105,3 
-1 ,5 
103,4 
-0 ,9 
-0 ,4 
7,7 
-1 ,6 
-8 ,3 
79,0 
6,2 
9,5 
10,6 
65,5 
1985 
7,0 
0,8 
0,7 
-0 ,6 
2,3 
15,6 
2,2 
13,4 
0,5 
-2 ,1 
-1 ,7 
5,9 
6,1 
4,5 
-1 ,3 
-1 ,5 
0,2 
108,1 
-1 ,7 
87,8 
1,7 
91,2 
1,9 
0,6 
11,8 
0,3 
-9 ,0 
119,7 
10,8 
7,8 
10,6 
67,9 
1986 
5,3 
1,5 
4,4 
3,0 
5,3 
15,7 
2,0 
13,7 
2,8 
-0 ,8 
-0 ,8 
0,7 
3,8 
4,7 
4,1 
0,9 
0,8 
108,2 
0,1 
93,2 
6,1 
94,5 
3,6 
0,6 
11,7 
2,1 
-9 ,4 
123,9 
11,4 
12,7 
7,9 
69,7 
1987 
4,5 
2,0 
5,6 
3,0 
7,1 
16,0 
1,8 
14,2 
3,8 
0,5 
0,5 
1,9 
2,4 
1,8 
-0 ,2 
-0 ,5 
1,6 
105,9 
-2 ,1 
94,2 
1,1 
93,9 
-0 ,7 
0,5 
11,3 
1,3 
-7 ,5 
131,0 
10,7 
10,2 
7,8 
75,1 
1988 
6,9 
5,0 
15,4 
14,7 
15,9 
17,6 
1,8 
15,8 
4,5 
0,2 
0,2 
1,6 
1,8 
2,4 
0,9 
0,6 
3,5 
103,1 
-2 ,7 
90,0 
-4 ,5 
90,1 
-4 ,0 
1,5 
10,2 
1,7 
-6 ,7 
131,9 
10,3 
7,7 
7,9 
81,7 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
8,6 
3,8 
13,7 
7,5 
21,2 
19,3 
1,6 
17,7 
5,1 
1,6 
1,6 
3,5 
4,7 
3,5 
0,0 
-1 ,1 
2,2 
99,8 
-3 ,2 
87,9 
-2 ,3 
88,8 
-1 ,4 
1,6 
8,6 
1,7 
-6 ,7 
127,9 
10,6 
13,3 
8,7 
90,1 
1990 
6,2 
3,4 
8,4 
7,1 
10,9 
20,2 
1,5 
18,7 
3,5 
0,8 
0,4 
3,1 
2,7 
7,7 
4,4 
4,9 
2,3 
102,3 
2,5 
92,8 
5,6 
91,3 
2,8 
1,1 
7,6 
0,9 
-5 ,7 
128,3 
10,9 
4,5 
10,1 
85,7 
1991 
4,6 
1,9 
0,3 
2,0 
-1 ,9 
19,8 
1,6 
18,2 
1,6 
0,8 
0,3 
2,9 
2,7 
6,8 
3,8 
4,0 
2,2 
104,1 
1,8 
92,2 
-0 ,7 
91,2 
0,0 
-0 ,3 
7,5 
1,7 
-6 ,6 
130,1 
10,6 
5,3 
9,3 
80,3 
1992 
4,7 
1,0 
2,5 
3,8 
0,7 
19,9 
1,5 
18,3 
1,9 
1,1 
1,0 
2,4 
3,6 
5,4 
2,9 
1,7 
1,7 
104,1 
0,0 
94,5 
2,6 
92,5 
1,4 
-0 ,7 
8,2 
1,8 
-6 ,9 
132,2 
10,9 
8,6 
79,6 
1993 
3,6 
0,5 
-3 ,3 
-2,8 
-4,0 
19,1 
1,5 
17,5 
0,6 
0,0 
0,3 
2,8 
3,1 
4,7 
1,8 
1,6 
1,2 
104,5 
0,4 
98,2 
3,9 
96,6 
4,5 
-0 ,7 
9,3 
1,8 
-6 ,2 
134,3 
10,3 
76,8 
1 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
» M3H. 
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Table 63 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Denmark 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending ( + ) or net borrowing ( - ) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year)b 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
11,7 
4,3 
6,5 
24,0 
4,6 
0,1 
0,2 
6,6 
7,0 
10,7 
3,8 
3,4 
3,2 
100,0 
0,2 
100,0 
2,1 
100,0 
1,7 
1,1 
-2 ,0 
2,2 
10,6 
9,0 
100,0 
1974-84 
11,4 
1,8 
-2 ,0 
-4 ,5 
2,4 
19,7 
3,3 
16,4 
0,9 
-0 ,9 
-0 ,5 
10,1 
9,4 
10,6 
0,5 
1,1 
1,4 
100,6 
-0 ,3 
111,4 
-1 ,5 
109,0 
-0 ,9 
0,4 
6,3 
-3 ,4 
-2 ,9 
37,2 
4,0 
13,3 
16,4 
72,5 
1985 
8,8 
4,3 
12,6 
8,9 
16,2 
18,7 
2,2 
16,6 
5,4 
2,3 
3,3 
4,3 
4,3 
4,7 
0,4 
0,4 
1,7 
93,6 
-1 ,3 
95,8 
0,4 
100,3 
0,9 
2,5 
7,2 
-4 ,6 
-2 ,0 
76,8 
9,9 
15,8 
11,6 
84,2 
1986 
8,4 
3,6 
17,1 
18,0 
16,6 
20,8 
1,6 
19,1 
6,1 
2,3 
2,3 
2,9 
4,6 
4,4 
1,5 
-0 ,2 
1,0 
92,5 
-1 ,2 
101,3 
5,7 
102,3 
2,0 
2,6 
5,5 
-5 ,4 
3,4 
69,0 
8,8 
8,4 
10,6 
89,7 
1987 
5,0 
0,3 
-3 ,8 
1,1 
-8 ,9 
19,7 
1,8 
17,9 
-2 ,2 
-5 ,5 
-5 ,5 
4,6 
4,7 
7,9 
3,1 
3,0 
-0 ,6 
95,9 
3,6 
110,7 
9,3 
109,0 
6,6 
0,9 
5,6 
-2 ,9 
2,4 
65,8 
8,3 
4,1 
11,9 
81,1 
1988 
4,6 
1,2 
-6 ,6 
-5 ,5 
-8 ,6 
18,1 
1,9 
16,2 
-1 ,2 
-5 ,2 
-5 ,6 
4,0 
3,4 
5,0 
1,0 
1,5 
1,8 
95,7 
-0 ,2 
108,8 
-1 ,7 
108,3 
-0 ,6 
-0 ,6 
6,4 
-1 ,3 
0,6 
66,8 
8,0 
3,5 
10,6 
80,7 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
5,2 
0,8 
-0 ,6 
-5 ,7 
5,7 
17,8 
1,7 
16,1 
0,4 
-2 ,8 
-2 ,9 
5,0 
4,3 
3,8 
-1 ,2 
-0 ,5 
1,5 
93,8 
-2 ,0 
104,4 
-4 ,0 
105,7 
-2 ,4 
-0 ,7 
7,7 
-1 ,5 
-0 ,5 
66,2 
7,5 
8,3 
10,2 
82,7 
1990 
3,9 
1,7 
-0 ,5 
-4 ,6 
3,7 
17,7 
1,7 
16,0 
-0 ,8 
-3 ,0 
-3 ,7 
2,1 
2,1 
3,4 
1,3 
1,3 
2,3 
92,8 
-1 ,0 
107,5 
2,9 
104,5 
-1 ,1 
-0 ,5 
8,1 
0,5 
-1 ,4 
66,7 
7,3 
7,1 
11,0 
82,1 
1991 
4,1 
1,2 
-2 ,8 
-8 ,1 
2,8 
17,1 
1,7 
15,4 
0,1 
-0 ,1 
-1 ,1 
2,4 
2,9 
3,7 
1,2 
0,8 
2,2 
91,6 
-1 ,4 
101,6 
-5 ,4 
99,7 
-4 ,7 
-0 ,9 
8,9 
1,3 
-2 ,0 
72,2 
7,3 
6,4 
10,1 
83,3 
1992 
3,5 
1,0 
-8 ,3 
-4 ,5 
-12,0 
15,6 
1,5 
14,1 
-0 ,4 
-0 ,9 
-1 ,4 
2,1 
2,5 
3,2 
1,1 
0,7 
1,7 
90,7 
-0 ,9 
102,9 
1,3 
98,8 
-0 ,8 
-0 ,7 
9,5 
3,0 
-2 ,3 
74,0 
6,9 
10,1 
83,7 
1993 
3,5 
1,8 
1,9 
4,5 
-0 ,6 
15,7 
1,6 
14,1 
2,1 
1,7 
2,0 
1,6 
1,7 
2,5 
0,9 
0,8 
1,7 
89,9 
-0 ,9 
105,4 
2,4 
101,0 
2,2 
0,1 
9,5 
3,0 
-2 ,7 
76,2 
7,2 
84,7 
* 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
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Table 64 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Germany b 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
West Germany 
Unified Germany 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(% of GDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
West Germany 
Unified Germany 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
West Germany 
Unified Germany 
13. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
West Germany 
Unified Germany 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (M3; end of year) 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
8,9 
4,3 
4,0 
24,9 
4,2 
20,8 
4,5 
-0 ,5 
-0 ,3 
3,5 
4,4 
9,1 
5,4 
4,5 
4,0 
100,0 
0,5 
100,0 
2,3 
100,0 
2,2 
0,3 
0,7 
0,4 
0,9 
10,9 
7,2 
100,0 
1974-84 
6,1 
1,7 
-0 ,2 
-0 ,8 
1,4 
20,9 
3,3 
.17,6 
1,4 
-0 ,5 
-0 ,2 
4,7 
4,3 
6,1 
1,3 
1,7 
2,0 
104,0 
-0 ,3 
108,2 
-2 ,3 
108,3 
-1 ,6 
-0 ,3 
4,0 
0,7 
-2 ,9 
32,1 
2,0 
7,4 
8,1 
72,9 
* 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
b West Germany, unless otherwise stated. 
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1985 
4,1 
1,9 
0,0 
-5 ,6 
9,9 
19,5 
2,4 
17,2 
0,9 
-2 ,1 
-1 ,7 
2,1 
2,2 
2,9 
0,8 
0,7 
1,1 
100,2 
-0 ,4 
92,5 
-1 ,8 
99,6 
-1 ,9 
0,7 
7,1 
2,4 
-1 ,2 
42,5 
3,0 
5,0 
6,9 
73,3 
1986 
5,6 
2,2 
3,6 
2,7 
4,3 
19,4 
2,5 
16,9 
3,3 
-0 ,3 
-0 ,5 
-0 ,3 
3,3 
3,6 
3,9 
0,3 
0,8 
99,7 
-0 ,5 
101,4 
9,6 
106,1 
6,6 
1,4 
6,5 
4,3 
-1 ,3 
42,5 
3,0 
6,6 
5,9 
76,8 
1987 
3,4 
1,4 
2,1 
0,0 
5,0 
19,4 
2,4 
17,0 
2,6 
-1 ,0 
-1 ,1 
0,8 
1,9 
3,2 
2,4 
1,2 
0,7 
100,2 
0,5 
107,5 
6,0 
110,0 
3,6 
0,7 
6,3 
4,1 
-1 ,9 
43,8 
2,9 
5,9 
5,8 
75,9 
1988 
5,3 
3,7 
4,6 
3,1 
6,7 
19,6 
2,3 
17,2 
3,6 
-0 ,9 
-1,1 
1,4 
1,5 
3,0 
1,6 
1,5 
2,9 
98,8 
-1 ,4 
103,6 
-3 ,6 
106,3 
-3 ,4 
0,8 
6,3 
4,3 
-2 ,2 
44,4 
2,9 
6,9 
6,1 
80,5 
(Aannual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
6,1 
3,4 
6,5 
4,8 
10,0 
20,2 
2,4 
17,8 
2,8 
-0 ,8 
-0 ,9 
3,1 
2,6 
2,9 
-0 ,2 
0,2 
1,9 
97,1 
-1 ,7 
99,7 
-3 ,8 
103,1 
-3 ,0 
1,5 
5,6 
4,8 
0,1 
43,2 
2,7 
5,6 
7,0 
84,8 
1990 
8,7 
5,1 
8,7 
5,3 
13,3 
21,0 
2,3 
18,6 
4,9 
2,8 
2,7 
2,7 
3,4 
4,7 
2,0 
1,3 
2,0 
96,4 
-0 ,7 
102,2 
2,6 
101,1 
-2,0 
3,0 
4,8 
3,5 
-2 ,0 
43,6 
2,6 
4,2 
8,9 
88,8 
1991 
8,1 
3,7 
6,5 
4,1 
9,1 
21,6 
2,3 
19,3 
3,1 
3,0 
2,6 
3,9 
4,2 
5,8 
1,8 
1,5 
1,1 
96,8 
0,4 
100,5 
-1 ,7 
100,2 
-0 ,9 
2,6 
4,2 
1,2 
-0 ,9 
-3 ,6 
-3 ,2 
45,0 
2,8 
6,3 
8,6 
88,2 
1992 
6,1 
1,5 
1,9 
1,7 
4,5 
-2 ,0 
21,5 
2,3 
19,3 
1,2 
0,5 
0,3 
4,1 
4,5 
5,4 
1,3 
0,8 
0,7 
97,0 
0,2 
105,6 
5,1 
103,9 
3,7 
0,8 
-1 ,5 
4,5 
0,9 
-1,1 
-3 ,5 
-3 ,2 
45,9 
3,1 
8,0 
86,8 
1993 
3,0 
-0 ,5 
0,0 
-1 ,7 
0,5 
-4 ,0 
21,4 
Z,J 
19,1 
-0 ,5 
-1 ,4 
— 1,1 
3,6 
3,5 
3,6 
0,0 
0,1 
0,4 
96,6 
-0 ,3 
110,1 
4,3 
110,5 
6,4 
-1 ,0 
-1 ,0 
6,0 
-0 ,1 
-1,1 
-3 ,9 
-3 ,6 
48,5 
3 2 
: 
: 
84,5 
Table 65 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Greece 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending ( + ) or net borrowing ( - ) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year)b 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
12,5 
7,7 
10,0 
22,7 
8,1 
3,1 
3,3 
3,5 
4,5 
10,4 
6,7 
5,7 
8,1 
100,0 
-2 ,2 
100,0 
-3 ,9 
100,0 
-4 ,4 
-0 ,4 
-2 ,9 
18,2 
100,0 
1974-84 
20,6 
2,5 
-2 ,2 
-3 ,7 
0,1 
22,0 
1,5 
-0 ,3 
0,0 
17,4 
17,7 
21,5 
3,5 
3,3 
1,5 
98,3 
1,8 
78,8 
0,6 
77,5 
1,4 
1,0 
3,7 
-2 ,5 
31,8 
2,4 
25,4 
13,4 
69,0 
1985 
21,3 
3,1 
5,2 
3,1 
7,7 
19,1 
4,4 
14,7 
5,4 
2,6 
3,3 
18,3 
17,7 
23,4 
4,3 
4,8 
2,2 
107,9 
2,6 
77,3 
-1 ,9 
82,1 
-1,8 
0,9 
7,7 
-8 ,2 
-13,6 
62,5 
5,3 
26,8 
15,8 
34,8 
1986 
19,4 
1,6 
-6 ,2 
-0,8 
-12,6 
18,5 
4,1 
14,3 
-1,1 
-4,6 
-4 ,7 
22,1 
17,5 
12,8 
-7 ,6 
-4 ,0 
1,3 
102,2 
-5 ,2 
65,5 
-15,2 
67,5 
-17,7 
0,3 
7,4 
-5,3 
-12,0 
65,0 
5,7 
19,0 
15,8 
43,8 
1987 
13,5 
-0 ,7 
-5,1 
-5 ,0 
-5 ,2 
17,2 
3,2 
14,0 
-1 ,5 
-4,8 
-4 ,7 
15,7 
14,3 
11,4 
-3,7 
-2 ,5 
-0 ,6 
100,2 
-1 ,9 
64,2 
-2,1 
64,7 
-4 ,2 
-0,1 
7,4 
-3,1 
-11,6 
72,5 
7,2 
24,0 
17,4 
47,7 
1988 
20,3 
4,1 
8,9 
9,2 
8,4 
17,5 
3,2 
14,3 
6,7 
2,2 
2,2 
14,3 
15,6 
19,1 
4,2 
3,0 
2,4 
100,8 
0,6 
67,6 
5,3 
68,6 
6,0 
1,6 
7,6 
-2 ,0 
-13,8 
80,2 
7,9 
23,2 
16,6 
49,9 
1989 
16,6 
3,5 
10,0 
4,0 
18,1 
19,2 
3,4 
15,9 
3,8 
0,4 
0,5 
15,2 
12,7 
18,1 
2,6 
4,8 
3,0 
102,6 
1,7 
69,5 
2,9 
71,3 
3,9 
0,4 
7,4 
-5 ,0 
-17,7 
85,9 
8,2 
24,2 
44,2 
1990 
20,4 
-0,1 
5,7 
2,2 
7,9 
19,4 
3,1 
16,4 
0,9 
-1,8 
-2 ,2 
19,7 
20,5 
19,7 
0,0 
-0 ,7 
-1 ,2 
103,1 
0,5 
73,7 
6,0 
73,0 
2,4 
1,1 
7,2 
-6,1 
-18,6 
95,3 
11,9 
15,3 
44,3 
1991 
21,7 
1,8 
-2 ,0 
-6 ,4 
3,3 
18,2 
3,6 
14,7 
2,7 
1,8 
1,2 
18,4 
19,5 
15,1 
-2,8 
-3,7 
3,5 
96,0 
-6 ,9 
69,1 
-6 ,3 
68,9 
-5 ,6 
-1 ,6 
7,7 
-5,1 
-15,2 
100,9 
12,8 
12,3 
62,2 
1992 
17,3 
1,5 
0,6 
-3 ,0 
4,5 
17,5 
3,6 
13,9 
1,1 
0,2 
0,1 
16,0 
15,6 
12,4 
-3,1 
-2 ,8 
2,0 
91,5 
-4,7 
67,9 
-1 ,6 
66,8 
-3 ,0 
-0 ,5 
7,7 
-3 ,3 
-13,4 
105,6 
14,6 
74,0 
1993 
14,5 
1,6 
4,5 
3,0 
6,0 
17,9 
3,9 
14,0 
1,6 
1,0 
1,4 
13,5 
12,7 
11,3 
-1 ,9 
-1 ,2 
1,7 
88,8 
-2 ,9 
66,2 
-2 ,5 
65,7 
-1 ,7 
-0,1 
8,5 
-3 ,0 
-9,8 
106,0 
14,5 
79,8 
1 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
b M3. 
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Table 66 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Spain 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general governmentb 
— other sectors b 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP)b 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP)b 
16. Money supply (end of year)c 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
14,8 
7,2 
10,4 
24,6 
7,6 
2,7 
2,9 
6,6 
7,1 
14,6 
7,5 
7,1 
6,5 
100,0 
0,6 
100,0 
1,8 
100,0 
1,2 
0,7 
; 
-0 ,2 
100,0 
1974-84 
17,7 
1,7 
-1 ,6 
-1 ,8 
-1 ,3 
23,2 
2,4 
20,3 
1,0 
-0 ,8 
-0 ,5 
16,1 
15,7 
18,8 
2,3 
2,7 
3,2 
103,5 
-0 ,5 
117,1 
-0 ,6 
113,0 
0,2 
-1 ,4 
10,4 
-1 ,7 
-2 ,4 
20,1 
0,8 
18,0 
71,7 
1985 
11,1 
2,3 
4,1 
2,0 
9,1 
19,2 
3,7 
15,5 
2,9 
0,1 
0,8 
8,2 
8,5 
9,4 
1,1 
0,8 
3,7 
94,1 
-2 ,8 
101,4 
-0 ,6 
106,7 
-0 ,4 
-1 ,3 
21,6 
1,4 
-6 ,9 
45,2 
3,1 
13,8 
13,4 
84,5 
1986 
14,6 
3,2 
9,9 
6,5 
15,8 
19,5 
3,6 
15,8 
5,4 
1,5 
1,5 
9,4 
11,1 
9,5 
0,1 
-1 ,4 
1,8 
91,1 
-3 ,2 
103,8 
2,3 
105,1 
-1 ,5 
1,4 
21,0 
1,6 
-6 ,0 
46,2 
4,0 
14,0 
11,4 
101,6 
1987 
11,8 
5,6 
14,0 
9,9 
23,2 
20,8 
3,4 
17,4 
8,1 
4,4 
4,5 
5,7 
5,8 
6,7 
0,9 
0,8 
1,1 
90,8 
-0 ,3 
106,3 
2,4 
104,8 
-0 ,3 
4,5 
20,4 
0,1 
-3 ,1 
46,6 
3,5 
15,4 
12,8 
108,3 
1988 
11,1 
5,2 
14,0 
12,4 
16,6 
22,6 
3,8 
18,8 
7,0 
2;5 
2,4 
5,0 
5,7 
6,8 
1,8 
1,1 
1,7 
90,3 
-0 ,6 
112,1 
5,5 
111,2 
6,1 
3,4 
19,3 
-1 ,1 
-3 ,3 
42,9 
3,4 
14,4 
11,8 
112,4 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
12,1 
4,8 
13,8 
15,1 
12,9 
24,2 
4,4 
19,7 
7,8 
4,3 
4,3 
6,6 
7,0 
6,3 
-0 ,3 
-0 ,7 
1,2 
88,6 
-1 ,8 
118,7 
5,9 
119,4 
7,4 
3,5 
17,1 
-3 ,2 
-2 ,8 
44,4 
3,5 
14,6 
13,8 
122,0 
1990 
11,2 
3,6 
6,9 
10,8 
1,4 
24,6 
4,9 
19,7 
4,7 
2,2 
1,7 
6,4 
7,3 
7,9 
1,4 
0,5 
0,8 
88,4 
-0 ,2 
126,8 
6,8 
122,6 
2,7 
2,8 
16,1 
-3 ,7 
-4 ,0 
44,5 
3,5 
15,3 
14,7 
123,5 
1991 
9,4 
2,4 
1,6 
4,3 
-2 ,5 
24,1 
5,2 
18,9 
2,9 
2,3 
1,7 
6,3 
6,9 
8,7 
2,2 
1,7 
2,1 
88,0 
-0 ,4 
127,7 
0,7 
124,6 
1,6 
0,2 
16,3 
-3 ,5 
-4 ,9 
45,6 
4,0 
10,9 
12,4 
123,5 
1992 
7,5 
1,2 
-2 ,0 
-3 ,4 
0,2 
22,6 
5,1 
17,6 
1,8 
0,8 
0,8 
6,0 
6,3 
9,0 
2,8 
2,5 
2,8 
87,8 
-0 ,3 
128,7 
0,8 
123,5 
-0 ,8 
-1 ,6 
18,0 
-3 ,7 
-4 ,6 
47,4 
4,3 
12,2 
123,6 
1993 
5,7 
1,0 
-1 ,9 
-3 ,3 
0,3 
22,0 
5,0 
16,9 
0,4 
-0 ,4 
0,0 
5,5 
4,7 
7,3 
1,7 
2,5 
2,6 
87,7 
-0 ,1 
123,8 
-3 ,8 
119,9 
-2 ,9 
-1 ,6 
19,5 
-3 ,4 
-4 ,2 
49,5 
4,7 
120,4 
• 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
t> Break in 1985/86. c ALP: Liquid assets held by the public. 
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Table 67 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
France 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+ ) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(% of GDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year)b 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
10,7 
5,4 
7,5 
24,0 
5,6 
0,7 
0,9 
4,8 
5,1 
9,9 
4,8 
4,6 
4,7 
100,0 
-0 ,1 
100,0 
-0 ,8 
100,0 
-1 ,2 
0,7 
0,4 
0,4 
; 
13,7 
6,9 
100,0 
1974-84 
13,1 
2,2 
-0 ,5 
-1 ,1 
0,3 
22,5 
3,4 
19,1 
1,6 
-0 ,2 
0,1 
11,2 
10,7 
13,8 
2,3 
2,8 
2,2 
106,2 
0,6 
93,8 
-0 ,8 
93,0 
0,1 
0,0 
6,0 
-0 ,3 
-1 ,6 
39,6 
1,6 
13,1 
12,3 
69,0 
1985 
7,8 
1,8 
3,4 
-0 ,4 
10,0 
19,3 
3,2 
16,0 
2,3 
-0 ,4 
0,2 
6,0 
5,8 
6,6 
0,6 
0,7 
2,1 
104,2 
-1 ,4 
86,4 
1,8 
93,1 
2,1 
-0 ,3 
10,1 
0,1 
-2 ,9 
45,5 
2,9 
7,4 
10,9 
68,8 
1986 
7,9 
2,4 
4,6 
3,6 
4,3 
19,3 
3,2 
16,1 
4,3 
0,7 
0,7 
2,9 
5,3 
4,6 
1,7 
-0 ,7 
2,3 
101,1 
-2 ,9 
88,9 
2,9 
92,5 
-0 ,6 
0,1 
10,3 
0,5 
-2 ,7 
45,7 
2,9 
6,8 
8,4 
76,6 
1987 
5,3 
2,2 
5,0 
3,2 
6,7 
19,8 
3,0 
16,7 
3,3 
-0 ,3 
-0 ,3 
3,3 
3,0 
3,7 
0,4 
0,6 
1,9 
99,9 
-1 ,2 
88,4 
-0 ,5 
89,6 
-3 ,2 
0,3 
10,4 
-0 ,2 
-1 ,9 
47,2 
2,8 
9,8 
9,4 
78,8 
1988 
7,5 
4,3 
9,6 
6,7 
10,8 
20,7 
3,3 
17,4 
4,4 
- O i l 
-0 ,2 
2,9 
3,1 
4,4 
1,4 
1,2 
3,4 
97,8 
-2 ,1 
84,8 
-4 ,1 
86,3 
-3 ,7 
0,8 
9,9 
-0 ,3 
-1 ,7 
46,8 
2,7 
8,4 
9,0 
84,8 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
7,4 
3,8 
6,8 
7,2 
6,4 
21,2 
3,3 
17,9 
3,3 
-0 ,2 
-0 ,2 
3,6 
3,5 
4,7 
1,0 
1,2 
2,6 
96,4 
-1 ,4 
82,5 
-2 ,7 
84,9 
-1 ,6 
1,1 
9,4 
-0 ,4 
-1 ,1 
47,5 
2,7 
9,6 
8,8 
89,2 
1990 
5,4 
2,2 
3,1 
2,7 
4,1 
21,2 
3,5 
17,8 
2,6 
0,0 
-0 ,5 
3,2 
3,1 
5,0 
1,8 
1,9 
1,2 
97,0 
0,6 
86,0 
4,2 
85,1 
0,2 
1,0 
9,0 
-0 ,8 
-1 ,4 
46,7 
2,9 
8,9 
9,9 
87,5 
1991 
4,2 
1,1 
-1 ,3 
0,6 
-2 ,5 
20,8 
3,4 
17,4 
0,8 
0,1 
-0 ,6 
3,2 
3,1 
4,2 
1,0 
1,1 
0,7 
97,4 
0,4 
82,6 
-4 ,0 
82,3 
-3 ,3 
0,4 
9,5 
-0 ,5 
-1 ,9 
48,5 
3,1 
2,5 
9,0 
84,2 
1992 
4,8 
1,9 
-1 ,5 
2,3 
-4 ,3 
20,0 
3,4 
16,6 
1,0 
0,1 
-0 ,1 
2,6 
2,9 
4,1 
1,5 
1,2 
2,2 
96,4 
-0 ,9 
84,2 
1,9 
82,5 
0,2 
-0 ,2 
10,1 
0,1 
-2 ,8 
50,1 
3,2 
: 
8,6 
86,0 
1993 
3,9 
1,0 
-0 ,7 
0,2 
-1 ,4 
19,6 
3,3 
16,2 
1,0 
0,5 
0,9 
2,7 
29 
3,9 
1,2 
1,0 
1,3 
96,2 
-0 ,3 
86,7 
3,0 
85,9 
4,2 
-0 ,3 
10,8 
0,2 
-3 ,2 
52,4 
3,3 
; 
; 
85,9 
* 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992-93. 
» M3. 
Table 68 
Main economic indicators 1961­93 a 
Ireland 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961­73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961­73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961­73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending ( + ) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year) b 
17. Long­term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961­73 = 100) 
1961­73 
11,8 
4,4 
9,9 
21,2 
5,1 
1,1 
1,3 
6,3 
7,2 
11,3 
4,7 
3,9 
4,3 
100,0 
­0 ,4 
100,0 
0,4 
100,0 
0,2 
0,1 
­2 ,5 
­3 ,8 
12,1 
100,0 
1974­84 
17,8 
3,8 
1,8 
1,3 
2,3 
25,9 
5,1 
20,7 
2,3 
0,7 
1,0 
14,5 
13,5 
17,4 
2,5 
3,5 
3,5 
100,2 
0,0 
95,6 
­0 ,4 
94,1 
0,1 
0,3 
10,3 
­8 ,4 
­10,9 
76,0 
6,6 
16,6 
14,7 
78,0 
1985 
8,4 
3,1 
­7 ,7 
­7 ,1 
­7 ,4 
19,0 
4,0 
15,0 
1,1 
­1 ,7 
­1 ,1 
5,0 
5,2 
8,9 
3,7 
3,5 
5,4 
94,3 
­1 ,8 
97,8 
0,7 
102,5 
0,8 
­2 ,2 
18,2 
­3 ,9 
­11,2 
107,9 
10,3 
5,3 
12,7 
100,7 
1986 
6,1 
­0 ,4 
­2 ,8 
­4 ,6 
1,5 
18,0 
3,7 
14,3 
1,1 
­2 ,6 
­2 ,7 
4,6 
6,5 
5,3 
0,7 
­1 ,2 
­0 ,6 
93,7 
­0 ,6 
103,8 
6,1 
105,4 
2,8 
0,2 
18,2 
­2 ,9 
­11,1 
119,9 
9,7 
­1 ,0 
11,1 
102,8 
1987 
7,4 
5,0 
­3 ,2 
­7 ,6 
0,9 
16,4 
2,7 
13,7 
­0 ,2 
­3 ,9 
­3 ,9 
2,9 
2,3 
5,3 
2,4 
2,9 
5,1 
91,8 
­2 ,1 
98,6 
­5 ,0 
97,9 
­7 ,2 
­0 ,1 
18,0 
1,2 
­8 ,9 
120,6 
9,6 
10,9 
11,3 
113,0 
1988 
7,9 
4,9 
1,5 
1,9 
0,1 
16,3 
1,9 
14,4 
1,6 
­3 ,2 
­3 ,4 
2,5 
2,9 
6,1 
3,5 
3,1 
3,9 
91,1 
­0 ,7 
96,3 
­2 ,4 
95,8 
­2,1 
1,0 
17,3 
1,5 
­4 ,8 
118,2 
8,9 
6,3 
9,4 
116,2 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
11,5 
6,5 
15,1 
15,1 
19,6 
17,7 
1,9 
15,8 
6,7 
3,2 
3,1 
3,7 
4,7 
6,2 
2,4 
1,4 
6,6 
86,7 
­4 ,8 
91,0 
­5 ,4 
91,7 
­4 ,3 
­0 ,1 
15,7 
0,8 
­1 ,8 
108,0 
8,1 
5,0 
9,0 
140,4 
1990 
6,6 
8,3 
10,2 
11,7 
7,2 
18,6 
2,2 
16,4 
6,3 
4,3 
3,9 
1,7 
­1 ,6 
4,4 
2,6 
6,0 
4,8 
87,7 
1,2 
90,6 
­0,4 
88,3 
­3,7 
3,3 
14,5 
1,3 
­2 ,5 
101,6 
8,2 
15,4 
10,1 
139,0 
1991 
3,8 
2,5 
­7 ,2 
­1,4 
­11,6 
17,1 
2,4 
14,7 
­0,7 
­0 ,6 
­1,1 
3,2 
1,2 
4,4 
1,1 
3,1 
2,6 
88,2 
0,5 
86,3 
­4 ,8 
84,5 
­4 ,2 
­0 ,1 
16,2 
6,0 
­2 ,1 
100,9 
8,0 
3,1 
9,2 
133,3 
1992 
5,9 
2,9 
1,6 
2,5 
0,5 
16,8 
2,4 
14,4 
­0 ,9 
­1 ,6 
­1 ,7 
2,9 
2,9 
6,3 
3,3 
3,3 
2,8 
88,5 
0,4 
88,7 
2,8 
85,7 
1,3 
0,1 
17,8 
6,7 
­2 ,7 
99,0 
7,2 
9,1 
133,5 
1993 
4,5 
2,1 
2,2 
3,0 
1,2 
16,7 
2,4 
14,3 
2,2 
1,5 
1,9 
2,2 
2,3 
5,9 
3,6 
3,4 
2,0 
89,8 
1,4 
93,3 
5,1 
90,9 
6,1 
0,1 
19,2 
6,6 
­3,0 
98,7 
7,2 
128,6 
■ 1961­91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992­93: Economic forecasts winter 1992­93. b M3. 
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Table 69 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Italy 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
• — construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+ ) or net borrowing ( - ) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year)b 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
11,0 
5,3 
4,7 
24,4 
5,3 
0,4 
0,6 
4,9 
5,5 
11,5 
6,3 
5,7 
5,5 
100,0 
0,1 
100,0 
-0 ,3 
100,0 
-0 ,8 
-0 ,2 
1,4 
-3 ,1 
; 
15,4 
7,0 
100,0 
1974-84 
20,1 
2,8 
0,5 
-1 ,4 
3,6 
23,3 
3,2 
20,1 
2,4 
0,6 
1,0 
16,6 
16,8 
19,0 
2,0 
1,8 
1,8 
103,9 
0,0 
89,0 
0,2 
87,6 
1,2 
0,9 
7,1 
-0 ,6 
-9 ,3 
60,9 
5,4 
17,3 
15,2 
64,3 
• 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
b M2. 
1985 
11,7 
2,6 
0,6 
-0 ,5 
1,9 
20,7 
3,7 
16,9 
2,8 
0,0 
0,8 
9,0 
8,9 
10,1 
1,0 
1,1 
1,7 
101,7 
-0 ,5 
95,5 
-0 ,6 
103,3 
-0 ,4 
0,9 
9,6 
-0 ,9 
-12,6 
82,2 
8,0 
11,1 
14,3 
66,6 
1986 
11,0 
2,9 
2,2 
1,9 
2,6 
19,7 
3,5 
16,2 
3,4 
-0 ,3 
-0 ,4 
6,2 
7,9 
7,5 
1,3 
-0 ,3 
2,1 
99,3 
-2 ,4 
100,9 
5,7 
105,0 
1,7 
0,8 
10,5 
0,5 
-11,6 
86,2 
8,5 
10,7 
11,7 
76,5 
1987 
9,3 
3,1 
5,0 
-0 ,7 
11,9 
19,7 
3,5 
16,2 
4,3 
0,8 
1,0 
5,3 
6,0 
8,2 
2,8 
2,1 
2,7 
98,7 
-0 ,6 
104,4 
3,4 
105,6 
0,6 
0,4 
10,3 
-0 ,2 
-11,0 
90,4 
7,9 
7,2 
11,3 
80,3 
1988 
11,0 
4,1 
6,9 
2,3 
11,6 
20,1 
3,4 
16,7 
4,7 
0,2 
0,2 
5,7 
6,6 
8,8 
2,9 
2,0 
3,2 
97,6 
-1 ,2 
103,8 
-0 ,5 
105,7 
0,1 
0,9 
10,8 
-0 ,7 
-10,7 
92,6 
8,1 
7,6 
12,1 
85,5 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
9,3 
2,9 
4,3 
3,9 
5,1 
20,2 
3,4 
16,8 
2,9 
-0 ,6 
-0 ,6 
6,5 
6,2 
8,8 
2,2 
2,5 
2,9 
97,2 
-0 ,4 
107,1 
3,1 
110,7 
4,7 
0,1 
10,6 
-1 ,3 
-9 ,9 
95,5 
8,9 
9,9 
12,9 
87,1 
1990 
9,9 
2,2 
3,3 
2,5 
3,5 
20,2 
3,4 
16,8 
2,7 
0,1 
-0 ,4 
5,9 
7,5 
10,5 
4,4 
2,8 
1,1 
98,8 
1,7 
115,7 
8,1 
115,0 
3,8 
1,1 
9,9 
-1 ,4 
-10,9 
97,8 
9,6 
8,2 
13,4 
83,5 
1991 
8,8 
1,4 
0,9 
1,2 
0,7 
19,8 
3,3 
16,4 
2,2 
1,6 
0,9 
6,8 
7,3 
8,7 
1,7 
1,3 
0,7 
99,4 
0,6 
116,9 
1,0 
117,3 
2,0 
0,8 
10,2 
-1 ,9 
-10,2 
101,3 
10,2 
9,0 
13,0 
82,3 
1992 
6,3 
1,1 
-0 ,2 
0,4 
-0 ,7 
19,4 
3,1 
16,3 
1,3 
0,4 
0,4 
5,3 
5,2 
5,1 
-0 ,2 
-0 ,1 
1,0 
98,4 
-1 ,1 
114,5 
-2 ,0 
112,7 
-3 ,9 
0,1 
10,2 
-2 ,4 
-10,5 
106,8 
11,5 
13,7 
84,2 
1993 
5,3 
0,8 
-1 ,2 
-0 ,7 
-1 ,6 
19,3 
3,1 
16,2 
-0 ,2 
-1 ,0 
-0 ,5 
5,8 
4,5 
4,1 
-1 ,6 
-0 ,4 
0,8 
97,2 
-1 ,2 
103,5 
-9 ,6 
102,5 
-9 ,0 
0,0 
10,6 
-2 ,4 
-10,2 
112,2 
12,6 
84,2 
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Table 70 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Luxembourg 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+ ) or net borrowing ( - ) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year) 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
8,7 
4,0 
4,9 
26,4 
4,0 
3,0 
4,4 
7,4 
4,2 
2,8 
3,0 
100,0 
-0 ,2 
: 
1,1 
6,8 
2,0 
100,0 
1974-84 
8,8 
1,7 
-2 ,1 
-3 ,1 
-0 ,8 
24,5 
6,2 
18,3 
1,6 
7,7 
7,0 
9,7 
1,8 
2,5 
1,2 
115,9 
1,3 
0,4 
1,6 
25,3 
1,4 
15,4 
1,2 
8,0 
51,8 
1985 
6,0 
2,9 
-9 ,5 
-2 ,1 
-20,5 
17,7 
4,6 
13,1 
0,1 
4,3 
3,0 
4,2 
0,0 
1,2 
1,5 
108,6 
-0 ,3 
1,4 
2,9 
43,8 
6,2 
14,0 
1,1 
9,5 
63,6 
1986 
8,8 
4,8 
31,2 
5,7 
87,2 
22,1 
4,3 
17,8 
8,0 
1,3 
3,8 
3,6 
2,3 
-0 ,2 
2,1 
106,2 
-2 ,3 
2,6 
2,6 
38,8 
4,3 
13,5 
1,1 
8,7 
71,9 
1987 
1,9 
2,9 
14,7 
8,9 
18,7 
25,5 
4,9 
20,7 
4,2 
1,7 
- ι , ο 
4,8 
3,1 
5,9 
0,1 
112,2 
5,7 
2,8 
2,5 
30,3 
2,4 
11,9 
1,2 
8,0 
56,7 
1988 
10,0 
5,7 
14,1 
8,8 
16,1 
27,0 
5,0 
22,0 
6,8 
2,7 
4,0 
3,1 
0,4 
-0 ,9 
2,6 
108,4 
-3 ,4 
3,1 
2,0 
30,8 
3,1 
9,8 
1,0 
7,1 
68,1 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
13,0 
6,7 
8,9 
4,6 
-16,9 
27,1 
4,8 
22,3 
5,7 
3,6 
6,0 
6,7 
3,0 
0,7 
2,9 
106,1 
-2 ,1 
: 
; 
3,7 
1,8 
34,0 
5,3 
8,3 
0,7 
7,7 
76,8 
1990 
6,2 
3,2 
2,5 
8,0 
10,9 
26,9 
4,7 
22,2 
5,1 
3,6 
2,9 
6,9 
3,2 
3,9 
-1 ,1 
111,4 
5,0 
4,3 
1,7 
34,2 
5,0 
6,9 
0,6 
8,6 
65,6 
1991 
6,1 
3,1 
9,8 
7,1 
11,4 
29,0 
4,4 
24,6 
8,4 
2,9 
3,0 
5,4 
2,4 
2,3 
-0 ,6 
114,7 
2,9 
: 
3,6 
1,6 
27,9 
-0 ,8 
6,1 
0,6 
8,2 
57,1 
1992 
4,5 
2,2 
4,5 
6,0 
3,5 
29,7 
4,5 
25,2 
3,3 
3,4 
2,2 
5,1 
1,6 
2,8 
0,7 
117,1 
2,1 
: 
1,5 
1,9 
19,9 
-0 ,4 
6,8 
0,5 
7,9 
50,9 
1993 
6,2 
2,0 
2,3 
3,3 
1,7 
29,6 
4,7 
24,9 
2,2 
4,7 
4,1 
6,0 
1,2 
1,8 
0,5 
118,6 
1,3 
: 
1,5 
2,0 
18,7 
-1,0 
7,8 
0,5 
47,0 
■ 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
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Table 71 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 ·' 
Netherlands 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government1» 
— other sectors'5 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP)b 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP)b 
16. Money supply (end of year)0 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
11,2 
4,8 
5,3 
25,7 
4,9 
0,1 
0,3 
5,0 
6,0 
11,4 
6,0 
5,0 
3,9 
100,0 
1,0 
100,0 
2,9 
100,0 
2,6 
0,9 
0,5 
-0,8 
: 
10,3 
5,9 
100,0 
1974-84 
7,8 
1,7 
-0 ,9 
-2 ,0 
1,3 
20,6 
3,3 
16,8 
1,3 
-0 ,4 
-0 ,2 
6,1 
5,9 
7,2 
1,0 
1,2 
2,1 
103,5 
-0,9 
118,1 
-1,3 
117,2 
-0,8 
-0 ,3 
7,5 
1,7 
-3 ,9 
3,9 
8,9 
9,6 
74,0 
1985 
4,5 
2,6 
6,7 
-0,1 
15,5 
19,7 
2,6 
16,6 
3,2 
0,8 
1,3 
2,2 
1,8 
1,4 
-0,8 
-0 ,4 
1,0 
93,2 
-1 ,4 
97,8 
-3 ,0 
102,1 
-2 ,9 
1,5 
10,5 
4,1 
-4 ,8 
71,6 
6,3 
10,7 
7,3 
85,2 
1986 
2,5 
2,0 
7,9 
5,0 
10,1 
20,6 
2,5 
17,6 
2,1 
-1 ,6 
-1 ,6 
0,2 
0,5 
1,6 
1,4 
1,2 
0,0 
94,2 
1,1 
103,3 
5,6 
105,3 
3,2 
2,0 
10,3 
2,7 
-6 ,0 
73,1 
6,2 
5,1 
6,4 
83,8 
1987 
0,4 
0,8 
1,5 
1,9 
1,9 
20,8 
2,1 
18,7 
1,2 
-2 ,2 
-2 ,2 
-0 ,9 
-0 ,4 
1,5 
2,4 
1,9 
-0 ,6 
96,6 
2,5 
107,5 
4,1 
107,8 
2,4 
1,4 
10,0 
1,9 
-5 ,9 
75,6 
6,4 
4,4 
6,4 
76,9 
1988 
3,8 
2,6 
4,5 
10,3 
5,0 
21,3 
2,1 
19,2 
1,8 
-2 ,6 
-2 ,7 
0,5 
1,2 
0,9 
0,3 
-0 ,3 
1,0 
95,3 
-1 ,3 
104,5 
-2 ,8 
105,3 
-2 ,3 
1,6 
9,3 
2,8 
-4 ,6 
78,8 
6,3 
10,6 
6,3 
78,2 
1989 
6,0 
4,7 
4,9 
2,3 
5,3 
21,5 
2,0 
19,5 
4,6 
1,2 
1,3 
1,2 
1,2 
0,7 
-0 ,5 
-0 ,5 
2,7 
92,3 
-3,1 
98,3 
-6 ,0 
99,8 
-5 ,2 
1,9 
8,5 
3,5 
-4 ,7 
78,8 
6,0 
13,7 
7,2 
84,5 
1990 
6,5 
3,9 
3,6 
0,6 
7,6 
21,3 
2,0 
19,2 
3,5 
0,7 
0,3 
2,3 
2,5 
4,1 
1,8 
1,5 
1,5 
92,4 
0,0 
99,5 
1,3 
98,5 
-1 ,4 
2,3 
7,5 
4,0 
-4 ,9 
78,8 
6,0 
8,2 
9,0 
86,2 
1991 
5,3 
2,2 
0,1 
-2,1 
2,6 
20,8 
2,0 
18,8 
1,7 
0,7 
0,3 
3,3 
3,0 
4,3 
0,9 
1,3 
0,9 
92,7 
0,3 
97,0 
-2 ,5 
96,6 
-1 ,9 
1,3 
7,0 
3,9 
-2 ,5 
78,3 
6,2 
4,7 
8,9 
85,3 
1992 
4,0 
1,3 
-0 ,4 
0,0 
-0,8 
20,6 
2,1 
18,5 
0,6 
-0 ,4 
-0 ,5 
3,1 
2,7 
4,8 
1,7 
2,1 
0,9 
93,8 
1,2 
99,8 
2,8 
98,2 
1,6 
0,4 
6,7 
3,6 
-3 ,5 
79,8 
6,2 
8,1 
81,8 
1993 
3,4 
i 
2¿ 
18,3 
0,3 
-0 ,2 
0,1 
2,7 
2,8 
0,6 
0,5 
1,1 
93,2 
-0 ,6 
102,5 
27 
101,3 
3,2 
-0 ,4 
7,6 
3,6 
-3 ,5 
81,7 
6,2 
80,9 
' 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
b Break in 1986/87. 
' M2. 
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Table 72 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 a 
Portugal 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(%ofGDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+ ) or net borrowing ( - ) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year)b 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
11,1 
6,9 
7,9 
24,1 
2,7 
21,4 
7,3 
2,5 
2,7 
3,9 
3,9 
10,8 
6,7 
6,7 
6,7 
100,0 
0,0 
100,0 
-0 ,7 
100,0 
-1 ,2 
0,2 
: 
0,4 
0,6 
0,6 
100,0 
1974-84 
23,3 
2,1 
-1 ,0 
27,4 
3,2 
24,1 
1,2 
-0 ,5 
-0 ,2 
22,5 
20,7 
24,4 
1,6 
3,1 
2,7 
119,1 
0,4 
100,4 
-2 ,2 
98,1 
-1 ,6 
-0 ,5 
6,8 
-7 ,3 
39,9 
3,3 
21,7 
38,1 
1985 
25,2 
2,8 
-3 ,5 
-6 ,0 
-4 ,5 
21,8 
2,5 
19,3 
0,9 
-1 ,8 
-1 ,2 
19,4 
21,7 
22,5 
2,6 
0,6 
2,8 
104,4 
-2 ,2 
80,1 
1,7 
83,0 
2,0 
0,0 
8,8 
0,4 
-10,1 
70,9 
7,9 
28,6 
25,4 
44,9 
1986 
25,4 
4,1 
10,9 
8,7 
14,2 
22,1 
2,6 
19,5 
8,3 
4,3 
4,3 
13,8 
20,5 
21,6 
6,8 
0,9 
7,0 
98,4 
-5 ,7 
81,0 
1,0 
81,6 
-1 ,7 
-2 ,7 
8,3 
2,4 
-7 ,2 
69,5 
9,2 
26,3 
17,9 
53,6 
1987 
17,1 
5,3 
15,1 
9,4 
26,8 
24,2 
2,7 
21,5 
10,4 
6,5 
6,6 
10,0 
11,2 
17,9 
7,2 
6,0 
4,7 
99,7 
1,3 
82,0 
1,3 
81,1 
-0 ,6 
0,5 
6,9 
-0 ,4 
-6 ,8 
72,9 
7,8 
19,7 
15,4 
53,0 
1988 
16,0 
3,9 
15,0 
10,1 
23,2 
26,8 
2,9 
23,9 
7,4 
2,9 
2,7 
10,0 
11,6 
13,4 
3,1 
1,5 
3,9 
97,4 
-2 ,2 
82,7 
0,9 
82,2 
1,4 
0,1 
5,7 
-4 ,4 
-5 ,4 
75,2 
7,8 
17,7 
14,2 
54,9 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
18,8 
5,2 
5,6 
3,5 
10,0 
26,4 
3,1 
23,3 
4,3 
0,7 
0,7 
12,1 
13,0 
12,8 
0,6 
-0 ,2 
4,1 
93,5 
-4 ,1 
83,9 
1,4 
84,3 
2,6 
1,0 
5,0 
-2 ,3 
-3 ,4 
72,1 
7,2 
10,4 
14,9 
60,4 
1990 
19,3 
4,4 
5,9 
5,3 
5,8 
26,4 
3,9 
22,4 
5,4 
2,9 
2,5 
12,6 
14,3 
18,7 
5,4 
3,9 
3,5 
93,8 
0,4 
90,2 
7,5 
88,3 
4,7 
0,9 
4,6 
-2 ,5 
-5 ,5 
68,4 
8,1 
11,3 
16,8 
60,8 
1991 
16,5 
1,9 
2,8 
4,5 
1,0 
25,5 
4,0 
21,5 
4,1 
3,6 
2,9 
11,9 
14,3 
19,0 
6,4 
4,1 
1,0 
96,7 
3,0 
101,6 
12,6 
100,1 
13,3 
0,9 
4,1 
-3 ,5 
-6 ,4 
68,5 
8,5 
19,0 
17,1 
58,6 
1992 
15,0 
1,7 
3,6 
2,5 
4,8 
25,1 
4,0 
21,1 
3,6 
2,9 
2,7 
9,1 
13,1 
14,9 
5,3 
1,7 
1,9 
96,5 
-0 ,2 
115,0 
13,2 
111,7 
11,6 
-0 ,2 
4,8 
-2,1 
-5 ,6 
66,2 
9,1 
15,0 
59,0 
1993 
9,4 
1,3 
3,3 
2,8 
3,8 
25,4 
4,0 
21,4 
3,2 
2,6 
2,9 
6,8 
8,0 
9,9 
2,8 
1,7 
1,8 
96,4 
-0 ,1 
121,0 
5,2 
117,8 
5,5 
-0 ,5 
5,4 
-4 ,2 
-4 ,8 
66,3 
7,9 
57,5 
' 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. 
b L - : Liquid assets residents. 
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Table 73 
Main economic indicators 1961-93 " 
United Kingdom 
1. Gross domestic product 
— at current prices 
— at constant prices 
2. Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices 
— total 
— construction 
— equipment 
3. Gross fixed capital formation at current prices 
(% of GDP) 
— total 
— general government 
— other sectors 
4. Final national uses incl. stocks 
— at constant prices 
— relative against 19 competitors 
— relative against other member countries 
5. Inflation 
— price deflator private consumption 
— price deflator GDP 
6. Compensation per employee 
— nominal 
— real, deflator private consumption 
— real, deflator GDP 
7. GDP at constant market prices per person 
employed 
8. Real unit labour costs 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
9. Relative unit labour costs in common currency 
• against 19 competitors 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
• against other member countries 
— 1961-73 = 100 
— annual % change 
10. Employment 
11. Unemployment rate 
(% of civilian labour force) 
12. Current balance (% of GDP) 
13. Net lending (+ ) or net borrowing (—) of general 
government (% of GDP) 
14. Gross debt of general government (% of GDP) 
15. Interest payments by general government 
(%ofGDP) 
16. Money supply (end of year) b 
17. Long-term interest rate (%) 
18. Profitability (1961-73 = 100) 
1961-73 
8,4 
3,2 
4,6 
18,5 
3,2 
-1 ,9 
-1 ,8 
4,9 
5,1 
8,3 
3,3 
3,0 
2,9 
100,0 
0,1 
100,0 
-1 ,9 
100,0 
-3 ,0 
0,3 
-0 ,1 
-0 ,6 
; 
7,6 
100,0 
1974-84 
14,4 
1,2 
0,4 
-0 ,7 
1,4 
18,1 
3,0 
15,1 
1,1 
-0 ,8 
-0 ,5 
12,6 
13,0 
14,4 
1,6 
1,2 
1,5 
101,7 
-0 ,3 
92,1 
1,0 
87,9 
2,3 
-0 ,3 
6,5 
-0 ,1 
-3 ,6 
58,6 
4,5 
14,0 
13,2 
75,1 
1985 
9,6 
3,7 
4,0 
-2 ,4 
10,7 
16,9 
2,1 
14,9 
2,9 
0,0 
0,9 
5,3 
5,7 
7,6 
2,2 
1,8 
2,5 
97,0 
-0 ,6 
94,3 
1,4 
100,8 
1,8 
1,3 
11,4 
0,5 
-2 ,9 
59,0 
5,0 
13,0 
10,6 
91,7 
1986 
7,7 
4,1 
2,4 
6,1 
-0 ,9 
16,8 
1,9 
14,9 
4,7 
1,2 
1,2 
4,3 
3,5 
7,8 
3,4 
4,2 
4,0 
97,2 
0,2 
87,5 
-7 ,2 
87,5 
-13,2 
0,1 
11,4 
-0 ,8 
-2 ,4 
58,0 
4,5 
15,9 
9,8 
92,7 
1987 
10,1 
4,8 
9,6 
11,0 
8,7 
17,5 
1,7 
15,9 
5,4 
2,1 
2,4 
4,4 
5,0 
6,9 
2,4 
1,8 
2,7 
96,3 
-0 ,9 
87,5 
0,0 
84,0 
-4 ,0 
2,1 
10,4 
-2 ,0 
-1 ,3 
55,8 
4,3 
16,4 
9,5 
99,0 
1988 
11,2 
4,3 
14,2 
13,4 
13,0 
19,1 
1,3 
17,8 
8,0 
3,8 
4,1 
5,1 
6,6 
7,8 
2,5 
1,1 
1,0 
96,4 
0,1 
96,5 
10,3 
94,4 
12,4 
3,3 
8,5 
-4 ,8 
1,0 
49,5 
3,9 
17,6 
9,3 
102,1 
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 
1989 
9,4 
2,1 
7,2 
5,4 
11,6 
20,1 
1,8 
18,3 
3,3 
-0 ,3 
-0 ,3 
5,9 
7,1 
8,3 
2,2 
1,1 
-0 ,8 
98,3 
2,0 
99,2 
2,7 
99,3 
5,2 
3,0 
7,1 
-5 ,4 
0,9 
43,2 
3,7 
19,1 
9,6 
97,5 
1990 
6,8 
0,5 
-3 ,1 
-0 ,6 
-3 ,6 
19,3 
2,3 
17,0 
-0 ,5 
-3 ,0 
-4 ,0 
5,3 
6,3 
9,5 
3,9 
3,0 
-0 ,2 
101,5 
3,2 
103,1 
3,9 
97,7 
-1 ,6 
0,7 
7,0 
-4 ,2 
-1 ,3 
39,8 
3,4 
11,5 
11,1 
87,5 
1991 
4,3 
-2 ,2 
-9 ,9 
-8 ,4 
-11,9 
16,7 
2,2 
14,5 
-3 ,2 
-3 ,9 
-5 ,1 
7,2 
6,7 
8,9 
1,5 
2,0 
0,9 
102,7 
1,2 
106,8 
3,6 
102,8 
5,2 
-3 ,1 
9,1 
-1 ,8 
-2 ,8 
41,1 
3,0 
5,8 
9,9 
85,9 
1992 
3,6 
-0 ,9 
-0 ,4 
-1 ,4 
0,6 
15,6 
2,1 
13,5 
0,0 
-0 ,9 
-1 ,0 
5,1 
4,6 
6,0 
0,8 
1,3 
1,4 
102,6 
-0 ,1 
104,7 
-2 ,0 
98,0 
-4 ,6 
-2 ,3 
10,8 
-2 ,7 
-6 ,2 
45,9 
3,1 
9,1 
90,0 
1993 
4,9 
1,4 
-0 ,8 
-1 ,5 
0,0 
15,5 
2,2 
13,4 
0,5 
-0 ,4 
0,2 
5,1 
3,4 
3,7 
-1 ,3 
0,3 
3,1 
99,8 
-2 ,8 
93,4 
-10,8 
87,6 
-10,6 
-1 ,7 
12,3 
-3 ,5 
-8 ,3 
52,6 
3,8 
94,7 
■ 1961-91: Eurostat and Commission services; 1992-93: Economic forecasts winter 1992/93. b M4. 
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situation to date 
The determinants of supply in industry 
in the Community 
The development of market services 
in the European Community, 
the United States and Japan 
Technical progress, structural change and employment 
Annual Economic Report 1985-86 
Annual Economic Review 1985-86 
Employment problems: views of businessmen and the 
workforce 
Compact — A prototype macroeconomic 
model of the European Community 
in the world economy 
Commission report to the Council and to Parliament 
on the borrowing and lending activities of 
the Community in 1985 
Annual Economic Review 1986-87 
Annual Economic Report 1986-87 
The determinants of investment 
Estimation and simulation of international trade linkages 
in the Quest model 
Commission report to the Council and to Parliament on 
the borrowing and lending activities of the Community in 
1986 
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48, September 1991 
The economic outlook for 1988 and budgetary policy in 
the Member States 
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Annual Economic Report 1987-88 
The economics of 1992 
Creation of a European financial area 
Commission report to the Council and to Parliament on 
the borrowing and lending activities of thé Community in 
1987 
Annual Economic Report 1988-89 
International trade of the European Community 
Horizontal mergers and competition policy in the Euro-
pean Community 
The borrowing and lending activities of the Community 
in 1988 
Economic convergence in the Community: a greater effort 
is needed 
Annual Economic Report 1989-90 
Economic transformation in Hungary and Poland 
One market, one money 
The impact of the internal market by industrial sector: 
the challenge for the Member States 
Stabilization, liberalization and devolution 
Annual Economic Report 1990-91 
Developments on the labour market in the Community 
Quest — A macroeconomic model for the countries of the 
European Community as part of the world economy 
The economics of EMU 
The path of reform in Central and Eastern Europe 
Fair competition in the internal market: Community State 
aid policy 
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Special edition No 1/92 
51, May 1992 
52, 1993 
(In preparation) 
— Annual Economic Report 1991-92 
— The economics of limiting C02 emissions 
— The climate challenge: Economic aspects of the Com-
munity's strategy for limiting C02 emissions 
— The European Community as a world trade partner 
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Eastern Europe and the USSR 
THE CHALLENGE OF FREEDOM 
GILES MERRITT 
The sparks of unrest 
that leapt from Berlin in 
November 1989 to 
Moscow's Red Square 
in August 1991 are 
firing an explosion of 
political and economic 
change. Out of the 
ashes of Communism is 
emerging the shape of 
a vast new European 
market-place stretching 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
In his fascinating account of 
Europe's fast-changing East-West 
relationships, Giles Merritt argues 
that a massive rescue operation must 
be mounted to ensure the success of 
these changes. The upheaval of Com-
munism's collapse is 'The challenge 
of freedom'. 
Written with the cooperation and 
support of the European Commis-
sion, this book sets out to identify the 
key policy areas where a new part-
nership is being forged between the 
countries of Eastern and Western 
Europe. It offers a privileged insight 
into the current thinking of European 
Community officials, poli-
ticians and industrial 
leaders, and analyses 
the factors that will 
determine whether the 
emerging market econ-
omies of Eastern Europe 
can truly be absorbed 
into a single European 
economy. 
Immensely readable and 
often disturbing, this important book 
contains much up-to-date and hith-
erto unpublished information on 
such major East-West problem areas 
as energy, environmental control, 
immigration, trade relations, agricul-
ture and investment. It also examines 
the arguments surrounding a 'Mar-
shall Plan' for Eastern Europe that 
would emulate the famous US aid 
programme that helped relaunch the 
economies of Western Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II. 
For anyone concerned about the 
future of Eastern Europe and the 
USSR, whether from a political, 
social or economic standpoint, this 
book is essential reading. 
256 pp. — Price: ECU 14.30 (excluding VAT) 
CM-71-91-655-EN-C 
Bulletin 
of the European 
Communities 
The Bulletin of the European Communities, which is issued 10 times a 
year (monthly, except for the January/February and July/August 
double issues), is an official reference publication covering all spheres 
of Community activity. 
It is compact, easy to consult (with an index and copious references to 
the Official Journal and to previous issues), logically structured (to 
reflect the main fields of Community policy) and wholly reliable. The 
Bulletin is an essential reference tool, describing the passage of Com­
munity legislation through all its stages from presentation of a pro­
posal by the Commission to final enactment by the Council. 
Thanks to its topical commentaries on the month's major events, it 
provides the student of European integration and other interested 
readers with up-to-date and accurate information about the most re­
cent developments in Community policy — the creation of a single 
market, economic and social integration, the Community's role in 
international affairs, etc. 
Supplements to the Bulletin are published from time to time, contain­
ing important background material on significant issues of the day. 
Recent Supplements have covered German unification, the Commis­
sion's programme for 1992 and European industrial policy for the 
1990s. 
The Bulletin and its Supplements are produced by the Secretariat-
General of the Commission, 200 rue de la Loi, Β-1049 Brussels, in the 
nine official languages of the Community, and can be ordered from the 
Community sales agents. 
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INF092 
The Community database focusing on the objectives and the 
social dimension of the single market 
As a practical guide to the single market, INF092 contains vital infor-
mation for all those determined to be ready for 1992. 
INF092 is really a simple market scoreboard, recording the state of play 
on the stage-by-stage progress of Commission proposals up to their 
adoption by the Council, summarizing each notable development and 
placing it in context, and keeping track of the transposition of directives 
into Member States' national legislation. 
Using INF092 is simplicity itself. It can be consulted on-screen by means 
of a wide range of everyday equipment connected to specialized data-relay 
networks. Fast transmission, the virtually instant updating facility (several 
times a day, if necessary) and dialogue procedures requiring no prior 
training make INF092 ideal for the general public as well as for business 
circles and the professions. 
The system offers easy access to information thanks to the choice of 
menus available and to the logical presentation modelled on the structure 
of the White Paper, the Social Charter and the decision-making process 
within the institutions. 
Enquiries may also be made to the Commission Offices in the Member 
States or - for small businesses - the Euro-Info Centres now open in all 
regions of the Community. 
Eurobases Helpdesk [ Tel.: (32-2)295 00 03 
Fax: (32-2)296 06 24 
Official Journal of the European Communities 
DIRECTORY 
OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION IN FORCE 
and other acts of the Community institutions 
The Community's legal system is of direct concern to the 
individual citizen as much as to the Member States themselves. 
Both lawyers and non-lawyers, then, need to be familiar not just 
with national law, but also with Community legislation, which 
is implemented, applied or interpreted by national law and in 
some cases takes precedence over it. 
To make Community legislation more accessible to the public, 
the Commission of the European Communities 
publishes a Directory, updated twice a year, 
covering: Official Journal 
ol the European Commun 
- binding instruments of secondary legislation 
arising out of the Treaties establishing the three 
Communities (regulations, decisions, directives, 
etc.); 
- other legislation (internal agreements, etc.); 
- agreements between the Communities and non-
member countries. 
Each entry in the Directory gives the number and 
title of the instrument, together with a reference to 
the Official Journal in which it is to be found. Any 
amending instruments are also indicated, with the 
appropriate references in each case. 
The legislation is classified by subject matter. 
Instruments classifiable in more than one subject 
area appear under each of the headings concerned. 
DIRECTORY 
OF COMMUNITY 
LEGISLATION IN FORCE 
and other acts 
of the Community institutions 
The Directory proper (Vol. I) is accompanied by 
two indexes (Vol. II), one chronological by 
document number and the other alphabetical by keyword. 
The Directory is available in the nine official languages of the 
Community. 
1 064 pp. - ECU 83 
ISBN 92-77-77093-7 (Volume I) 
ISBN 92-77-77094-5 (Volume II) 
ISBN 92-77-77095-3 (Volume I and II) 
FX-86-91-001-EN-C 
FX-86-91-002-EN-C 
EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY 
European Economy appears four times a 
year, in March, May, July and November. 
It contains important reports and com­
munications from the Commission to the 
Council and to Parliament on the 
economic situation and developments, as 
well as on the borrowing and lending 
activities of the Community. In addition, 
European Economy presents reports and 
studies on problems concerning economic 
policy. 
Two supplements accompany the main 
periodical: 
- Series A - 'Economic trends' appears 
monthly except in August and describes 
with the aid of tables and graphs the 
most recent trends of industrial pro­
duction, consumer prices, unemploy­
ment, the balance of trade, exchange 
rates, and other indicators. This supple­
ment also presents the Commission 
staffs macroeconomic forecasts and 
Commission communications to the 
Council on economic policy. 
- Series Β - 'Business and consumer 
survey results' gives the main results of 
opinion surveys of industrial chief 
executives (orders, stocks, production 
outlook, etc.) and of consumers (econ­
omic and financial situation and 
outlook, etc.) in the Community, and 
other business cycle indicators. It also 
appears monthly, with the exception of 
August. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are 
published under the responsibility of the 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the Commission of the 
European Communities, 200 rue de la Loi, 
Β-1049 Brussels, to which enquiries other 
than those related to sales and sub­
scriptions should be addressed. 
Subscription terms are shown on the back 
cover and the addresses of the sales offices 
are shown on the third page of the cover. 
Success in business 
depends on the decisions you make ... 
which depend on the information you receive 
Make sure that your decisions are based on information that is 
accurate and complete! 
In a period of rapid adjustment, with national economies merging 
into a single European economy under the impetus of 1992, reliable 
information on the performance of specialized industry sectors is 
essential to suppliers, customers, bankers and policymakers. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, need easy access 
to information. 
The market must be defined, measured and recorded. Information 
is needed on production capacities, bottlenecks, future develop-
ments, etc. 
Panorama of EC industry 1991-1992 
Current situation and outlook for 180 sectors 
of manufacturing and service industries 
in the European Community 
1 400 pp.* ECU 110 * ISBN 92-826-3103-6 * CO-60-90-321-EN-C 
SOCIAL 
EUROPE 
Social Europe, published by the Commission of the 
European Communities, Directorate-General for 
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs 
(DG V), Coordination and Information Policy Unit, 
deals with current social affairs in Europe. 
The basic review appears three times a year. In 
addition, a number of supplements/files are published 
annually, each dealing in depth with a given subject. 
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OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
2, rue Mercier — L-2985 Luxembourg [Tel. (352) 499 28-1] 
ENERGY 
A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD 
Since it first appeared in 1985 Energy in Europe has become recognized as an 
invaluable source of information on both the policy-making and the operational 
aspects of European Community energy policy. Subscribers include leaders of 
energy-consuming and energy-producing industries and other decision-makers in 
the private and public sectors, as well as major consultancies and research institutes 
in and outside the Community. 
In the present situation within the Community, itself at the eve of the single market, 
and vis-à-vis the huge energy problems, as well as the potential, of our neighbours 
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
the energy sector is of the greatest strategic importance. An understanding of it is 
indispensable in many areas of economic activity. It also constitutes a crucial factor 
within a debate of truly global importance, namely the protection of the environ-
ment, including the global warming issue. 
Energy in Europe continues to keep its readers abreast of the ongoing situation as 
regards overall policy, markets, energy planning, and the constant quest for cleaner 
and more efficient energy technology. 
Market trends and perspectives are covered in two regular issues each year, and also 
in a Short-term energy outlook appearing in the first half of the year and an Annual 
energy review at the end of the year which includes the world energy situation by 
region including EC Member States, the short-term energy outlook for the 
Community, and a review of trends in main indicators over 10 years. Further 
Special Issues are also produced in connection with major developments or events, 
including international conferences on or relevant to the energy sector. 
Energy in Europe appears in English but each issue also contains translations into 
French, German or Spanish of articles from the preceding issue. 
Also available: 
Treaty on European Union 
253 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92­824­0959­7 * RX­73­92­796­EN­C — 1992 
Conradh ar an Aontas Eorpach 
253 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92­824­0964­3 * RX­73­92­796­GA­C — 1992 
National implementing measures to give effect to the White Paper 
of the Commission on the completion of the internal market 
Situation at 31 October 1992 
448 pp. * ECU 47 * ISBN 92­826­4973­3 * CM­76­92­875­EN­C — 1992 
Reports of Commission Decisions relating to competition ­ 1989/1990 
247 pp. * ECU 12 * ISBN 92­826­3868­5 * CV­73­92­772­EN­C — 1992 
Harmonization of company law in the European Community ­
Measures adopted and proposed ­ Situation as at 1 March 1992 
518 pp. * ECU 54 * ISBN 92­826­4314­X * C1­74­92­831­EN­C — 1992 
Green Paper on the development of the single market for postal 
services (Communication from the Commission) ­ COM(91) 476 final 
371 pp. * ISBN 92­77­45007­X * CB­CO­92­263­EN­C — 1992 
Farm take­over and farm entrance within the EEC 
148 pp. » ECU 15 ♦ ISBN 92­826­3667­4 * CM­73­91­376­EN­C — 1992 
Copyright and information limits to the protection of literary and 
pseudo­literary works in the Member States of the EC 
262 pp. * ECU 27 * ISBN 92­826­3666­6 * CM­75­92­049­EN­C — 1992 
Social security for persons moving within the Community ­
Social Europe 3/92 
154 pp. * ECU 19 * ISSN 0255­0776 * CE­AA­92­003­EN­C — 1992 
Urban social development ­ Social Europe - Supplement 1/92 
125 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92­826­4013­2 * CE­NC­92­OOl­EN­C — 1992 
Enterprise and people aspects in the information technology sector 
to the year 2000 ­ Social Europe - Supplement 2/92 
111 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92­826­4537­1 * CE­NC­92­002­EN­C — 1992 
Towards a Europe of solidarity: housing ­ Social Europe - Supplement 3/92 
142 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92­826­4567­3 * CE­NC­92­003­EN­C — 1992 
The regulation of working conditions in the Member States of the 
European Community ­ Volume 1 ­ Social Europe - Supplement 4/92 
114 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92­826­4996­2 * CE­NC­92­004­EN­C — 1992 
EUR 14197 ­ Evaluation of economic effects: relevance and impacts 
of EC programmes promoting industrial R&D with special emphasis 
on small and medium­sized enterprises (pilot methodological study) 
K. HORNSCHILD, F. MEYER­KRAHMER 
129 pp. * ECU 13.50 * ISBN 92­826­3817­0 * CD­NA­14197­EN­C — 1992 
EUR 14198 ­ Evaluation of the impact of European Community 
research programmes upon the competitiveness of European industry ­
concepts and approaches 
J.S. METCALFE, L. GEORGHIOU, P. CUNNINGHAM, H.M. CAMERON 
44 pp. * ECU 6.00 * ISBN 92­826­3818­9 * CD­NA­14198­EN­C — 1992 
Employment in Europe ­ 1992 
206 pp. * ECU 11.25 * ISBN 92­826­4559­2 » CE­75­92­106­EN­C — 1992 
Focus on the East ­ Energy in Europe 
157 pp. ♦ ECU 19 * ISSN 1017­6705 * CS­BI­92­001­4H­C — 1992 
A view to the future ­ Energy in Europe 
176 pp. * ECU 19 * ISBN 92­826­3665­8 * CS­75­92­841­EN­C — 1992 
The finances of Europe, Daniel STRASSER 
439 pp. * ECU 18.50 * ISBN 92­826­2306­8 * CM­60­90­280­EN­C — 1992 
XXIst Report on Competition Policy ­ 1991 
446 pp. * ECU 29 * ISBN 92­826­3850­2 * CM­73­92­247­EN­C — 1992 
Europe in figures ­ Third edition 
256 pp. * ECU 16.50 * ISBN 92­826­3371­1 * CA­70­91­895­EN­C — 1992 
Inventory of taxes levied in the Member States of the European 
Communities ­ 14th edition 
726 pp. * ECU 80 * ISBN 92­826­0417­9 * CM­59­90­855­EN­C — 1992 
A common market for services ­ Banking · Insurance · Transactions in 
securities · Transport services · New technologies and services · Capital 
movements · Free movement of labour and the professions 
(Completing the internal market ­ Volume 1) 
169 pp. * ECU 17 * ISBN 92­826­3566­X * CO­62­91­001­EN­C — 1992 
The elimination of frontier controls ­ Control of goods · Control 
of individuals · Value-added tax · Excise duties 
(Completing the internal market ­ Volume 2) 
88 pp. » ECU 17 * ISBN 92­826­3573­2 » CO­62­91­002­EN­C — 1992 
Conditions for business cooperation ­ Company law · Intellectual 
property · Company taxation - Public procurement 
(Completing the internal market ­ Volume 3) 
86 pp. » ECU 17 » ISBN 92­826­3583­X * CO­62­91­003­EN­C — 1992 
Community social policy — Labour market · Employment and pay · 
Improved living and working conditions · Free movement of workers · Social 
protection · Freedom of association and collective bargaining · Information, 
consultation and participation of employees · Equal treatment for men and 
women · Vocational training · Health and safety at work · Rights and. 
protection of children and adolescents · The elderly · The disabled 
(Completing the internal market ­ Volume 6) 
308 pp. * ECU 34 * ISBN 92­826­3609­7 * CO­62­91­006­EN­C — 1992 
The current situation, evolution and future prospects 
for agriculture in Yugoslavia 
128 pp. * ECU 12 * ISBN 92­826­3485­X * CM­72­91­899­EN­C — 1992 
A practical guide to cross­border cooperation 
112 pp. * ECU 10 ♦ ISBN 92­826­3143­5 * CT­70­91­992­EN­C — 1992 
1992: a pivotal year (address by Jacques Delors, President of the 
Commission, to the European Parliament) ­ From the Single Act to 
Maastricht and beyond: the means to match our ambitions ­ The 
Commission's programme for 1992 ­ Supplement 1/92 - Bull. EC 
45 pp. * ECU 5 * ISBN 92­826­3841­3 * CM­NF­92­OOl­EN­C — 1992 
Research after Maastricht: an assessment, a strategy ­
Supplement 2/92 - Bull. EC 
49 pp. · ECU 5 » ISBN 92­826­4307­7 » CM­NF­92­002­EN­C — 1992 
Europe and the challenge of enlargement - Supplement 3/92 - Bull. EC 
24 pp. * ECU 5 * ISBN 92-826-4524-X * CM-NF-92-003-EN-C — 1992 
The creation of the internal market in insurance, BUI POOL 
126 pp. * ECU 10.50 * ISBN 92-826-0246-X * CB-58-90-336-EN-C — 1992 
European Economy - No 44 - One market, one money -
An evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of forming an 
economic and monetary union 
351 pp. * ECU 18 * ISSN 0379-0991 * CB-AR-90-044-EN-C — 1992 
European Economy - The economics of EMU - Background studies 
for European Economy No 44 'One market, One money' 
Special edition No 1 - 1991 
248 pp. * ECU 18 * ISBN 92-826-1996-6 * CM-60-90-208-EN-C — 1992 
European Economy - No 51 - The climate challenge - Economic 
aspects of the Community's strategy for limiting C0 2 emissions 
253 pp. * ECU 23.50 * ISSN 0379-0991 * CM-AR-92-051-EN-C — 1992 
Practical guide to legal aspects of industrial subcontracting within the 
European Community - Volume I - The subcontract 
118 pp. * ECU 11.25 * ISBN 92-825-9593-5 * CB-27-89-001-EN-C — 1992 
Practical guide to legal aspects of industrial subcontracting in the 
European Community - Volume II - The legal framework of 
subcontracting in the twelve Member States 
70 pp. * ECU 9 * ISBN 92-826-4651-3 * CB-27-89-002-EN-C — 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume I - The rules governing medicinal products for human use in 
the European Community - Revised edition / September 1991 
228 pp. * ECU 20 * ISBN 92-826-3166-4 * CO-71-91-631-EN-C — 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume II - Notice to applicants for marketing authorizations for 
medicinal products for human use in the Member States of the 
European Community 
186 pp. * ECU 16.50 * ISBN 92-825-9503-X * CB-55-89-293-EN-C — 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume III - Addendum No 2 - May 1992 - Guidelines on the quality, 
safety and efficacy of medicinal products for human use 
206 pp. * ECU 23 * ISBN 92-826-4550-9 * CO-75-92-558-EN-C — 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume IV - Good manufacturing practice for medicinal products 
177 pp. * ECU 19.50 * ISBN 92-826-3180-X * CO-71-91-760-EN-C — 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume V - Veterinary medicinal products 
158 pp. * ECU 14.25 * ISBN 92-825-9643-5 * CB-55-89-972-EN-C — 1992 
The rules governing medicinal products in the European Community -
Volume VI - Establishment by the European Community of maximum 
residue limits (MRLs) for residues of veterinary medicinal products in 
foodstuffs of animal origin 
127 pp. * ECU 13.50 * ISBN 92-826-3173-7 * CO-71-91-768-EN-C — 1992 
Credit Institutions - Community measures adopted or proposed -
Situation as at August 1992 
356 pp. * ECU 37 * ISBN 92-826-4842-7 * C1-76-92-293-EN-C — 1992 
New information technology in education - France 
110 pp. * ECU 13 * ISBN 92-826-4771-4 * CY-03-92-007-EN-C — 1992 
New information technology in education - Germany 
124 pp. * ECU 13 * ISBN 92-826-4683-1 * CY-03-92-004-EN-C — 1992 
New information technology in education - Denmark 
138 pp. * ECU 14 * ISBN 92-826-4681-5 * CY-03-92-003-EN-C — 1992 
New information technology in education - The Netherlands 
108 pp. * ECU 12 * ISBN 92-826-4779-X * CY-03-92-011-EN-C — 1992 
New information technology in education - Luxembourg 
122 pp. * ECU 13 * ISBN 92-826-4777-3 * CY-03-92-010-EN-C — 1992 
Removal of tax obstacles to the cross­frontier activities of companies ­ Supplement 4/91 - Bull. EC 
67 pp. * ECU 4.25 * ISBN 92­826­3025­0 * CM­NF­91­004­EN­C — 1992 
Agriculture in Europe 
97 pp. * ECU 7 * ISBN 92­826­0476­4 * CM­60­90­418­EN­C — 1992 
Telecommunications in Europe, Herbert UNGERER with the collaboration of Nicholas P. COSTELLO 
Revised edition, 1990 
257 pp. * ECU 10 * ISBN 92­826­1640­1 * CM­59­90­346­EN­C — 1992 
European Economy ­ No 35 ­ The economics of 1992 
222 pp. * ECU 16 * ISSN 0379­0991 * CB­AR­88­035­EN­C — 1992 
European Economy ­ No 40 ­ Horizontal mergers and competition policy in the European Community 
98 pp. ♦ ECU 16 » ISSN 0379­0991 » CB­AR­89­040­EN­C — 1992 
European Economy ­ No 45 ­ Stabilization, liberalization and devolution ­ Assessment of the economic situation and 
reform process in the Soviet Union 
191 pp. * ECU 18 * ISSN 0379­0991 * CB­AR­90­045­EN­C — 1992 
European Economy ­ No 50 ­ Annual Economic Report 1991­92 ­ Strengthening growth and Improving convergence 
285 pp. * ECU 20 * ISSN 0379­0991 * CM­AR­91­050­EN­C — 1992 
European Economy ­ Social Europe ­ The impact of the internal market by industrial sector: the challenge for the 
Member States ­ Special edition - 1990 
340 pp. » ECU 18 * ISBN 92­826­1818­8 » CM­59­90­887­EN­C — 1992 
Social Europe 3/91 ­ Equal opportunities for women and men 
202 pp. * ECU 18 * ISSN 0255­0776 » CE­AA­91­003­EN­C — 1992 
Guide to the reform of the Community's structural Funds 
104 pp. * ECU 11.25 » ISBN 92­826­0029­7 « CB­56­89­223­EN­C — 1992 
The rights of working women in the European Community, Eve C. LANDAU 
244 pp. * ECU 5.25 * ISBN 92­825­5341­8 * CB­43­85­741­EN­C — 1992 
European Economy ­ No 36 ­ Creation of a European financial area ­ Liberalization of capital movements 
and financial integration in the Community 
212 pp. * ECU 16 » ISSN 0379­0991 * CB­AR­88­036­EN­C — 1992 
1992: the European social dimension, Patrick VENTURINI 
119 pp. * ECU 9.75 * ISBN 92­825­8703­7 * CB­PP­88­B05­EN­C — 1992 
Research on the 'cost of non­Europe' ­ Basic findings 
Volume 1 ­ Basic studies: Executive summaries 
578 pp. * ECU 53.25 « ISBN 92­825­8605­7 « CB­PP­88­B14­EN­C — 1992 
Volume 2 ­ Studies on the economics of integration 
652 pp. * ECU 57 * ISBN 92­825­8616­2 * CB­PP­88­C14­EN­C — 1992 
Volume 3 ­ The completion of the internal market : 
A survey of European industry's perception of the likely effects 
309 pp. * ECU 25.50 * ISBN 92­825­8610­3 * CB­PP­88­D14­EN­C — 1992 
Volume 4 ­ The 'cost of non­Europe': 
Border­related controls and administrative formalities ­
An illustration in the road haulage sector 
280 pp. « ECU 22.50 · ISBN 92­825­8618­9 ♦ CB­PP­88­E14­EN­C — 1992 
Volume 5 (Parts A + B) 
The 'cost of non­Europe' in public­sector procurement 
Part A: 552 pp. * ISBN 92­825­8646­4 * CB­P1­88­F14­EN­C — 1992 
Part B: 278 pp. * ISBN 92­825­8647­2 * CB­P2­88­F14­EN­C — 1992 
Parts A + B: ECU 120 * ISBN 92­825­8648­0 
Volume 6 ­ Technical barriers in the EC: An illustration by six industries 
The 'cost of non­Europe': Some case studies on technical barriers 
242 pp. * ECU 21 * ISBN 92­825­8649­9 * CB­PP­88­G14­EN­C — 1992 
Volume 7 ­ The 'cost of non­Europe': Obstacles to transborder business activity 
154 pp. « ECU 12.75 * ISBN 92­825­8638­3 « CB­PP­88­H14­EN­C — 1992 
Volume 8 ­ The 'cost of non­Europe' for business services 
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